This operation "Ristow" was a small operation. On the whole it had the same purpose as had the previously discussed operation "Panther." Here again the tasks were to pacify the area which was infested with bands, and to take away from the bands their material, strongholds, and their personnel support. Besides from this area too surprise attacks occurred constantly on the railway line Novi Pridor. The safeguarding of the repair work along the railway line was a further purpose of this operation, as I can see from the order.
Q. I would like to point out that this purpose of the operation is mentioned also in a report of the 383rd Regiment, which was submitted under the same number. This report is dated the 5th of January 1944, and the reference to the safe-guarding oi the railway line can be found on Page 51 of the English text and Rage 62 of the German text. Will you please continue, General?
A. These were the reasons why it was necessary to evacuate the male population from these areas. These were obliged to serve the Croat State, but in areas threatened by the bands they, partly voluntarily and partly forced by the bands, joined the bands. The planned evacuation of the supplies and of the cattle is also mentioned in the document, and the reasons are given. It says here, and I quote: "In order to deprive the bands of the supply bases." It was, as a rule, not necessary to carry out and evacuation because these band strongholds were usually in such difficult terrain that it was not possible to transport anything away from these areas.
Q. General, according to the documents was it possible for you to ascertain whether this purpose of the operation "Ristow" was actually achieved?
A. The purpose wasn't quite achieved, as we can see again from this document.
The operation had to be interrupted. As a consequence, unfortunately it could not be carried out in full and, therefore, the purpose was not achieved to the extent which had been intended.
Q. General, I would like to put an additional question with regard to this question. You know that in this Courtroom there have repeatedly been discussions about the terns "occupation" and "occupation de facto?" What I mean is, was it possible for you to reach ever locality in the area if you wanted to do so? Were you in a position to clear up the mopped-up-area? Can you give us your comments about this question?
A: If I said here that the purpose was not completely achieved, the reason for this was that the operation had to be interrupted. However, by this I don't mean to say that we, had we wanted to, could not have been in a position to reach those localities which we wanted to reach. Thank God, our troops were strong enough so that as a matter of principle we could get anywhere and reach any place we wanted to reach so that one can say that the whole area was of course occupied and dominated by us. For this it isn't necessary that I put troops into every tiny hamlet or village; it is quite sufficient if I control this area and that was an absolute fact in my sector.
Q: General, after these operations on a larger scale, let's now discuss some more of the individual incidents. I would like to discuss the prosecution documents with you as far as we haven't done this already, according to the units by which they were submitted and within these units again in chronological order. We have mentioned quite a number of the divisions subordinate to you, amongst these on the occasion of the operation Panther, we mentioned the first Cossack Division which already has played a large part here. Therefore let's start with this division. My first question is: when was this first Cossack division subordinated to the 15th Corps?
A: When we talk about the first Cossack division, we have to distinguish between the two Cossack brigades. One of these brigades and the division staff were subordinated to the 15th Corps around the 5th of December for the purpose of the operation Panther because this operation started on the 7th of December. The other brigade was at a later date subordinated to the Corps, and then during the march to the area to which it was assigned it carried out an operation, the operation Brandfackel.
fackel.
Q: Then we have to distinguish, General, between these two brigades. What was the assignment of the first brigade when it first became subordinate to you?
A: The first brigade took part in the operation Panther. That is just what we discussed.
Q: And what was the further task of the brigade, General?
A: After the operation Panther was completed, this brigade was assigned for safeguarding the railway and then later, I think that was also in January, the second brigade was also used for this task, and this second brigade when it was added to the division, was committed to carry out the operation Brandfackel.
Q: From the documents, can we see, General, just about when this second brigade was added?
A: No, I don't think we can see that. I believe it was January. I wouldn't know which document would show it. I can't say that because I haven't got that very document, but I think some of the documents show it.
Q: All right then, we will determine the time factor later on when we deal with these individual documents. Can you also tell us, General, which were the operations that the second brigade was to carry out when it became subordinate to you?
A: Yes. As I have said before, this second Cossack brigade had received an order from the army to mop up the areas of Bosna and Syrbas. This was an operation which had been given the code name Napfkuchen and, subsequently, this brigade was also to act in my corps sector. The operation which took place in my corps sector was carried out under the code name Brandfackel.
Q: These facts, General, can be seen from one document of the prosecution which again we find in Document Book 15 on page 44 of the English text and page 45 of the German text. I have reference to prosecution Exhibit 369 which is NOKW-1425. In this document, on the pages 44 of the English text and 45 of the German text, we find an action report of the first Cossack division. Have you got that report in front of you, General? Or can you give us some details about the operation Brandfackel?
A: To the best of my recollection, the operation Brandfackel dealt with the following. In the Northeastern part of he corps sector, there was the Kozara area. This is a mountain area which I have just mentioned. In earlier times, this had been a training ground for troops, I believe as early as in the days of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. At this period we are concerned with now, it was a bandit area from which constantly attacks and surprise attacks took place on the railway line to Banja-Luka. However, all the time I left sufficient forces of my own to mop up this woodland area, but all the time the corps had numerous reports, also Q reports -- those are intercepted radio reports -- saying that there in these training grounds the bands had camps and depots and stores. It was further reported that large stores of hay had been accumulated in that area. For all these reasons, I have found it very suitable that the second Cossack brigade was put at my disposal. And thus, I gained the opportunity to mop up this banned area. I would like to stress here that this is an uninhabited area which was used as a training ground for troops. In this case, it was the area where the band strongholds were to be found.
Q: I have just before mentioned, General, that this action report of the first Cossack division can be found on page 44 of the English and page 45 of the Document Book 14. This report might serve as a further incrimination of your person. On page 55 of the English text and page 57 of the German text, the divisional commander mentioned that on the occasion of the operation whole areas were supposed to be destroyed. Maybe you can explain this sentence which is a little incomprehensible to me.
A: An order of mine to destroy whole areas has never been given by me. As a matter of fact, I was never in a position to do that as I have just explained now because this operation Brandfackel concerned an area which was not inhabited and which was merely a training ground. Therefore, when one talked about this operation, one could not destroy whole districts.
Q: The remark of the commander of the Cossack division has been mentioned at a previous time. Maybe you can now give your comments to this remark.
A: General von Panwitz was a very bravo officer, always ready for action, and he was well known as such, but on the other hand he also was a very ambitious officer and he was very sensitive and touchy. He was inclined to throw around with high-sounding expressions. This brigade had received from me the assignment to mop up this terrain which was mountainous and difficult to negotiate. And they took things a bit too easy by just mopping up the areas on the right and left of this district which were a little easier to reach and I reproached the divisional commander with this fact. It can also be seen that this operation did not take its course in the same way as we had expected it to do. This is shown from the document by a handwritten note saying that the result was not in accordance with the expectations.
Q: I would like to add this sentence. This handwritten remark which is mentioned by General Leyser here is contained on page 54 of the English text of Document Book 15 and on page 82 of the German test. The exhibit is 370. You can continue now, General.
A: I can only imagine now that he used as an excuse this rather high-sounding expression in order to hide the fact that he hadn't done all that was expected of him but as I have said before there has never been such a thing as the order to destroy whole districts.
Q: I have just referred to Exhibit 370. This was Document NOKW-1430 contained in Document Book 15. In this document on the pages 54 of the English and 82 of the German text, we have the final reports concerning the operation Brandfackel which we have already mentioned. This report is dated the 22nd of January, 1944. On page 1 of this document it is mentioned that one hospital with 100 beds and two small ammunition depots were destroyed. The destruction of this hospital is one of the reports which has been submitted by the prosecution on several occasions. Besides being contained in this document which I have mentioned now, it is again shown in the same document on page 53 of the German Document Book and page 56 of the English Document book. There we find it in the daily report of the 15th Mountain Corps dated the 13th of January, 1944. The destruction of this hospital we find again this time in a different document book, namely in Document Book 16. There we find it in Exhibit 395. Here we have a War Diary entry of the 15th Corps, dated the 21st of January, 1944. This is on page 99 of the English text and page 144 of the German text.
This entry again has as its subject the destruction of the hospital. Therefore, it has been mentioned in three different places. After having explained this, General, will you give us your comments on the actual facts concerning this destruction of the hospital?
A: Basically, I have the following to say to the subject. In the areas in Croatia where the band fighting took place, we had for the most part uninhabited areas. These woodlands were -- there were hardly any settlements as we think of them in the mid European sense of the word.
The bands had their strongholds and their depots. There were also the munition depots and the stores of the bands and besides there were also a few barracks which had buncks in them. This was about all which you could find in band strongholds of this kind. The significance of these barracks was at the best that wounded were received there before other people were. In actual fact, these barracks were used by the bands as quarters. Now, we intended to deprive them of these accommodations and to make it more difficult for them to hide in this territory and that was partly the purpose of these anti band actions which we had to carry out down there and, therefore, a tactical necessity. Besides, there was the danger of infection because these huts and barracks were full of lice, as has been previously mentioned by General Rendulic. There was not only the danger of infection of the troops but also a danger for the civilian population, and in fact has been confirmed by a document of the army doctor of the army at that time.
Q I believe this is more or less clarified, this particular question, and I would now like to ask you what was the assignment of the Cossack division other than these band operations?
A The main assignment of the Cossack Division was the safeguarding of the railway line and from the localities where they were stationed they carried out their smaller or medium-sized operations for the safeguarding of the railway line.
Q May I ask you additionally here which were the railway lines mainly in the area of this division?
A The division was mainly concerned with the railway line to Zagreb and to Karlovac. The other railway line which was in my corps sector belonged to the sector of the 373rd Division.
Q We will deal with that one later. When we are talking about the safeguarding of the railway line by the first Cossack division, I would like to show you another document, General, and this is already contained in Document Book 14. Here on page 43 of the English text and page 26 of the German text, we have an entry which is rather important here.
This entry is contained in prosecution Exhibit 340 which is Document NOKW-509. The document which I have reference to is an inquiry of the corps headquarters of the 69th Reserve Corps, dated the 25th of November, 1943, and addressed to the 15th Mountain Corps.
The 69th Corps states here that the constantly repeated attacks on the railroad line Zagreb-Karlovac seemed to make it desirable to evacuate all villages close to the line and if necessary to destroy them in so far as these villages cannot be garrisoned with railroad security troops and in particular with the first Cossack division. Further, the 69th Corps asked for information as to the intentions in this respect. Can you remember this affair, General? And mainly can you remember what was the answer given to the 15th Corps to this inquiry?
A I cannot remember this inquiry in detail. All I can say is that in my area, no villages were destroyed unless it was necessary for military and tactical reasons.
Q Will you for the time being remain with the question of the securing of railroad lines by the Cossacks? I believe there is also a daily report of the 13th of January, 1944, which refers to this sphere. This report is contained in Document Book 15 on page 56 of the English text and 83 of the German text. This is Exhibit 370 and it says here in the daily report of the 13th of January, 1944, under the first Cossack division, "area 18 kilometers south of Zagreb, village taken after firing of shots, band suspects arrested." Can you give us your comments to this sentence?
A This undoubtedly is an operation with the intent to secure the railroad line. The division had undoubtedly ascertained that from this village frequently surprise attacks and dynamitings of the railroad line had been carried out and that possibly a band was quartered in that village. Then this division would have attacked the village and after brief fighting it would have conquered the village and since the bands were not uniformed, all those people who in some way were suspected were arrested first of all. It was not possible to do it in a different way because the bands didn't wear any uniforms.
Then the people were examined and if nothing could be proved against them they were dismissed.
Q Where the activity of the first Cossack division is concerned, another few incidents have been submitted and we will have to deal with them. The first of these is a daily report by the first Cossack division addressed to the 15th Mountain Corps, dated the 18th of December, 1943. This report is also contained in Document Book 15 on page 4 of the English text and page 3 of the German text.
This is Exhibit 364 which is Document NOKW-1136. This daily report from the 8th of December, 1942, reads, and I quote: "Railroad which had been blown up had been repaired near Point 101." Can you give us your comments on this incident, General?
A May I see the document, please?
Q As I said, General, this is the report of the 15th Cossack division to the Mountain Corps and dated the 8th of September, 1943.
A This whole incident can be reconstructed from the very same document on page 4, because here the division reports on the 7th of December, 1942, and I quote: "12 kilometers Northwest of Sisak, empty train struck mine on water bridge near Point 101. Bridge destroyed." And it is further announced here that on the 8th of December, reprisal measures were to be carried out. These reprisal measures by which I mean the arrest of the 36 hostages are then again contained in the daily report of the 8th of December, which is the one which you have just read out to me. As is shown by a number of documents, this blasting of bridges and interruptions of railroad lines in this district were affected by the reprisal measures. That was the reason why this operation Panther was carried out. The division had in several instances warned the population and had pointed out to them that if these sabotage acts were not to stop in that area, then some time steps would be taken and hostages would be arrested, and I would assure that is the reason why the Cossack Division apprehended these 36 hostages.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Q. General, before the recess we discussed the blowing up of the railway line near Point 101 on the 7th of December, and the reprisal measures carried out on the 8th December, namely the seizure of 36 hostages; before continuing I would like to call the Tribunal's attention to the following: this incident has been submitted by the prosecution in a number of documents, which I will give to the court. The blowing up of the bridge on 7 December is mentioned in the Daily Report of the 15th Corps on the 8th December, and as such has been submitted, Exhibit 367, page 17, Document Book 15, in its English version, and also on page 17, of the same Document Book 15, and in that daily report, the one of the 7th December, the reprisal measures are announced. The same incident is once again contained in the daily report of 9 December to the 2nd Panzer Army. That report is contained in the same exhibit on page 19 of the English Book and page 18 of the German book. In order to add further complications this daily report by the corps to the Army does not turn up only in this document. It crops up again in Prosecution Exhibit 365, NOKW 1339, also in Document Book 15, on page 8 of the English and German. In other words, this report is contained in no less than four different exhibit numbers, and these four different exhibit numbers contain the report twice or three times in some cases.
Now, to go General, to the next incident. I now have reference to Document Book 15. At this time it is Exhibit 370, which is of interest. The incident I mean is described on page 57 of the English Book, German page 84. It is a daily report by the Corps of yhd 27 January 1944. Here the First Cossack Division reports, and I quote: "Line Southeast of Topolje again passable, 22 hostages hanged." Would you please give us your comments on that incident, General?
A. This incident must not be regarded as an isolated case. These 22 hostages which were hanged constitute an absolute exception. They were not hanged because one railway line was blown up, but as a measure of retaliation and deterrence for countless disruptions and explosions which had occurred in this area during that period of time. It seems to me especially that these were taken from the 36 hostages whose seizure we have just discussed.
Q. This incident, namely the hanging of the 22 hostages has been offered on another occasion by the Prosecution, namely in Document Book 25, on page 45 of the English version and page 35 of the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Where did these hostages come from?
THE WITNESS: From the report we discussed before, the First Cossack Division had apprehended 36 hostages when they were combing out a certain area not very far from the railway line, and although these hostages had been arrested the acts of sabotage along the railway line did not terminate. As a means of deterring further acts we meant business on this occasion, and the 22 hostages as reported were hanged.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there any warning or statement made?
THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed. Warnings were issued to the population and statements on frequent occasions.
THE PRESIDENT: Were they in this case?
THE WITNESS: Yes, also in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything in the record to show it, anything in these documents to show it?
THE WITNESS: It is contained in several documents that on frequent occasions proclamations of this sort and threats were made by the Division to the population.
THE PRESIDENT: What I am getting at is, before a hanging of hostages was there some statement made to the immediate community that such hangings would occur, and can you show that as to every particular hanging or at least some of them, or incidents of hanging?
THE WITNESS: I believe I said this morning that this reprisal measure had to be carried out by the Commander of the Division by agreement with the Croatian representatives of the Croatian Government. I imagine that the incident here occurred in the following manner, and I shall show later on that in the course of this period of time no less than 23 incidents of blowing up railway lines occurred. The result of these acts must have been that the division, as I said before, repeatedly drew the population's attention to the fact that they must discontinue these things. The first measures taken by the division, as becomes clear from our document here, was the arrest first of all of the 36 hostages as a deterrent measure. Although these 36 hostages were arrested it becomes equally clear from the documents that these acts of sabotage continued. Thereupon the division, which had the order to protect this vital railway line for supplies, felt itself compelled to show the population for once that they meant business, and then in connection with the Croatian representative, as the order demanded, carried out this reprisal measure as a means of deterring people from committing these acts of sabotage.
Q. General, before his Honor put this question to you, you said that this incident must not be regarded out of context. May I point out here that the prosecution have used this same incident with the same date in another exhibit. This is contained in Document Book 25. It is an entry contained on page 45 of the English version and page 35 of the German. The exhibit number is 567. This is a daily report by the 15th Mountain Army. It is a daily report by 1c dated 27 January 1944. The Prosecution have only selected one sentence for their document book, which is contained on page 45, as I said before.
The sentence reads as follows: "As railway lines were blown up northwest of Sisak, 22 hostages were hanged on the site of the blasting on 25 January." From the photostat copy which the prosecution have submitted I have included further passages from this document in my own document book. This is Leyser Document 36, contained in Document Book 2, page 107. May I offer it as Leyser Document 27.
General, let me hand you the photostatic copy of this document and I want you to give us your comments on this document on the basis of the entire report.
A. This daily report by 1-C is interesting for a number reasons. May I quote briefly first under 2-A in this report. There it states that a mineblock was removed northwest of Vrlika and in the same paragraph it says on the road from Sinje to Vrlika and Knin one bridge head has been blown up.
Q. May I as the interpreter whether they have found the document?
THE INTERPRETER: No.
BY MR. TIPP:
Q. I beg your pardon, I just see that this part is not contained in the document book. Perhaps, General, you will be kind enough to read these passages verbatim from the photosatic copy for the record?
A. To repeat: "The road from Sinje to Vrlika and Knin, one bridge was blown up, twenty roads blocked with stones and 25 explosions." In other words 46 acts of sabotage along one single road and in no case of these acts is a single reprisal measure mentioned here.
Then we also have on the same page under Western Croatia......
Q. May I interrupt here, this remark is contained in the document book.
A. Western Croatia is the area of the 1st Cossack division. To quote: "On January, 24th, 5 kilometers south-east of Bihac plundering through strong bands."
To leave out one line and continue:
"10 kilometers south-west of Bosnia Novi a small demolition squad of the partisans chased away, 1 winch and 98 blasting cartridges captured."
"23 points along the line 7 - 15 kilometers east of Bosni Novi were blown up; probably in connection with the crossing of the San by the 11th Brigade."
Q. May I interrupt you briefly and point out here that in the photostatic copy there is another entry, with regard to the point I was discussing with General von Leyser, just now, that is the note that 22 hostages have been hanged; is that correct, General?
A. Yes quite.
Q. Would you then please continue, General?
A. All these acts of sabotage mentioned in Croatia, and the surprise attacks, occurred in other words in the area for which the first Cossack division was responsible. It is therefore absolutely certain that the division had threatened to take strong measures if there would be continued attacks. In a document which we have previously mentioned, mention was made that hostages had been apprehended beforehand. If therefore the divisional commander by arrangement with the representative of the Croatian government decided under these circumstances to take strong action in the case of repeated attacks, namely to carry out the reprisal measures which he so often threatened, nothing can be objected to there under the prevailing conditions as I see them, and in view of the large numbers of attacks it seems to me the number of people executed can be answered for.
THE PRESIDENT: May I make the inquiry as to why the guard is taking that paper away from the young lady?
THE GUARD: She is not supposed to write in here.
THE PRESIDENT: Whose orders?
THE GUARD: The sergeant of the guard, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any reason why she cannot take some notes on this trial if she cares to?
THE GUARD: Those are my orders, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You are supposed to carry out your orders and I am not taking you to task. I wish you would have the sergeant see me.
I am not taking you to task, you are doing your duty but let me see the sergeant later please.
THE GUARD: All right, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY MR. TIPP:
Q. General, had you finished?
A. Yes, thank you.
Q. Now, General, let me ask you one question about this incident. We have had a general discussion about this case, but in this special interest, did you hear about this reprisal measure before it was carried out?
A. No, not before it was carried out. I only heard about it when the division reported the incident.
Q. And now the question might be of interest to you General, could you find out in your perusal of these documents how many reprisal measures concerning human beings were carried out by the first Cossack Division as long as this division was under your orders?
A. From my perusal of the documents here, the only case in my area where human lives were taken as a reprisal measure, is this case of the Cossack division.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, this applies to the whole of the 15th Corps?
A. Yes, it does indeed.
Q. Well, General, let us leave the 1st Cossack Division; can you tell us when that unit left your area?
A. That becomes clear from an entry in the war diary. May I have that document? I believe it was on the 3rd of March.
Q. Just a moment, General, if the Tribunal please, in order to make various incidents quite clear in the case where we don't have sufficient documentary proof, I have included some of the war diary of the 15th Corps from among the documents we received from Washington.
It is contained in Leyser document Book 2, Document 28 on page 82. It is offered as Leyser exhibit 28. May I draw attention to the fact that here for once we have the same figure for document and exhibit. It might be important to refer to this because in the future course of the examination I shall repeatedly make reference to this document in order to clear up certain problems. May I hand you this document, General, then perhaps you can tell the Court when the 1st Cossack division left your area and how that can been seen?
A. The diary shows and I quote......
Q. Will you tell us where you quote from, the date, etc.?
A. It is the entry of 3 March 1944.
Q. It is on page 84 of the Leyser document book:
A. I quote: "By order of Special Panzer Army Headquarters, Ia (Enclosure 627/44 top secret), the 1st Cossacks Division and the 1st mountain Division are placed under the command of LXIX Army Corps. Transfer of command 9 March. Transfer of the current affairs by 12 hours 10 March 1944.
May I add to this perhaps that when the Cossacks Division was handed over, the corps area, that is to say the railway line ZagrebSisak was also taken away from the corps.