The case mentioned in the document must according to the name of the village concern a mopping-up operation of this kind, where the Battalion captured a depot of captured goods held by the bandits. It is shown by this fact that the area concerned was a typical bandit area, situated in a northerly direction from the convoy traffic artery, from where the convoys were continuously attacked. In the mapping-up operations these forces had considerable casualties of their own as shown by the document itself. To me it is a well known general fact learned in the fighting against bandits, that these units were customarily attacked within the village when on these mopping-up operations. If in Document NOKW-1331 mention is made of the razing to the ground of villages partial to bandits, then this is due to the fact, that also in these villages mentioned attacks by bandits took place while the search of the village was in progress or after the depots had been ascertained. In many cases it turned out that while the units marched in, the village a neared peaceful and the population looked cheerful, women and children welcomed the soldiers while no men were to be seen around. As soon as the soldiers started to search the houses, found hidden bandits or depots women and children vanished and shooting started from all houses. During the battle which then ensued the easily inflammable houses of the village, usually consisting of only a few huts, were affected.
4. Many of the villages were destroyed in the wars for religious and national beliefs as in Croatia everyone fought against anyone. I experienced it so myself in the operation Livno that they plundered and murdered behind the fighting soldiers who had just reached the far side of the village. This was reported to me and I drove over there right away to ascertain whether this had been done by our soldiers. But I had to convince myself that a Cetnik detachment whose presence had been unknown to me, had appeared and in the rear of the troops invaded the village whose inhabitants were predominantly of the Moslem faith. With some quickly assembled groups I arrested this Cetnik detachment and kept them for the time being under guard.
On the second day following I turned them over to the division. This act of the Cetniks against the Mussulmans of Livno was an outcome of the cruelly carried out wars for religious and national beliefs just mentioned.
5. In regards to the question of cooperation with the native organization, especially Ustaschas and Cetniks, I can make the following statement: The forces of the Ustaschas had their own Commanders from whom they received their basic orders. I took them on principle, under my tactical command if they were stationed within the area of my Regiment, but time and again I had the experience that they had vanished a few days later without notice of departure. There has never been any fixed attachment of army-units and thereby a fixed subordination. There was no possibility of carrying out disciplinary measures against the Ustascha or its Commanders. In cases of this kind, whenever we considered intervention necessary, it was only possible to report the matter concerned to higher quarters so that through the Croatian Liaison-Officer in charge, measures could be suggested to the Ustascha Command. Of course I have never witnessed a success, but this might have been due to the fact that the Ustascha - units retired as soon as they noticed that something was to be planned against them.
"The Cetnik United were self-defense formations in the areas with Serb population which, as far as I know, were not centrally commanded. These formations joined the German troops, when a German unit operated in their locality, or fixed up permanent quarters there, without formally subordinating themselves. They accepted orders from the German commands and executed them, as far as security and reconnaissance operations were concerned. Naturally, the connection was rather loose; they also frequently operated on their own bat, and the commanders were unable to influence them in any way. Of course, it was not possible to punish these formations or their leaders.
"Although these Ustascha and Cetnik formations were not subordinated militarily, this fact was, however, reported to the division. When the army learned about any crimes committed by these formations, which they had done on their own bat, and which, according to our opinion, was unjustifiable, this was reported in the prescribed manner, in order, as mentioned before, to enable the high commands to give the necessary orders in this connection." ....
In paragraph 6 the affiant deals with General von Leyser's character and says -- this is the last sentence on the same page , "He was extremely anxious to bring to an end the national and religious fights by reducing the existing differences, to pacify the area and solidify and promote the confidence of the population in the German Wehrmacht.
On the other hand, he demanded of his soldiers the necessary firmness to save his troops any further losses. For instance, he was of the opinion that reprisal measures should only be employed as a last recourse, when military necessities made this imperative. Above all, the reprisal measures and the incident precipitating them had to be within reasonable proportions. I personally did not know that an order for proportionate reprisal shootings existed at all. General von Leyser did not mention this order to me either, and was not interested in executing such an order. His guiding principles were the security of the armed forces." ....
In the next paragraph the affiant describes welfare measures taken by General von Leyser for his troops and what he insisted that his commanders would do. I read the last paragraph:
"General von Leyser was also interested in the welfare of the population as far as this was possible. He repeatedly mentioned that by necessity the war also imposed hardships upon the population; that, on the other hand, however, it was the task of a responsible commander to alleviate them, within his powers. For instance, he issued an order expressly prohibiting that artillery or air force units should attack villages and towns, or destroy them, unless there was particularly serious and stubborn enemy resistance in them."
This brings me to the end of my documents in this connection and I should like to continue with my examination of the general.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. When you described the fighting done by the 114th Division, that on its march to Italy they were to carry out mopping up operations. One of the operations where the 114th Light Infantry Division took part was Operation "Dreznica", where, according to an entry in the war diary, the 392nd Division was also participating. This brings me now to the service done by the 392nd Division. Let me ask you a basic question first. In what area was that division serving?
A. The 392nd Division was serving in the Right Sector of the Corps; it was in that part which, after the surrender of the Italians, was not yet occupied. That is the reason why, as mentioned before, Operation "Panther" was carried out, which was a preparatory operation for the advance of the 392nd Division to the Coast. The 392nd Division arrived, and I believe I have mentioned this before, in December 1943, and was then given the order to reach the Coast.
Q. What was the other assignment of that division, General?
A. The assignment given to the division was more or less the same as the one given to the 264th Division, to occupy the coast, mopping up on the islands, and extend the positions; and also to safeguard the area in the rear.
Q. When we discuss documents concerning that division, I should like to mention now the first operation in which this division took part, - Operation Dreshnica, which apparently was a joint operation of the 392nd Division and the 114th Division. That Operation is mentioned in the Inductment, under Count 3, paragraph 9 L. The Prosecution have said that between January 1944 and March 1945, troops of the 392nd Division, under the command of the 21st Army Corps, destroyed and plundered the villages of Dreznica, Pisac, Tuzevic and Vojvodersa.
What can you tell us about this count in the indictment?
A. The 392nd Division was at no time subordinate to the 21st Corps because the 21st Corps was not serving in Croatia but in Albania. Therefore I think the prosecution have made a mistake. The 392nd Division was under the 15th Army Corps, which is the reason why this really must be a mistake on the part of the prosecution.
Q. Perhaps I can ask you an additional question, general. It says there in this count of the indictment that these destructions had been carried out between January 1945 and March 1945. You said just now that the division was subordinate to the 15th Army Corps. May I ask you to tell the Tribunal, for the sake of clarity, when you handed over the 15th Army Corps?
A. I handed over the 15th Army Corps at the end of July 1943.
Q. That means, doesn't it, general, that that division was subordinate to you until the end of July 1943?
A. Yes, it was subordinate to me until the end of July 1944.
Q. Now, General, we have endeavored to glean facts from the prosecution documents which are at the back of the various counts in the indictment. From all the material submitted by the prosecution did you find out on what the prosecution based this particular assusation?
A. No. When I went through all these prosecution documents I found the names Pisac, Tuzevic and Vojvodersa , which , it is alleged, have been plundered by the 392 Division, at no place at all. The only think mentioned in the prosecution documents is the village of Dreznica. That, I think, was mentioned in three or four documents, but there we shall have to find out soon that this was a typical combat action. That will come later on.
Q. May I say first in what prosecution documents the term Dreznica is contained. At first it is contained in Document Book 25, in Document NOKW-1770, which is Exhibit 568, on page 47 of the English and 37 of the German. Then the name Dreznica also turns up in Document Book 25 in Exhibit 570, which is Document NOKW-1772 on page 50 of the English and 39 of the German.
And for the last time we come across the name of Dreznica in Document Book 16, in Document NOKW-1416, Exhibit 389, on page 79 of the English and 121 of the German.
General, before discussing these various documents, I would like to ask you to tell the Court briefly what the purpose of the Dreznica Operation was.
A. The area around Dreshnica, as I have said repeatedly before, was occupied by the Italians prior to tho surrender of the Italian Armed Forces. After the surrender it was, for a lengthly period of time, not occupied by German troops. But we received reports about it to the effect that in that area the bands had formed large-sized depots and dumps from Italian supplies. Tho purpose of the operation now was, as was the case with all other operations, to disperse and smash the bands and then to clear up the camps so that they would lack any support for any future actions. The documents themselves, which were mentioned just now, do not say very much about that. I think other documents should be mentioned as well here which will show how this operation Dreshnica proceeded.
Q. May I say in this connection, Your Honors, that the Prosecution have submitted a document which perhaps, if it were complete, would show us what the Dreshnica Operation was about. But unfortunately it is not complete. In Exhibit 568, which is Document NOKW-1770, contained in Document Book 25, on Page 37, there is the cover of tho operational file, concerning tho Dreshnica Operation, but unfortunately the actual contents of the file are lacking so that we can't reach any conclusions from that. I would like to ask you now, General, to take Document Book XXV and look at Exhibit No. 568. The document to which I have reference now is on Page 37. I am sorry; it's Page 47 of the English Document Book and on Page 37 of the German Document Book. Can you tell the Tribunal what that document is and what conclusions you reach from the contents.
A. The document contains two entries which, moreover, are described as notes, which becomes clear from the heading. The first note is the final report by the 392nd Division, concerning the Dreshnica Operation. Enemy dead, prisoners, deserters, and military booty are mentioned. The next note is a similar report by the 114th Division, concerning operations in this area. It has no heading or signature, as this document reveals.
Q. General, what is your explanation of these notes?
A. As I see it, it must be a compilation perhaps made by the man who kept the War Diary. There are many corrections and many things struck out; so one cannot say what is correct and what is not correct.
I think that can be done only when one looks at the second document about the Dreshnica Operation, and I think I should have a look at it first.
Q. May I then ask you, General, to look at the second report to which you had reference just now, which is contained in the same Document Book, on Page 50 of the English text and Page 39 of the German text. It is contained in Document NOKW-1772, which is Exhibit 370. This document is called the final report about the Dreshnica Operation. Can you give us your comments on that document?
A. This final report is a final compilation of the reports contained in the above mentioned notes by the 392nd and 114th Divisions. The same figures and destructions are reported in this report which I mentioned before. The purpose of the operation was, as I said before, to disperse and smash the organization of the bands. And that entailed, above all, the destruction of the depots and other supplies. In the same report there is a mention made that it was not possible to take the booty along because of difficult terrains and surprise attacks on the convoys. As the troops did not wish to occupy this area all the time, and I emphasize "wish," what they had to do in order to smash the bands effectively was to destroy the depots of the bands. What the troops were concerned with was to deprive the bands of the possibility of forming a cohesive organization.
Q. As I told you before, General, the Prosecution in the Indictment have asserted that four villages had been burned down and looted. Can you, on the basis of that document, tell us something about that, because we have no other document concerning this point?
A. As I said before, from the documents submitted here, nothing can be seen about that, with the exception, of course, of the Dreshnica Operation. About the other three villages mentioned I did not find anything as far as plundering of civilian population is concerned, as maintained by the Prosecution, I don't think that this can be maintained, especially because I don't see what this loot was supposed to have consisted of.
According to this report it consisted of 34 light machine guns, 8 heavy machine guns, 12 light mortars, 25 rifles, 24 trucks, 3 armored cars, 3 armored cars, 3 motorcycles, 1 armored reconnaissance car, 35 Italian tents, 500 heavy mines, 18,074 mm. shells, 120,000 rounds of Infantry ammunition. No looting of civilian property is mentioned at all.
Q. I shall now come to the last document, General, where the name of Dreshnica is mentioned. This is contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution. There in Exhibit 389, on Page 82 of the English text and Page 124 of the German text we find the name "Dreshnica." The document number is NOKW-1426. Dreshnica is mentioned here in the Dally Report of the XVth Army Corps of the 22nd of April 1944. In that Daily Report it says, under 392nd Division, to quote briefly: "Keulenschlag: In the course of continued mopping up of the area west Dreznica at present inconsiderable resistance by minor bands. Five enemy dead, three prisoners, 2 deserters. Booty established up to now: 30 tons of Infantry ammunition, 15 tons of Artillery ammunition, machine gun and trench mortar material, 50 cubic meters Diesel, 60 tires, 100 bags of salt, several cases of cigarettes and cigars, matches, 60 cart loads of boards." And then it reports the destruction of two barracks.
Can you tell us about this point, General?
A. Here we have again a mopping up operation in the same area. As the list of booty shows, all these things are military objectives, not those usually owned by civilians. It is quite clear here that the troops again made a thrust into this area which they wanted to occupy only temporarily in order to check up on things. And this showed that they could always go wherever they wanted to go at any time at all.
Q. The 392nd Division, General, has now been discussed conclusively I think. There are a very few documents about its area. There is one more incident from the area of that Division which is included in the Prosecution documents. May I ask you to take up Document Book XXV for this purpose? There, in Exhibit No. 570, on Page 51 of the English and Page 40 of the German, the 392nd Division is mentioned.
The document to which I have reference now is a Daily Report by your Corps of the 8th of February 1944. Under 392nd Division it says: "Intention: reprisals for attacks on Pricie," and in the next Daily Report of 9 February 1944, which is contained on the next page of that document the Division reports a reprisal measure carried out. It says, "As a retaliation for the stabbing of an officer western sector of Pottom, 3.5 km NE of Obrovac, and burned down." This is the only case of reprisal measures in the area of that Division.
What can you tell us about that incident, General?
A. I cannot recall the incident itself but those two reports show that in the village of Kordun an officer had been stabbed to death. Such incidents were not infrequent in that area in the beginning and the population, as was ordered in ovary case, was then warned and exhorted that should these incidents occur more frequently they must expect reprisal measures and here we have a case simply where the troops decided to carry out reprisal measures but this is the only case by the 392nd Division. In apprehending the perpetrator the troops again encountered enemy resistance in the village and in the fighting which ensued the houses were destroyed.
Q. As you mentioned General, you have no recollection of your own of this incident?
A. No, I do not.
Q. On further question in this connection, were those reprisal measures concerned with human beings?
A. According to the report no human beings suffered in this case.
Q. Now as far as the 392nd Division is concerned I should like to say that I will examine the witness Kobe whom I have announced and then we will be quite sure about the character of these incidents. Documents concerning the area of the 392nd Division and which concern mopping up operations we have now discussed. We shall discuss other assignments of that division in a later connection. I can now start discussing the last division which was under you in this area which was the 264th. When did that division reach your area?
A. In November the 264th Division took over from the 114th Light Infantry Division which was serving along the coast.
Q. What was the assignment given to the division when it reached the area?
A. First it had the assignment to occupy the three big harbor towns, Zara, Sibenik and Split. The 114th Light Infantry Division was withdrawn to the area around Knin.
Q. What happened to the area between and behind those harbor towns?
A. The 114th Light Infantry Division was given the assignment to clear this area which after the Italian surrendered was infested by the bands because between those three towns no safe and secure communication existed as yet.
That was the task first of the 114th Division so that the 264th Division could continue with the fortifying of the coastal positions. Equally the 114th Division was used to secure the islands in front of the coast and clear them of tho bands. The extension of the defensive positions along the coast could only be done in the form of strong points because in the case of these vast distances every division had a front of about 150 kilometers and no continuous defense was feasible.
Q. Did the division have any other assignments?
A. I need hardly say that the main assignment of the corps applied to the 264th Division of which we are now talking. They did no only have to extend and occupy the defensive position on the coast. The assignment also said that they must fortify a second defensive position along the mountain line. The assignment for the 264th Division in other words was (one) to hold the first defensive position along tho coast including the islands (two) defensive position, the foothills of the mountains, and (third) to pacify the area in between.
Q. Now, in the case of this vast area which you mentioned, that assignment was somewhat ambitious wasn't it, General? Did the division still have the possibility apart from the basic assignments to carry out mopping up operations in tho area which was also part of its orders.
A. As said before the 114th Light Infantry Division was stationed in that area and mopping up operations were to a large extent carried out by that division up to the moment when it was called over to Italy. Nevertheless the 264th Division alone would not have been in a position to occupy the whole of the area in the way it was ordered and to pacify it which was the reason why the corps was constantly given forces by the Army which were available so that the corps would be in a position to carry out the pacification of the area. Then by order of the corps this pacification was carried out up to the point that when the 114th Division left this pacification had been achieved and the area in between could at all times be used for small convoys and contact existed.
At the same time the division had carried out the pacification of the area, in the sense of the pacification report to the Army, that the various villages were fortified like strong points by the Ustasha and Cetniks inasmuch as they were not occupied by the German troops. Of course there were frequent conflicts on these occasions but thanks to the good contact and good agreement between the divisions the various commanders were in a position to segregate the Ustasha and Cetniks in the various villages and it became possible to say that this area had been pacified.
Q. Do you want to say by that, General, that there were no more destructions in that area after that?
A. No, that of course I couldn't say. What I mean was that in that area by the mopping up of the bands by the 114th Division and other elements no large scale activities by the bands occurred but the minor bands whom I have mentioned in the beginning still remained active in large numbers. I would like to say that acts of sabotage did not decrease but these were not large-scale operations or large-scale surprise attacks but they were purely acts of sabotage against the roads and lines of communication.
Q. What did the troops do against these sabotage acts?
A. The troop couldn't do anything but continously patrol the roads and if that was not enough and the acts of sabotage along the roads persisted occasionally reprisal measures had to be resorted to. There again as was ordered from above the population was warned and enlightened by posters, etc. If the sabotage acts did not decrease reprisal measures had to be taken to safeguard the troops.
Q. Now, that was one side of the fighting, but were there not also mopping up operations in that area which it took up so much time in the case of the other divisions relatively speaking?
A. There were of course, on the part of the division, again in this area, mopping up operations where an available report showed that minor bands had concentrated there and things like that.
Q. About these mopping up operations, General, we have a few reports available here which we should discuss in order to clear this up. Would you first please turn to Document Book XXV of the Prosecution. I think you have still got it there. Would you please look at page 45 in the German book, which is on page 58 of the English book. This is Prosecution Exhibit 570 which we have mentioned so often before. It is NOKW 1772. There we have a daily report by the XV Army Corps of 23 February 1942. This contains a report by the 264th Division. It is mentioned there that a courier had boon shot. Can you tell us something about that, witness.
A. It is mentioned in that report that a battalion had made a thrust towards two Croatian villages end they had made a raid at night in Komenka, 5 kilometers Northeast of Split. On that occasion a communist message center was liquidated end it was there that the courier whom you mentioned was shot. Whether this occurred during combat or while trying to escape cannot be seen from this report. In any case it was not done as part of the reprisal measure. It is also mentioned here that three suspects obviously also members of the same message center had been arrested. No mention is made here of a reprisal measure,
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will take its afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
DR. SAUTER: (Sauter for defendant Lanz) May it please the Tribunal the defendant Lanz is asking to be excused from tomorrow's session in order to prepare his own examination.
JUDGE CARTER: The leave will be granted in accordance with our usual conditions.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, before the recess we had discussed a number of mopping-up operations by the 264th Division. I would like to ask you now to turn to Document Book XVI in connection with these operations. I have reference to a report which is contained in the English Document Book on page 80, and on page 122 of the German Document Book, and will you please turn to this letter page? That is document for the Prosecution, NOKW 1416, which is Exhibit 389. The report which I have reference to is contained in the daily report of 16 April 1944 made by the 15 Army Corps. It is reported here 7 kilometers southeast of Rogosnia in the area of Sinj two bandits each shot dead while escaping. What are your comments on this report?
A. This report also shows troops were all the time carrying out mopping up operations. Obviously, on this occasion they shot armed bandits who escaped after the combat action, and two of them were shot in this action. The exact occurrence cannot be reconstructed from this brief radio report.
Q. I believe that is quite sufficient in this case. I would now like to ask you to give your attention to the same exhibit on page 125 of the German text, which is page 84 of the English Document Book. Here we have a daily report of the Corps dated 23 April 1944. It is reported here under 264th Division, in reprisal for attacks on our trucks two villages 4 kilometers northwest of Trogir were partly burned down.
The same incident has been submitted by the prosecution again in a different document. We find this same report in document book XX of the Prosecution, on page 6 of the English text, which is page 4 of the German document book. In this case it is Document NOKW 1551 of the Prosecution, which is Exhibit 458. This report has reached a very high agency. It has reached the Daily Report West of the OKW General Staff of the Army. It is dated 23 April 1944. I would like to ask you, witness, after I have clarified these circumstances, to give your comments on the facts; by this I mean the partial destruction of these two villages 4 kilometers northwest of Trogir, Can you tell anything of your own knowledge about these facts?
A. Yes, I can tell you of my own knowledge. I know that district quite well. I myself with my escorting officers went there once or twice. Northwest of Trogir the road goes on very steeply in many bends, and because mines were planted there all the time this serpentine road was at its starting and at its end secured by our own men. In spite of this fact again and again on this particular spot there occurred mine attacks. Within this stretch of road guarded by the posts on each side there were two farms, one could not call them villages. It was only possible that if mines were planted in that stretch of road that they were planted from the inhabitants of these two farms, or at least the inhabitants of these farms had to be in the "know." These people were on repeated occasions warned by the Division. They always denied any knowledge about the mines. They were told if this mine planting went on then their houses would be destroyed, and in spite of this mine blastings occurred time and again, and that is the report which is here submitted by the 264th Division.
These two farms on the serpentine road Northwest of Trogir were destroyed. It is striking, in this connection that these people disappeared before the houses were destroyed. That explains quite obviously that they considered themselves guilty. Therefore, the measure was, under all circumstances, justified, and it shows that we investigated the matter and only took a reprisal measure after all the warnings, etc, had been of no avail.
Q, May I ask you one question in this connection, General, was the reprisal measure which was taken here, successful?
A. Yes, after these houses had been burned down there were no more mine plantings along that stretch of road. The success was quite obvious.
Q. I would like you to remain with that report for a moment which says here further that 2 kilometers northwest of Trogir 2 suspects were arrested. Can you give us a reason for this arrest, and give your comments, General?
A. This is shown quite clearly in the report of the 264th Division. It says there that two soldiers west of Trogir were shot by bandits. In my opinion it was the duty of the division to make investigations as to who the perpetrators might have been. This was done and two suspects were arrested. I cannot see any reason why that should present a crime. Any Army would have endeavored to establish who the perpetrators were, and that is all I could say.
Q. Well, then, General, will you turn up in this same exhibit page 126, which is page 89 of the English text. This is the next report. It is a report about the arrest of the suspects and is dated the 23 April. The next report have is the report of 24 April 1944.
The entry reads "as a reprisal for surprise attack band quarters burned down." Can you explain this measure to us, General?
A. In the daily report of the 264th Division of the 22nd of April, it says that -"14 kilometers northwest of Trogia, own trucks went on mines. Subsequently the mine troops which were committed, were attacked. In this operation 6 own losses were suffered, 13 wounded, 2 trucks were a total loss and 1 truck was damaged. The bands wore partly civilian clothing and partly Ustasha caps. The result of the combing of the terrain has so far not been submitted." Here we see that a heavy attack by the bands had occurred and that considerable losses had been suffered by the Germans. Then the territory was combed out , which is also reported in the report, the troops encountered band quarters and this attack had obviously been carried out from this band nest, and so this band-nest was destroyed. In spite of the high losses on the part of the Germans, no reprisal measures against human beings were carried out. This is a proof, then, that the troops were not set on harming the civilian population but they attempted to find the bands there where they were concentrated, and they destroyed their quarters, so that no more sabotage acts could be carried out from these accommodations.
DR. TIPP: In order to clarify these circumstances I may say that the quotation to which General von Leyser had reference, which is a report of the 264th Division dated the 22nd of April 1944, is not contained in the Prosecution document but it is contained in my Document Book 2, on page 113; this is Leyser Document No. 39 which I had offered as Leyser Exhibit 25.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. We can now leave these mopping-up operations, reprisal acts, etc. From those things which we have so far discussed concerning the tasks of the 264th and of the 392nd Division, one might conclude that this band-fighting had been the most essential task of your two coast divisions. This conclusion could be drawn from the way in which the prosecution documents were submitted. Would you please tell us, General, whether this impression would be a correct one, or, if not, what the conditions actually were?
A. No, that, of course, is in no case correct. The securing of the supply lines was one of the tasks but not the most essential tasks. The most essential task which the coast divisions had was the building up and the securing of the defense installations along the coast; that was their task, and not merely the securing of the supply lines. That was a task which was carried out on the side.
Q. The building up of the coast defense installations was, in accordance with what you said before, intended to counter an anticipated landing of the Allies. Could one expect such a landing at that time and did you have any reasons -- any grounds -- for such an anticipation?
A. Yes, at that time one did certainly expect such a landing along the Adriatic Coasts In Italy the front had moved more and more towards the North and this again gave the possibility of a possible allied landing along the Adriatic Coast. Above all, there was the enemy air activity which became so strong and destroyed all localities along the coast and which again led to the conclusion that the allies might land there. Through the destruction, or rather through the bomb attacks, our own troops were comparatively little hit when the localities were destroyed, because our own units were widely dispersed in the strong points, as I have previously mentioned, but the civilian population was quite strongly hit through these attacks, and, above all, their homes. One might perhaps add the following. We also received reports to the effect that in the mountains in the rear area, airplanes landed all the time, which supplied the band members with arms, equipment, etc., and in this manner there might also have been the possibility that if this allied landing on the coast was carried out, the bands in the rear area, through the supply of their ammunition, etc., could become dangerous to us.