Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Perhaps, General, you would start the sentence again.
A Well, he said that above all, between General Fehn, the SS Fuehrer Vitztum, who was the High SS and Police Leader there in Albania and the Commander of the SS Skanderbeg Division, there had frequently been disputes which were not bearable for a long period. Amongst other things, he told me that when I got there I wasn't to bother myself at all about the political affairs and, further, he said that I should make no private visits to Albanian families and to keep myself apart from this as far as possible in the same way as I had had no political activity in Croatia. Of course I should make my official visits to the Government there but otherwise I should remain reserved. Above all, he stressed that the SS Skanderbeg Division stationed there was no longer subordinate to me. This SS Division Skanderbeg was in the process of being set up there and I shouldn't worry myself about this at all and should keep my hands off it so that there would be no more friction between the SS Fuehrer, the SS Division there, and myself.
In addition, he said that of course if perhaps later on large fighting would take place - at that time part of the rear movement had already started - that then this SS Division or at least parts of this SS Division might become tactically subordinate to me; I should in every case, however, make an application to the Army, but otherwise I should not bother myself about this division at all since it was not subordinate to me. Then I went to the army conference and from there I went to Tirana where the corps was stationed and I arrived on the 31st of July or the first of August.
DR. TIPP: Your Honor, with regard to this point, which is of very great importance for General von Leyser's case, I have a few difficulties about evidence here. Your Honors know that General Fieldmarshal von Weichs at the moment is excused from the sessions and one cannot know whether or when he is coming back to these sessions and whether or not he can take his stand in the witness box and therefore with regard to this point mentioned by General Leyser I cannot call Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Field Marshal Weichs for testimony. But as a precaution with regard to this point and to another point which I will come to later, I have obtained two affidavits from General Fieldmarshal von Weichs and have included them in my document book.
I would suggest that I should be allowed to continue in the same way as was done with the affidavit of General Lindemann. That is, these affidavits are submitted for the time as affidavits and I should be allowed to introduce them in evidence. If, contrary to expectations, Field Marshal Weichs should be able to appear in the witness stand, then of course, I would agree that the affidavits be struck from the records since I would then be able to question Field Marshal Weichs about this in the witness stand, which of course is better evidence. In addition, I would like to say that I am in the happy position of having my three document books completely translated and the two witnesses I wish to bring are already here, so that I can examine General von Leyser without interruption.
It would without doubt be very expedient if this presentation of evidence is not interrupted here by the fact that General Fieldmarshal Weichs cannot appear in the witness stand. Therefore, I would like to ask that I can introduce for the moment these two affidavits.
MR. FULKERSON: If your Honor please, I have no objection to that proposal provided, if General von Weichs does become well enough to be seen by a member of the Prosecution and questioned about this affidavit, even though he is not well enough to come into court and testify, that the Prosecution be permitted, if it would appear that that is necessary, to submit a counter-affidavit or a supplemental affidavit to the one which Dr. Tipp has obtained. This is rather a this, in the and, will amount to taking his deposition in two affidavits but at least that way we will have the opportunity to question him, provided of course his health is improved enough to permit that about the statements which he has made in the affidavit which Dr. Tipp now proposes to introduce.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your comment as to the suggestion made by a member of the prosecution staff, Dr. Tipp?
DR. TIPP: I of course have nothing against that, your Honor. I don't know sufficient about General Fieldmarshal von Weichs' health, but I think I can assume that according to what Dr. Laternser says a short interrogation by the Prosecution is quite possible.
THE PRESIDENT: By reason of the statements made by the member of the Prosecution staff and the further statement made by Dr. Tipp, you may proceed with the presentation of the affidavit.
MR. FULKERSON: And I believe that in the event that General von Weichs is able to come back into the courtroom to testify then the affidavit will be subject to a motion to strike by the Prosecution as we did with other affidavits.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will entertain such a motion if it is necessary and if it is deemed advisable. You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Then I offer from my Document Book II, page 118, Leyser Document No. 14. I offer this as Leyser Exhibit No. 51. This is an affidavit by Fieldmarshal Maxmilian von Weichs, sworn to in Nurnberg on the 31st of July, 1947, before the Summary Court Officer, Capt. Binder. Because it is so important, I would like to read the affidavit. It is to be found as I have already stated on page 118 of the document book, figure 1:
"1. The XV and XXI Mountain Corps belonged to Army Group F, which was under my command. Up to the end of July 1944, General von LEYSER was the commanding general of the XV Mountain Corps, General FEHN commanding general of the XXI Mountain Corps. Towards the end of July 1944, I gave these two commanding generals the order to exchange their respective mountain corps.
"2. The main reason was the existence of strained relations between General FEHN and the SS and political leader VITZTUM, which led to constant friction. HIMMLER had achieved that the SS-Division Skander Court No. V, Case No. VII.
beg was established in the Kosserow region."
I would like to interpolate here briefly, your Honor, and point out a mistake in the copying. It says SS Division Skanderberg. Of course it is the SS Division Skanderbeg. I would ask that if this mistake is in the English document book it should be corrected. It crops up again later on. And I continue:
"SS-Brigadefuehrer VITZTUM was to lead this establishment. The SS-Division Skanderbeg was placed under his command. VITZTUM received his instructions in this matter from the SS-Main Office directly. Since General FEHN as commanding general of the XXI Mountain Corps, which was in Albania where this Division was now to be activated as well, apparently considered himself likewise responsible for this activation and tried to interfere in this direction, friction ensued.
"3. In order to eliminate the friction that had arisen, I transferred the command of the XXI Mountain Corps to General von LEYSER, whom I knew from our official co-operation to be a calm and deliberate man. By this measure I meant to prevent serious difficulties.
"Before taking over his command of the XXI Mountain Corps, I summoned General von LEYSER to Belgrade in order to give him special directives: namely not to pay any attention to the SS-Division Skanderbeg and that he had better leave his hands off the matter. I explicitly emphasized that the SS was not under his command, that it operated on its own responsibility and according to directives given by the SS-Main Office. In doing so I told him that in case of larger scale actions the SS-Division might, of course, be tactically put under his command upon request."
As from your testimony, General, and also from the affidavit of General Fieldmarshal von Weichs, it can be seen that between your predecessor, General Fehn, and the delegate of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Albania, SS Brigadefuehrer Vitztum, there were political frictions, I would like to ask you whether you yourself in this connection also had any kind of difficulties at all?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A Well, one can't call them difficulties, but I know that Fieldmarshal von Weichs had received a complaint or whatever you want to call it, through envoy Kasche about ma and my staff.
Q With regard to this point, your Honor, I would like to submit another document which is also contained in Document Book II on page 120. This is Leyser Document No. 42 and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 52. This is another affidavit by Fieldmarshal von Weichs. I would like to refer briefly -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please, Before we proceed with the reading of the affidavit I think it might be advisable if we take our noon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is recessed until 1330.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General von Leyser, my last question before the recess was whether during your activity in Albania as Commanding General of the 21st Corps, you encountered any political difficulties. I was caused to put this question to you through a preceding answer of yours, namely that General Fehn who was your predecessor in the command, was replaced because of differences of opinion which occurred between you and Vitztum in Tirana, the capital of Albania. Will you give us your brief comments on this?
A I said that I did not have any direct difficulties, but I do know that Fieldmarshal von Weichs had received a complaint or whatever you want to call it via the envoy Kasche about myself and the staff of my corps.
Q In this connection, your Honors, I have offered Leyser Document No. 42 contained in Document Book II of the Defense, page 120. I offered this document as Leyser Exhibit 52. I would like to read some passages from this affidavit. The affidavit of General Fieldmarshal von Weichs starts as follows:
"About December 1944 or January 1945, I received an anonymous letter through the ambassador KASCHE. This letter contained a brief opinion of the gentlemen of the Staff of the XXI. Mountain Artillery Corps.
"The opinion given about Herr v. LEYSER was approximately the following: "The Commanding General v. LEYSER is a rather good soldier, very kind and cooperative; at times it is hard to find out what his intentions are, at conferences he is very smart and clever. He does not cooperate with all his heart, but merely because of his sense of duty. His staff has the reputation of being reactionary.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"Since, on principle, I do not take up such anonymous letters, I told that to the ambassador - I forwarded the letter officially to General v. LEYSER.
"It seemed very probable to me that this letter originated from a supervisory office in Albania, since the knowledge of the statements could come only from that time. It is even more probable that the origin of this letter could be found in this direction, since after 20 July 1944 the supervisory activities of the SD had considerably increased."
General von Leyser, may I put a question to this particular problem? The date of 20th of July, 1944, is mentioned here. Would you please tell the Tribunal to what event this date refers?
A This means the attempt on Hitler's life which occurred on that date, on the 20th of July, 1944.
Q I would then like to continue.
"For me this was an indication that General v. LEYSER, in accordance with the directions given by me before the taking over of the XXI Mountain Artillery Corps, was, in order to avoid incidents, kind and cooperative in his behavior and attitude towards the other officers, above all, towards the SS and police leader VITZTUM (special commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER), with whom there were conflicts before, but he obviously acted with reserve in accordance with the orders given by me."
After these preliminary questions, General, I would like to put to you the following question; when did you take over the command of the XXI Corps?
A I am afraid I cannot give you the exact date, but I do know for sure that for instance on the 20th of July, which is the day when the attempt on Hitler's life occurred, I was still with the XV Corps. Subsequent to this, roughly about four to five days later, I want via Sarajevo to attend this conference which had been ordered by the army and than I was present at a discussion with Fieldmarshal von Weichs. To the best of my recollection, around the 31st of July I must have Court No. V, Case No. VII.
arrived in Tirana and I think it was then I took over the leadership of the Corps, roughly around the 1st of August.
Q We can then take the first of August, 1944, when you took over this command. Could that be correct?
A Yes, that would be about correct.
Q The Prosecution has further submitted a number of documents incriminating you. I would like to discuss these documents with you in chronological order. The first document which I would like you to have a look at is contained in Document Book 13, on page 102 of the German Document Book and on page 131 of the English text. This is document NOKW-951 of the Prosecution which had been offered as Prosecution Exhibit 334 and the entry which I am mainly concerned with is in Document Book XIII of the English version on page 131. I assume that the Prosecution made a mistake when submitting this document. This document represents an excerpt from the War Diary of the XXI Mountain Corps from the period of the 1st to the 30th November, 1943. The 100th Infantry Division reports here under the 15th of November, 1943, that on the occasion of Operation 505, reprisal measures were carried out against two Italian officers.
Will you make your comments to this report in order to keep the record clear?
AAs is clear from the date, this must be an error on the part of the Prosecution because as we have just established, I took over the leadership of the XXI Corps only on the 1st of August, 1944, and these incidents reported here occurred in November, 1943. For that reason, I cannot be concerned with these happenings.
Q One other document to which this same circumstance applies has been submitted by the Prosecution in Document Book XV. It is contained on page 73 of the English document book and on page 100 of the German text. This is Prosecution Document NOKW-931 submitted as exhibit of the Prosecution Exhibit 371. This again is a report from the 100th Infantry Division which at that time was subordinate to the XXI Corps.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
This particular report is dated the 13th of December 1943 and furthermore we have in the same document a report of the 17 December, 1943. Both these reports, according to the text of the document, are addressed to the headquarters of the XXI Corps, not to the headquarters of the XV Corps. Will you please clarify these circumstances too, General?
A The same applies which I said before. Since I only took over command of the Corps on the 1st of August, 1944, this particular report is dated way before my time.
Q A third document of this type has been offered in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution; it is contained on page 53 of the English text and on page 102 of the German document book. This is Document NOKW-833 of the Prosecution which was submitted as Exhibit 380 of the Prosecution. Here we have a report of the same agencies dated the 4th of February, 1944. I might assume then, General, that the same applies here as did for the document which we have discussed before.
A Yes, the same applies here.
Q After we have clarified these points, we shall now start to discuss the actual tasks of the XXI Corps. First of all, I would like you to answer the following question. In what area was this Corps stationed?
A The XXI Mountain Corps was stationed, first of all, in the area of Albania and Montenegro. The headquarters of the Corps staff was in Tirana which is the capital of the independent state Albania.
Q What units were subordinate to you when you were with the XXI Corps?
AAt first, I had two divisions subordinate to me: The 181st Division and the 297th Division.
Q. Did you, at a later time, have any other units subordinate to you, General?
A. Later on, during my time as commander of the 21st Corps, I had many other divisions subordinate to me.
Q. Can you briefly, in order to inform the Tribunal, tell us how large, approximately, was the area of your corps sector?
A. Every division had approximately a coastal sector of 250 kilometers. I believe that illustrates best the size of the area which was under the command of the corps.
Q. Will you please also tell us something about the assignment of the 21st Corps?
A. The 21st Corps had approximately the same task as had the 15th Corps. By that I mean securing of the coastal area against a possible enemy landing.
Q. You said that two divisions were subordinate to you, one of each of which hand to secure and to defend a coastal area of 250 kilometers. Was it possible for these troops also to take care of the security of the hinterland? As you know, this securing of the hinterland has played a considerable part when we discussed the tasks of the 15th Corps.
A. I'll like to say, in this connection, that the rear area of the 21st Corps, when I took over the command, was very much quieter than it was when I took over the command of the 15th Corps; but the divisions had several rifle battalions at its disposal for the securing of this area who were to be in charge of the securing of the supply lines, et cetera. Besides, in this rear area which had been newly attached to Albania, the so-called Kossorew district was occupied by the SS Division Skanderbeck, so that there certain security of supply lines could be achieved by the units already stationed there. This division as I'd like to stress again, was not subordinate to me as we have established before.
Q. General, what were the opponents whom you had to face in that particular area?
I'd like to specify in my question that I mean, of course, not an enemy from outside, an enemy who might possibly have landed. I am referring to the opponents within the area of your corps.
A. The political situation in Albania was even more confused than the one in Crotia. There were bands of the most varied types. Some of them were so-called National bands which tried to join the area to a greater Serbia. Then there were other National bands who wanted an independent state of Albania. And then again there were other bands, Communist bands, who counted themselves as belonging to the so-called Tito bands or tried to join up with these groups.
Our real enemies were only the Communist bands; The National bands partly, remained neutral towards us, and partly they fought the Tito bands, the Communist bands.
Q. In order to clarify these rather interwoven conditions, I'd like to refer back to one document which I have already offered. This particular document is on Page 127 of Document Book 2 Leyser. It is Leyser Document 44 which I had offered as Leyser Exhibit 21. This is an affidavit of the former Lt. Colonel Hans Klein who, according to Number I of this affidavit, from January 1945 until the end of the capitulation, was the I-a of the division and was, therefore, subordinate to the 21st Corps.
In order to deal with the problem which I have just discussed, I'd like to refer back to Numeral 7 of this affidavit which is on Page 130 of Leyser Document Book II. The witness says here: "Opponents of the German Wehrmacht: According to my knowledge of the conditions since September 1944 the following distinctions must be made in appraising the opponent:
a) Partisan bands which pursued their normal occupations and, occasionally, came to the fore as opponents of the Wehrmacht, carrying out surprise attacks when an opportunity presented itself.
b) Partisan forces which, while organized on military lines, were only partly uniformed or wearing insignia which could be recognized at a distance.
c) Forces which conformed with the Hague Land Warfare Rules. Excepting one case in Fall 1944, when a Yugoslav brigade, coming from Italy, had landed in the area to the South of Mostar, such military formations never appeared in front of the divisional sector in the area between Brod and the Reich frontier until the last two months of the war. These units were uniformly using Russian clothing and equipment.
That the bands had no regard for the civilian population in carrying out their acts of sabotage is proven, for instance, by their attempts on the Mostar - Sarajevo railroad line, which, for all practical purposes, only harmed the civilian population; an interruption in the supply of the division was never achieved. The civilian trains were cut out, and after the line had been repaired military trains had the right of way as the situation required."
In Number 8 this is also material:
"8. Cetniks: At the beginning of my assignment in Fall 1944 the division collaborated with the Cetniks. There was no doubt, though, that the Cetniks inwardly rejected us as the occupiers of their country, that they were adversaries of the Ustasha in whom they saw the most uncompromising exponents of an independent Croatian state, while they wanted a unified Yugoslavia, and that they were no less inimical to the TITO-forces, because, in contrast to the latter, they aspired to a unified Yugoslavia leaning on the Western powers and not on Russia. Later on, when the Cetniks opposed the German forces, and obviously attempted to push to the coast in the Dubrovnik area, thus inviting the Western powers to effect a landing, TITO concentrated superior forces and defeated them in the Bileja and Trebinje area. They then withdrew to the North."
After this interpolation, General, we will turn back to the 21st Corps and the first thing I want to deal with is this Division Skanderbecg since almost all the documents which were used against you, where the 21st Corps is concerned, referred to this SS Division Skanderbecg.
I'd like first of all to have Document 16 of the Prosecution submitted to you. (Document handed to witness.)
Here on Page 164 of the German and 124 of the English test you find Exhibit 406 of the Prosecution. This is Document NOKW 1135 of the Prosecution. This document represents a report of the 21st SS Mountain Division Skanderbecg, dated 2 October 1944. Do you know this report, General?
A. No. At that time I was not present with the corps and on my return, when I came back to the corps, this SS Division Skanderbecg, had already been dissolved or at least it was no longer located within my sector.
Q. Could you tell us, witness, whether this report was at any time received by your staff?
A. That must have been the case. I cannot say for sure. To the best of my knowledge I have not seen this report because, as I have mentioned before, I was absent and when I returned this particular division was no longer in my sector and no longer under my jurisdiction.
Q. Could you tell us, please, General, when you returned?
A. Around the 16th of November I returned to the corps.
Q. We will deal with your absence which, according to your testimony, lasted from the second or third cf October until the 16th of November at a later time. You said that you cannot recollect this report of those days. Perhaps you can now, while looking at the document, clear up a few points which might be of importance in this trial.
It says here, on Page 164, which is 124 of the English text, the first page of the document under Number 2 concerning the organization of the Division Skanderbecg, that this division received the greatest possible help by the Plenipotentiary for the Reichsfuehrer SS in Tirana, SS Gruppenfuehrer Vitztdum, and that it was furthermore supported as much as possible by the 21st Mountain Corps.
Could you now tell us, witness, how the organization of this division Skanderbecg came about, what kind of a unit was it, who was the responsible person for it?
A. The SS Division Skanderbecg was a Waffen SS unit which was to be recruited from Albanian inhabitants. As I had already mentioned, Himmler had obtained the Fuehrer's consent that indigenous units of the SS could be recruited. With the organization of this SS Division Skanderbecg, the then SS and Police Leader was commissioned. This man was at the same time Plenipotentiary for the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. He was also Higher SS and Police Leader in Albania.
This recruitment and organization was, therefore, purely an SS matter which was no concern whatsoever of the Wehrmacht. After this recruitment and organization had been carried out there and, as I mentioned, was carried out in a sector which was more or less part of the 21st Mountain Corps area, my predecessor, General Fehn, apparently, took interest in this procedure. On this occasion I believe he gave this division one officer and twelve NCO's as instructors. This was a matter of course in order to support the military training of this division. On the other hand, this seems to have been the reason why there were differences of opinion between General Fehn and SS Leader Vitztum and the SS Brigade Leader Schmitzler who was in charge of this division.
I, myself, when I received the directive of the Field Marshall, did no longer take any interest in this recruitment and, therefore, I am in no position to give you any details about it.
Q. General, in this report of the 2 October, 1944, it says, doesn't it, that the Division was technically subordinate to the 21st Corps? Can you clear up this point for us?
A. Yes, that is correct; but that means that this subordination was valid at the beginning of the organization of this Division Skanderbeg. But it further says here: "The Division Commander mentioned that on the first of October 1944 the Division --" I beg your pardon -- "As of the first of October the Division was subordinate to the 21st Mountain Corps when the Division was organized." But it doesn't say that it is still subordinate to the Corps. That also shows that this Division was not subordinate to the 21st Corps. Besides, it is said in this order that it was a technical subordination and not a general subordination. This again proves that the subordination only applied at the beginning of the organization of the Division and then it was only a tactical one.
Q. What you say, General, is that when the Division was first organized it was tactically subordinate to your corps but that later on this subordination was rescinded on the order of Field Marshall von Weichs so that in the further course of your activities there was no more relation of subordination of the SS Division Skanderbeg to the 21st Corps. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is correct. During my tenure the SS Division was no longer subordinate to my corps, neither in tactical respect nor in any other respect.
Q. Just before you mentioned, General, that as of approximately the second of October to the 16th of November you were absent from the corps, which is a time period of about six weeks. During that time you were not in the area of your corps. May I ask you how it happens that you can give us these dates so exactly?
A. On the 29th of September I received a telegram which said that my wife had been killed on the occasion of an American air attack and my son was wounded; and subsequently on the second or third of October I received a special leave.
Q. I believe you ought to talk a little slower.
A. On the second or third of October I was, therefore, not with the corps. After my return about two to three weeks later Field Marshall von Weichs put his airplane at my disposal and with this airplane I was to fly to Tirana. The airplane, however, flew astray during the night and we did not have sufficient fuel and we had to make an emergency landing during the night.
We landed on the River Drina near Sarajewo and after this emergency landing I, myself, and the twelve other people on board the airplane lived as prisoners, more or less, of a Chetnik unit. I was detained there for about eight days with this Chetnik unit and the First Mountain Division liberated me.
Then I went to Zagreb, to the army group, where I had been asked to appear in order to report about the experiences which I had. Thereafter, approximately around the 16th of November, I returned to my corps. At that time, however, the corps was no longer situated in Tirana but had already retreated in the withdrawal movement and was in the area of Skopa.
Q. General, according to your description you stayed for about eight days and were detained by a band. On this occasion you had an opportunity to observe this band from a very close distance. Therefore, from your own knowledge and observations, can you tell us anything about how this band was organized, how it was armed and equipped, what kind of uniforms the members wore and perhaps you could also tell us something about their fighting methods to the extent to which it ms possible for you to observe them?
A. The treatment which my men and myself received at the hands of these bands is significant for the confusion which reigned in that area. We were actually not treated as prisoners because we were left our arms and ammunition which is usually taken away from prisoners. This band, because it was a Chetnik band, was a very strong opponent of the Tito bands which I gathered from remarks which I overheard there. These Chetnik bands were not opposed to the German Wehrmacht; otherwise they would have regarded me as an ordinary prisoner.
The bands who were there also did not fight against the German Wehrmacht but they only fought against the Tito bands.
Where the other questions which you put are concerned, the question as to how we were treated, I can say that after we were detained there by the bands, we were suddenly surrounded by two or three hundred people on the way who had machine guns, et cetera, so that it was not possible for us to advance at all and then I asked these people to let us have a doctor in order to treat the men who had been wounded on the occasion of the emergency landing.
Then we intended to go on and we were prevented from doing so. I then asked the Chetnik doctor who talked German why we were not allowed to march on and why we were treated as prisoners. He answered me: "I hope and I wish for you that you are not a prisoner with us because we, on principle, do not make any prisoners. All prisoners with us are shot."
That was a doctor who should have been in a position to know something about the treatment of Prisoners and that was his opinion. I, myself, and my men, were brought before the leader of these bands. He also told me at once - I believe he had learned that I was a general and he could also see that from my uniform -- that I was not his prisoner. He emphasized this fact. I believe he did that in order to impress his people of this fact. He told me he would have to keep me in protective custody because otherwise I would be killed by the Tito bands with my small number of surrounding men.
I did not quite see his point and told him I'd rather like to march on. I was, however, not permitted to do that. I had to remain with the operational staff of this band and I had to march with them, I must, however, admit that this leader was very chivalrous and behaved in a very proper manner. He even gave me his horse so I didn't have to walk. For hours we marched through that district to a mountain village which was situated high up in the mountains. In this village the staff of the corps was located. I established at that time that the corps staff of the band was involved here.
Q. May I ask you one question in between here? Was it possible for you to establish why this band or this so-called corps staff detained you at all? You said on the one hand you were no prisoner but, on the other hand, it was not a friendly Chetnik unit. I believe that the whole situation is not quite clear.
A. In the final analysis I did not quite realize why I was detained there. At that time I assumed that I was more or less regarded as an object for exchange. This staff was quite nervous and agitated. As soon as any reports came in, to which I might refer back later, that bands had appeared in the neighborhood, everybody was alarmed immediately. Everybody had to keep his luggage ready and then this staff would hide in some other bushes. Through this I gained the impression that at some time, when this staff would be badly off, and might be attacked by surprise from Tito bands, it would use me as an object of exchange, which seemed rather suitable.
Q. What kind of an organization was it, General? Before that you were talking about an army staff. In order not to let anybody gain the wrong picture here maybe you can give us your comments.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A I said the leader called himself the leader of a Cetnik ArmyCorps. All these people had given them military designation. This socalled corps staff consisted on the one hand of the commander who was a former Serbian General Staff Officer. This man acted in a very correct and proper manner towards me. His Chief of Staff was a University Professor from Belgrade and besides his staff consisted of two or three more officers. I cannot tell you where they came from. The rest were men about a body guard as he called them of two to three hundred men. In the opinion of these people it was a so-called corps staff of the bands. The members of this staff wore of course no uniform. For the most part they wore the clothing of that particular region and if they wore uniforms they were of the most varying types, German ones, Italian ones, Jugoslavian ones, and partly also, English uniforms. The arms of these people were also of a very varying type. There was German munition which they had captured, Jugoslavian munition, British, American, etc. I can remember the American munition very well because I was very interested in it. They had a double barreled machine gun which I know quite well. This proves they also had American equipment.
Q One more question in this connection, General. You told us that the members of this band and the members of the body guard gave a very varied picture where their clothing and uniforms were concerned. Can you also tell us whether these people wore the famous uniform and insignia which according to the Hague rules of land warfare is to be recognized at a distance?
A The only thing which was a common insignia amongst all these people was a Serbian eagle which was worn by all these people. It was an eagle of about 4 centimeters which could, of course, not be recognized at any distance and would in no way correspond to the Hague rules for land warfare. But, that was the only thing that was the same with every individual member of that band. I cannot say very much about a division or organization of these bands because I was in no position to observe it or judge it. It was rather interesting to me and rather important to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
observe their report activities. Since we had an opportunity in this small mountain village to move around freely within the corps staff area always accompanied by two armed men we had occasion to watch the reporting activities rather closely. The village was surrounded by a double or threefold security line and there was very lively reporting activity there. If one talks of regular army one cannot apply this term here. All the couriers which came and went there and there were a great number of them who were mostly old women, ragged children and old men. One could recognize this when one observed the whole procedure; that they show an identification to the guards and when they had shown this pass they were allowed to enter the village. In the same we observed this for the staff building itself. There also only those people were allowed to enter who showed a pass and then they came back with a report. It was typical for these couriers that for the last 200 meters the courier has to advance in running to the man he wants to report to in order to show him how important his report was. These children and boys did the same thing. When they had reached the post at a distance of 200 or 300 meters they started running in order to show that the report which they had was an important one. We, therefore, had extremely good opportunity to watch this whole procedure. To me, now, at this point, it is interesting wherein this trial itself always asserted that that was a regular army with all the training, equipment and uniform directives of a regular army; that I, myself, observed that all these couriers and everybody who belonged to this unit never wore a uniform. On the contrary they were only spies; they were dressed in civilian clothes and women and children were used.
Q Now, one concluding question concerning these observations which you made with your own eyes. Could this band which you described to us be designated as a regular unit which was asserted here so often?
A No, as I have stressed before their can be no talk of a regular army or a regular belligerent.
Q After this description of your personal experiences, General, Court No. V, Case No, VII.