After you finished describing your activities in Russia during your direct examination you passed on to the subject of the political situation in Croatia. I would like to ask you a few questions along that line, I won't ask you about anything that is too much detail, but the Pavelic was the head of the State of the independent Croatian Government when you went down there, was he not?
A. Yes.
Q. And his political party, his main supporters, were the Ustasha, which I believe you said corresponded to the German Allgemeine SS?
A. I think that is approximately what I said.
Q. And then in addition to the general Ustasha, whom I take it were simply civilians who were interested in Pavelic's cause, there were also the armed Ustasha units?
A. I don't think I understood that properly.
Q. My question was probably too complicated. I will try again. In addition to the general Ustasha you also had an armed Ustasha, a Waffen Ustasha?
A. Yes, but I think you said the general Ustasha was civilian, or something like that. That is what I understood.
Q. Yes.
A. No, the general Ustasha also wore uniforms and then exactly this was in comparison with the SS, there was the General SS and the so-called Waffen SS, and it was similar with the Ustasha. They had the general Ustasha, also they had partly in the localities where they were, and then there were the Ustasha battalions.
Q. And then these Ustasha units were, of course, fanatical supporters of Pavelic, were they not?
A. I don't know whether they were fanatics, but they supported the Croatian Government. In addition to the Ustasha there was the Croatian armed forces.
Q. But the armed Ustasha was definitely a political unit from start to finish, wasn't it; I mean, it was definitely a party organization.
A. I don't know so much detail about all this, but I should think probably that is what it was. It was kind of a political organization.
Q. And where did the armed Ustasha get their arms?
A. Of course, I can't say that either exactly. I only know that there was a Crotian War Ministry, and that this War Ministry, and that this War Ministry, or I think it was called Ministry for Armaments, or something, that rather this Croatian War Ministry provided the Ustasha and Croatian armed forces with arms.
Q. And this independent state of Croatia was a fairly young affair when you arrive, was it not; it had only been formed in 1941?
A. Yes, it was naturally a rather young state.
Q. And prior to its formation there were not any armed Ustasha units there, were there?
A. I wasn't there before, but it probably didn't exist, because before the state existed of course that didn't exist.
Q. And the same for that matter can be said for the Demebrans, the Croatian Wehrmacht, isn't that true?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. And both of these fledgling armed forces had been hatched after the Germans came into Croatia?
A. This Croatian state had formed itself, but after all for me as a soldier that does not make any difference. I didn't worry about politics. For me it was an allied state, and I had to do my duty as a soldier there.
Q. I am not going to ask anything about the general political situation. I am just talking about the armed forces which were down there.
A. Yes. At that time the Croatian state, of course the state has to have any army, and therefore armed forces were immediately set up.
Q. Both the armed Ustasha and the Demobrans then were organized after the German occupation, we agree on that I believe, and they both collaborated with the Germans tactically from time to time, with the German Wehrmacht?
A. Yes.
Q. And the Germans furnished both of these organizations with arms and munitions and so forth when the need arose to carry out these tactical assignments?
A. The German Wehrmacht did not supply the munitions but tho Croatian War Ministry supplied this. I don't know where Croatian War Ministry got this. But probably it was an allie, they got it from the total stocks available or something like that.
Q. You mean from the total German stocks available?
A. I don't know. I don't know anything about the industrial conditions in Croatia. Whether they had their own munitions factories I don't know.
Q. Well, now, in addition to these units -- that is, Domobrans and the Armed Ustasha -- there were certain other units such as the 373rd Infantry Division and the 392nd Infantry Division which were actually part of the German Wehrmacht but whose men came from Croatia -- that is, whose men were Croatians and whose non-commissioned officers and officers were Germans. Is that correct?
A. These so-called Croatian divisions were German divisions. They belonged to the German Wehrmact and, as I have stated, the officers were Germans and the NCO's were also partly German and the 60% to 70% approximately were Croatians and the others were Germans who had lived in Croatia.
Q. Now, yesterday or the day before Dr. Tipp asked you to comment on a couple of documents. I don't believe I need give the number but I will give you the general gist of them. If you need them for reference I can give you the number.
The first one was a request by the 392 Division to be allowed to draft or conscript Croatians into its own ranks. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. And then that request was refused by the 2nd Panzer Army, as you pointed out in your own document book, about two or throe days later. Do you recall this incident that I am talking about?
A. Yes, I remember that. At that time I said so many volunteers had reported to this Croatian Division and they waited to be soldiers in these Croatian Divisions.
This was, of course, very understandable because these Croatian legion divisions were very good troops and had very good soldiers and, of course, soldiers like to belong to a good unit; and as a result applications to join this division were very many and, therefore, there was this entry in the War Diary that we had passed on this application to the army because neither we nor the army could approve of this application but this was finally a decision to be made by the Croatian government.
Q. Well, perhaps we would clarify all this if we did look at the document. This is Document NOKW-1445. It is found in Book XVI, page 99 of the English and 144 of the German. It is the entry for January 19.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, maybe it has been mistranslated but it says here that authorization is sought for the 392nd Division to draft men fit for military service. Is that what your version says?
A. Well, in the German version it states: "Upon request for 392nd Division authorization is sought from headquarters 2nd Panzer Army for 392nd Division to enlist men for military service."
Q. Does that sound to you as though the 392nd Division was turning away droves of voluntary recruits?
A. No, it was not entirely "driving away", but they had reported to the 392nd Division and now the 392nd Division was asking what we should do with all these people who wore coming to us. "Can we enlist those people?" -- that was the question and we passed it on to the army; and as the channels were laid down, it went through General Glaeser to the Croatian War Ministry and there they would decide whether we should do that or not. There had to be some kind of order in recruitment. One can't just sort people out. This must be regulated from a central office and, as Croatia was an independent state, the Croatian War Ministry was the Central Office.
Q. Wouldn't it have been just as easy to have requested permission to accept volunteers as it was to ask permission to draft people of military age if that's what they meant?
A. I am afraid I didn't quite understand.
Question repeated by the interpreter.
A. Yes, basically it is the same in my opinion whether I ask for the permission to accept them or to enlist them-- shall I repeat?
Q. Yes, if you please,
A. The difference, in my opinion, is if I ask whether I should enlist them then I know that so and so many people have reported and they want to join before it was accepted, and if I say, "Shall I draft them?", then it means I have to look for them; but basically, in my opinion, it is the same.
Q. I see. In other words, in your opinion there is no difference in the German language between a voluntary recruit and a conscriptee or a draftee.
A. Yes, there can be a difference.
Q. Well, that distinction doesn't seem to have boon drawn here if your interpretation of this is correct.
A. I don't know what you mean.
Q. Never mind. Now, then, we have this report -- this request, ratjer -- which is before you and then I believe in your own document book you have the refusal by the 2nd Panzer Army for this request. You don't care to look at that, do you? Dr. Tipp has it there, if you want it.
A. Yes, in my opinion one can see from this what I have just said. It states: "2nd Panzer Army does not agree to the drafting of Croatians to the 392nd Division and recommends that they be engaged with the help of the army inspection"; and that is what I said. The 392nd Division had received many applications and they are asking if they can enlist or draft them and as the army cannot decide about this, the army states that the Army Inspection should do this. That is, the man in Croatia who would have distributed them.
Q. General, I am going to hand you NOKW-1446 which I should like to introduce as Prosecution Exhibit 613. Please turn to the page numbered 14.
That is page 7 of the German and page 6 of the English. This purports to be a daily report from the 392nd Division to the 15th Mountain Corps on the 21st of March 1944. I wish you would just read the part that follows the word "intention," General, aloud please.
A. "Intention: Have hunt code name 'Lagerleben' (taking into custody of 200 compulsory recruits 6 kilometers east southeast of Cinde.
Q. Go right ahead. I would like to know what it means.
A. This means that the 392nd Division, Thick was stationed in this area has received the report that 200 of the men, compulsory recruited by the partisans are in a camp and they went to keep them but it doesn't mean that these 200 people were compulsory recruited, this is an operation of the 392nd Division in order to release these compulsory recruits from the partisans, not a case of compulsory recruitment as you seem to mean.
Q. How do you draw that conclusion, General?
A. Because it says: "intention" here. I can't imagine it any other way. I even think that in this other document which has been submitted here there is also something similar, the fact that the partisans have taken compulsory recruits some place or other and they were released also by the 392nd Division. This isn't a compulsory recruitment as you mean it but it is a liberation of such people.
Q. Well, having looked at those other two documents, first a request from the 392nd Division to be allowed to draft recruits, to use your phrase, and then seeing the 2nd Panzer Army's refusal back in January 1944, you think that it is out of the question that this passage here refers to compulsory recruits for the 392nd Infantry Division.
A. These 200 people?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q Now, General, I am sorry that I am not quite able to follow your logic on this but I wish you would try to make it clearer to me.
A Could I ask which date this other entry is?
Q It is the 31st of March and it is on page 14 of the photostat.
A In the entry of the war diary -- may I see that again? What date.
Q The request is on January 19th and the refusal is January 21.
A In my opinion, even from that one can see -- this request of the 392nd Division was in January -- that is two months before this -therefore, this entry cannot have anything to do at all with that one. That entry was in January -- not request. This one is March.
Q I realize that. But is it possible to look at that without taking anything else into consideration except that request in January and draw the conclusion that here the 392nd Division was doing what it asked permission to do two months before?
A No.
Q That's not possible?
A First of all, from this one sentence one can see that it says: "intention." The division should, if possible, report its intention and this "Lagerleben" is also a sign, as is usual, that, as usual all, operation have a code name as "Lagerleben" or "Panther." We have also had the word "Panther" in this trial and here it is quite clear that the division has the intention of undertaking an operation under the code name of "Lagerleben" in order to release and liberate these 200 compulsory recruits about which they had probably received a report about their whereabouts.
Q Where does that word "release" appear, General?
A It isn't in here but if I make an operation in order to get 200 people from a camp I would not call them compulsory recruits in advance, but there it states these are 200 compulsory recruits. Therefore, I know there are 200 people in this camp who, as the report was received, have been compulsorily recruited by the partisans in this area?
and this also confirms the fact that all the former reports -- Panther and everything else we talked about in this trial always stated that in this area we should make this drive so that the Croatian government take out these men and draft them for service? but the partisans compulsorily recruited these men and by force, therefore, the 392nd Division is going to undertake this operation in order to -- I call it--"liberate", release these 200 compulsory recruits in the course of an operation.
Q General, what happened to the citizenship of these volunteers in these Croatian legion divisions?
A The volunteers in the division -- you mean the Legion Division?
Q Yes.
A They were Croats.
Q But they wore serving in the regular division of the German Wehrmacht?
A Yes. How these conditions were regulated I don't know.
Q You know this, don't you, General: if one of these men committed an offense, was he subject to a German court martial?
A In the legion division these men were subordinate to the German military courts and I must assume that there must have been some kind of an agreement between the Croatian government and the German government.
Q Now, of course since these legions or divisions wore part of the Wehrmacht you had absolutely control over their activities as commanding general of the 15th Corps, I mean of those divisions that wore under you.
A The divisions were subordinate to me just the same as every other German division.
Q Now, let's take the case of the Ustasha. You had a good deal to say about what their movements and activities should be, didn't you?
A From time to time the Ustasha were tactically subordinate in the sector with the divisions where they were stationed.
Q Well, to what extent could you decide, as commander of the XVth Corps, whether you wanted to use these Ustasha units or not? How much independence did they have and could they refuse to be attached to you in a tactical operation?
A During my examination I stated this, too: in themselves the Ustasha batallions in the area were subordinate to the division at the time and if an operation was made then the divisions were also able to deploy the Ustasha tactically but, at the same time, in my examination I also said that there wore frequently difficulties there because these Ustasha battalions frequently turned to their Croatian authorities and made some kind of objection or complained. That happened. As a result often they didn't actually take part in the operation as we really wanted them to and quite often there were very great differences and frictions.
Q But these difficulties and frictions existed as the result of the personalities or the particular objections of particular Ustasha officers, did they not? There was no general objection to the Ustasha being under the XVth Corps in the sector of the corps.
A Well, these were difficulties which we had to overcome. A soldier has to overcome every difficulty. If they did not want to do it, then we had to do it with our own men* We had to do the thing somehow. It had to be done.
Q I don't believe you understood my question but I will try again. The Croation government agreed that the Ustasha unit should be subordinate to the division in whose area they were, did it not?
A Yes.
Q Now, when you say that these units were subordinate to you tactically, exactly what do you mean? Do you mean that they were only subordinate to these divisions insofar as a particular tactical operation was concerned? Is that what you mean?
A Yes. These Ustasha batallions were subordinate; as I have often especially mentioned in this trial. They were subordinate only for purely tactical purposes. This means that for this operation they received the tactical orders and had to accept these tactical orders from the division; but anything which happened -- perhaps excesses of some kind where intervention became necessary -- in this connection they were not subordinate to the German division. That means that in a disciplinary connection and from the point of jurisdiction they were subordinate to their own officers.
Q I see. I think I understand your distinction but, for example, suppose we take one division, for example, and that division has an operation which lasts for two weeks during that two week period all the Ustasha units in the area of the division operate with it, cooperate with it; now, after the operation is over, to what extent does the division control the Ustasha units; that is to say, to what extents are the Ustasha units subordinate to the division between operations, between tactical operations? Do you understand?
A Yes. This is how the matter is: let's say the operation lasts eight days. Then the operation is finished. Then the individual parts of the troops and the Ustasha battalions belonging to this go back to their headquarters where they were stationed before and there they take on the old commission which they were carrying out before. It could be protection of a sector or a supply line or road or something like that.
Q Now, who assigned them, as you call them, these "old commissions"? Who assigned the tasks that they were to perform between operations?
A The division to whom they were subordinate, and, therefore, all these formations had to report everything that happened to the division.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Fulkerson, we will take our usual recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Mr. Fulkerson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q I want to ask you, General, one more question about that document NOKW-1426, which refers to the 300 compulsory recruits. Now, your explanation was that this was -- I believe it's on Page 14 -your explanation was that this operation had as its purpose to liberate these 200 men who had been compulsorily recruited by the partisans.
A Yes, quite.
Q In other words, it was an operation which was of a friendly nature so far as the German Army's attitude towards these 200 men was concerned?
A I'm afraid I didn't quite follow just now.
(THE INTERPRETER REPEATS THE QUESTION FOR THE WITNESS)
Yes, well if you want to put it that way.
Q Well, why is it that in this document this operation is referred to as a "rabbit hunt"?
A Well, that was a term coined by somebody on the staff of the 392nd Division. They would chose the most weird expressions for their operations. For instance, one was called "Napfkuchen" -- "birthday cake." Why should it be called "birthday cake?"
Q There's lust one thing wrong with that explanation, General. This wasn't a code name. The code name is "Lagerleben." It is described as a "rabbit hunt".
A Well, I can't tell you anything about that. The code name is "Lagerleben" is taken from a camp, and they probably used that name because they were in that camp. I don't know why they chose that expression.
Q And you don't think there's any significance at all to the use of the expression "rabbit hunt" to describe what they were going to do?
DR. TIPP: I don't want to make an unnecessary objection, Your Honors, but the Witness has already stated, I believe twice, that that code name was coined by somebody on the staff of the 392nd Division and that he does not know why that particular term was chosen. If you ask him three or four more times I do not believe that he can answer any other way.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
Q You don't think that there's any significance whatever in this operation's being described as a "hare hunt" as a "rabbit hunt"?
A I can only repeat that I did not know who coined the phrase, if you find it a disagreeable expression. When one hunts a hare he shoots, but then nothing is said about it there. All we are concerned with here is the name, and how it came about I don't know.
Q No, I was just wondering how a liberation undertaking would be described as a "rabbit hunt." Of course, rabbits are also caught with mets and traps.
AAs a rule they are being shot.
Q All right. Now, we were discussing, before the recess, the Ustasha and the way in which these elements of the Ustasha were subordinated to the various divisions of the XVth Corps. And you testified, if I understood you correctly, that the divisions gave these units orders to accompany it and cooperate with it in certain tactical operations, and that, in addition to this, between operations the division directed these units as to what their tasks were to be, such as the guarding of railroads, roads, etc.
A I don't think that the division ordered such things. That would be done by the local man in charge of railroads, etc.
Q What do you mean by the "local man in charge?"
A What I mean is that these Ustasha battalions, if I may repeat, were subordinate in a tactical respect, but in other respects they were not subordinate for purely tactical operations in combat etc.
Otherwise they were not subordinate in any other respects.
Q Now, when the division was not engaged in some other undertakings, such as "Panzer," "Napfkuchen," "Brandfackel," or one of the other innumerable undertakings, you testified that the Ustasha units were used to guard roads and to watch railroad trestles and that sort of thing.
A Yes, these battalions were stationed in some village and took over, as it were, protections and security measures for the supply roads, for instance. But for that we need not use or own German troops in those villages.
Q I realize that, but who assigned them these tasks? Who told them what roads to guard? Who told them what railroads trestles to watch?
A That, of course, was ordered by the division, within the scope of the divisional sector.
Q Now, where were these troops quartered -- these Ustasha troops? Where were their barracks, or where did they live during the time that they were being used to garrison the villages and guard the supply routes?
A In the same place as the German troops, in the village itself or if there was time enough we built barracks for them or gave them certain positions within those villages.
Q Now, who assigned the village in which a particular Ustasha battalion would be billeted?
A I suppose the division ordered that. They would say the battalion would be put there or there, just as it was possible within the whole scope of the divisional area.
Q And you yourself said that as Commander of the XVth Corps you saw to it that Ustasha battalions were never billeted in Serbian villages.
A I think that should be understood just what that difference was. At the beginning we said there is a general Ustasha, and then there were the Ustasha battalions. What I meant by saying that they should not be stationed in villages has the following connection:
In order to pacify the country, as I put it, and in order.....
Q Just a minute please, General. Pardon me for interrupting you, but I think I understood what you meant. You said that you would not allow Ustasha battalions to be in Serbian villages because you wanted to prevent bloodshed; you didn't want the Ustasha murdering the Serbs. That's what you meant isn't it?
A Yes, that's what we wanted to avoid if possible, of course.
Q Well, then, summing up what you just said the Ustasha battalions were subordinate to the division in whose area they were, in tactical dense. That's right isn't it?
A In a tactical respect, yes.
Q The division gave the orders as to what assignments they were to carry out generally, such as the guarding of roads, railroads. That's correct isn't it?
A For the area in which they were stationed, yes.
Q The division decided what villages the particular Ustasha battalions were to be billeted in. That's correct isn't it?
A Yes.
Q And when the division was going to carry on a tactical operation of its own it then issued orders to these Ustasha battalions to cooperate with it and told them what their tasks would be in the course of that operation, after all they were our allies.
Q And that's what you mean when you say that the Ustasha battalions were tactically subordinate to the division?
A Yes.
Q Now, in addition to this tactical subordination that we have discussed, did the division or the corps attempt to regulate the internal organization of these Ustasha units in any way?
A No, we had no influence on that. That was entirely up to the Croats.
Q So that if it came to you attention that there was an officer, for example, in a Ustasha detachment who was unfriendly to the Germans there was just simply nothing you could do about it?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A. What I could do in that case, would probably have been reported by the division, to the corps. I would pass that on to the army in the official channel and the army would then turn to the competent general, the General von Glaise, the General Plenipotentiary in Zagreb, and he was the liaison officer with the Croat Ministry of War and on that channel the matter would be put in order.
Q. Now let's turn for a minute to the Domobrans, the Croatian Wehrmacht. Again, the Domobrans was tactically subordinate to the divisions, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. It also had these various tasks of guarding the supply routes assigned to it. It was also assigned its oillets--that is to say, it was also told where to billet troops by the Germans?
A. Yes.
Q. It also-
A. May I modify this a little? One mustn't understand it so literally by saying that the division decides this, that or the other things. For instance, if in the case of the 373rd Division, one Croatian Rifle Brigade was attached, that brigade within the area of the division would be assigned a certain sector and then of course it was not the division who said this battalion is going to village "A" and the other one will go to "B" but that would be assigned of course by the Croatian brigade itself. The Croatian brigade was merely assigned a certain sector by the division.
Q. In other works all the Germans did was to issue orders to the Brigade commander and they allowed him some discretion in carrying out those orders?
A. Because he had all the tactical training for that purpose.
Q. So that really all the Germans did in a situation such as that was to tell such and such a Croatian brigade "Your task will be so and so, your sector will be so and so; but we don't care whether you put the first battalion on the right flank or the third battalion on the right flank?"
Is that what you mean to say?
A. Yes, up to a point. The tactical assignment and how they carried it out in detail was up to the brigade commander of the Croat Brigade.
Well, did the German army have any interest in interfering with the internal affairs and organization of the Domobrans?
A. They were interested in the sense that one knew if the brigade was assigned a certain tactical assignment they should carry it out as we wanted them to and there are certain internal tactical and military principles and as we were dealing with an allied state they were given German orders as their model and according to these principles they had their people trained and led their people.
Q. But the Germans took no interest whatsoever, for example, in the personnel of the Domobrans or the Ustasha. They didn't attempt to regulate who was and who was not suitable for a certain position nor did they attempt to improve or change the internal organization of any of these units?
A. No, I at least had no influence whatsoever on it nor did I ever bother about this. At the most, as I said before, if somebody failed I would then on the official channel which I have described before make a report that this particular officer perhaps may not be quite suitable for his particular post. I can remember, for instance, that on one occasion I did this in the case of one officer in BanjaLuka or somewhere like that, and then he was replaced by someone else. That was the only type of influence I could afford but any direct intervention in the personnel problems I was in no position to do nor had I any cause to do so.
Q. I want to hand you document NOKW-975 which we will introduce as -- no, I am sorry, that has already been introduced as Exhibit 253. It is in Document Book X, page 34 of the English.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: What is the exhibit number, Mr. Fulkerson?
MR. FULKERSON; 253, your Honor. That is page 34 of the English, Document Book X and 27 of the German.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
Q. I realize that this order which is dated January 9, 1943, was before your time but I want to direct your attention to paragraph 2 and 3 of it, Would you mind reading those aloud, please, Sir? And then giving us the benefit of your comments on that?
A. Paragraph 2 reads as follows: "All armed Croatian units in the area designated under 1 are subordinate to the divisions. As far as possible, the Croatian authorities are to be left with a certain responsibility of their own. It is not desirable to tear up the Croatian units which have just been put in order.
"3. It is of the utmost desirability to bring in replacements and to reorganize the Croatian Wehrmacht, if necessary to clean out; Ustasha units, in so far as this has not been done up to now, are to be inserted into the Croatian Land Wehr and they are to be organized into units, not below battalion strength."
I would like to explain about this. As you said yourself, this order dates 7 January 1943, issued by the Commander of German troops in Croatia who was my predecessor. I myself therefore do not know this order, of course. All I can conclude in this matter is that at that time the Croatian Wehrmacht in all probability was still being formed and now it was intended by the Germans to support this.
All I can say is that when I was down there, any interference with the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Ustasha could not possibly have occurred in that extent because during my time these units were more or less ready, which becomes also clear from paragraph 3. As I have always testified so far, I spoke of Ustasha battalions as little as possible, but in paragraph 3 you can see that at that time no Ustasha battalions existed at all but that they were about to be established and also in that respect by the German Wehrmacht or at least by the Commander of the German troops in Croatia, who was also the territorial commander -- a certain amount of influence was taken on this. This is the only thing I can deduce from this order.
When I was down there, any such intervention did no longer take place, as after all there was a Croatian Ministry of War in existence and if there were any personnel matters involved, as I mentioned before, General von Glaise who was the German Commander in Croatia at the time was the liaison officer with the Croatian authorities. During my period of time, this no longer had any effect.
Q. Is there any reason to suspect, General, that paragraph 3 of this order was not carried out by General Leuders before you went down there?
A. That it was not carried out you mean?
Q. Yes, is there any reason to think that it was not?
A. I can't say that at all. I don't know.
Q. Well, if it had been carried out, the result would be that by the time you arrived the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Ustasha had already been cleaned out by the Germans and reorganized?
A. Yes, that I think has been done.
Q. And you think that -
A. We had also an army inspector, a German General, who had the assignment of organizing the Croatian Wehrmacht. As you said yourself, the Croatian state was a very young state. They had to build up something first and in that they were by us Germans supported.
Q. Not only supported but screened according to this order?
A. If somebody has the order of establishing something, he must have a certain amount of authority to interfere when he notices that there are mistakes here or there and perhaps at that particular period of time it must have appeared to the German General that the organization was not a very good one and that most likely is why he made these propositions, but of course I myself cannot say very much about that order because I do not know what the conditions were at the time. I do not know the reasons behind it.
Q. But it is your impression in any case that the Croatian Wehrmacht was organized by the German army?
A. Yes, well this happens quite often all over the place that small states are being supported by bigger states in their military equipment for organizational purposes.
Q. Well at the time that -- during the period say, between the surrender of Yugoslavia and the organization of the Croatian Wehrmacht, then there were no armed forces in Croatia except the German army and these bandits that you have been describing?
A. Well, the bandits were no army.
Q. No, but I don't want to get into an argument with you about the organization of the bandits right now, but I put it this way, that during the period while the German army was helping the Croatian state to organize its own army, the country was occupied by the German army and that was the only regular army in your opinion in existence there?