A I cannot say when the Croatian army was established. I am inclined to assume that at the moment when the Croatian government was formed, they began at once to establish a Wehrmacht but I am not sure.
Q But you are positive that this army inspector was put in charge of the task of organizing the Domobrans along German lines?
A Yes, according to German meaning, according to our orders, etc. he will probably have done it that way.
Q But you don't know whether part of this assignment of his was to furnish arms and ammunitions for the Domobrans?
A No, there is nothing I can tell you about that. I really don't know.
Q What kind of arms did the Domobrans have? What was their standard infantry rifle, for example?
AAs far as I can remember, it was the German infantry rifle.
Q Which of course fired the same sort of ammunition as the German rifles?
A Yes.
Q What sort of ammunition did -- where did they get the ammunition from?
A If they were German rifles, the German ammunition must have come from Germany.
Q Well, was the same true of the other small arms? For example, the sub-machine guns, the machine pistol?
A I said before I am not quite clear about this, whether the Croatian state had ammunition factories of their own, -- it is quite possible, in which case they probably produced these things there also.
Q But there was the Domobrans was organized in such a way that its equipment was interchangeable with the German Wehrmacht equipment?
A From a point of view of arms, I think this is true up to a point but not from a point of view of uniforms. They had their own uniforms.
Q Was the same true of the Ustasha units? What sort of arms did they have? Was their equipment interchangeable with the Domobrans and with the German Wehrmacht as well?
A I believe so, yes, but I am not entirely certain about this, but I am inclined to think so.
Q They too used the German Mauser infantry rifle?
A I don't know. I assume so.
Q So that to sum up once more, both the Domobrans and the Ustasha were organized under the auspices of the German army? At least, that is what you think?
A It must have been that way because the Croatian state hadn't existed before. It was only being formed at that time. At the time of the existence of Yugoslavia there was no Croat state; therefore it can only have happened in that period of time.
Q And the German army furnished experts to organize and train the troops?
A Yes. People who trained them were supplied.
Q And they were armed with German equipment which was interchangeable with the equipment that the Wehrmacht used?
A I said yes several times to this; I am not quite certain.
Q And they were organized according to the pattern of the German army?
A No, that is not entirely correct. They had certain things which we no longer had.
Q Well, generally speaking?
A Well, all armies of the world are more or less organized in the same way. Sometimes you call one thing a brigade and in another case you call it a division but as a matter of principle there are a great many similarities, there are battalions, platoons etc.
Q And then after the Domobrans and the Ustasha had been organized and armed and trained by the Germans, then their various units were made tactically subordinate to the German units in whose area they were stationed?
A What happened was that after the capitulation of the Yugoslavs, the entire area was occupied by German troops.
Thereupon, under this occupation which existed, the Croat state, this young state, formed its own army which takes a certain amount of time. Now as this young state was an ally of Germany's, it goes without saying that Germany would support this enterprise.
Q Now then, aside from the German Wehrmacht, including the Croatian divisions, the Domobrans and the Ustasha, there was another group of people who customarily bore arms or at least who, according to you, had arms and they were the Cetnik units. Now they were also tactically subordinate to you, I believe, were they not?
A You can't put it that way; the Cetniks were not an army. The Cetniks were bands, and in the Croatian area, these Cetniks by virtue of the fact that numerically speaking they were small, they had to link up with somebody. It has been mentioned here before as the conflict between the Croats and the Serbs was a great one, the Cetniks were a Serb organization which probably existed in some form before and who now in the Serb area under Mihailovic were as certain insurgent movement. In my interrogations, I have stated that in the area of the XV Corps, the Cetniks who otherwise fought the Germans under Mihailovic would during my period of time and in my area not fight against us but that was purely a matter of expediency on the part of the leader of the Cetniks because he had to realize that first of all he was numerically superior and if he would not attach himself to the German Wehrmacht or at least not establish friendly relations, he would not only face the Wehrmacht but also the Croats and as a third opponent whom he regarded as his most important enemy he would face the Tito bands which is the reason why we in some cases helped the Cetniks--in order to make it possible that they might protect themselves, we put them into villages populated by Serbs and allowed them to form an organization known as the Cetnik bands in order to protect their own villages against Tito bands, but that does not mean that the Cetniks can be put on the same level as the German or Croat Wehrmacht. It was never an army in that senses you can't make that comparison at all.
Q Nevertheless, regardless of what you call them, there were certain Cetniks groups or units regardless of whether they had a formal organization or whether they wore uniforms, there were such units in Croatia and you were ordered to disarm them and you didn't disarm them, and you gave as your reasons, first, that to disarm them would mean that they would be annihilated either by the Tito bands or by the Ustasha; and second, as long as they had arms they would fight the Tito bands and to that extent would help you out. Is that not true?
A Of course, they helped us out up to a point because they were fighting Tito. This only proved that Tito who was not a Croat nor a Yugoslav, but if they regarded themselves to be the successors of the Yugoslav army. You can't have two Yugoslav armies. That simply proved that both those organizations were not a Yugoslav army. They were simply bands or Cetniks units.
Q And actually the only difference between them, in your opinion, is that the Tito bands, to use your own phrase, or the partisans were fighting against you, while the Cetniks were fighting with you?
A You can't really say they fought with us. On certain occasions, they opposed the Tito bands in order to protect themselves.
Q Well, in these daily reports to the XV Corps, by various divisions isn't it true that time after time you see mention of various Cetniks units and their activities? For example, do you remember, the one in which the Cetnik reconnaissance detachment took a certain number of prisoners, shot 13 of them and I believe turned two loose -- I don't want to argue about that document, but I just want to call to your attention that these things were mentioned. Well now -
A I explained at the time that we had orders then that all occurrences in my area were to be reported, no matter whether they concerned subordinate units or whether they concerned any other unit at all, so that we would be kept up to date and in order to take stops if and when necessary.
Q Well, but if these Cetnik units had not been tactically subordinate to these divisions and had not reported to the divisions what had happened, then these incidents would not appear in the division reports, would they? How would the division know about them?
A Let me correct you first. They were never tactically subordinate. Tactically the Chetnik units were never subordinate to the divisions because they were not an army. Any subordination can only apply to a regular army or troop units, not to bands. But the divisions which hoar about those things by their channels, they had their definite sector and for tho sector they were responsible and whatever occurred in tho sector tho divisions would report.
Q Well, from time to time in those division reports weren't these Chetnik units actually given a number, such as -- I don't remember one offhand, but say the 373rd Chetnik Reconnaissance Detachment?
A No.
Q They were never given such a number? They were never identified as units operating with tho Division?
A I cannot recall any such document where a Chetnik unit had a number. I really don't know. It may be that the Tito bands call themselves Tito Brigade; that the Chetniks would, on location, appear in a report as such. That is quite possible. They all had names.
Q Well, wasn't it true that these detachments would, on occasion, report back to tho division when they had made an operation?
A That was probably handled differently in the various localities. It depended how tho units were treating the German troops. There were many Chetnik units who did not like us as tho occupying power - as no country will do and such units, perhaps, did not pass on reports. Others who were loss fanatic would report to tho division because they thought that would be the correct thing to do.
Q And generally speaking, these divisions that were not so fanatical, as you say, would cooperate with the Germans and would not do anything that was inimical to their interests?
A They had no cause really. If they were not hostile to us they would not do anything against us, surely.
Q Now, you said the other day that although you had an order to disarm these Chetniks that you didn't carry it out and you gave your reasons. Did you go further than that and, from time to time, furnish arms, actually furnish arms to these Ghetnik detachments?
A That also happened. If, in certain areas, the Serb villages were frequently raided by Tito bands what we did was to furnish arms so that those people could protect themselves and fight back against the bands. That only was a contribution to the pacification of the country, After all, our main interest was to have law and order and not have shooting all over the place. But if I am the occupation power there, surely it is my business to see to it that there is law and order.
Q At any rate, you didn't furnish arms, I take it, to groups of people unless yon were fairly sure that those groups of people were not going to use the arms on you or your man?
A I would like to emphasize once again that this was entirely an action dictated by expediency on our part. I frequently said you mustn't trust these people too far. Should there be an Allied landing it was highly doubtful whether those people wouldn't fight against us. We couldn't trust them a hundred percent, of course, but, on the other hand, it was in our interest to have as much peace and order as possible. We were not interested in having unrest. It would have boon much nicer for us if everybody had been peaceful and calm.
Q But you don't , seriously contend that you, as a responsible officer, furnished arms to groups of people unless their friendliness to the Germans had already boon demonstrated?
A That I think goes without saying. I wouldn't give arms to anybody. Negotiations had been going on how it was to be handled and people said for this or that reason and then, after these people had been screened, it might well be possible, although I cannot remember it in detail, they were given arms for their own protection; but one can still maintain at the same time whether it might be a hundred percent sure that they will always be nice to us; in the case of the Ghetniks at least who were more inclined towards the Allies, it was very doubtful.
Q Well, if you gave arms to anyone who was unfriendly toward the Germans, it was a mistake of judgment on your part; it wasn't because you knew that you were doing it, was it?
A They were not hostile to the Germans. Those who collaborated with us I can hardly regard as anti-German.
Q And there were units, actual units from time to time, who did collaborate on tactical operations with the German troops, did they not?
A Well, one should really form a different picture of that. By tactical operations you speak as though we had a regular troop there. If these reports say occasionally that the Chetniks had taken part this does not moan that they took part like a regular army. It simply means that the people in that neighborhood, in the Serb villages, would perhaps, once the operation touched upon their villages, would protect their own village in that area so that no Tito band could invade it or from their villages they sent out reconnaissance troops, perhaps, and then report to us; but the whole matter, of course, is connected with their tactical assignment.
But any tactical subordination in the purely military sense you could not possibly mention here.
Q Well, when they sent out a reconnaissance detachment, for example, and they discovered the positions and strength of the partisans in a certain locality and came back and reported to you, they were certainly carrying out what you would classify as a tactical task, weren't they?
A If you want to put it that way, yes.
Q If they hadn't done it some German reconnaissance detachment would have to do it, would it not?
A Yes.
Q Well, what is your justification for using these irregular, un-uniformed Chetniks as allies of the Germans on these tactical missions if you condemn this practice so heartily when the partisans used it? You say that that was a terrible thing on their part.
A Would you please repeat your question? I am afraid I didn't quite follow in detail.
Q It is simple enough. What was the difference between the German troops using armed, un-uniformed Chetnik bands for such things as reconnaissance and the Tito bands using armed, un-uniformed bands for the same purpose?
A We did not use Tito bands for our purpose.
Q I will ask the question again. What was the difference between the Germans using Chetnik un-uniformed armed bands in connection with its tactical operations and the Tito bands using armed, un-uniformed bands for their tactical operations?
A Well, this was entirely a matter of expediency.
A You seem to be so familiar with the Hague Convention regarding the use of uniforms and all. What was the difference, in so far as the International Law is concerned, between the one instance and the other?
A We used the Chetnik bands, if we used them at all, not as a regular army, but, as I said, as a protective or reconnaissance troop against the Tito bands. In other words, they helped us against our joint enemy; but that does not moan that I could make claim that the Tito bands are a regular army.
Q Well, when you used those people they were armed, were they not? You have already told us that they were.
A Yes.
Q And they presumably wore armed for the purpose of shooting people and according to these reports they did shoot people when they were out on these missions in connection with the German tactical operations?
A Yes.
Q So that for all practical purposes, so far as that operation was concerned, they were acting as an ally of the Germans just as you say the Domobrans and the Ustasha did. Is that not true?
A Yes.
A Well now, what is the justification -
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Fulkerson, at this time we will adjourn for lunch.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 hours (A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 14 November, 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
ERNST von LEYSER -- Resumed
DR. WEISGERBER: Dr. Weisgerber for General Speidel. Your Honors, I ask permission that my client may be absent from the court on next Monday in order to prepare his case.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That may be done. You may continue, Mr. Fulkerson.
CROSS EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q General, you have had an hour and forty-five minutes to think about the last question. What is your answer to it, please, sir? Do you remember what the question was?
A Yes. It concerned tactical subordination of these Chetnik units under the German divisions and troops. One cannot speak about this at all. The Chetniks were local protective units which, when an operation was carried out by the Germans, joined these; but one really cannot say that we committed them into action.
Q Well, I may have misunderstood you but I thought on direct examination that you said something along this line, that you ordered Ustasha detachments not to be put in Serbian villages and for Chetnik detachments not to be put in Croatian villages. Is that right?
A Yes. I said something like that. In the area there between the Knin and Zara there were various Serbian villages. In addition, after the whole area was cleared of large bands, there were Croatian authorities there who then called managed affairs in these villages. Then came the Chetniks and Ustasha, that is, Serbs and Croats -- into friction with each other because these were purely Chetnik regions and in order to avoid this we ordered that no Ustasha -- and here it wasn't a question of armed Ustasha but general Ustasha -- were to be stationed in these Serbian villages and these Serbian villages had their own Chetnik protective units.
Q Well, when you used a reconnaissance detachment of Chetniks did you form the band -- did you organize the band yourself or did you take one that was already organized and in being, so to speak?
A I think one must imagine it in this way: If the German troops undertook an operation in one "area and there was a Serbian village there and in this village there was a Chetnik unit, then this Chetnik unit joined, during this operation, with the German troops probably, because at the same time it guard edits own locality. It isn't so that the Germans collected the Chetnik units together or organized them, but these Chetnik units were a certain kind of self-protective units in organization with the consent of Croat government and then these people themselves sent out reconnaissance troops which were at the same time a security for them and also because we wanted to cut out an operation in this area they were also at the same time reconnaissance units for us* Since they were not in opposition to us, they, of course, let us know the results of their reconnaissance.
Q Well, did you make a practice of using other un-uniformed groups other than the Chetniks as allies of yours?
A What kind of allies could they be?
Q That is what I an asking you. We have covered the Domobrans.
A No.
Q These were the only troops that you used or the only troops, let's put it this way, who acted in liaison with the German troops who were not uniformed, not regular troops?
A Yes, just as I have described about the Chetniks who joined us by themselves.
Q Now, about this Croatian independent state, we have discussed the organization of their armed forces and the relationship of their armed forces to the German Armed Forces. Are you under the impression that the Pavelic Government was given the popular support of the population down there?
Let me put it to you this way: Do you think that the Pavelic Government could have stayed in power had it not been for the presence of the German Army?
A Well, I can't say that at all, because I don't know the conditions at all.
Q Well, if you don't know, who would? We have had affidavit after affidavit which describes how assiduously you went all over the country inspecting conditions to find out what was going on yourself and you were down there for some time. You didn't have an opportunity to form an opinion about that subject?
A Yes. As to this I must say that, of course, I knew only a small sector. I only knew that part which lay in my sphere. How the whole matter would have turned out if we hadn't been there, well, I can't say.
Q How many sectors were there as regards the German Army? I mean by that, how many corps sectors was Croatia divided into?
A It had three corps sectors.
Q The 15th Mountain Army Corps and the 69th Mountain Army Corps and what was the other one?
A The Fifth SS Corps.
Q And your sector, that is to say, the Sector of the 15th Army Corps comprised an area of about what percentage of the total area of Croatia?
A That would probably be about a third.
Q Well, how long, actually, did the Pavelic Government last after the German left?
AAs long as I was there the Pavelic Government was in power, i.e. until the end of the war; that is, until the end of April, 1945, when I went away.
Q Well, have you any idea how long this independent Croatian State survived the withdrawal of the German troops?
A The Croatian troops also withdrew with the German troops. Ten days or 14 days after I left, that is, when peace was concluded, everything had come to an end. When the last fighting took place I don't know whether Zagreb was also given up, that I don't know.
Q I am not asking you now about military operations. I am just asking you how long the independent Croatian state lasted after the German troops left.
A I don't know.
Q Nov, you said the other day that in all matters affecting the Croatian populace -- and that included the Ustasha -- the Domobrans as well as the civilians -- that the Croatian authorities had to be consulted. For example, you said that when the matter of shooting hostages arose the German divisional commander was supposed to consult with the Croatian Liaison Officer; is that right?
A Yes, and this was based on an order of the Armed Group dated the 22 of December, 1943. That was exactly laid down in this order.
Q But isn't it a fact, General, that the Croatian Liaison Officer was only consulted as to the selection of the particular victims after the decision by the Germans to shoot somebody had already been made?
AAs to this, I can only say that in my sector such an occurrence took only place once and it was surely dealt with according to the provisions which I have just mentioned.
Q Well what part did the Croatian Liaison Officer take in these decisions? Was he consulted by the German Divisional Commander as to whether in his opinion reprisal measures were justified or was he only consulted after the decision to take reprisal measures had already been made. That's what I want to know.
A I wasn't present at those conversations but according to the order it says quite clearly that the Divisional Commander has to get in touch with the Croatian authorities and the decision rests with the representative of the Croatian Government. Therefore, I must assume and I was not reported to the contrary that that is what took place.
Q You mean that in every case of an execution of hostages it is your impression that the Divisional Commander first consulted with the Liaison officer who then in turn consulted with the local authorities who then in turn consulted with Zagreb or something to that effect?
A No, the Liaison had full authority. He didn't have to ask questions back but he had the decision in his own hands. Therefore, he could say yes, one must imagine that this was a mutual conversation between the Divisional Commander and the Liaison man and if the two say that this is absolutely necessary that this thing is carried out.
Q Well, some of the reprisal measures, some of the hangings and shootings took place a very short time after the occurrence or the act which inspired them, for example: in the case that you refer to where this railroad was dynamited on 25 January and the hostages were hanged on the 26th. The Croatian Liaison Officer must have been a pretty quick witted fellow to make his decision and selection in that short a time, wasn't he?
I don't think that is how the conditions were. From all documents which were submitted with regard to this incident it follows that one day or a few days previously the hostages had already bean seized and as I have also seen from the documents I think there were 23 cases of dynamiting and according to regulations first of all the hostages were seized as a warning to the population; the population had been warned and then they were told if further sabotage acts should occur then we really mean business about the whole thing and the hostages will be shot. This moans that this last railway sabotage act was the eventual cause why now by reason of all the many preceding incidents of that kind of reprisal measures were taken. It doesn't mean that for this individual case the 20 were hanged.
Q Well, on the other hand I believe that you testified on direct examination that so far as these 22 hostages who were hanged are concerned you didn't have any independent recollection on the matter at all. You didn't personally recall it. It is only from the documents that you know anything about it?
A Yes.
Q Therefore, your conclusion that the 22 people hanged on the 26th of January were part of the 36 people who had been arrested earlier is purely a surmise on your part, isn't it?
A Yes, it is a logical conclusion on the basis of the documents.
Q It doesn't exclude the conclusion that these might have been 22 different people?
A But according to these documents I must assume that this was the case.
Q But if your surmise is correct, General, then it is an absolute certainty that these people who were hanged could have had nothing to do with the railroad dynamiting on the 25th of January, isn't it?
A Of course they were in connection with this matter; the seizing of hostages was a reprisal measure which was threatened and if the affair takes place then use will be made of them; that is, it was previously threatened.
Q If these 22 people who were hanged were part of the 36 people who had been arrested 3 or 4 weeks earlier they could hardly have had anything to do with the railroad dynamiting which took place while they were in custody, could they?
A I don't know if it was four or five weeks before. I don't know. It could be and if you say that then it probably it is so.
Q Assuming that that is correct, I believe actually that there was a period of 3 or 4 weeks between the arrest of the 36 hostages and the hanging of the 22; assuming that that is correct, then what is your answer to the question?
4 Then, it is quite possible that these hostages were seized and the civilian population were threatened and were warned that if the sabotage acts continued then hostages would be shot for these acts.
Q Have, you noticed an instance anywhere in all these documents where the Croatian authorities protested against specific arrests or against specific executions and that as a result of that protest the Germans changed their decision?
A No, I can't remember that I read that in the documents.
Q Well, so much for the independent Croatian state. We will pass now from fiction to what you call humor. I want to talk now about Document NOKW 1331 which is in Book XV; it is Exhibit 367, page 13 of both the English and the German. The specific passage that I want to talk about is on page 25 of the English and on page 24 of the German. This is the little resume of the subjects of conversation between you and General Rendulic on November 5, 1943. The report says that General Rendulic -- I'm sorry, it is on page 24 of the German Document Book and page 18 of the photostat. Now, your explanation for this on direct examination was that whoever wrote this entry was simply being facetitious when he said that General Rendulic proposed that a 1,000 band suspects be shot and 1,000 additional hostages be arrested. Is that correct?
A I said this-- this is how I said it: If General Rendulic had mentioned any figures at all then of course he never meant this figure seriously. That's what I said. I didn't say that tho man who had taken down the minutes had put down wrong numbers. I didn't say that.
Q No, but I believe your explanation was that he was simply being humorous; that he was simply being facetitious.
A No, I just said I can't remember the figures and if the General had mentioned them he certainly didn't mean it seriously. That's what I meant.
Q Do you recall this particular conversation?
A Yes, I can remember that this was one of the first discussions and I can remember that I was there, but I really can't remember how this was literally expressed.
Q This was tho first time that you talked to your immediate commanding officer after you went to tho Southeast and you don't recollect what was said about a proposal to shoot hostages.
A It wasn't the first time but from the war diaries it can be seen that already in October I was there for the first time and there it was agreed that I should come once again to the Army after having previously found out about things with my Corps. And then on the 5th of November as it shows here I flew there and those were the points of discussion which we talked about there.
Q. What is your explanation for this figure, 1,000 band suspects, and that is, it seems to me, not simply a typographical error, since, it is pre-fixed by a rather large number, what is your explanation for how that crept into there, if that isn't what was said.
A. I have already said that I was there and General Rendulic wanted to make the importance of Banja-Luka clear to me. First of all Banja-Luka was the old capital of Croatia and consequently the Croatian Government didn't want it to come under Tito's occupation and such sort of things were talked about in the discussion. It was probably said this and that is very important and in case of certain events such and such steps have to be taken and I think when the minutes were taken then the most important points were put down. The whole discussion was not put down literally.
Q. What was your response to this proposal?
A. I don't know any more. Perhaps I didn't say anything at all. Perhaps I just realized that this was a very important locality.
Q. You went down to the Southeast and passed through General Rendulic's headquarters on the way to the Corps and then you stayed with the Corps and looked the situation over and then you came back and had your first serious conference with General Rendulic and at this conference he proposed to shoot 1,000 people and you don't have any recollection of that, nor of what you said to him in response?
A. I really don't know what I answered.
Q. Now, then, let's look at the part here in parenthesis at the end. General Rendulic has already told us what fine relations existed between him and the Fuehrer. Now then here is a reference to a conversation between the Fuehrer and General Rendulic on the 16th of September. What was that conversation about?
A. This conference General Rendulic probably had with the Fuehrer and in it they probably talked about Banja-Luka and they probably said that it was a very important place and it had to be held under all circumstances.