The German Military Commander on the Peloponnessus.
His Majesty the Emperor and King and Marshal Badoglio have solemnly declared on 25 July 1943 that the war on Germany's side will be continued, and that Italy will abide by its given word. Because of political pressure they could not realize this intention. At present you have only the following alternatives: You and your troops remain our old allies and continue to fight with us against the common foe. In that case, you will be subject to German leadership, which will take care of you and your troops as much as possible. You are to issue immediately the orders required for that purpose. Unreliable leaders or troops have to be reported to me without delay.
Or You have the desire to cease the fight and to return peacefully to your homeland.
In that case you are ordered to surrender and secure all your military equipment in perfect condition to the German Wehrmacht, so that nothing will fall into enemy hands.
You and your troops, who up to now have courageously fought on our side as our close comrades in arms, remain our good friends. You and your troops will be granted an honourable evacuation back to your homeland. The officers will, of course, retain their weapons, All non-commissioned officers and enlisted men their side arms. On the other hand, it will not be permitted that any additional war equipment or army stocks are taken along. The Army Group will at an early date arrange for the orderly evacuation of your troops by rail.
Should any of your troops have the objectionable intention of joining the enemy, this plan will be prevented by armed force. Telephone conversations and teletype messages are prohibited. The troops will be guarded in their billets by German troops. Until further notice, supplies will be provided by German Wehrmacht authorities.
(Signed) FELMY
Q General, following up this proclamation, were measures taken in accordance with the proclamation?
A Yes, I know of no case where measures were not taken according to the directives in the proclamation. The opinion, as I judged, it at that time, and my own attitude toward the Italians, becomes quite clear from the wording of the proclamation.
Q I now offer from document book 5, document No. 98 on page 34, it is offered as exhibit 32 and I beg to read this document:
"1st Armored Division Commander - 15 September 1943:
A The Commanding General of the Corps General Staff LXVII. Army Corps directed the letter enclosed in enclosure 1 to the Monarchs of Nauplia, Patras, Pirgos, Tri polia, Kalamata, and Sparta.
B In the area of the division the announcement, attached as enclosure 2, is to be forwarded to the prefects of Nauplia, Patras and Pirgos through the territorial commanders. They are to be posted up in all municipalities.
C The feeling of relief and the joy of the population because of the departure of the Italians are to be followed up as far as possible, the now re-established order is to be emphasized on all occasions. In this connection the following orders are, in particular, issued herewith:
1.) Peace and order in the country must be maintained by all possible means. Our own forces are to be kept to the strictest discipline. From now on I will have prosecuted any violation of discipline, as well as looting, unlawful requisitioning of food, too low payments etc. without mercy by Court Martial. I warn all commanders and loaders of units of the grave consequences of any failure in proper official supervision.
2.) Any interference in internal Greek affairs is prohibited. Maintenance of internal order is left to the Greek authorities of police, civil administration and judiciary.
They are, in their work, to be assisted in every respect.
3.) In each nomarch 100 trustworthy policemen are to be nominated by the nomarch who are available for carrying out police measures. After having been screened they are to be equipped with one carbine each, if possible with an additional pistol (revolver). The territorial commanders will issue the police with weapons stored by the Italians, where they cannot be found, or prove insufficient. Italian weapons should be used. The nomarchs are to be warned that they are personally responsible for the safeguarding of the weapons. In doubtful cases the Chief of military police 81 is prepared to answer all questions.
4.) 20 additional Greek policemen are to be armed by Station Headquarters Corinth, who will be subordinated to the Military Police Force 81 for the purpose of the bridge control Corinth.
5.) All prisons are to be checked up with the assistance of the Secret Military Police (G.F.P.) Pro-German Prisoners, incarcerated by the Italians, are to be set free. Members of enemy states interned are to be brought to the Secret Military Police group 640, Pricus. The guarding of the prisons is left to the Greek police, as well as the food supply. In case prisoners have been caught of importance for our own forces (agents, spies, saboteurs), a special non-commissioner is to be assigned for supervision during the time of their detention.
In order to satisfy the ardent craving for news of the Greek population the printing-works will be opened without delay. The newspapers issued will be scrutinized. One copy each is to be sent to the division section Ic, another copy by courier direct to the Corps General Staff for special assignment LXVIII Army Corps Ic.
For announcements from the territorial commanders a special column on the first page will be reserved. Besides announcements of orders, the territorial commanders will have to lay stress on influencing the population, particularly in the fight against communist organizations.
In the first place original ideas, adapted to local conditions, should be published. Excerpts from German radio news are to be forwarded to the papers. Supply of leading articles will be done by the propaganda platoon.
7.) Censorship of mail and telegrams will be abolished, and replaced by spot-check censorship through the territorial commanders. Suitable officials of the Greek administration will participate in this censorship.
8.) Contact is to be made with all organizations offering their co-operation, reports will be, at the same time, made to the division.
9.) Restrictions of the personal liberty of the population, ordered as a first measure of the state of siege, may be relaxed by the territorial commanders at their own discretion. In places where there is still a greater number of interned Italians, the population should be barred from the streets after dusk, until they have been transported away. The Greek population is to be kept away from the Italian internees.
By order (signed) Soeth, Colonel."
Colonel Sooth at that time deputized for the commander of the 1st Armored division because the latter deputized for General Felmy, commanding general of the LXVIII Corps. General Felmy was at that time in charge of Army Group Southern Greece.
The proclamation mentioned in the present document to the Nomarchs is the next document, which I would like to offer now. It is part of the same document and it is on page 36a;
"The German Commander on the Peloponnesus - 15 September 1943. To the Nomarchs in.........(blank). I believe there were six or seven of these, a nomarchy corresponds, as far as I can ascertain, roughly to a Landkreisin Germany and is the same size:
It is my firm will that, after the elimination of the Italian occupation forces, are now, after I have taken over the supreme command over all the German forces on the Peloponnesus, the country now entrusted to my protection shall regain absolute police order and security of law. Wherever any subordinate command or unit should in future become guilty of unlawful and arbitrary actions against the population, I will act with ruthlessness and severity. Every Greek citizen will be granted the right to complain against encroachments to the nearest German command.
Likewise, I assure the peaceful Greek population that I will give them my full military protection against the criminal activities of the predatory rabble of bands.
I hold you, in the area of your nomarchy, responsible for assisting me in my endeavours to preserve the police order and the reign of the law with the help of your official agencies to the fullest extent.
As a first measure, I have ordered that for the area of your nomarchy 100 trustworthy members of the rural police shall be re-armed and placed at your disposal for the execution of police measures. My intention is, in case this rural police proves to be worthy, to rearm gradually the entire rural police, disarmed formerly by the Italians.
I request you to see that the handbills you are receiving at the same time, containing my proclamation to the Greek population, are posted up in all the municipalities of your nomarchy in a place where it can be easily read. Beyond that, I expect that you impressively draw the attention of all the mayors of the municipalities of your nomarchy to the need for a good co-operation with the German occupation forces, and, that you see to it that future complaints against excesses of subordinate units-- if such should be raised -- will reach the competent military commands, so that just remedy may be done.
The German occupation force will confine themselves exclusively to their military task of warding off an attempt of invasion by the enemy, if any should be tried, in order to spare this country the horrors of a new war. We shall not interfere in the internal affairs of Greece.... It will be left exclusively to the Greek authorities of the police, the administration and the judiciary to maintain the internal order. They will be assisted in their task by the German Army in any possible way.
In this I have confidence in your being conscious of the supreme responsibility, resting upon you as the Nomarch, for the well being of tho province entrusted to you. (Signed): Krueger."
General Krueger was the commanding general of the 1st Armored division, and as I said before, deputized for General Felmy in his capacity as commanding general of the LXVIII Army Corps.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Now, let me turn back again to the document books of the prosecution. The next which is of interest now is Document Book XIII. The first document there is NOKW-898 which is Exhibit 314 on page 27 of the English and page 18 of the German. In this document we are concerned with the basic order by the OKW concerning the further treatment of those Italian soldiers who were not inclined to fight on the German side. According to this order, they were to be treated as prisoners of war and handed over to the suitable agencies for labor allocation.
Q. General, do you know this order?
A. In those days, after the Italian capitulation, a number of orders came in, one on top of the other. I cannot recall the details. Vecchiarelli's army had capitulated, had given up its arms, and there was, therefore, no reason to take any measures in the army area.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next document which I would like to discuss in this connection is on page 42 of the English and page 29 of the German book. It is NOKW-916, Exhibit 323. This document represents detailed directives issued by the OKW concerning the treatment of the Italian armed forces. The date is 15 September 1943.
Q. General, did you receive that order at the time and did you pass it on?
A. I am sure that we received it but there again I do not recall the details even if I look at it now. I said before the concentrating and transporting away of the Italians was in full swing at that time.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please, because of the connection in facts there, I should like to discuss another document here which is not contained in the same volume. It's contained in Volume XIX. It is NOKW-1016 on page 13 of the English and page 8 of the German book. It's Exhibit 445.
This document is a teletype letter by the 68th Corps addressed to the 1st Panzer Division on 16 September 1943 concerning the treatment of Italian units who turn over their arms to insurgents and further made common cause with the insurgents.
This wording allows for two basic conditions before the Italians were being dealt with. It amounts to a definite modification of the order which had come down from higher head quarters. The teletype letter also contains an additional paragraph by the Army Group Southern Greece according to which the shooting by court martial of officers by the divisional commander -- that is to say, not be some subordinate units -- it to be ordered.
Q. General, do you recall that order?
A. No, I do not recall any of the details.
Q. These orders concerning the treatment of Italians -- did they become of any practical importance in your area at all?
A. No, our situation was more fortunate than those of other army sectors. The disarming of the Italians in my area had proceeded very smoothly. The concentrating of Italian units, their transporting to Athens and their transporting away from there was in full swing. These assignments clained the time of the army group completely.
I once before pointed out that the situation was extremely acute. At first we were in no position to know whether or not the Italians would surrender and whether the disarming would proceed without fighting. Parts of the units had to be alerted for that contingency all the time. Other forces were necessary to collect the arms, the ammunition, vehicles---in short, the whole of the equipment of the Italian units, and to guard them, of course, because these things were extremely valuable and ultimately not the least important was to take over by our own forces the strong points which the Italians had evacuated.
I said before, had the Allies attacked at that time they could have taken Greece in one go. A landing from the air, or from the sea, along the Southern Greece area was entirely possible. In Attica and Boetia where I was a greenhorn, so to speak -- the Peloponnes I knew like my waist-coat pocket - but in those areas -- Attica, Boetia and Euboea -- I had to improvise many things in order to establish safeguarding and, if possible, defensive measures and to get the situation under control.
Therefore, I left all office work to my chief of staff, General von Gyldenfeldt who had been German chief of general staff of the Italian army before that. He knew the various people much better than I did and for that reason he rather skillfully smoothed out all conflicts with the result that I in Athens was not faced with any surprises.
You had to bear in mind that, according to Italian statements, the number of the Italians leaving the Peloponnes and Crete amounted to about 160,000 men and around that period of time in Athens we as a unit had about 5,000 men, the one airforce Field Regiment. That was the situation and, therefore, it is hardly surprising that I no longer recall these individual teletype letters, telegrams and other things which came in the mail concerning the treatment of individual Italian units. These details I really can't recall any more.
Q. About this problem of the Italians, in order to bring it to a conclusion as regards the prosecution documents, I should like to draw attention to one document in this connection which is contained in Volume IX. It is on page 31, 32 of the English book and on page 27 of the German text. It's Exhibit 220.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute; will there be other references to documents prior to Document Book XII? We brought them in from XII on this morning. We are going to send out for this one. Will there be others?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please, I just wanted to a very brief passage in this document for the record.
It is not entirely necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Will there be others prior to Document Book XII that we will need this morning?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: No, not prior to Document Book XII.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I should like to turn now to some defense documents. The next document which I should like to offer is contained in Volume V for Felmy. It is Document 103 on page 54. It is offered as Exhibit 23. I offer it so that the picture will become quite clear of the situation as it developed at the time when the Italians surrendered in the area of the 68th Army Corps. This is an extract from the war diary of the 68th Army Corps for the period of time between 1 July and 31 December 1943. This document again has come from the Washington material. I shall read from page 55. It says there:
"At 2100 hours" -- this apparently means 8 September 1943 -"It has been announced by radio that Italy has allegedly concluded a truce with the Allies. For the time being this news item is considered to be Allied propaganda.
"2240 hours Wehrmacht Communications Command at Athens announces that the measures according to order by the communication chief of Army Group E, which were issued for code word "Axis", are to be put into effect in the communications service without delay.
"2300 hours Chief of General Staff receives confirmation by telephone after inquiry from Chief of the German General Staff with Italian 11th Army Corps High Command that news about Italian truce is true. Army Group E has already given code word "Axis". Passing on of the code word is being postponed as negotiations between Chief of German General Staff with Italian 11th Army Corps High Command and Supreme Commander of the Italian 11th Army. General Vecciarelli, are still in progress.
"2345 hours As the Commanding General is absent, being on an inspection tour in Patras, all German troops stationed on the Peloponnes are "alerted". Based on the radio announcement and having been alerted, the troops are able to prepare in good time for the expected measures following the code word "Axis". Everywhere inconspicious preparatory measures are being taken.
"The Commanding General in the Patras is informed by phone to go to Athens on the following day as quickly as possible, in order to continue the negotiations, and possibly to take over Army Group Southern Greece.
"9/9/1943 0500 hours First transport of VII Fortification Infantry Battalion 999 arrives on the island of Zante.
As the radio station of the battalion was left behind in Athens and will only arrive with the last transport, there is no direct connection between the VII Fortification Infantry Battalion and the High Command: (Radio connections only via Admiral Aegaeis).
0520 hours Order by telephone (later by radio) from German General Staff with 11th Italian Army Group High Command: Begin to put into effect measures "Axis": 0800 hours.
"0730 hours Commanding General flies from the aerodrome at Araxos to Athens to take over the command of Army Group Southern Greece."
"0800 hours. In the whole of the Command area, except the island of Zante, the execution of the measures ordered for the code word "Axis" commence: Taking over of heavy weapons, supply deports and communication connections, disarming and collecting of Italian troops. Nowhere is any resistance offered to the German measures on the part of the Italians. A large part of the Italian troops show their joy about the cessation of hostilities for Italy. Others are totally indifferent and passive. Only few express the desire to continue the fight on the side of the Germans.
"0900 hours 1st Armored Division reports that the bridge across the Corinth Channel is firmly in our hands, Barracks and local headquarters of Corinth have been occupied.
"0930 hours Commanding Officer of 1st Panzer Division, MajorGeneral Krueger, arrives in Wytina and assumes command of the LXVIII Army Corps. Colonel Soeth, has been given the command of the 1st Armored Division.
"1020 hours 1st Armored Division reports that the disarming of Italian troops in Corinth has been completed.
"1200 hours The division are ordered to leave, for the time being, the units detailed for taking over the Italian coast defense sectors and to place coast security groups right in front. The disarmed Italians whose evacuation is planned, are to be kept together. III./ Fortification Infantry Battalion 999 (Kyparissia) is tactically subordinated to the 117th Infantry Division, effective immediately.
"1430 hours. In a telephone message to Army Group Southern Greece the Strategic and Tactical Planning General Staff gives the following survey of the situation:"
THE PRESIDENT: May I inquire, Dr. Mueller-Torgow, as to how extensive you intend to continue as to the reading of these reports? It seems to me they are tactical reports which the Tribunal can give consideration to but it will take a lot of time and, unless it is absolutely necessary. I wouldn't think that anything in particular would be gained at this time by reading it into the record. I do not want to restrict you, though. Do you have some particular purpose in reading it all into the record?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: All I wanted to read was just the next paragraph, if the Tribunal please; but I shall do without it.
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, go ahead if you care to.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: In general, the taking over of the heavy weapons is completed. In the sector of the 117th Infantry Division hand weapons have partly been retained by the Italians. Almost all Italians with the 1st Panzer Division and the 965 Fortification Infantry Regiment have been disarmed. Of the coastal artillery in the sector of the 965 Infantry Regiment 1 naval coast battery 20, 3 (Cape Papas) and 3 betty batteries 12, 2 (north or Pirgos) have been taken over according to plan and are ready for defense action. The measures in the sectors Guthion and Sparta are still in progress; there have been no reports concerning Pilos."
May I read just a few more passages from this document so that we can see what effect the Italian surrender had on the hand situation particularly in the Peloponnese. Under 14 October 1943 it says in the third paragraph:
"Commanding Officer of 117th Infantry Division in appointed military commander for the Peloponnese. Authorities and units of the air force and Navy have been ordered to cooperate closely with the Commanding Officer of the 117th Infantry Division in as far as the defense of the Peloponnese is concerned.
Then from page 59, on top, second paragraph:
"Because of the constant increase of bandit attacks on the main roads of the Peloponnes orders are issued, immediately effective, that all individual trips with motor vehicles are prohibited and that convoy traffic is to be introduced.
"New instructions by the Army Group regarding the uniform conduct of the fight against Communism pursuant to the Fuehrer Cyder (see enclosure). According to this the political leadership of all operations against Communism is taken over by the Special Plenipotentiary for the Southeast, Envoy Neubacher, who amongst other things has the sole right to conduct negotiations with the bandit leaders or to approve of them."
Under 7 November 1943 I should like to draw attention to the second paragraph where it says:
"To the northeast of Kalamata a monastery which the bandits had turned into a fortress like building is destroyed by artillery fire. On searching it afterwards military equipment is found and some prisoners are taken."
3 paragraphs further down it says:
"The Regiment Brandenburg conducts a reconnaissance operation in the area of Akphissa-Arachowa at which 140 men of a bandit reserve company are captured."
And under 11 November 1943 it says in the second paragraph:
"Pursuant to Fuehrer Order permission is now given for the forma tion of Greek volunteer groups.
(Restrictions: Must not be placed in own front units for fighting the Anglo-Saxons, no sizable indipendent formations to be organized."
I am informed this entry was on the 12th of November -- not the 11th of November.
The next document I beg to offer is contained in Elmy Volume No. II. It is document No. 64 on page 57. It will be given exhibit number 34. This document is an affidavit by Heinz von Guldenfeldt who was once General. It says in paragraph 2:
"With regard to Count 3 of the indictment, figure 12-i, pages 17/18, I can confirm that within the area of the 68th Army Corps, as in the entire area of Southern Greece, no Italians were shot while they were disarmed and evacuated. The entire operation was carried out in the territory of Southern Greece without shedding one drop of blood."
The next but one paragraph reads:
"The negotiations with General Vecchiarelli on disarming had the result that he ordered his Italian troops in Southern Greece first to deliver the heavy weapons and then the light weapons; also the delivery of the motor vehicles, depots, etc., as well as the evacuation of the Italians was arranged with General Vecchiarelli or his delegate. Thus by the interference of the Italian Supreme Commander himself, it was achieved that the whole move was carried throughout without friction or bloodshed."
In order to make everything quite clear, I should like to point out that General von Gyldenfeldt was, as I believe I mentioned before, German General Chief of Staff with the 11th Italian Army.
The next document which I should like to cover is contained in the same volume. It is Document No. 58, on Page 24, and it is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 35. This is an affidavit by Rudolf Pohl. I shall read only the second and third paragraphs: "I was assigned from September, 1942 until the end of the war as chauffeur to the LXVIIIth Corps." I shall now read the third paragraph: "When the Italians were disarmed, no Italians were shot, as far as I know. At this time I was with many other German officers in the Italian camps: everything took place in an orderly way and without incident."
The next document to which I should like to come back is the affidavit given by Guenther Kleykamp in the same volume. The Document is No. 59, on Page 27 of Document book 2. It says there, under Roman I, on Page 27:
The 11th Italian Army was subordinated to the German Army Group E at Saloniki. The Army's area included almost all of Southern Greece as well as the Islands. The Army consisted of several Italian corps, composed partly of Italian and partly of German units, and of the German LXVIIIth Corps, composed of 2 Italian and 2 German divisions, on the Peloponnes.
Since the Italians considered exclusively their sphere of interests, the German influence was very small. This was shown especially in the capital, where the German Wehrmacht had been granted only part of Piraeus as its sphere of influence. The Italians did almost nothing to stem the increasing economic, financial and political deterioration in Greece and thereby to decrease the dangerously growing of the Commnists. Since the activity of the Greek partisans at that time was directed mostly against Italian and only little against German troops, the Italians were primarily interested in measures to protect their own safety. The Italian units were almost always stationed in garrisons located in large towns, and disliked, to undertake operations against the partisans, who ruled the country to an increasing extent.
After the capitulation of the Italian Armed Forces in Italy on 8 September 1943, "Army Group Southern Greece" was formed as directingstaff (Fuehrungsstab) for the troops stationed in Attika-Poeotia and the Peloponnes. It was possible to control the critical situation which had arisen danger to the defensive front on the Southern part of the Balkans.) General VECHIARELLI, the Commander-in chief of the 11th Italian Army, gave his approval to a peaceful demobilization and internment of those Italian forces, which did not want to fight on with the German Wehrmacht against the Allies. He issued orders to his Army, which contained regulations on the surrender of arms, the turning over of supply installations etc., to the German Wehrmacht as well as on the internment of Italian officers and soldiers. Corresponding orders were issued to the German troops by Army Group Southern Greece, the commander of which General FELMY had become in the meantime. The latter also contained an order, that any possible resistance be broken by force of arms. That however did not become necessary within the area of the Army Group, since the Italians almost without exception obeyed the orders of their Commander-in-chief, and since they desisted from hostile actions. Scattered resistance by local Italian commanders was eliminated by negotiations. In this manner, all the measures necessary for the security of the German positions within the area of Army Group Southern Greece, were carried out without friction. That however did not prevent the Italians from turning over their arms to the partisans or from selling them to other interested parties (thus Italian handgrenades, for instance, were still sold months later on the black market in Athens.) Neither compulsory measures nor yet shootings were carried out within the area of Army Group Southern Greece, as far as I know.
The Italian armed forces were demobilized while constant liaison existed between the Army Group and the Supreme Commander of the 11th Italian Army. The staff of the Italian Army continued to function until the most important measures had been carried out.
According to my recollection nothing that could be considered of international agreements, or the laws and customs of warfare, secured within the area of Army Group Southern Greece. In addition, our work in carrying out this operation was acknowledge in a written order by Army Group E, to which we were subordinated: Owing mainly to the successful negotiations conducted by the German General Staff at the 11th Italian Army and by the Army Group with the Italian Supreme Commander, the demobilization of the Italian armed forces - in all of Greece was carried out without friction - and with the exception of several cases outside the area of the Army Group - without bloodshed.
And the last document offered in this connection is contained in Felmy Document No. III. It is Document No. 76, on Page 33. It is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 36. It is an affidavit by Dr. Erich von Shaeure, who, at that time, was a military judge with the 117th Mountain Infantry Division. From Page 34 of this affidavit I should like to read the third paragraph: "I never heard anything on the Peloponneusus about the shooting of Italian officers and soldiers. The capitulation of the Italian Army was carried out in complete calm and order. The Italian officers willingly surrendered their weapons to us and wished us luck in our war against Comminism, which they hated."
Q General, what did the Germans do in order to hit back against band surprise attacks now that the Italians were no longer there?
A The German troops were facing an increasing activity of bands, which expressed itself in surprise attacks, and they did not know what to do at first because, up till then, their relations with the Greek population had been extremely good, and they could not understand why the situation should have become more tense. The OKW had issued its regulations for the fighting of bands, and they provided for very harsh measures. They were issued from the point of view that only if one takes extremely severe reprisal measures he will be able to intimidate the malicious elements and thereby bring them to give up their violations of International Law.
Q What was your attitude towards these orders, General?
A Personally I shared the opinion of the OKW only up to a point It seemed to me to be too rigid and too general. It did not take into consideration individual cases. Military necessity for reprisal measures depends on the extent and the circumstances. As a hard and fast rule, it seemed to me that the ratios ordered were very high, but there must have been a reason why the OKW decides on those ratios
Q Did you think that reprisal measures were necessary in every single case?
A We did not take reprisal measures for every incident. According to the Washington document, which came in belatedly, from the War Diary of the General Command, between July and December, 1943, I could see that from among 91 acts of sabotage--blowing up of railway lines and telephone communications, surprise attacks on vehicles, and other matters--reprisal measures were taken foronly 60. Nothing was done at all about the remaining 31 cases.
But this had two aspects. It was impossible to do nothing at all about these surprise attacks because the confidence of the troops in their leaders would have gone away. Officers and men would not have understood why murder s and mutilations of their comrades were not being avenged and why nothing happened to get the bands to give up their bolshevistic conduct of warfare for the troops had given no provocation for them to act as they did. Otherwise, the danger existed that the troops or individual soldiers, in an entirely natural excitement, would act independently on their own and go out and carry out their own reprisal measures of some sort.
Q General, is it your view that the surprise attacks would have diminished or ceased altogether if reprisal measures would not have been taken at all?
A The terror by the bands would not have ceased. It would have grown to such an extent that the mission of the Corps would not have been possible of realization any more. After all, one can see what happens in Greece today, and nowadays they can act with quite different measures than we could at the time. An amnesty has just been issued but it did not bring about any essential change. I won't say another word, Mr. Fenstermacher.
Q General, as a topic, I would like to give you "the surprise attacks on the Air Force Field company.
A That was the turning point. This surprise attack was near Inoy-to spell it:I-N-O-Y- which is to the north of Eleusis. This is Eleusis along the Athens-Corinth Road, and along the Athens-Thebes Road is Inoy to the north of Eleusis. There in the second half of October, 1943 the Company suffered a surprise attack. Some of them were shot down.
A third of the remainder were slaughtered in a bestial manner. Air Force soldier Doerner--D O-E-R-N-E-R--who suffered a knife wound near his ribs - the knife slid off his rib - fought his way back to the troops, was treated in a hospital, and then he was interrogated by court-martial Judge Buschenhagen. I would liked to have called him as a witness so that he could tell this Tribunal, from his own experiences, how the bands observed International Law, but he is a prisoner of the Yugoslavs; so I could not contact him. In this slaughtering I saw clearly, for the first time, what influence Bulgarian Communist elements had. A thing like that had not happened in the Peloponnes up to that moment, and we did not take any reprisal measures. I must admit that this was a very difficult decision for me to reach because, after all, I had to be straight-forward with my troops and shoulder the responsibility. All that happened was that the military experiences were analyzed and passed on to the divisions. I should like to say this was the dilemma that I faced: was I to take reprisals immediately or must I, once more, use other methods and means in order to bring about a change? So we dropped pamphlets and sent wireless messages and used other types of propaganda in order to try to influence the bands so that they would fight decently.