But we soon saw that this was a complete failure. The situation did not improve, but it grew worse.
Q May I, in this connection, offer a document which is contained in Felmy Document Book II? It is Document No. 63, on Page 54, and it is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 37. This document is an affidavit by General Drum, who, at that time, was the Commending Officer of the 11th Air Force Field Division, between January and October, 1943, and as such he was subordinate to General Felmy. I should like to read a few extracts from this document. On Page 54 it states in the second paragraph:
"In September or October, 1943 (I no longer remember the date) a company of the 21st Air force Jaeger Regiment..." I might interpolate that this Company is the one to which General Felmy has just had reference. "...was subordinate to me, together with a platoon of the Police Regiment stationed near Eleusis happened to get into a trap of bandits in the mountains northeast of Eleusis, east of the road Athens-Thebes on the return from a reconnaissance patrol. The company was almost completely annihilated by concentrated machinegun fire and other weapons from the steeply mounting heights all around a narrow basin. The company leader and all the officers with the major part of the company and the Police Platoon were found dead (over 100). Only a few soldiers (5-6) were able to save themselves and report the incident. About 30 men, most of them wounded, fell into the hands of the bandits, a soldier of the company who was badly wounded from being stabbed into the chest with a knife later succeeded in escaping under unspeakable difficulties and troubles, disguised as a bandit. He was the only survivor among the prisoners."
I might interpolate here that this is the man Doerner whom General Felmy has mentioned.
"He reported that all those taken prisoners after the raid had been slaughtered in a brutal way by the bandits. Their bellies had been ripped open with knives so that they died in dreadful pains.
"On the day after the raid the 21st Airforce Jaeger Regiment with 2 battalions under the leadership of the regiment commander, Brigadier General Pawelke, was assigned upon my order to fight the bandits however it did not succeed, since the bands after a short rearguard action retreated into the mountains as usual. The regiment did neither succeed in taking prisoners nor in finding any dead on the battle-field, so that no clear information could be obtained on the strength and membership of the bands. I, personally, was in the battalion which was assigned on the right flank during the battle and could see about 300 retreating bandits. On the evening of the same day I reported to General Felmy on this as well as on the outcome of the whole battle. Although the raid and the brutal slaughtering had embittered him, as well as all the troops and staffs in Greece in general, General Felmy did not order any reprisals in spite of the fact that just during that time raids and cruel brutalities against the supply lines on the road AthensThebes, as well as in other places, were increasing. The motives for the mildness which Felmy showed at that time as well as on every occasion were to be attributed to his extremely decent and noble personality. He avoided harsh measures even when they were justified and it was not in his nature to pay off in the same coin. His opinion in this case was, that the bandits had to be annihilated in battle, that, however, reprisals should not be taken against the population as long as its cooperation with the band was not proved."
THE PRESIDENT: Before you start on another document we'll take our morning recess.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, in order to summarize what we have discussed before, you maintain that reprisal measures were unavoidable. Would it not have been more correct to punish those who were actually guilty?
A That question is a theoretical one and, as such, is justified, but in actual fact things couldn't be done that way because it was the very tactics of the bands that they attacked from ambush and as soon as the German troops appeared on the scene they would hide and disappear in the mountainous terrain. We, as soldiers, would have preferred to act the other way. We would rather have annihilated them in combat. That would have made the deterring effect even stronger.
Q Who was responsible and competent for the ordering of reprisal measures and authorized to order such measures?
A The provisions concerning this changed frequently. As early as June 1943, for instance, a regimental commander could order reprisal measures. In later directives the reprisal measures were left at the discretion of divisional commanders or the military commanders, to the extent to which those held executive power.
Q How were you, as commanding general, and your corps staff, involved in the ordering or reprisal measures?
A Since the right to order reprisal measures was the right of the regimental or divisional commanders, the Corps Headquarters would only learn of such reprisal measures through daily reports, after they had been ordered. The divisional commanders, when ordering reprisal measures, had to adhere to the provisions of the OKW and to comply with the directives which I had discussed with them in order to be able to deviate from the rigid scheme which had been fixed and in order to gain understanding for the special circumstances which prevailed.
Q General, who was it who decreed, at the time, that reprisal measures could be ordered by divisional commanders?
A That must have been in October 1943.
Q WHO was it - what agency?
A I would say the OKW, via the Army Group.
Q And who dealt, in your Corps Staff, with the incoming reports?
A The I-c in the Corps Staff was the one who dealt with the incoming reports and he had to pass them on to the Army Group, in the so-called morning and evening reports. These reports were passed on by teletype or they might even be passed on by telephone. If the communication lines did not function, then these reports would have to be sent on by mail, or courier. The I-a also reported sometimes about the execution of reprisal measures, if such reprisal measures would be in connection with the commitment of the troops, which happened occasionally. Apart from that, the I-a was the man who worked on the commitment of the troops and the organization of the troops.
Q Were only reprisal measures contained in the I-c reports?
A No. The I-c reports were set up according to a certain scheme. They contained a number of other facts; above all the reason for such reprisal measures could be seen from them - for instance, the number of German losses.
Q What other agencies in your area, apart from the I-c, reported to the Army Group?
A There were quite a few who did that. In the Corp Area the Military Commander, sometimes the Higher SS and Police Leader, the Admiral Aegean, and the Sea Commanders subordinate to him; there were two of those on the Peloponnes. One was stationed in Patras and one Sea Commander was in Kalamata; one Sea Commander was stationed in Attica, somewhere near Athens; and then there was the Commander of the German Air Force in Greece. All those agencies reported; within the framework of their jurisdiction they could order reprisal measures and report about them to the Army Group.
Q Were only such reprisal measures incorporated into the reports of the Corps as were taken by agencies subordinate to the Corps?
A The Army Group wanted to be informed about all of the incidents in Southern Greece.
Therefore it was customary that not only special events were reported but also reprisal measures taken by other agencies. The Military Commander did things in the same way. The I-c Department, if I may call it that, is a kind of information office within the Army Group and the sentence "novarum vrum cupido" can be applied to it because even insignificant reports could be of military importance; they had to be evaluated and analysed.
Q The Prosecution has submitted quite a number of reports concerning reprisal measures which appeared under the heading "68th Corps." Does that mean that all these reprisal measures were taken by agencies subordinate to your Corps?
A No. I just tried to explain how this report machinery worked and how these reports came about. There was one additional factor also. The higher agencies have a situation map in the scale of 1 to 1,000,000 because they have to be informed of all theaters of war and have such maps concerning all these places. On such a map, in the proportion 1 to 1,000,000, an area such as Southern Greece is very small, of course, and so there was only space left to enter the report of one command agency and since the tactical leadership was in the hands of the 68th Corps, in the event of an enemy landing, all these reports were sent out under the heading "68th Corps."
Q. In this connection, I would like to mention one example in Document Book No. 20 of the Prosecution. In Document NOKW-1551, Exhibit 458, page 4 of the English Document Book and page 3 of the German text, there is a report "West" of the OKH, dated 4 April 1944 and reprisal measures in the area near Levadia - Delphi are reported by the Police Regiment 18, under the heading LXVIII Corps: General, was that Regiment subordinate to you?
A. No, Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police leader, but it was in the area of Levadia - Delphi.
Q. But, it was not subordinate to you?
A. No, it was not subordinate to the Corps.
Q. In the same document raids and reprisal measures in Athens are mentioned. Was the Corps Headquarters involved in that?
A. Where raids and reprisal measures in Athens are concerned, the Corps Headquarters played no part in that.
Q. Finally in this document, a British command operation is mentioned on a radio transmitter on the Island of Santorin; did the Corps Headquarters have anything to do with this as this incident is also charged to the Corps?
A. No, the Corps was led by an airforce man, but there was no naval officer in this staff. In the event Santorin, an Island is involved, which is not even in the Corps area. I will point out the Island on the map. The Island Santorin is immediately north of Crete.
Q. Apart from the daily reports, did the war diaries and activity reports of the divisions reach the Corps?
A. No, the divisions sent the war diaries and the activity reports directly to an Army Archives. Documents of that type could not have been read in my staff neither or me nor the expert, because we just did not get them.
Q. In this connection, I offer a document from Felmy Document Book 5, which is Document No. 89, on page 2, it will be offered under Exhibit No. 38. On page 3 there is a memorandum entitled: "The Purposes of the War Diaries and War Documents". I merely want to point out one paragraph on page 5, under V, "Conclusion of War Diaries and where to deposit them", it says there in the second paragraph:
"Concluded war diaries with all enclosures and activity reports go, while informing the superior authorities by report, immediately to the Chief of the Army Archives, Potsdam, Hans von Seeckstr. 8."
General, how were the incoming reports dealt with in the Corps Staff?
A. All incoming mail was submitted to the Chief of Staff and he disseminated it to the departments concerned. He was informed about possible reports coming in by telephone through the officer on duty if he himself did not happen to be on the telephone. Then the departmental chiefs, namely the Ia, Ic, the IIa, the quartermaster and others concerned, after having looked through the incoming mail, reported orally to the Chief of Staff whenever that was necessary. Either at that time, or right away when the mail came in, the Chief of Staff ordered what was to be shown to me personally or decided which events I should be informed about orally. The bulk of the individual reports never actually reached my desk, those things that were submitted to me I would initial.
Q. I would again like to draw attention to Document No. 59, Felmy Document Book No. 2, which is the affidavit Kleykamp from which I have read repeatedly.
If it please the Tribunal, I would like to turn to page 31, it says there under 2:
"2). The necessary interference of the LXVIIIth Corps with questions of Greek internal politics, economics and propaganda not only practically required much effort and understanding, but also was impeded formally by the duplication of the many German offices stationed in Greece. Since those offices had their own communications channels, the Corps had to obtain appropriate information privately, if it wanted to remain informed on all the important events within its area, for instance, the results of an operation against bandits by the 18th SS-Police Regiment, on the proposed anti-strike propaganda by the Military Commander, on a razzia conducted by the Higher SS and Police Leader in a communist section of Athens, on the shooting of communists by Evzons, etc. The results of those investigations were included in the daily reports by the Corps (mostly Ic reports) to the Army Group E, since otherwise the latter would not have been informed at all or only late. It was not always stated specifically, whether those measures were carried out by German soldiers or by other organizations, since the Army Group was interested only in the events as such. Thus the report of the Corps might contain for example statements on retaliatory measures, which were carried out within the Corps area, though not by its units, but by the Military Commander, the Higher SS and Police Loader or by Greek volunteer units."
I would like also to read paragraph 3 on the top of page 32:
"3). All the offices were often inclined to make exaggerated statements in their reports (slanted reports). Neither did Army units resist from that practice. Even the lower headquarters liked to increase the amounts of booty and the numbers of prisoners to round figures. This phenomenon was multiplied during the processing and compiling of reports at higher headquarters, so that almost always misleading impressions were created. Unfortunately that did not apply to Greece alone, but to the whole Wehrmacht. Above all it also applied to the figures, which were reported in connection with retaliatory measures and the shooting of hostages. All those figures must therefore be taken with a grain of salt."
General, what was the normal course that the daily work in your Corps would take?
A. As I have stated on an earlier occasion, it was the main task of the LXVIII Corps to conduct the defense against possible attacks of the Allies, whether these be from the sea or from the air. That was my main task, which filled most of my time. The danger of an enemy landing was hanging over us like the sword of Damocles and it even increased in the course of time.
Q. Why did it increase?
A. Partly we had direct reports and partly it was the evaluation of the reports received by the highest agencies, because the high agencies had machinery to evaluate such reports, agencies abroad, etc.
There were reports to the effect that English elite divisions were being concentrated in Egypt. Sometimes reports were there about the presence of ships in Mediterranean harbours. We were fairly well informed of the organization of the so-called Greek Army of Liberation, which also was in Egypt and we were also informed about planned commando operations which were mainly supposed to come from the Island of Cyprus (Cypern) which is situated at the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and within the British area of supremacy. We heard of planned landings by air and similar surprise attacks, which we might anticipate. That was the reason why we had constantly to check on the defense preparations of the troops.
The fortifications also had to be adapted to the new tactical knowledge gained, and this new tactical knowledge was based on experience made when the Allies had landed in Italy, in Normandy later, gained from Commando operations in the Adriatic Sea. Therefore, I was very often on official trips. I felt and realized that that was my main task. I knew all bases in my area and I have selected a large part of these bases myself.
When the Italians left the Alliance, we had to do things all over again. The inspection of a regimental sector, for instance, on the Peloponnes, took easily five days. The reason for this was partly the bad communication situation, and because of the danger from the air it was only possible to fly at night time so that a round trip through all the islands Zante or Paros--Zante is spelled Z-a-n-t-e and Paros is spelled P-a-r-o-s. Zante - Paros. Melos (M-e-l-o-s) - A round trip through these islands also might take four to five days.
Q Did the Allies make their preparations together with the bands for the landing?
A That was quite obvious. In Cairo. The Allies entertained constant communication with the bands. Repeatedly we had found radio transmitters of British origin on the occasion of band operations. We knew that parachutists were frequently dropped in order to maintain contact with the bands. In the final analysis, that was the whole meaning of the inciting of the bands and the supporting of the bands; namely, that at that moment when the Allies landed somewhere, the bands started operations and attacked us from the rear.
After all, the British did not support the band to the extent they did for nothing.
Q What was the situation, Particularly in Attica?
A The distances in Attica were shorter, of course, but the inspection of fortifications also took up a certain amount of time, and new such field positions and fortifications were established when I came to Attica. Furthermore, the Army Group had subordinated to me a railroad security regiment which was to protect the railroad line from Athens via Lamia.
Lamia is spelled L-a-m-i-a. That was a task which should really have been part of the work of the Military Commander because in my opinion it was a territorial problem.
I don't know why the Army Group subordinated this railroad security regiment to me. It caused a lot of extra work for us since along that railroad there were quite a number of very valuable installations. That threw over the whole organization as it had been up to that point, it bared the plain land of troops and attached particular importance to the structures there. There was the Bralo Bridge, (B-r-a-l-o) Bridge, which was a viaduct of over 140 meters height which bridged the gulf and there was a similar bridge, the Asopotamos Bridge (A-s-o-p-o-t-a-m-o-s). Then there was the Gorgopotamos Bridge (G-o-r-g-o-p-o-t-a-m-o-s). Then there were a number of tunnels, particularly so near Lamia.
Q General, did you also have to deal with political problems?
A Yes, political questions also took up a considerable amount of my time, particularly after the collapse of the Italians, when it became obvious that the EAM had gained increased influence. We had quite good ideas about what was going on down there in their sphere of foreign politics, so that the written works which appeared now about the fightings in Greece do not surprise me in the least.
I have no intention of quoting them in order not to make Mr. Fenstermacher raise objections but there is nothing new in them, only confirmation of what we could prove at the time only in part, but where we knew quite well what was intended. These political questions, since the Corps Headquarters had the task of defending against possible enemy landing, had a great influence on the conduct of war. However, the whole situation was involved and complicated as very much is in the Eastern countries. There were the Greek inner political currents which existed. Then there was the constant change of influence which was exercised from the exile government of Mr. Papandreu in Cairo.
At that time even we knew of the conference in the Libanon where six communists had to be included in the Papandreu Government. In order to cover up for existing differences of opinion in the exile government; many politicians in Athens saw a mystery in this fact and they felt very uncomfortable about it because they didn't like that particular solution. We received information concerning mutiny which had occurred in the newly created Greek Army of Liberation.
In spring and summer, 1944, this mutiny occurred and in my opinion it can be traced back to the influence of communists. They wanted to prevent that certain circles loyal to the government would gain influence in Greece and possibly dominate the situation there if the exile government or parts of the exile government would be transferred to the Greek mainland. There were a large number of political questions which I only touched upon here and which influenced the whole situation.
Q Was taking care of the troops also part of your tasks, General?
A Certainly it was. Of course, I had to look after my soldiers and had to see that they were well off. That became quite a difficult problem because of the inflation. It was a problem which occupied a great deal of our time because we did not dispose about the necessary means. In some way, we had to find a way out of this situation and to better the position of the troops. However, not only the material part of the was importance but also the spiritual welfare of the troops was quite a difficult problem. One has to know these isolated strong points on the Peloponnes or on the Greek islands where our men suffered under the climate. Also we didn't have enough radio sets in order to put them in contact with the rest of the world. As I said, the spiritual welfare also was a difficult problem for us.
Q General, the documents submitted by the prosecution seem to show a one-sided and therefore a wrong picture of your official activity.
A They are one-sided because they are taken out of the context and because they only deal with reprisal cases. Everything connected with the combatting of bands was not in the foreground of my activity.
It did not take up the most part of my time. The provisions and directives for the combatting of bands had been issued and fixed by the OKW. This, as far as the execution was concerned, was a task of the divisional commanders. As I said, the execution of reprisal measures had been made the task of the divisional commander and therefore I could restrict my attention to what was necessary and material.
Q Did you have the chance of examining the expediency of reprisal measures ordered by subordinate units on the spot?
A No, the vastness of the area and the very nature of band fighting made that quite impossible. Any band operation would occur surprisingly. It was not announced beforehand. Not even the divisional commanders could in every case be at the right time on the spot and make their decisions on the basis of their own observations. They also had to rely on reports from their troops unless they themselves were in charge of one particular operation, which, however, only happened in the case of large-scale operations. An additional factor is the frequency with which surprise attacks, sabotage, etc. occurred.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: At this point, if it please the Tribunal, - I would like to submit a document which reports the situation in the spring of 1944, and in particular about the band situation. This is Document 104, contained in Felmy Document Book V, page 61, and this document will be offered under Exhibit 39. This is the War Diary of Army Group E. Unfortunately it is not quite complete. The first few pages are missing, also in the photostat.
In the first paragraph on page 61 there is some report about the 28th and 29th of April, but according to the whole contents of the report only the year 1944 can be meant. I would first of all like to read from page 61 where it says, "Enemy Reports", toward the middle of the page:
Political situation: In addition to the economic crisis, the widely circulated rumors which again and again appear in a new version of an early withdrawal of the German Wehrmacht and an imminent landing by the Allies, are strong determining factors in regard to the morale in the capital and the entire country.
They result in various considerations and generally in a play for time.
The Communist party is setting up a strong organization for the coming crisis in the outspoken workers district of the capital.
The active communist propaganda does not result in such membership gains which one could have expected as a result of a continuous economic disintegration. The Greek national circles are fully aware of the seriousness of the coming struggle with the Communists; the fight for Athens is also prepared in their camp. One is of the opinion that the Greek security battalions, joined by the national partisan groups, will be in a position to break the communist terror. There are signs for the establishment of a national defense front. It is said that rumors, resulting from the situation on the eastern front, of a withdrawal of the German troops, have caused the Government to get in touch with EDES in Athens. Previously existing differences seem to have been bridged. By a close association with the Zervas organization one intends to have a strong government on a broad basis ready to take over in case the German troops are withdrawn.
Partisan situation: Stepped up sabotage activities, increased Communist attacks on Greek volunteer units and self-protection organizations, active measures of recruitment and organization by the Communist and national bands as well as growing Allied influence continued to be the characteristics of the band situation in the Greek territory.
Conduct of the bands: In Northern Greece repeated surprise attacks, especially from the Paikon - and Vermion mountains, were carried out on anti-Communist bases and on our own supply lines.
Further focal points of band activities were south of Florina and southeast of Kastoria. In the course of a major operation of our own we inflicted heavy casualties on the bands in the Vermion mountains and destroyed their bases. In the West Olympus area strong groups of bands resisted our own assaults and those carried out against them by anti Communist units. In the Pelion mountains the bulk of the bands succeeded in evading a major operation by retreating to the north and west. The situation in Northern Greece is unchanged. In Western Greece the existing armistice between the EDES and ELAs organizations did not result in a lessening of their differences. Zervas, in remaining neutral towards the German troops, succeeded in shifting the northern part of the Arachtos front to the East and in strengthening the central part of this front.
The Allied Military Mission: It is above the task of the Allied Military Mission in Greece to organize the bands for the fight against the occupation power. British liaison staffs with wireless equipment are not established in every ELAS division and Zervas units. The strength of the Allied Military Mission can be estimated at 300 to 400 men who presumably have been reinforced during the past few weeks. In general the influence of the.... liaison officers seems to diminish to the advantage of...... For the first time reliable reports about the appearance of individual ..... officers have been received.
Now, following there is a paragraph missing. This is a Washington document which was only received here recently. It is one of the original documents which was sent over separately, and in the photostat paper is stuck over these parts.
"In general the influence of the .... liaison officers seems to diminish to the advantage of ...... For the first time reliable reports about the appearance of individual ..... officers have been received."
Supply: The supply of the bands through dropping from the air by the Allied Air Force and through submarine landings is increasing, however, it does not yet cover the demand. To give an opinion about the actual number of sorties flown for the purpose of bringing supplies to the bands in Greece is not possible due to the incomplete reports of the air information center.
Armament: The increasing enemy supply flights and the frequent landings improve the band's armament and ammunition situation to a great extent. According to reports from a reliable source Zervas has received five light mountain guns (5,6 cm) and six anti-tank guns (2,5 cm) and consequently has greatly strengthened its fighting power.
Strength: Zervas, according to reliable reports has considerably strengthened his forces. It is said that the number of 7000 active men under arms, as agreed with the British, has been reached and that therewith the rearmament of the EDES has been concluded. The "Times" stated at the end of March that the strength of the Greek ELAS bands amounted to 30,000 men. This statement corresponds substantially with the records here at hand. See enclosure for information about distribution of the forces.
Opinion of the situation: In anticipation of coming events the Communist as well as the national forces are concentrating and preparing, Zervas, evidently through a neutral attitude towards the German Wehrmacht, endeavours at present to maintain the connection with England as a result of the war material deliveries.
Pretending to fight against the traitors of the Greek nation the Communists already attempt, through surprise attacks on Greek security forces, to weaken their internal political opponents of tomorrow.
In case of an Allied landing the "Major Greek Revolt" can be expected in the course of which, however, every party will attempt to make their own interests prevail. According to a report from a reliable source Zervas does not intend to fight the German occupation power but he evidently will attempt to secure himself a loading position in the new Greece with the help of the national circles over the then tied down Communist enemy.
On page 64 it says in the teletype to the Commanderin-Chief Southeast, towards the middle of the page:
The band situation at the Peloponessus has become so critical that merely a few, constantly occupied coastal sections including ports and towns located in these sections, as well as the cities of Tripolis and Spartha and their immediate surroundings, are still under the control of the troops. The major operations resulted in only small success as the excellent not of communications of the bands excludes any surprise. The not of communication is provided by the civilian population who therefore share the guilt for the German casualties. The indulgent treatment of the civilian population, so far practiced by the military administration, had no effect of any kind. If the day comes when the 117th Light Infantry Division will be withdrawn the Peloponnessus could be given up at lost due to the present band situation. After the present pacification policy has resulted in failure and in consideration of the military situation, it is now imperative to take into account the state of war which is actually prevailing at the Peloponnessus and to make use of all military and political means of power under a unified command in order to restore order and tranquility."
