AFTERNOON SESSION THE MARSHAL:
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal, please, may I continue reading from Felmy Document 104 in Felmy Volume V, page 64, I shall start again at the bottom of the page, with the last but one sentence:
"After the present pacification policy has resulted in failure and in consideration of the military situation, it is now imperative to take into account the state of war which is actually prevailing at the Pelopponnessus and to make use of all military and political means of power, under a unified command, in order to restore order and tranquility."
To this purpose the High Command of the Army Group E, after all essential preparations have been concluded, plans to declare the Peloponnessus a "zone of combat" until the pacification has been accomplished. Basic accord is requested from the High Command Southeast in order to bring an immediate start of the preparations. The pacification under the command of the 117th Light Infantry Division is to be carried out in such a manner that through appropriate cordoning off measures, the communications between the civilian population and the bands will be ruthlessly eliminated. Following that the active fight is to be carried out. The International Red Cross maintains the closest contact with the bands and also supplies them with food.
To continue on page 66 I shall read the paragraph headed "Combat Reports," at the middle of that page:
"A tendency to exaggerations in reports could be observed. Enemy strength and enemy losses are, as a rule, given as improbably high. The troop and intermediary offices must again be taught the soberness and honesty so well practised in the German army. A sharp line of distinction must be drawn between the official reports and the releases of propaganda and defensive spirit agencies, which stand on a different level. By order of OKW, combat reports, and reports about special events, are in future to be signed, from the company upwards, by an officer, held responsible.
Indication of the official post only as the dispatcher is forbidden."
And then I would like to continue on page 67, at the bottom:
Situation with regard to band fighting: The situation with regard to bands in the Greek territory is characterized by a steadily increasing threat to our supply roads and the systematic organization of the band communication net. Raids by Communist bands against our weaker outposts still occur, while the bands avoid major conflict with the occupation force.
And then on page 67-A, it says:
In Western Greece, Zervas kept to his neutral attitude towards the German Forces. He continued to march his newly organized bands into position on the Arachtos front. The declaration of the Peloponnesus as combat region by reason of increased band activity considerably influenced the conduct of the bands in that region. The number of acts of sabotage and raids diminished conspicuously since then.
THE INTERPRETER: There is no page 67-A in the interpreter's book.
THE PRESIDENT: The book the Tribunal has, at least the one I have no page 67-A.
DR. MUELLER-TORTOW: I am sorry, Your Honor, this is outside my control.
THE INTERPRETER: I have just found the page Dr. Mueller Torgow is reading from, so you may continue.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: It is the bottom of page 67.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you may continue.
DR. MEULLER-TORGOW: I shall then continue on page 68, the second half:
"Critical judgment of the situation: The above-mentioned movements of forces from Egypt to Palestine and further into Syria may mean a broadening of the spring-board Egypt, with the aim of a larger-scale attack against the main-land of Greece, as well as Crete and Rhodes. On the other hand, there is the possibility that a shift of the center of gravity into the Levant and especially Syria takes place, aiming at a shorter way of attack (eventually via Turkey) for an offensive against the Dodecanesus, thereby broadening the former commando operations."
On Page 68-A, it says at the bottom under "Greece".
"The Allied invasion in Northern France has not yet produced a clear political reaction. The general jubilation gave way to an attitude of expectation, due to the news coming in about the course the invasion is taking. If the invasion in Franco fails, the ground will become more favorable for the German policy.
With regard to the band situation one can expect that the shock effect, produced by the declaration of the "Peloponnesus a combat region, will persist. The impression upon the population, which is to a great part opposed to the bands, is of a positive nature. By the isolation of the Peloponnesus from the main-land and by the sealing-off of the bandinfested regions, the prerequisites for more intensive fight against the bands are given."
Corps Gen Staff (Gen. Kdo.) XXII reports time and assignment of the forces, time table and geographical plan for the concentration, and fuel requirements.
I shall continue on page 70:
"Situation with regard to the bands. The situation in the Greek area with regard to the bands is characterized by the increasing threat to our own communications and by the systematic organization of the net of communications of the bands. Apart from that, attacks by Commun. bands against rather weak bases of our own forces and motorized convoys still occur, while the bands are ddging major conflicts with the occupation forces. Terrorizing the population by EAM and ELAS still continues. Operations of our own brought about some relaxation of the tension."
On page 70-A, roughly in the middle:
"The declaration of the Peloponnesus as a zone of combat on account of the increasing activity of the bands had a vital influence upon the conduct of the bands in that region. Resistance of the bands against detachments of Greek volunteers persists, and of the bands against detachments of Greek volunteers persists, and numerous reprisals against members of their families are committed by them. As before, they withdraw before major operations of our forces, or try to camouflage as harmless inhabitants.
On page 71, the second phrase "Allied Military Mission:
According to reports, confirmed repeatedly, the Allied Military Mission is supposed to be composed of about 190 Englishmen and 30 Americans. They are said to have even received some re-inforcements recently. No active influence on the military direction was noticeable so far.
In some Elas-bands districts the Allied officers appear to gain increasing influence upon the direction of the groups of Partisans, in excess of their former scope of tasks, Possibly, the progress made by the bands as to leadership and fighting methods are results of the instruction received by Allied training officers. No clear picture results of the relation between the bands and Allied officers. Tensions, as reported occasionally, are very likely to be of a local character only.
Communications: The organization of the bands' communications has made considerable progress in the course of the past months as a result of continuing assistance by the Allies. In particular wireless communication has gained importance for the transmission of communications.
Supply: Supplying of Zervas bands is done, just as before by the Allied Air Force and through landings in the area.
In the area of Paria.
"The supply position is said to be assured. On the other hand, the Elas bands are suffering from difficulties of supply of material and food: it is not possible to see clearly to what extent they are sharing in the dropping of supplies and landings of the Allies.
Armament. The Allied supply aeroplanes and landings, particularly on the coast of North-Western Greece, brought arms mainly to the Servas bands, amongst them some 1, mountain guns, ammunition and equipment. The equipment of the Elas bands was considerably improved thereby.
The Elas bands were also supplied with 1. artillery to a lesser extent, above all those in the area of Macedonia. Some divisions are said to have complete batteries, at 5 guns each, at their disposal.
Supply of ammunition is still causing difficulties to the bands.
Morale: The morale of the bands is generally bad, according to depositions made by prisoners. The formation of the self-defense units in the various districts has its effect in this connection, as it is endangering the system of requisitioning which as yet used to work so smoothly. Complaints are being made about the bad food supply. The population shows, in the areas controlled by the bands an increasingly negative attitude towards the Elas units, in as far as Zervas allows, seeing in them rightly the cause for their economic distress and for their exclusion from the relief measures of the International Red Cross.
Still, this fall off in the morale must not lead to the quite wrong conclusion that the partisan units which are becoming stronger in armament and international organization, are losing in importance and menace to us. Hardest possible fight against the partisans in any form remains the law of the hour, before it comes to combat operations for the coast.
May it please the Tribunal, it was just pointed out to me here is a correction in the photostatic copy. The document book included the sentence, "The population shows, in the area controlled by the bands, an increasingly negative attitude towards the Elas units, inasfar as Zervas allows," should read "the terror" instead of "Zervas." I should be grateful if this would be corrected.
May it please the Tribunal, I would now like to submit a rather voluminous document. This is the whole of document book 4. It contains the War Diary of the LXVIII Army Corps for the period of time between 1 January and 30 June, 1944. It is document No 87 and it is offered as exhibit No. 40.
The War Diary of the LXVIII Corps with which we are concerned here has been used by the Prosecution as exhibit No. 20 with relatively few extracts. This is document NOKW-1065, Prosecution Exhibit 480 on page 137 of the English, 99 of the German, volume 20. The extracts, which the prosecution has used in the aforementioned document, give only a very incomplete picture of the situation of the day, because it omits all the things which cause reprisal measures, mainly the constant attack by bands. I have therefore decided to submit the War Diary we have received from Washington without any abbreviations in the same form as it was received by the Corps from the archives of the Army. It is not my intention to submit the details and I shall not read any parts of it. But I recommend it to the Tribunal for study. He who will read that diary will know what went on in southern Greece at that time. I should like to confine myself to a very brief summerization.
During the time concerned, that is the first six months of 1944 157 acts of sabotage, blowing up of railroad lines, destruction of telephone lines, blowing up of bridges, surprise attacks, etc. had occurred. In the case of operations and against the bands, the enemy was contacted 175 times, only those cases were taken into consideration where the enemy was actually engaged, that means between January and June of 1944 there were in each month 55 of the incidents just described, that is to say almost two on each day of the six months. The incidents in Athens are not included in this, because there the Higher SS and Police Leader was the competent officer, nor are the losses due to attacks on Greek volunteer units on the Pelophnnes included, but only those incidents which refer to the LXVIII Army Corps.
I should now like to continue in my examination of this witness.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did you ever observe that the units committed excessed of which you did not approve?
A. Yes, on two occasions. These were the cases of Kalavrita and Pristelmont.
Q. Those two cases I shall come back to later on in detail. You said it was not really possible to apprehend the bands themselves by following up the excesses committed. Now apart from reprisal measures, were there any tactical measures carried out against bands so that the affair could be stamped on, root and branch, so that the bands could be exterminated?
A. Yes, several operations of that type were carried out and thereby it always became clear that roops stationed in the Pelopponessus were not sufficient to really hunt the partisans down. The battle of annihilation, in other words, militarily speaking was not feasible, that is to encircle them from all sides so nobody could escape, so that they could be put out of action in that manner. Therefore, we had to confine ourselves to attack the centers of the bands themselves.
Q. Were these operations successful?
A. For the reasons, which I have just mentioned, they were not decisively successful. It was not possible for a long period of time to denude the defensive sectors of the troops, because nobody could judge whether or not the Allies would not land tomorrow thus a large scale hunting down, such as I would like to have seen, did not occur.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: May I interpolate here? My attention has been drawn to the fact that the term "Kesseltreiben" was translated as "hunting down." I am not sure that this "hunting down" is as strong as "Kesseltreiben" in the German?
THE INTERPRETER: May I say something about this, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, indeed.
THE INTERPRETER: Well, in my idea, the term "Kesseltreiben" is a shooting term in German and "hunting down" means a relatively thorough type of hunting an animal.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, the prosecution has frequently expressed the view that they did not regard the occupation of Greece by German troops as effective and that the Greek population therefore were not under any obligation to observe the Hague convention toward the German occupation force. At this point I do not wish to discuss the question whether or not the effectiveness of the occupation can be judged at the moment of the cessation of fighting or whether it should not be judged under the conditions of internal difficulty under which the Greek Government of today labors, I only want to ask you now whether the effectiveness of the occupation existed as long as the troop units under your command were present in Greece?
A The occupation of southern Greece was effective at all times. The bigger cities, which formed certain centers of power, were always occupied by German troops. We had the two high ways firmly in our hands and we were in a position to go anywhere we wanted to get if it became necessary. The many acts of sabotage did not alter anything in these matters. The bands always took evasive action when we wanted to engage them in their hiding places in these difficult mountain areas and we chased them away from there too. We did not allow them to rest.
From the war diary, which you have just submitted under document book 4, I have seen that throughout those six months, as an average, there were major or minor operations against the bands on 29 days of each month, operations to say where we engaged the enemy and exchanged bullets. Into this a stipulation must be placed, that successful operations had been fulfilled. It must be described as a "Fairy Tale" really for the prosecution to say that the Edes bands or Elas bands had chased the German troops out of Greece. That really means putting things up-side down. We evacuated the country when we had orders to do so. We could have demanded the Luftwaffe to help us in order to fight the center of the bands, but we did not do so.
The strong points of the bands in the mountains were difficult to locate because we had bad maps and in the situations which exists in the case of every air raid a large number of nonparticipants would lose their lives. The British did not exercise that consideration. I would like to recall the attack on the small town of Argos in the autumn of 1943; as far as I remember losses among the Greek civilian population amounted to over two hundred persons. Argos was not a base, indicating on map) it had no military importance whatsoever.
I should also recall the British air raids on the harbor town of Pyracus in January, 1944. I think there were air raids on three successive days. The result was that 600 Greeks were killed and over 1,000 were injured. We choose a more considerate form when conditions on the Peleoponnes became unbearable. We merely declared it a combat zone, only we should have done that earlier because soon after that declaration these surprise attacks decreased considerably and finally they ceased altogether.
Q May I once again come back to Felmy document book 3 and draw attention to document No. 76, there on page 34 I should like to read the last paragraph, this is from exhibit 36:
"In conclusion I can say.....," I may interpolate, the affiant Scheure was a Military Judge of the 117th Mountain Infantry Division.
"In conclusion I can say, that in the staff of the 117th Mountain Infantry Division the only thing I always heard about General Felmy was, that he always made difficulties concerning reprisals, he was too timid and exact, it would only cost more lives of German soldiers, and anyway only the same means could be used against partisans who today were camouflaged in civilian clothes as peaceful farmers and tomorrow fought us fully armed. Furthermore I remember a case where great dissatisfaction was expressed in our division staff about the behavior of General Felmy. At that time, General Felmy was accused of being a formalist and completely indifferent to the protection of the lives of German soldiers against the cruelties of the partisans.
I believe that me division commander himself said this, when General Felmy refused to ask his superior authorities for the use of airplanes against partisan villages."
Q General, did in the course of time any special experiences form themselves in the fighting against the bands and what use was made of these experiences?
A In the early spring or summer of 1944, I had established a band fighting school in the case of reconnaissance attacks of the Corps, which was based in the Poleponnes, particularly to teach the peculiarities of fighting against the band, which were so different from the regular fighting we were used to. In that school in particular the sub-leaders were trained who were mostly exposed to these surprise attacks, also a number of older classes of N.C.O.'s and officers and their attention was drawn to the peculiarities of partisan warfare as they were not familiar with that type of warfare and could be taken by surprise.
Q You said this morning that you had to affirm the reprisal measures as such, because otherwise the bands would have become the masters of the situation. Now, were the objects of the reprisal measures chosen indiscriminately from among the civilian population?
A No, of course not. The divisions had orders to choose the hostages particularly carefully. They used the secret field police and any other measures the troops might have found and of course they made use the services of German confidential agents. As I mentioned before, the volunteer units were used as a sort of screening agency as their men came from the Peloponnes and for that reason knew all about the various conditions in the provinces and villages, better than anybody else. Quite apart from this, their intelligence service was much better. There was perhaps an uncle in one village and an aunt in another. They just lived in the neighborhood, so that you could be quite certain that you could get a hold of the really guilty ones.
Q Whom did you include among the really guilty ones?
A Well, apart from the partisans and band members themselves, all those who sympathized with them in one form or another, who gave them assistance and above all intelligence bearers who could act as couriers or who were well known as Communist office holders, briefly all those who shared the idiological concepts of the bands and expressed it in their actions, not only toward the Germans but also toward the Greeks.
Q In summarization, we might say that the acts that the troops frequently called sabotage hostages were not sabotage hostages in the actual sense, they were reprisal measures hostages in order to use the strict term, they were reprisal hostages?
A Yes, the troops were quite well aware of this, even though they preferred the term hostages here.
Q General, in conclusion: In connection with this general examination in connection with the bands and reprisal measures taken, did you independently of concrete orders from higher agencies think about the problem whether or not reprisal measures, such as the shooting of reprisal hostages, the setting on fire of hostage's houses was legally admissible?
A During the first World war no partisan warefare such as we experienced in Greece existed at all. Even the Hague Land Warfare Convention contains only most general provisions concerning warfare against franctireurs. Above all. nothing detailed is contained concerning reprisal measures. Under International Law reprisals are admissible, but on the extent or the ratio admissible there the opinions differ, no hard and fast rule exists. The decisive factor is always military necessity, that is to say ultimately decisive is the troop commander on the spot. The impression formed in his mind, can no longer be reconstructed today after four years, perhaps you could do so on the spolt, but International Law is changeable.
For instance, submarine warfare had to be adjusted to up to date conditions and here before the International Military Tribunal this has been expressen in the judgment On Grand Admiral Doenitz by the International Military Tribunal. Customs of war become unwritten law of nations.
Court No, V, Case No. VII.
One thing is quite clear in the Hague Convention, that the occupation power is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and, equally, that the inhabitants of an occupied territory must not indulge in any illegal acts against the occupation power. Reprisals are always the consequence of illegal actions, of illegal actions of civilians.
Why were things calm in Greece in 1941 and 1942? I experienced this myself. Because the population remained calm. And why were reprisal measures necessary in 1943 and 1944? Because some of the population had been incited by the British to commit acts of sabotage of all types.
The safety of the occupation power was threatened and law and order in the country was upset. The provisions of International Law, such as described in the Hague Convention had been unequivocally violated by the Greeks. That is my opinion.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: May I once again draw attention to a document in Document Book II? It is Document No. 59. It is the affidavit by Kley Kamp. I should like to read from page 39, the last but one paragraph:
"The safety and the authority of the German troops demanded that terror and attack by the EAM and the ELAS be combatted by strong measures. Insofar as the actual culprit could not be arrested, which usually was the case, reprisal measures were a military necessity. No special ratio was applied. The original quota 1:50 to 1:100 was not even approached in the reprisal measures in the area of the LXVIII Army Corps. According to the directives of the corps, the reprisal measures were exclusively directed against active Communists and Partisan helpers (message carriers, liaison persons, leaflet distributors). They considered the fight of the ELAS their own, they supported it materially and ideally.
"The arrest of this circle must have the desired effect of intimidation. General Felmy was always conscious of the great responsibility Court No. V, Case No. VII.
which an order for reprisal measures carried with it. But this responsibility could all the more easily be borne, because all national Greek circles approved of the Battle of the German Wehrmacht against Communism and the Communist partisans and the Greek government, authorities and organizations voluntarily supported them. In order to paralyze this support through the Greeks themselves, Communist propaganda stated then, just as it does today, that the fight of the Wehrmacht was directed against the Greek people."
I would now like to introduce another defense document in the same volume. This is document Felmy No. 60, the next one in the same volume, on page 43. It is offered as Exhibit 41. This is an affidavit by Rudolf Kneschke. I shall read from paragraph 2 on page 43:
"From 18 August 1942 until 4 January 1944, I was 03 in the Staff of Felmy and during this time I acted as Ic several times. In the period, the details of which are important to the prosecution, I was on furlough in Berlin from 6 December 1943 to 4 January 1944, the day of my transfer.
"Herr Felmy always had the viewpoint that one should try to convince the Greeks by kindness of the futility of their active resistance, a viewpoint which was not understood by the simple soldiers in many cases. In this connection Herr Felmy authorized the carrying out of a number of discussions with the Nomarchs in the autumn of 1943 and he also took part personally in them, and they were conducted in a spirit of friendship and compliance. That these discussions could not have the desired result was caused by the fact that the Nomarchs, who occupied positions approximately equivalent to our Landraete or district presidents, exerted no influence upon those partisans who lived and ruled in the mountains, although they, considering the distance, maintained message service to them which functioned most efficiently.
The innumerable small attacks of the part of the Italian army of approximately 60,000 men stationed there, which numerically was far superior to the German troops, were responsible for the most part, for Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the extremely hostile conduct of the population, particularly on the Peloponnese. In contrast to our rations, the Italians had little to eat and plundered and stole wherever they could get hold of anything edible. It is understandable for every patriot that the revenge taken for that not only fell on the Italians, but also upon the Germans allied with them. On the other hand, even today it is almost incomprehensible to me, with what generosity and tolerance Herr Felmy regarded the activity of the bandits at that time.
"The fighting of the partisans was carried on with every illegal means. Mere malice and cunning could not defeat the German soldier, who was not distrustful in Greece as such. Two examples:
"In the late summer of 1943; a motor trap on the way from Patras to Corinth, which could have come there by accident, not by human agency, caused the unthinking descent of a garrison of some what more than a platoon of armored infantry. An attack by shooting down from the mountain slopes, about a dozen dead, the remainder prisoners, no trace of any participants, except the dead. A week later in about the same spot, a new attack, this time in vain.
"In Parnassus, October 1943: An attack in the strength of at least a battalion upon a village in which a company of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division was quartered. The entire company treacherously assassinated, the throats of most of the men cut, the skulls split. As far as I remember, one person escaped, and was heard in a court martial in order to confirm the cruelties practiced by the Partisans in violation to international law.
"In the last months of the year 1943, it became impossible for a courier vehicle to travel alone from Athens to the Peloponese. It had to be driven under the protection of an armored vehicle, if it were to be at all secure from the constantly increasing attacks. From May to November 1943, the number of bandits on the peloponnese increased from about 8,000 to 40,000 men according to reports from agents. This was less due to the fact that almost every night the British dropped Court No. V, Case No. VII.
weapons and supplies, as it was due to the tremendous support of the Partisans by the sale and the delivery of Italian material.
"I can verify the fact that for the duration of my stay in Athens and before that on the Peloponnese, Herr Felmy, in spite of all these events and still more, which I no longer remember in detail, advised quiet and reflection and did not give a single order to kill any sort of hostages."
If the Tribunal please, I should now like to continue in the discussion of the prosecution documents and the next document book I shall use will be Document Book XIII. I should like first to discuss NOKW-1552 on page 123 of the English and 93 of the German book. It is Exhibit 333. This document contains a number of daily reports by the High Command of the German Staff of the Army of September and October 1943.
On page 127 of the English which is page 97 of the German there is under "68th Army Corps" mention is made of the destruction of several villages northeast of Gythion and on page 129 in the English, which is 99 of the German, the destruction of ammunition and supply depots and of band villages in the Helikon Mountains is referred to.
May I remark here -- and I shall do that always if one event is mentioned in several documents -- the same event has been described in Volume XX in NOKW-1363 on page 76 of the English and page 54 of the German. It is Exhibit 471. This is the Ic daily report for the 68th Corps of 10 October 1943. As said before, it is the same incident which both documents describe.
Q General, what could you tell us about this incident?
AAs for the incident near Gythion, I have no recollection of them. On the other hand, the operation in the Helikon I remember for the reason that the First Armoured Division had been taken out and opportunity was made use of for a number of operations by the bands south of the Malaccian Gulf. The destruction of the ammunition and Court No. V, Case No. VII.
supply depots of the bands and of the band villages was justified, it seems to me, because this was a military necessity.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I shall now discuss Document Book XVI of the Prosecution. There is, first, Document NOKW-172, Exhibit 379, on page 47 of the English and 98 of the German text. This is Exhibit 379. This document contains a directive by the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 22 December 1943 concerning reprisal measures.
Q Did you receive this order at the time and, if so, did you pass it on?
A Yes, that is so. This order coincides with my own opinion which I always stood up for and does not contain any new points of view as far as I am concerned. The rigid ratio of hostages is not contained in the document whereas other reprisal measures are being maintained and it is left to the discretion of the responsible divisional commanders as it always was, on other superior officers who have the same disciplinary powers as a divisional commander. The only new thing here is that the political aspect is also being mobilized as it were to support the battle of the soldiers.
In the Introductory remarks, it says especially, that Ambassador Neuhacher is entrusted with the political leadership of the unified counteraction against the Communist peril in the Southeast.
Q Will you please tell us where you found that sentence?
A It is the first sentence in the document -- "The Fuehrer orders unified counter measures." It is the first sentence. This is how the order starts. That was the only new aspect that the political forces were called in as well.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next relevant document I wish to discuss is in the same volume Exhibit 408. This is NOKW-855 on page 130 of the English and 168 of the German. This is a number of administrative measures ordered concerning the evacuation of the rear area of the 2nd Armoured Army in October 1944. This document does not really fit our present context but I would like to discuss it all the same because it is contained in the same volume.
Q Would you please give us your comments on this document?