Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A The High Command, as I said once before, had by the end of October 1944, left the Larissa Area and gone by air to Syrmia. There I took over a defensive sector between the Rivers Save and Danube. After the fall of Belgrade, which occurred about ten days or a fortnight before this, the evacuation of the rear area of the 2nd Panzer Army had already been initiated. In this connection there was to be an area of about 5 kilometers immediately behind the main fighting line in my sector which was to be evacuated. This was an order which I could not evade as the fronts had become stationary and a sort of positional warfare was about to start. Espionage and the exchange of intelligence had to be discontinued. Then these measures also served the purpose of protecting the population. Modern warfare which brings with it Panzer operations and shelling hits far behind the troops, where fighting is fluctuating and local Greek thrusts must be held off, where a second and third defensive line must be established, where tank traps and mine barriers must be established, there you have no use for the civilian population. They are not aware of the danger in which they find themselves. Apart from this military installations, ammunition depots and such like must be established.
The main dressing stations and collecting stations for the wounded must be established in the villages and, depending on how the main fighting goes, whether you stop at the second or third line of resistance, it cannot always be avoided that whole villages or some parts of villages are fortified as strong points and supporting bases for the defense.
All this explains why the civilian population had to be evacuated from that area. It really was for their benefit and because otherwise they would only suffer unnecessary losses; but, even before this order took any effect, the High Command was transferred to Southern Hungary because there the Russians had advanced beyond the Danube.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: This brings us to the end of our discussion of Document Book XVI and I should like to turn to Book XVII.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General, Document NOKW-044 which is Exhibit 418, has been used to incriminate you. It is to be found on page 77 of the English and page 58 of the German text. Here we find for the first time the operation known as Kalavrita. By operation, I mean both the tactical operation and the retaliation measure taken afterwards. This operation is mentioned in no less than 32 documents submitted by the prosecution; I mean passages of documents and not the documents themselves, of course.
I should like to deal with the whole matter in one stroke and anticipate those documents which mention the operation Kalavrita. They are contained in Volume XVII to XX. These are the following documents:
In Volume XVII, the one mentioned just now, NOKW-044, Exhibit 418 on pages 88 and 89 of the English and 66 and 67 of the German.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
In Volume XVIII, NOKW 670, Exhibit No. 437, on Pages 51 and 52 in the English and Pages 55 and 56 in the German.
NOKW-692, Exhibit 422, on Page 115 in the English and Page 83 of the German text.
In Volume XIX, NOKW-755, which is Exhibit 449, on Pages 75 and 75 of the English and Pates 100 and 102 in the German.
Finally, in Volume XX, NOKW-1363, Exhibit 471, on pages 77 and 80 to 84 of the English, and Pages 55, 58 and 60 of the German.
NOKW-1246, Exhibit 472, on Pages 90 and 92 in the English and Pages 64 and 65 in the German:
NOKW-1257, Exhibit 447, on Pages 95, 96, 97 and 98 in the English and Pages 67, 68, and 69 in the German.
NOKW-1555, which is Exhibit No. 475, on Page 103 of the English and Page 73 of the German text.
Finally, NOKW-1402, which is Exhibit No. 476, on Pages 110, 112, 114 to 116 in the English, and Pages 78, 79, 80, and 81 of the German.
Now, General, before I ask you to give us your own version of the Kalavrita Operation I should like to submit a few documents.
First, in Felmy Document Book V, on Page 39, Document No. 101. This is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 42. This is an order for the movements and the combing out within the scope of the Wytina Operation on 29 August 1943. The date is 26 August 1943. This order comes from the 117th Light Infantry Division. I shall not read the details of this document, but I would like briefly to analyze its contents. It shows, on Page 40, that Kalavrita is an old centre of the bands in the Peloponnes. As early as August, 1943, a mopping-up operation was started there, but it did not lead to any success.
On Page 46 there is an enclosure. I beg your pardon; on Page 43 there is an enclosure, and it is called, "Enemy Information Paper for North and West Peloponnes." From this Enemy Information Paper it becomes clear, and I draw particular attention in this connection to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Pages 45 ff., that the German agencies knew who were the responsible leaders of the ELAS bands and that operations were carried out only if and when the necessary reconnaissance results were available. I should like to draw particular attention to Page 46 because Kalavrita is mentioned there, after a large number of other villages are mentioned first. That is the part which I would like to read:
"Kalavrita: Responsible pol. leader of the ELAS: Vassilios Papdopulos, living in Patras, travels between the villages of Aigialias and Kalavrita and gives the new instructions of the Communist Party to the local group leaders of the EAM. Andreas Tsakinopulos, middleman between the communist organization of Patras and the subordinate commander of Aigialias.
Exposes on the "Communist organization of the province of Kalavrita district committee".
I. Georgius Karkulias, telegraph office employee, secretary of the District Committee.
II. Nikolaus Papavassilopoulos, cashier.
III. Georgios Kaklamanos, member of the district committee and responsible for "ELAS", brother-in-law of the first.
IV. The manager of the "Panellica" coffee house, Mitsos, member of the district committee and responsible man of the "National Solidarity".
V. Georgios Bres and both operate a lignite mine.
It is also illegible on the photostatic copy.
VI. Athanasios Ikonomu in the locality of "Niamata", Diakofto district, with a staff of about 80 workers, of whom Athanasios Ikonomu is the manager and pol. leader. The latter is not only the responsible man of the "National Solidarity", but he is also connected with the district committee of the communist organization of Aigion, distributes publications to the communist organization of Kalavrita through the railroad Court No. V, Case No. VII.
worker (brakeman) Theod. Ervides, who works on the Patras railroad line. Both of the latter's brothers, Illias and Nostas Ervides, are communists and are in Larissa security camp. The meetings of the Kalavrita district committee are held in the house of the barber Panag. Bratsaki in Kalavrita. The latter is a member of the Communist Party and at present is in the Larissa security camp. His wife, Amalia permits the house to be used for the above mentioned purpose. Residence of Mikos and several subordinate commanders in the northern exit of the town."
Finally I should like to draw attention to the map which is attached to this document, which gives the impression of band activity in the Northwest Peloponnes.
The next document I offer comes from Felmy Document Book III. It is Document No. 72, on Page 22, and I offer it as Felmy Exhibit No. 43. This is an affidavit by professor Dr. B. von Freyberg. At the beginning of his statements, on Page 20, he says that he was, between August, 1942 and October, 1944, a government surveyor of the reserve, with the Staff of the XVIth Army Corps. His assignment, as he says, consisted of insuring the water supply for the troops and it took him to the remotest positions and strongpoints. May I read some extracts from this document on Page 22?
"In the fall of 1943 I was ordered to explore all pass-roads running over mountain ranges as to their water-supply. I traveled all these roads by myself, unescorted, with the exception of the Kalavrita road. The latter was so unsafe that, as I was told, only units of at least company strength could have passed unopposed. An escort of such strength was not available for my purpose, so the Kalavrita road was the only one which could not be explored. I cannot make any further contributions towards the clarification of later events in Kalavrita. On 13 January, after termination of my leave, I returned to Athens with Court No. V, Case No. VII.
General FELMY in his plane, and did not hear about these events until later during conversations at table. I was not surprised, however, to hear that violent clashes took place just there, as Kalawrita was regarded as the most dangerous district in the Peloponnes right from the beginning."
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be an opportune time for us to take our afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal. I would like to establish a correction here. NOKW-692, Exhibit 422, is not contained in Document Book 18 but, instead, in Document Book 17 of the Prosecution and I would be grateful if the proper correction would be made.
I would now like to read from Felmy Document Book II, Document No. 65, on page 59. This will be offered under Exhibit No. 44.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that again, please?
DR. MEULLER-TORGOW: Felmy Document Document 65, Exhibit No. 44. This is an affidavit executed by August Winter. On page 59, at the top of the page, it says:
"From the end of August 1943 until the middle of March 1944 I was Brigadier General and Chief of Staff of Army Group E, which was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast."
I am then going to read from the same page, approximately from the 10th line from the bottom:
"A particularly strong Communist revoluntionary group had settled down in the area of Kalavritha and had organized there, as we found out afterwards, a fortified center of resistance. This group of revolutionaries currently maintained contact with the Communist forces of the EAM stationed in the mountains north of the Gulf of Corinth and from there it was supplied with weapons and ammunition. The group of revolutionaries in Kalavritha permanently threatened the strategically important connections of the road along the coast and the railroad Corinth-Patras, as well as the road from Tripolis to Pirgos. Thus there was some danger that, at the decisive moment, namely in case of an attack from outside across the sea against the west coast of the Peleponnese and into the Gulf of Patras, the supply lines of the forces assigned for coastal protection would be cut off.
Therefore, it was an absolute military necessity to defeat the group of revolutionaries in Kalavritha, to eliminate it permanently, and for this purpose to annihilate their base. What particular measures were necessary for this purpose could only be decided by the leading Division Commander on the spot....."
Since we are dealing with this particular document book and that particular page, I would like, at the same time, to read the second paragraph, on page 60:
"The decision for a military action against the revolutionary center Kalavritha was issued at the time by the Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division, Major General von LeSuire, who was charged with the defense of the Peleponnese against attacks from without and its protection against revolts from within. The intention in general had also been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E by Corps Headquarters LXVIII A.K. and had his approval. I do not remember the text of the communication. Also the result of the move was reported to the Commanderin-Chief of Army Group E. According to the prevailing custom, the report contained the result of the battle as well as the casualties on the enemy side resulting from this battle and the fact that the places forming the strong point of the revolutionaries and which were stubbornly defended by the enemy had been destroyed. I cannot remember any details of the report."
In this connection I would like to offer a second affidavit executed by General Winter which is contained in the same document book on the following page, page 61. It is Document 66 and it will become Exhibit 45.
I do not want to read that particular document.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, I would like to ask you to give us the preamble to the so-called Operation Kalavritha, which is under discussion here. Perhaps you could do this briefly?
A. Approximately in the second half of October 1943 the 5th Company of the Light Infantry Regiment 149 on the occasion of a reconnaissance patrol got into the area Kalavritha, which was known to be a band center of resistance. On that occasion members of the regiment were captured.
Q. Will you please show us Kalavritha on the map?
A. (Indicating on map) Kalavritha is southeast of Patras and is connected with a cable car to the coal mine there. The regiment attempted to negotiate with the bands through intermediaries in order to effect an exchange of prisoners. For many weeks these negotiations did not lead to any result and thus it came that at the beginning of December attempts were made to start a relieving action and liberate the prisoners. Around that time, I believe it was the 7th of December, the regiment learned, through two wounded of the 5th Company who had escaped being slaughtered, that the bulk of the 5th Company was detained somewhere near Kalavritha by the bands and that its members had been tortured and mutilated. It is now fairly obvious that, as a consequence, the members of the troops were very excited.
DR. MEULLER-TORGOW: May it please the Tribunal. In this connection I should like to refer to one document used during the evidence for General Geitner. This is contained in Geitner Document Book 5, and it is Document 119. This document book will be submitted shortly by Dr. Sauter. The document concerned is an affidavit executed by one Gruber, who makes statements about the Kalavritha Operation. From Felmy Document Book III I am now offering Document 76.
...I beg your pardon, I have already offered this document but there is one passage in this affidavit which I would like to read. The affidavit was executed by the former military judge of the 117th Division Dr. Scheure; I have already read parts of this affidavit but I would now like to read from page 34 in Felmy Document Book III. I am reading only the second passage on this page:
"A witness in the court martial which I had to conduct against Captain Schober on the grounds of cowardice, described - he had been severely wounded and had played dead - the whole cruelty of the murder of the defenseless German soldiers. They had to sit down at the edge of a gorge, had to cover their heads with their coats, then they were executed by machine gun fire from three sides. Since Captain Schober's death was also confirmed, I dropped the proceedings. This cruelty, violating international law, excited the German soldiers enormously. Every village inhabitant was suspected of being a partisan, since, during the operations, the villages were usually found empty and caches of arms were discovered in many of the villages...."
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, was there no successful operation which resulted in the capture of the bands themselves?
A. No. On that occasion also there was no successful action and the bands themselves could not be captured. Only very small-scale battles were fought and the results were about 10 dead on the German side. The Divisional Commander, as a consequence, ordered reprisal measures for the murder of the 78 German soldiers. The reprisal measures were carried out by the troop which was committed at the time. Therefore the tactical operation, that is, the relieving action, was followed up by the reprisal measure proper.
Q. I do not particularly want to deal with the many details of the tactical operation since, on the basis of the indictments, these are not of great interest. What was your connection with the Operation Kalavritha, General?
A. I neither ordered the relieving action nor the reprisal measure.
Q. When did you hear about the incidents?
A. I am afraid I cannot tell you that exactly, now. Possibly the Division had reported the starting of the relieving action to liberate these prisoners. Such tactical operations could be ordered by the Divisional Commander at any time. The Divisional Commander was authorized to do that and, seen from a formal point of view, everything was in order. Approximately between the 8th and 15th of December 1943 I deputized for the Commanding Chief in Salonika. During this time the Corps Headquarters was led by General von LeSuire, as my deputy. From Salonika I undertook a trip which lasted for several days, in order to inspect the German Arabic Battalion which had remained of the former German Arabic Instruction Detachment. The Corps Headquarters had, at the time, been appointed as the expert agency for all Arabic questions by the OKW and therefore a connection still existed with this battalion. At a later tine this battalion joined me in the Athens Area. As a consequence of my absence from Salonika, I only learned about the incident of the reprisal measures and the other incidents of Kalavritha when I returned to Athens.
It is even possible - at least that is how I remember it - that only after I returned from my Christmas leave, in January 1944, that, through an oral report given to me by General von LeSuire, I learned about the events as a whole and gained a picture of the whole situation.
Q. In any case, the Divisional Commander reported to you orally after the operation had been concluded?
A. Yes, that is correct. Only, I am afraid, I cannot give you the exact date nor do I know the exact words exchanged in the subsequent discussion. I can give you only the substance of this discussion.
Q. Did you agree to the reprisal measures?
A. No, on the contrary. I told General von LeSuire that reprisal measures for the murder of the 78 German soldiers had been ordered rather hastily. He should have announced this fact in every way at his disposal before he took reprisal measures. Only in this way the one-sided propaganda which resulted could have been prevented. In the way in which it was actually handled, the German leadership was discredited and we were regarded as the only guilty persons, as though the 78 people involved had not been harmed at all.
Q. That was more or less a formal point of view, General. What was your material attitude to the reprisal measures taken?
A. I was against the destruction of so many villages because part of the population which had lost their homes were thus necessarily driven into the arms of the bands. Furthermore, it had not been proved that all persons shot in reprisal were actually band sympathizers, although it was established that the area around Kalavritha was a center of resistance and was well known as such.
Q. What was General von LeSuire's attitude toward the objections raised by you?
A. General von LeSuire had to admit that these objections were justified but he replied that the reprisal ratio had not even been 1 to 10 and that his soldiers would necessarily lose their confidence in him if he did not avenge such atrocities at once.
He again pointed out that we had been too lenient near Eleus and that this mildness on our part had not borns any fruit - we had not achieved anything by it. He pointed out that from the area of Kalavritha constant surprise attacks had taken place on the coastal road and they had to be stopped at some time.
Q. General, did you, at the time, think about the problem - whether it might have been expedient to take any measures against General von LeSuire -- either to call him before a Court Martial or to ask higher agencies to have him replaced?
A. I had such ideas and reflections at that time but I came to the conclusion that I should desist from doing that for the following reason: Taking into consideration the mentality of the O.K.W., such a step did not promise any result. I would probably have achieved the exact opposite. If such a decision had been put up to Hitler, and that is what would have had to happen, he would probably have reproached General von LeSuire because he had not adhered to the reprisal quotas as ordered and had not taken even more stringent reprisal measures. I do not believe, therefore, that such a step would have had any success.
THE PRESIDENT: What happened to this General that you are talking about?
THE WITNESS: Later on he was put in charge of Corps Headquarters during the course of the summer.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is he now?
THE WITNESS: As far as I know, he is a Russian prisoner-of-war.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
BY DR. MUEKKER-TURGOW:
Q. General, what do you think would have happened to you?
A. I am fairly certain that I would have been replaced by somebody else and I am fairly certain that my place would have been taken by a man who would have suited the purposes of the O.K.W. better than I did and who would have adhered correctly to the orders given by the O.K.W. After the events of 1940 I was not persona grata with the O.K.W.
Q. You are referring to your dismissal at that time?
A. Yes, to have me replaced by somebody else would not have been a hard decision. God knows, I did not want to stick to my post. Seen from a military point of view, I had been put on ice long before. After I had been reactivated in 1940, I did not get an assignment with the air force, although I was the man who created the basis of the new air force. I was overlooked wherever promotions were concerned, and with the army I was naturally regarded as an outsider. I was not filled with any military ambition. As the total situation in Greece had developed by that time, no laurels could be gained down there.
Q. General, before the operation Kalavrita had taken place, did you see any occasion to take General von Le Suire to task because of too severe reprisal measures?
A. No. Before that, I had seen no cause to do that.
Q. After your discussions with Le Suire, did you gain the impression that in future he would act in accordance with your opinion and with your directives which you gave him on the occasion of the case Kalavrita?
A. Yes, that was my impression. Furthermore, I had told him that in a similar case before he undertook any large-scale destructions, he was to inquire from the corps headquarters. Besides, in January the directive we mentioned briefly before, had become known in accordance with which Ambassador Neubacher was the political plenipotentiary for Hitler and as such in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief Southeast. He was to determine the extent of the reprisal measures which he had limited, since no longer it had to be strictly adhered to. The authorization to cover reprisal measures was still within the sphere of work of the Divisional Commanders. As a consequence, General von Le Suire covered by orders from higher agencies could go on as he had done before to take reprisal measures such as seemed expedient to him.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
If it please the Tribunal, in conclusion of this incident, I would like to state that General von Le Suire has been granted me as as witness for some time.
I have tried everything in my power to get him to appear here so that he, as the man responsible at the time on the Peloponnes and as the most suitable person, could give us a picture of the band situation which prevailed at that time. Unfortunately, I did not succeed in doing this because General Le Suire, as has been stated just now by General Felmy, is a Russian prisoner-of-war. I managed to ascertain his prisoner-of-war number but the defense information center has not received any reply to the request for his appearance here from Russia.
Q. General, you said just before that, after the Kalavrita incident, you had told General von Le Suire to consult with the corps headquarters before he undertook any larger actions. After the Kalavrita incident, did the 117th Light Infantry Division carry out any large-scale reprisal measures?
A. Yes, there was one occasion on which a large-scale retaliation measure was carried out and that was in March, 1944.
Q. Did General von Le Suire, before this operation, consult with the corps headquarters in accordance with your instruction?
A. Yes, and that can also be seen from the War Diary of the Corps which has been submitted by the Defense as Document Book IV.
Q. I shall refer back to this operation when dealing with the corresponding prosecution documents. General, what is your evaluation and judgment of General von Le Suire as a soldier and as a man?
A. General von Le Suire had excellent qualifications as an officer. He had gone through general staff training and he had been Chief-of-Staff of a Corps. He came from the Mountain Troops. Physically, he was a very able-bodied man. He was very brave, and he never spared his own person in any way and his demands on his subordinates were accordingly. On the other hand, he would in any way stand up for the last one of his men. He was a soldier through and through. His weakness was that from all his inclinations he disliked dealing with political matters. He lacked the intuition for this. Therefore, he was inclined to regard the situation on the Peloponnes too much from a military point of view.
I have to admit, however, that on the Peloponnes in view of the total situation, there was little room for considerations other than military. As the responsible leader for the defense of the Peloponnes, he had to put the military necessities into the foreground on the Peloponnes more than this would have been necessary in any other theater of war. He had to act in accordance with these facts. Regarding his abilities as a soldier and troop leader, he enjoyed great reputation also with the Army Group.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Now, I would like to refer back to Felmy Document Book II, and to Document No. 61 in particular. This is an affidavit by the former first general staff officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division, whose name is Walter Barth. I am reading from page 50, the last paragraph on that page, number 13. The paragraph is entitled "Punishment of the Ic Captain Weber of the 117th Light Infantry Division."
"With regard to the punishment of the Ic of the 117th Light Infantry Division, Captain Weber, 8 March 1944, for disloyal remarks about the position of the Corps Headquarters the reprisal measures, General Felmy said, 'With the true patience of Job, I have tried to win the Division over to my point of view.' (A more lenient attitude toward the partisans). After the punishment of Captain Weber, the relationship between General Felmy and General von Le Suire became worse and worse. The reason was the opposing point of views of the two gentlemen as to how to bring peace to the Peloponnes. General Felmy wanted to build a spiritual counter-balance to the Bolshevism by an appeal to the good and nationalist Greeks by leniency and a policy of understanding. General von Le Suire was of the opinion that only by brutal fighting of Bolshevism would it be possible to bring peace to the country. In his attitude toward the Greek population, General von Le Suire was extremely correct and objective.
"Abuses on the part of the troop commanders were punished with the most extreme severity. (Alleged looting of the city of Nemea south of Corinthia by the Panzer Anti-Tank Battalion 117 in March 1944, which later turned out to be absolutely false and had been reported by the partisans to the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters.)" If it please the Tribunal, I would now like to discuss Document NOKW-044 contained in Document Book 17 of the prosecution.
This was Exhibit 418 and it was contained on page 87 of the English text and page 65 of the German Document Book. In the Daily Report dated 17 December 1943, for the area of the 68th Corps, it is reported "A reprisal for blasting of bridge and murder of a German soldier in the area of Tripolis, band village destroyed. 30 Communists shot."
This same incident appears in the following further documents: Document Book 19 --NOKW-755, Exhibit 449, page 77 of the English and page 103 of the German text; and in Document Book 20 in the following documents: NOKW-1363, Exhibit 471, page 84 of the English and 61b of the German; NOKW-1555, Exhibit 475, page 104 of the English text and page 74b in the German; and finally NOKW-1402, Exhibit 476, page 117 of the English and page 82b of the German text.
General, do you remember this incident?
A No, I don't remember this incident, nor can I say whether it was reported to me at the time.
Q This brings me to page 91 of the English text, which is page 67 of the German text still in the same document book. Under the heading "68th Corps," it is stated that as a reprisal for a band attack, southeast of Cythion, 25 hostages were shot. This incident also appears in various other documents. They are the following. In Document Book 20, Exhibit 471, NOKW-1363; 472, NOKW-1246; 474, NOKW-1257; and 476, NOKW1402. Do you remember that incident?
A No, I do not remember that one either. Possibly this took place at a time when I was absent from Athens.
Q In the Daily Report dated 6 December 1943, which is on page 92 of the English text, you find under "68th Corps" the report that 50 hostages were shot as a reprisal measure for the attack on the railroad head Southeast of Tripolis. This report is also included in Exhibit 479, NOKW-755, in Document Book 19; and in Document Book 20 in the following documents; Exhibit 471, NOKW-1246; 474, NOKW-1257; and Exhibit 476, NOKW-1402. Do you remember that report?
A No, here a gain I can make no exact statements? Only now I ascertained from the War Diary that during the surprise attack, ten German soldiers were killed and four were seriously wounded. The Division has retaliated the loss of these fourteen Germans with a ratio of one to 3.5, which the Division thought necessary.
Q The next report of interest in this document is contained on page 92 of the English text and page 68 of the German text. The same document book. This is the report dated the 5th of December, 1943. According to this report in Aigion, 50 hostages were shot. This report is also contained in Document Book 19 in Exhibit 449 and in Document Book 20 in Exhibit 472, 847, 475, and 476. Can you give us your comments on this incident?
A I am sorry but here again I cannot make any detailed statements and I cannot reconstruct the incident. Also, I did not find any indications in the War Diary concerning the German losses.
These losses were the cause for the reprisal measures.
Q The next reprisal measure mentioned in this document which concerns you is one concerning the shooting of 100 hostages contained in the daily report of the 29th of November, 1943, on page 94 of the English and 68 of the German text. It says, "As a reprisal for the band attack on the road Tripolis-Sparts, 100 hostages were shot at the place of the crime." This incident is also reported in the following document in Document Book 19 in Exhibit 449, NOKW-754; and in Document Book 20 in the Exhibits 471, NOKW-1363; 472, NOKW-1246; and 476, NOKW-1555. Do you remember that incident, General?
A Here also I cannot give you any detailed statements because I do not remember the incident. From the War Diary, I could only see that during that surprise attack, four German soldiers were killed and nine were kidnapped. Under no circumstances could one count on a return of those nine kidnapped soldiers. The Division in this case applied a reprisal ratio of one to eight.
Q That brings me to the daily report of the 25th of November, 1943, on page 98 of the English text and page 71 of the German text. Here the shooting of 20 communists is reported as reprisal for a band attack near Aigion. The same incident is dealt with in Document Book 20 in Exhibit 471, NOKW-1363, in the report dated the 24th of November, 1943. Can you remember that incident, General?
A No, I cannot remember that incident either, nor can I reconstruct the facts in their connection. In the War Diary and in other documents which I saw, I found no indications which would show how this reprisal measure was caused.
Q If it please the Tribunal, I would now like to deal with Document Book 18. The first document contained in that volume and which incriminates you, General, is Exhibit 473 on page 42 of the English text and page 49 of the German text. The Document Number is NOKW-670. It says here in the report of the Military Commander Greece, dated 22 March 1944, from the combat Commander in the Peloponnese, "59 hostages reprieved.