In Corinth, 45 hostages were shot to death."
In connection with this is the evening report dated 22 March, the preceding report in the same document. Here shootings in Tripolis and Sparta are mentioned which I shall deal with in a different context. What are your comments, General?
A I assume that these are reprisal measures caused by the surprise attack on the truck column on 11 March along the read Sparta-Tripolis. During that surprise attack, 21 German soldiers were killed and 42 were wounded. The reprieve of 49 hostages as mentioned in the report should be understood to mean that those persons who could not be proved as having contact with the bands were dismissed after the investigation had been concluded. I would assume with certainty that these investigations were carried out in conjunction with the staff by Col Papagondonas.
Q The shootings of hostages offered in the three reports on 22 March 1944 on page 41 in the English text, and page 48 in the German text, I shall refer to when dealing with the surprise attack on the motorized column on the road Tripolis-Sparta.
I shall now turn to an attack which occurred south of Tripoli on the truck column on the 11th March 1944; according to the morning report of 15 March 1943, page 44 of the English and page 50 of tho German document book, during this surprise attack, 21 soldiers were killed. As reprisal measures, among others, the shooting of 200 hostages was ordered and the burning down of 10 villages. According to tho order persons co-responsive for the attack were to be arrested as hostages. This incident is also dealt with in the following documents. In Document Book 18, Exhibit 436, NOW 208, page 30 of the English text and page 41 of the German text. In Document Book 20, Exhibit 458, NOW 1551, page 1 of both the English and German text. Exhibit 478, NOW 1417, page 130 of the English text and page 93 of the German text. Exhibit 480, NOKW 1065, on page 138 and 140 of the English text and pages 100 and 101 of the German text. Document Book 21, Exhibit 490, NOKW 1557, page 79 of the English and page 70 of the German text, and finally in Document Book 25, Exhibit 571, NOW 1667, pages 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 119 and 120 of the English text, and pages 53 to 55, 57, 58 and 91 of the German text. General, will you please give us your comments on the attack on 11 March south of Tripolis on the truck column?
A This is the event which I have hinted at before, when I discussed the events of Kalavritha. The 117th Light Infantry Division had received authorization to carry out these reprisal measures after it had asked for it at the Corps Headquarters. I happened to remember this incident so clearly because only after I had discussed the incident with Colonel Papgondonas, the Commander of the Greek volunteer battalions, I had given permission to destroy those villages which were reported by the Division as band strong points. Col. Papagondonas confirmed that these villages were known to him also as band hide outs, and had for sometime been evacuated by the population.
Q First of all the 200 reprisal prisoners were to be shot; as we found out 59 were reprieved. Do you think that the shooting of the remaining 141 reprisal hostages was a measure which could be militarily justified?
A Yes, in view of the German losses it was a reprisal quota of a little over one to two. We had suffered losses of 21 dead and 42 wounded.
Q Did you also think that the burning down of the band strongpoints was a military necessity?
A Yes, particularly since Col. Papagondonas had confirmed my own suspicion that the villages involved actually were band strong points. As early as November two surprise attacks had occurred on this highway, one on 23 November on a Naval truck column, and one on 25 November on a convoy of the 115th Light Infantry Division. On 20 of December another surprise attack occurred on a convoy of the 117 Light Infantry Division. All these dates I have taken from the entries in the War Diary which was received here from Washington. In addition there was a fourth surprise attack on 11th of March. Therefore, the situation was not as could be gathered from this document, that it was just one isolated occurrence. After these band strongpoints had been eliminated nothing further happened along that particular highway. There was no further surprise attack, which is proof from me, that we hit on the right thing.
Q The next incident of interest is on page 47 of the English text and on page 52 of the German text in the same document book. This is a 1-C evening report of the Military Commander of Greece dated 25 February 1944. According to this report as a reprisal for the attack on a truck column near Megalopolis on 22 February 1944, it was intended to shoot 200 hostages in Tripolis. These 200 hostages as can be seen from other documents were actually shot. The fact is also contained in the following documents: Document Book 20, Exhibit 477, NOKW 1556, page 124 of the English Document Book and page 38 of the German.
Exhibit 478, NOKW 1417, page 128 of the English text and page 92 of the German. Exhibit 480, NOKW 1065, page 139 of the English text and page 100 of the German text. In Document Book 21, Exhibit 490, NOKW 1557, page 78 of the English text and page 69 of the German, and finally in Document Book 25, Exhibit 571, NOKW 1607, pages 67 and 68 of the English text, and pages 51 and 52 of the German text, and also in Exhibit 579, NOKW 1804, page 119 of the English text and pages 90 and 91 of the German text. According to the entry of 23 February 1944 in Felmy Document 4, which I have offered today, which is the War Diary of the 68th Corps for the first six months of the year 1944, the "own losses" amounted to 15 dead and 7 wounded. General, will you please give us your comments on this?
A Even after having looked at the documents I can no longer recall this incident. The reprisal measure had been carried out by the Division. From the War Diary the losses reported were those you have just mentioned, 15 dead and 7 wounded. Further, I have gathered from the War Diary that two days prior to that, on the 20 February, another surprise attack had occurred in the area of Megalopolis. The Prosecution Document does not contain any reports about that surprise attack. The surprise attack on the 20 February was, I deeply deplore it, 9 more dead German soldiers and two wounded. 5 were kidnapped. I might well be justified, therefore in assuming that the division retaliated the losses of both those surprise attacks which are only separated by two days, and has therefore retaliated the losses of 38 German soldiers, which in this case would have amounted to a ratio of a little over one to five.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, might I make one brief statement? Yesterday afternoon, Your Honor will recall, we distributed to your Honor and filed with the Secretary General a third memorandum of law, regarding provisions of law applicable to these defendants, and the inapplicability of tho Geneva Convention to them. There German translation of this is ready, and will be distributed to the Secretary General and to the defense counsel.
This is the last memorandum of law the prosecution intends to file regarding the issues at point in this proceeding.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until tomorrow morning.
(Thereupon an adjournment was taken until 9:30 a.m. 4 December 1947).
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 4 December 1947, 0930, Justice Burke presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue.
HELMUTH FELMY - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW (Counsel for defendant Felmy): Yesterday, we stopped when we discussed documents in Document Book XVIII of the prosecution and this particular document NOKW-670, Exhibit 437. I would now like you to turn to page 49 of the English text. That is 53 -- 5* in the German text. This is the I-c evening report of the military commander dated 9 February 1942. According to this report, the sea commander had three neighboring villages set on fire on the Peleponnes as a reprisal measure and had 149 residents shot. The same incident is dealt with in the following documents, in the same Document Book XVIII, in Exhibit 434, NOKW-661, page 17 of the English text and page 20 of the German text; further in Document Book XX in Exhibits 477, NOKW-1556, page 122 in the English and 86 in the German text.
I may interpolate here that in that particular document 159 Communists shot are mentioned whereas in the document we have in front of us 149 are mentioned, in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, page 137 of the English and 100 German and in Document Book XXV in Exhibit 571, NOKW1667, page 66 of the English and 50 of the German:
and finally in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804, page 119 of the English and page 90 of the German.
The cause for the reprisal measure is an attack by bands on a naval truck column north of Calamata.
According to other reports, there were not 149 but 100 Communists shot: their own losses, according to the War Diary of the 68th Corpsreport, dated 7 February 1944, Exhibit 480,-10 dead and wounded.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did you at the time gain knowledge of this incident?
A. No, the naval commandant was not subordinate to me. At a later time, however, when I made an inspection trip I came through one of those destroyed villages and the reason for the destruction was pointed out to me when I asked why the village had been destroyed.
In the war diary which came from Washington I found out that that was not the first attack carried out on a naval truck column but the third surprise attack and only then the naval commandant decided to take a reprisal measure. From the war diary it can be seen that one surprise attack had been carried out on a naval motorized column on the 2nd of November 1943 and a further attack on the 23rd of November 1943 and this one mentioned hero was the third one, which is mentioned in this document. The Navy lost a total of 25 soldiers in these three surprise attacks so that the reprisal quota, if one takes a basic figure of 100 shot, is a ratio of 1 to 4 and, if one takes a basis of 149 shot, then it would be a ratio of 1 to 6.
Furthermore, in one document it was mentioned that the inhabitants of villages had supported the bandits. Presumably, that is the reason why the village or the villages were destroyed.
Q. Yes, that is mentioned in Exhibit 434, NOKW-661, on page 17 of the English document book and page 20 of the German document book. In this report it does not say: "Naval Commander", but "Combat Commander."
What can you tell us about that, General?
A That is a report passed on by the military commander Southeast and he was located in Belgrade and, apparently, didn't seem to know that on the Peleponnes on Calamata there was a naval commandant and another one in Patras on the northern coast. That is the explanation which I can give.
Q In all other reports the naval commandant and not the combat commander is referred to.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I would now like to turn to Exhibit 439, NOKW-647 on page 72 of the English and of the German Text. In the I-c morning report of the military commander Greece dated 27 July 1944 the shooting of 100 hostages as a reprisal measure for a band attack on an ambulance convoy near Blacherla northwest of Tripolis was mentioned. The same incident is dealt with in Document Book XX in Exhibit 460, NOKW-942, on page 14 of the English text and 11 of the German text, also in a report from Army Group E to the Commander in Chief Southeast from the 24th of July 1944.
Q General, do you remember that incident?
A I don't recall the incident itself, the surprise attack on an ambulance convoy which would be marked with a red cross; this surprise attack shows that the partisans did not adhere to the provisions of International Law because if they did. they would not have attacked an ambulance convoy clearly marked with a red cross.
Now, looking through the documents which we received from Athens, Greek newspapers, et cetera, I found a paragraph which dealt with this particular attack and which says amongst other things, that "25 German soldiers, most of them wounded in this particular attack lost their lives during that attack. That's all I can say about this incident.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next incident of interest to us is on page 80 of the English text and 79 of the German text of the same document book.
Under the date of 13 May 1944 it is reported that in Patras as a reprisal for a surprise attack 10 Communists hanged. This is a reprisal measure taken for the wounding of 2 members of the Navy by bandits. This same incident is dealt with in Document Book XX in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, on page 142 of the English text and 103 of the German text, also in Document Book XXV, in Document NOKW-1640, Exhibit 573, page 77 of the English and 77 of the German text.
Q Do you remember that incident, General?
A Since here also members of the Navy are attacked, the reprisal measure was ordered by the naval commander in Patras and I did not receive the order directly presumably because he had his special channel or because the Navy was concerned so that I was not informed about it. The Navy, after all, was not subordinate to me.
Q The next report which I will deal is the evening report of 3 May 1944 on page 82 of the English text and page 80 of the German text. According to this report, 350 Communists were shot because of a surprise attack and 10 Communists were hanged because of the attack on a train. This incident is also mentioned in Document Book XX, in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, on page 142 of the English text and page 102 of the German text; also in Document Book XXV, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 83 of the English text and page 65 of the German text; and in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804 on page 123 of the English and page 93 of the German text.
As can be seen from these documents, the surprise attack took place near Chani-Derweni, C h a n i - D e r w e n i.
Do you remember that incident, General?
A I don't remember the details of this incident either. Unfortunately, these were almost daily occurrences that sabotage acts occurred on the communication routes. Here again I tried to establish the reason for the reprisal measure and the only source which could possibly be connected with it is a Greek newspaper which reports from the end of April that in a train from Athens to Patras, -- this Chani-Derweni is situated between Athens and Corinthe, still on the mainland -- 42 Greek policemen who intended to go to Patras were murdered on the occasion of this surprise attack, so that might possibly establish a certain connection with the document in front of us here. I couldn't find any other indications.
Q That brings me to page 85 in the English text, page 83 in the German text. Here we have a I-c morning report of the military commander Greece dated 30 April 1944.
I would like to deal with paragraph 4 of this report which contains the reprisal measures for the murder of General Krech and of three men of his escort detachment and 5 men who were severely wounded.
It says in this report which is, as I said, dated 30 April, that on the 1st of May, one day later, 200 hostages were to be shot. Furthermore, according to the report, 100 Communists have been shot by Greek volunteer units.
This incident is also mentioned in the following documents: in the same Document Book XVIII, in Exhibit 438, NOKW-654, on page 62 of the English text and of the German text: in Document Book XX, in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, page 141 of the English and 102 of the German text; in Document Book XXI, Exhibit 490, NOKW-1554, on page 82 of the English text and page 72 of the German text; also in Document Book XXV, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 81 and 82 of the English and 63 and 64 of the German; finally in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804, on page 121 and 122 of the English and pages 92 and 93 of the German.
General, what are your comments on this incident?
A I certainly remember this incident because a divisional commander was killed in this attack. I learned of it in Salonika where I had been since the 21st of March as deputy for General Loehr. There I heard that the truck-convoy of General Krech had been attacked and that he had been shot during this attack; also 3 members of his escort were shot and 5 were wounded. The attack occurred along the highway between Moleioe, M o l e i o e, and Monemwassia, M o n e m w a s s i a. I will point it out on the map. That is the southeast corner of the Peleponnes. One company was stationed in Monemwassia. This was a naval base and it was stationed there to strengthen the naval forces and, apparently, General Krech was there to inspect that particular unit.
I was also informed that Colonel Papagondonas, through his Greek volunteers, had ordered as a reprisal measure for the losses incurred during that particular attack, to have 100 Communists or band suspects shot. Only here in the documents did I read that, apart from these, 200 other Communists were supposed to have been shot in Athens. I cannot make any statements about this. I don't know who could have ordered that shooting in Athens.
On the afternoon of the 30th of April I returned to Athens from Salonika and on the next day I took over again the leadership of the corps. Therefore, I could not even attend the funeral of General Krech whom I know from earlier days. Also I know his family. He had 6 or 7 children, to the best of my recollection.
Q General, I would like to ask you to clear up for us a difference in figures. In the war diary of the 68th Corps in Exhibit 480 in Document Book XX of the prosecution on page 141 of the English text and 102 of the German text, 335 Communists and band suspects are mentioned as having been shot. On the other hand, in the I-a report of the 68th Corps dated 2 May 1944, which is Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 82 of the English and 64 of the German, in Document Book XXV, only 325 Communists and band suspects are reported as having been shot, amongst them 200 in Athens and 125 on the Peleponnes.
How do you explain this discrepancy in figures?
A Inaccuracies occurred quite frequently in the reports. The liaison officer of the Corps Headquarters to Colonel Papagondonas, Colonel Papagondonas, Aptain Dietl, reported to me a number of 100 shot by the Greeks. I am very sure that I recollect that correctly. These were shot near Tripolis on the Peloponnes where the staff of Papagondonas was located. No shootings were carried out by the troops of the LXVIIIth Corps in Athens. I am in no position to clear up this discrepancy in figures authoritatively.
Q In your opinion, what caused Colonel Pagondonas to have 100 men shot for the Murder of General Krech and his escort?
A I said just now that Papagondonas' staff was located near Tripolis on the Peloponnes. In the same area there was also located the staff of the 41st Fortress Division which had, up to then, been led by General Krech. The close proximity in which the two staffs fund themselves had led to close military and tactical cooperation. A number of minor problems, such as equipment, training, etc., had to be discussed and considered. I can quite well imagine that Colonel Papagondonas had discussed these problems with General Krech. Furthermore, the Fortress Division had constantly occupied the coastal sectors, and these coastal sectors, or rather the rear strong points, were supported to a great extent by the volunteer units of Colonel Papagondonas. These units led each other and supported each other. I know of a number of fights which took place where parts of the Fortress Division used the volunteer units. Thus I can explain and can well imagine how Colonel Papagondonas and his staff felt about this attack against General Krech; they also realized that their own security of these units of the fortress which were so closely allied to the Fortress Division. There might also be some other human factors which played apart in this decision; I don't know.
Q This will bring me to Document Book XIX where, first of all, I would like to discuss Exhibit No. 449, on Page 37, ff. in the English and Page 35 ff.
in the German text, which is Document NOKW-755. Here we have Daily Reports by the Commander in Chief Southeast. I would like to deal with Page 55 of the English text, which is Page 68 of the German text. It states here in the report dated the 21st of July 1943 that "East of Amalias, Group IV, Fortress Infantry Battalion 999 fired on by band. As reprisal two hostages were shot. One locality was burned down."
General, do your remember that particular incident?
A In the material available to me this report is dated the 31st of July.
Q That is what I said, or did I make a mistake?
A I believe you said the 21st.
Q No, the 31st is correct.
A I remember that surprise attack very clearly, particularly so because it was the first clash between German troops and bands on the Peloponnes, in the middle of the summer 1943. The Regimental Commander Colonel Brueckner, whom I went to see sometime later, reported to me as follows: Already some days prior to the 31st of July his troops had been fired on near the same locality. This incident is also contained in the War Diaries which were sent from Washington. There under the 28th of July this incident is mentioned. As a consequence two hostages were arrested and a warning was announced to the population of the village of Geraki. On the 30th of July the attack occurred, which is mentioned in the document, and this, as I said, was the second surprise attack of this kind, and, as a consequence the Colonel fulfilled his threat and shot the two hostages and burned down the village. In his opinion a military necessity to carry out this measure existed. He could not allow any threat by bands in this rear of his position. The measure which he took was completely successful. In that particular sector there was peace for almost one year after that. I mentioned yesterday that, in my opinion, it is impossible to say now after four years what the actual situation was at the time and to reconstruct things as seen and evaluated at the time by the responsible commander.
Tension existed at the time because of the threat of a landing by the Allies in the Eles area, as there were plains there which were very well suited for landings on a large scale. The whole tendency as it was felt and realized at that time can no longer be reconstructed here in the courtroom today. At best one could compare the situation of the fights which take place today in Macedonia and Thrace, but still there is a big difference. The Greek troops fight only against the insurgents. They do not have to fear a landing in their rear which had to be expected at that time if we consider the German situation.
Q General, just before we discussed this incident you said that that was the first clash between German troops and bands in the middle of the summer of 1943. I would like to eliminate any misunderstanding right away. Do you mean it was the first clash with the bands?
A In my opinion it was altogether the first clash with the bands.
Q Altogether the first one?
A Yes, altogether the first clash between the German troops and the bands.
Q That brings me to Page 61 of the English text, which is Page 78 of the German text. Here we find a Daily Report of the Commander in Chief Southeast, addressed to the OKW, dated the 23rd of August 1943. According to this report, near Tripolis on the Peloponnes, band attacks occurred against German soldiers. In this connection two suspected localities where explosives and munitions were found were burned down. This incident is also dealt with in Document Book XX, Exhibit No. 472, NOKW-1246, on Page 87 of the English text and page 62 of the German text. Also in Document Book XXIV, Exhibit No. 544, Document No. NOKW-1761, on Page 207 of the English text and Page 158 of the German text.
General, do you remember that incident?
A No, I can't remember any details, nor can I explain that.
Q At this point I would like to draw attention to the following: In the photostat this Daily Report is contained as follows: "Area Nautia-Argos, two parachutists, presumably British arrested. Radio equipment and code material captured. Operation First Brandenburg Regiment in the Kyseiron Mountains concluded without any mentionable results. In the area south and southwest of the Parnas Mountains allegedly two medium strong bands. In mopping up, 1st Mountain Police Regiment 18, Southwest of Lamia, carried out several arrests, and captured weapons and munitions. Operation Combat Group 104 Light Infantry Division, in the area north of area Amphilokia, small enemy resistance was carried out according to plan. In the localities explosions and munitions were secured and the localities destroyed. Band suspected Monastery near Amphilokia was set on fire by airplanes."
General, what are your comments on this report?
A The two parachutists who were captured in the Argolis area turned out to be Creeks when they were interrogated later on by members of the Secret Field Police. I remember that incident very clearly because that was the first time we succeeded in apprehending such parachutists. After it had been established that they were Greek members of the Exile Government in Cairo they were taken to the Attilos prison in Athens, since the Military Commander was competent to judge Greek nationals. The operations of the First Brandenburg Regiment and of the 1st Police Regiment 18, near Lamia, were carried on outside the Peloponnes area. At that time, in August -- I believe the date is 23rd August -- only the LXVIIIth Corps and I were on the Peloponnes. I had nothing to do with either Boeotion or the Greek mainlands. The 104th Light Infantry Division, which is also mentioned, was not subordinated to me. Also the events in the area of Amphilokia near the Monastery took place outside the area of my Corps. At that time we were stationed on the Peloponnes.
Q In Exhibit No. 544, which I mentioned before and which deals with the same incident, it is said, by the way, that the place was not Tropea, but Doka. Are those two different localities?
A In Greek maps one can frequently find two names for one locality. One of the names is Greek and the other one is frequently of Albanian or Turkish origin. As Professor Stadtmueller explained to me -- at one time when we made a trip through the Peloponnes and encountered similar things -- M-E-T-A-X-A-S, Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister in 1935, had ordered that the Greek names were to he entered on the maps next to the old traditional names of Turkish and Albanian origin. So we experienced at one time, when we made a test, that old inhabitants of a village knew the old Turkish or Albanian name of their place, but they had no idea of the new Greek name which had been given to that particular place. That is my explanation for the two names.
Q On Page 64 in the English text and Page 82 in the German text it is said in the Daily Report of Army Group E, dated the 12th of September 1943, under the heading "Army Group Southern Greece," that, "During mopping-up operation of Levadia 200 band suspects were arrested. Ammunition was found; the locality was partly burned down. A reprisal measure for one murdered German soldier ten Greeks were hanged. What are your comments on this entry, General?
A During the morning of the 9th of September I had taken over Army Group Southern Greece, which had left the Peloponnes, and Levadia was from then on within the area of the Army Group. Since we were pretty busy with the transportation of the Italians and all other questions connected with the Italian capitulation, I can no longer remember this particular incident.
Q That brings me to Page 70 of the English text, which is Page 94 of the German text. Here we have a Daily Report of the Headquarters of Army Group E, addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated the 7th of November 1943. According to this, "In the area of the 68th Corps in Tripolis, 18 Communists were shot as a reprisal for railroad sabotage committed lately." The same incident is also dealt with in Document Book XX, Exhibit 470, NOKW-1355, on Page 65 of the English text and Page 48 of the German text. Also, in Exhibit 474, NOKW-1257, on Page 95 of the English and Page 66 of the German text. The shooting of these 18 Communists was a retaliation measure against a surprise attack on a train, on the 27th of October 1943 near Aighion.
Do you remember that incident, General?
AAighion is along the route Corinth-Agras, but I do not remember the incident itself, nor can I reconstruct the details of the incident. I have no indications on which I could base any such statement. I did not find anything in the War Diary.
Q From Felmy Document Book V I shall, in this connection, submit Document No. 108, on Page 76. This will be offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 46. It is a supplementary excerpt from this Prosecution document NOKW-755, in Document Book XIX. It says here, on Page 76, on the top, "LXVIIIth Corps: 18 Communists shot in Tripolis in reprisal for the recent act of railway sabotage." On Page 77 it says: "LXVIIIth Corps: Band attack"--behind the words band attack in brackets is '70.'"--on German freight train near Aighion; we had some losses and some missing. The shock unit brought into action has made no contact with the enemy. Reprisal measures begun. Eighteen Communists in Tripolis in reprisal."
This brings me to page 71 of the English and 95 of the German Book. Here we have a daily report of Army Group E darted 13 November. According to this, in Geruthrey, 80 suspects were arrested and brought to labor assignment camp. General, can you tell us something about this incident?
A That band members were to be made available for labor assignment was in compliance with a directive from the O.K.W. dated from the summer 1943. I can no longer recall this particular incident.
Q Now, would you please turn to page 72 of the English Document Book XIX? Here, under 68th Corps, you find a report from the high Command of Army Group E addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 20 November. According to this, amongst others, near Makrokomi German trucks were attacked by band. This band was defeated by a shock unit committed for this operation, under heavy losses, and the village Makrokomi was burned down. The same incident is discussed in Document Book XX, in. Exhibit 472, NOKW 1246, on page 89 of the English text and page 63 of the German text, that is, War Diary, No. 3 of the 68th Corps Headquarters : the entry is dated 19 November 1943. General, did you know about that incident at the time?
A This incident also I can no longer recall. Makrokomi is located in the Sperchaios Valley. This was the communication route of the bands via Karpenision to the Epirus Mountains. I will show that on the map, (pointing) here is Makrokomi and here is Karpenision.
Q In order to deal with this also while we are discussing the subject, I would like to draw attention to Exhibit 470 in Document Book 20. The page in which I am interested is 70 of the English and 50 of the German text. In a teletype of the 68th Corps a certain village 30 kilometers west of Lamia is mentioned. General, is that the same incident which we discussed just now?
A The assumption can be easily made that the same locality is concerned in both reports because the statement "30 kilometers west of Lamia" allows this conclusion.
Q That brings me to page 77 of the English text and page 103 of the German text. Here we have a report dated 19 December. According to this report, in Sparta, a band attack on an air force liaison unit was repulsed by the 2nd Company of the Regiment 737 without own losses. The band leader was shot. Do you know this incident, general?
A No. On the 20th of December I flew home, on leave; therefore, this report would not have reached me. It shows, however, that the band leader was shot during a combat action, when he and his band carried out a surprise attack on the air force liaison unit. Therefore this can in no way represent a reprisal measure.
Q The last report of importance in this document is on page 78 of the English text and page 105 of the German text. It is a daily report of Army Group E, dated 30 December. According to this, during clashes between Greek volunteers and Communists, during raids in suburbs of Athens, 7 Communists were shot and 107 suspects were arrested. Would you please give us your opinion on this, General?
A On the 30th of December, which is the date under which this report is issued, I was on leave. The report shows, however that the volunteer units concerned were volunteers of the Evzones, which were organized in Athens by the Higher----SS and the Police Leader and which were subordinate to him. The Corps had no connection whatever with the Evzones and certainly had no jurisdiction over them. That this incident is reported under 68th Corps by the Army Group is only proof for the fact that the events which occurred in the Corps Area were frequently reported under the heading of the Corps.
Q That brings us to the end of Document Book XIX and I should now like to deal with document book XX. The first document in which I am interested in this book is NOKW 1551, Exhibit 458, on page 3 of the English text, which is page 2 of the German document book --the daily report West dated 22 March 1944; and on page 141 of the English text, which is page 102 of the German text, we have an entry from the War Diary of the 68th Corps under 20 March 1944.