In both reports a sabotage act on the railroad line Corinth-Athens is mentioned. The train hit a mine and was fired on by bands. Several cars with supplies were burned out. According to the report which I mentioned first, the reprisal measure taken was 50 hostages shot. Do you remember that incident, General?
A No, I do not remember that particular case. As I said just before, unfortunately that was an almost daily occurrence so that I cannot possibly distinguish between all the individual incidents which occurred.
Q The next report with which I would like to deal is one dated 3 April 1944, on page 4 of the English text and page 3 of the German Document Book. According to this report, as a reprisal measure for surprise attacks on our own trucks between Levadia and Delphi, 10 Communists were shot. The same incident can be found in Document Book 25, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 77 of the English text and page 60 of the German text. What can you tell us about this, General?
A In the area which is mentioned here, namely Levadia and Delphi, the 18th Police Regiment was committed, which, as is known, was not subordinate to the Corps but, instead, to the Higher SS and Police Leader. There are several reports dated around the 25th of April about surprise attacks along that highway, I remember those later ones but I do not remember the first incident.
Q Do you mean the surprise attack on the column of the Commander of the Traffic Police?
A Yes, that is the one I mean. This again is a summary of reports which took place in the area of the 68th Corps; but no units subordinate to the Corps participated in these actions.
Q With such reports are you referring to the events in the area of the 18th Police Regiment which are, for instance, mentioned in Exhibit 437, on page 32 of the English text and 43 of the German text?
A Yes; that is the area where the 18th Police Regiment was committed at that time and that is the area where this regiment carried out band fights independently.
Q This incident is also mentioned in a number of other documents. They are in Document Book 18: Exhibit 438, NOKW-654, on page 62 in both the English and the German texts; in Exhibit 439, NOKW-647, on pages 84 and 86 of the English text and 82 and 84 of the German text; in Document Book 20 in Exhibit 479, NOKW-1356, on page 135 of the English text and page 97 of the German text; Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, page 142 of the English text and page 103 of the German text: further, in Document Book 25, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 78 of the English text and page 61 of the German text; also on pages 79 and 80 of the English text and 62 of the German text; finally, in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804), on pages 121 to 123 of the English text and pages 92 to 94 of the German text. General, are all these events connected with the surprise attack just mentioned?
A Yes, those are the events which are mentioned under the 25th of April. I would assume that reprisal measures in this case were carried out by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q On page 6 of the same document, under the area of the 68th Corps, from the OKH., the following is reported: "During the night of the 24th of April, a British commando operation was carried out against Island Santorin. The Navy transmitter did not function. In Athens during large scale raids, altogether 126 persons were arrested. Weapons and ammunition were captured. 15 Communists were shot. Along the road Athens-Thebes, a train hit a mine and derailed. The main railroad line was interrupted for about 8 hours." What are your comments on this general?
A That is a typical example which I have pointed out on several occasions. In this case an incident is mentioned by the OKH which not only had no connection with any troop units in the area of the 68th Corps but did not even occur in the Corps area - but instead on an island in the Mediterranean, north of Crete. Only because the highest agencies had a situation map in the proportion of 1 to 1,000,000 where there was only a small space left for my special entries, everything which occurred in Southern Greece had to be reported under the common designation of 68th Corps. I would again like to point out the Island Santorin on the map.
(Indicates on map) This island is located north of Crete. The raids in Athens were not carried out by the 68th Corps. Such operations in Athens came within the sphere of the Higher SS and Police Leader who used for this purpose, Evzones, gendarmerie detachments and policemen. I do not remember this sabotage attack on a railroad line which a train hit a mine and was derailed.
Q This brings me to the next document in this Document Book, which is Exhibit 459. On page 11 of the English text, which is page 9 of the German text, it is reported in the War Diary of Army Group E, under 68th Corps, - "On the road Argos-Tripoli, motor convoys III 670th Artillery Regiment - 1 Officer and 95 men - attacked by bands. Our losses 25 dead 25 wounded, 6 missing. Pursuit of the bands by detachments of 737th regiment under way. The measures taken as a result of the Peleponnese being declared a combat zone are being reported currently." General, do you remember this particular report?
A I remember this incident very well indeed. The commander of the Artillery Regiment of the 117th Division had held a training course for mountain shooting and on the return march back to the garrison one of the columns was attacked. This surprise attack was the immediate cause to declare the Peleponnese a combat zone which had been intended for some time. Despite the heavy losses, no reprisal measures were taken because, with the declaration of the Peleponnese as a combat zone, a new road was taken towards the final elimination of these bands.
Q What were these special measures?
A When the Peleponnese was declared a combat zone, General von LeSuire received special rights. The area was no longer under the administration of the Military Commander and, with the executive powers, also territorial rights were transferred into General von Lesuire's hands. He himself could establish blocked-off zones; he could issue curfew hours; he could restrict the traffic along the roads, the traffic of the ships and of the railroads; and he could take similar measures along that line in order to eliminate the communications of the bands and also to prevent leading band members from entering the Peleponnese, there had been a fairly active exchange between leading band members along the Gulf of Corinth; we knew that.
Q What effect did the declaration of the Peleponnese as a combat zone have on the supply of Athens?
AAthens had two sources of supply; one was Attica, where Athens is actually located, and the second one was the Peleponnese. From the Peleponnese they received in Athens mainly fruit and vegetables. Through the blocking-off measures which became a military necessity, through the restriction of traffic, the supply of the capital seemed somewhat threatened Ignoring the military interests we loosened these restrictions on traffic. We did not want to harm the supply of the capital of the country and, instead, consciously exposed ourselves to the military disadvantages which we had.
Q Did the declaration of the Peleponnesse as a combat zone show any successful result whatsoever?
A Yes. It had a complete success, as a matter of fact. These effects did not become apparent immediately but quite soon during the course of time they were felt. Of surprise attacks on vehicle convoys -only two took place. One of these was the already mentioned surprise attack on Laternia, on the ambulance convoy in July 1944. And another one in July 1944 was on a corps supply column on which occasion the protestant Divisional Chaplain of the 117th Light Infantry Division was taken prisoner. He had been enroute to take care of the troops and he was going to go to Thyperressia.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will take our recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, just before the recess, you mentioned the loosening up of regulations concerning the declaration of the Peloponnes as a combat zone, so that the securing of supplies for Athens might not be endangered. Were any other measures taken over and beyond that to safeguard supplies of the capital?
A. There were a number of measures which we took. The most important one, I think, was that an official of the German legation in Athens was appointed as economic Plenipotentiary and was attached to the staff of General von Le Suire, so that the military and economic measures might be adjusted to each other. That, I think, was the happiest solution and the best way out.
Q. At this point, I should like to continue reading the report which I began before the recess on page 11 of the English version and page 9 of the German. It says there, under "68th Corps," in the second paragraph:
"Euboea near Kimi, bandits attacked a truck of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. Our losses ten dead, five seriously wounded. 50 band houses burned down as a first reprisal measure."
The same report is contained also in Volume 25 in Exhibit 573. It is Document NOKW-1640 on page 93 of the English and 73 of the German, and it is also contained in Exhibit 579 on page 124 of the English and page 94 of the German Book. In the Ic report of the 68th Army Corps, in the document which I mentioned just now it says further:
in reprisal for KVC, 20 hostages were shot so far in Kimi.
General, what can you tell us about that incident?
A. I cannot give you any details about that incident. I no longer remember it. I should now like to submit from Document Book Felmy III, Document 70 which is on page 14. It is offered as Exhibit 47. This document is an affidavit by Wilhelm Kohler, once a general, who was the commanding officer of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. I should like to read this affidavit:
"In Kimi on Euboea, northeast of Chalkis, there are coal mines from which the electricity and water plants of Athens are getting supplied. During the spring of 1944 the supply to Athens of this coal was suddenly disrupted as Greek partisans through their attacks obstructed both the mining in Kimi itself, and the transport across Euboea to Chalkis. The supply of Athens seemed to be endangered. The Greek self-defense organization (Edes) under the command of the Greek General Papatanaaopoulos could not prevent these attacks, and asked through the Greek government for the allocation of German troops. Therefore a North-Caucasian (Russian) Battalion of volunteers - I no longer remember the number - was transferred to Chalkis for the protection of the supply line Kimi-Chalkis. Then this alone did not suffice, and the terror against the miners who were willing to work, increased, the North-Caucasian battalion was transferred to Kimi, and the replacement Training Battalion of the 11th Air Forces Field Division came to Chalkis, There were frequent engagements, and both sides suffered losses. In order to facilitate the protection of the mines around Kimi against attacks, and to make it more difficult for the partisans to approach the mines under cover, the local unit demolished, as far as I know, some houses and walls. This was a strictly military measure, which appeared to be necessary in the interest of the armed forces and of the civilian population which had to be protected.
Row many houses were demolished, and the exact time I do not know. I cannot state, whether the "Edes" -units of General PAPATANASOPOULOS which took part in all these combats, did perhaps more than was necessary.
In addition I state the following:
The activities of the partisans on Euboea also spread to the northern part of the island, and from there also to the mainland, where the partisan units collaborated with those of northern Boeotia. Beginning approximately in June these partisans groups which had crossed over to the mainland, repeatedly May I interpolate here that we are talking about the year 1944? "interrupted also the traffic from Chalkis to Thebes, and the railway lines from Thebes to Athens through their raid."
"At such an occasion an ambulance which had to bring injured members of the North-Caucasian battalion to the surgical hospital in Thebes was attacked from ambush west of Chalkis, and all aboard this ambulance, including the Mohammedan priest, were killed.
The partisans were particularly cruel as far as their actions were directed against the civilian population and the Greek police. According to the statements of inhabitants, massacres and mutilations occurred often, as well as cutting off the hands and allowing people to bleed to death, These cruelties were intended to prevent a co-operation between the population and the German troops.
I have known Air Force General FELMY under whom I served as commander of a division from December 1943 until the beginning of September 1944 as a superior who cared very much for his troops; their well-being was his highest aim.
I cannot remember that the division had ever received orders from him, with regard to retaliatory measures during that time, neither orders of a general nature nor special orders in individual cases."
Q. General, would you please give us your comments on the next entry in the same document? The document concerned represents a prosecution excerpt from the War Diary of Army Group E of 26 May 1944. It is on page 12 of the English and 9 of the German; it is the report of 26 May 1944.
A In June and July 1944 several large scale band operations were carried out in the Peleponnes. The Police Regiment 18 also participated in these, as did units of Greek volunteers. The Police Regiment 18 was at that period of time withdrawn from Boeotia, and was serving in the Peleponnes. In Boeotia it was replaced by a Regiment of the 4th SS Division, which the Army Corps had transferred there. Such details as are mentioned in the War Diary of the Army Group are not really very firm in my memory. One of these band operations I participated in myself in Southern Argolis, but there again after a brief engagement the bands merely took evasive action.
Q This entry concerned quite obviously the same incident which was mentioned in the War Diary of 68th Army Corps, in the same document book, page 142 of the English and page 103 of the German. This is Exhibit 480, NOKW 1065; is that correct, General?
A Yes, these are the same operations in Southern Argolis.
Q As for the rest of the text of the entry in this document would you like to make any comments about that? The entry reads as follows: "Northwest of Athens and Euboea engaged with group of bands at mine near Alemerion and near Kimi, mines were secured by elements of 843rd Battalion respectively Field Replacement Regiment.
A General Kohler mentioned in his affidavit attacks on these mines in Euboea, and again we were concerned here with one of these attacks, and from that it becomes quite clear that we had to secure these coal mines, because only thus could we keep the Greek Colony going. The coal was a necessity for the power station and electricity work and a peaceful development of the economic life was endangered by the bands. That was the whole point. That was one of the methods by which they put pressure on the population. I mentioned yesterday that they disrupted the food supply transport to Athens, at least they tried to. These were measures not only directed against the German occupation, but much more against the Greek population.
Q This brings me to the next document in the same book, which is Exhibit 460 on page 15 of the English and page 11 of the German text, and it says under "68th Army Corps,"----and the same report also occurred in Volume XXI, on page 89 of the English and page 78 of the German.
This is Exhibit 492. The document is NOKW 933. This report reads as follows, -- that is to day Exhibit 460 on page 15 of the English: "During 'Bule' in the area of Avion (30 North Athens) 17 bandits shot to death, 3 machine guns and other weapons captured." Do you recall that incident?
A In the summer months, particularly in June and July there were operations against the bands not only in the Peleponnes, but also in Boetotia and on Euhoea. These are purely combat reports, but the details I really do not recall. They certainly are not reprisal measures.
Q In the same document, page 15 of the English and page 12 of the German text, we have the 1c Evening report of the High Command Army Group E of 26 June 1944. It says there: "During search of Parnass Mountains 17 bandits shot to death." Do you wish to make any comments about that?
A I said just now that even in Boeotia such operations against the bands were carried out as they were in the Peleponnes. The area of the Parnass mountains was one of the places of refuge for the bands. It is again a mere combat report, and not a report of reprisal measures. May I point out where the Parnass mountains are on the map? They are North of the Gulf of Corinthe, and to the west of the road and railway Thebes-Lamia.
Q The next document is NOKW 340, which is Exhibit 462 on Page 21 of the English and Page 16 of the German text. It contains a report in the same wording as the Daily report of the Commander in Chief Southeast in Exhibit 467. It is NOKW 092 on page 57 of the English and page 43 of the German text. It is a teletype report by Army Group E addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, and this is what it says: "Combat Group Veigelt had an engagement with strong groups of insurgents near Kalaskopi, 10 kil. West Northwest of Gravia, 30 enemy dead counted, numerous wounded.
Kalaskopi and Inochorion destroyed. Combat group Froesch in the area north and south of Amphissa contacted retreating bands. Segditsa destroyed." Would you give us your comments about that?
A The names of the officers mentioned show me that here we are concerned with the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. Again we are concerned with a pure combat report from the last days of August. The destruction of the villages were not carried out by way of reprisal. That occurred during combat. It wouldn't have been the first time that the bands got a firm hold on these villages in the mountains, and that during combat the villages were destroyed by artillery fire, or at least suffered from it. And again I cannot give you any further details.
Q Now, I would like to draw your attention to the 1-C evening report of Army Group E, 29 August 1944, which is contained on page 30 of the English and page 22 of the German, and for the area of the 68th Army Group this is reported: "During local mopping up west of Korinth 15 enemy dead. During raid in Athens-Kallithea 20 communists shot."
A This report is a typical combat report as far as the area west of Korinth is concerned. As for Athens, the 68th Army Corps participated only in exceptional cases in such things, certainly not in this case.
Q The next document is NOKW 935, Exhibit 364, on Page 35 of the English, and page 25 of the German. On that Page we find a daily report by Army Group E addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, and dated 8 July 1944: "The area of 68th Army Corps. Unsuccessful attacks on own strong points, Southeast Kalamata and East of Korinth. With Jagdkommando thrust east of Kato Achaia some enemy losses. In Athens several Communists shot to death during raids." Please give us comments about that report?
A The first part of the report is again a typical combat report. Raids in Athens were always carried out by the Evzones or gendarmes. As I said the troop units were called into these cases only exceptionally, and not in this case anyway.
Q The next 1c Evening Report on page 36 of the English and page 26 of the German, contains a typical combat report, and also a report on a raid in Athens, and against does not concern the 68th Army Corps, and finally an attack with high explosives on a Greek construction train west of Lamia is mentioned, where despite material damage and numerous losses of life no counter-measures were taken. The same document contains on page 43 of the English and page 31 of the German book a Daily Report by the High Command of Army Group L of 18 August 1944, It says there under "Area 68th Army Corps." - "During continuation of operation on the Southeastern tip of the Peloponnesus more bandit sailing boats captured and destroyed. Unsuccessful bandit attacks on bridge guard Northwest of Amalias. Operation "Kranich" concluded without remarkable results. During raids in city quarters of Piraeus bandit resistance was broken by parts of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division and Evzones, 104 enemy dead, more than 5,000 arrested." The same report is contained in the 1c evening report of the same day, and may be found on the next page of the document. General, will you please give us your comments about this incident?
A. The first part of the report is once again a typical combat report concerning one of the many operations directed against the bands. Here we find mentioned for the first time that during a raid in Athens elements of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division were used. The Evzenes could not cope with the mopping up of the harbor town by themselves, and at the insistance of the military commander I helped out. If I remember rightly we gave them a Battalion and mainly blocked of the reads and thoroughfares. That so many bandits should have been killed according to the report proved how severe the resistance was, and how tense the atmosphere was at that time in and around Athens in the second half of August 1944. The arrest of 5,000 persons was carried out by the Police or Evzones, and the troops had no part in this. It was a typical police measure.
Q. The next document which has been used to incriminate you in this volume, is Exhibit 465, NOKW 1097, on page 43 of the English and page 34 of the German. It contains extracts from activity reports of the Second Brandenburg Regiment for the period of time 18 August 1943 to 4 September 1943. Can you tell us more about this report briefly?
A. At that time the Corps never received the reports or the War Diary of the Division. The Division rent War Diaries and Activity Reports to a certain army archive, directly. The Second Brandenburg Regiment, which we find mentioned here, was never subordinated to me, and from the report it becomes clear that it served in the area of Fiorina, and not in the area of the 68th Corps because on the 10 of September or 9 of September it was only that I took over the Army Corps of Southern Greece, Before then I had been down in the Poloponnes. We were not concerned with Florina The next incriminating document is NOKW 1012, Exhibit 466, on page 53 of the English and page 38 of the German. This document represents extracts from the 1c Activity Report, about the War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division from 16 June 1943 to 16 October 1943; what do you have to say about this document?
A. The same applies which I mentioned just now. Activity reports and War Diaries did not go through General Headquarters.
Q. I should like to read briefly from this document something which is not contained in the document book, but is only contained in the photostat copy: "In Sparta a Greek officer has been shot to death in the street during surprise attack 9 kilometers west of Aigien; 85 mules were lost. From among 52 Italians 51 deserted." Why only 51? -- The report does not show. I would like to remain with this document for a bit, General. Under paragraph 2 of the Noon Report of 23 August 1943, which is contained on page 53 of the English and page 39 of the German text it says: "In Arges change in attitude of population since the Divisional Staff has been transferred," Do you remember that fact?
A. Yes, there were difficulties encountered in Arges, I well remember. The explanation was that by the end of August there was at isolated places a certain amount of passive resistance to be found on the part of the Italians, which was simply part of the general trend of things, and I know that the Division had its difficulties there.
Q. Exhibit 472, which is Document NOKW 1246 on page 87 of the English and page 62 of the German, contains statements about differences between the town commander of Arges and the Commander of the Italian Sector Argolido. Does this fact connect with the report we have just discussed.
A. Yes, that is what I wanted to express. These differences could only be eliminated by having the sector transfer to the Germans, and the Italians were deprived of it. Applications to this effect were made to the Italian Army in Athens, who approved it, and that is a reason why I recall this. General Gyldenfeldt called me up about this, whereas at other points we were in perfectly smooth relations with the Italians. Only in Arges, as I said before, a certain amount of resistance was encountered, but this was before the Italians were disarmed. By the end of August the alliance still existed.
Q. In the Noon Report of 23 August 1943 it says under paragraph 2 in the second paragraph 10, hostages were arrested.
This had been done because a corporal had been disarmed and mistreated. That becomes clear from the second paragraph. This report is supplemented by a document in Document Book 24, the number of which is NOKW 1761, which is Exhibit 544 on page 206 and 207 of the English, and page 158 of the German. It says there in the War Diary of the First Panzer Division, in the entry of 24 August 1947, 1800 hours, 3 of the arrested hostages you have partially confessed will be shot to death. The others will be released. Do you recall this, General?
A. As the War Diary of the Panzer Division was not submitted to me the incident never came to my knowledge, nor can I recall it in any other connection. I haven't heard it through any other channel, I don't think.
Q Let me go back to page 53 of the English and page 39 of the German text, Document book 20, mention is made of the fact that on 25 September a sudden action was carried out in Patras, leading to the arrest of 26 prominent Communists by the secret field police and field gendarmerie in Patras. To repeat, mention is made in this report that on 25 September 1943 in Patras and sudden action was carried out, which led to the arrest of 26 Communists and a transmitting set was secured.
In document NOKW-1363, which is exhibit 471 on pages 75 and 76 of the English and 54 of the German there is a 1c report of 26 September and the 26 Communists Mentioned in the previous document are mentioned by name. Why were these 26 Communists mentioned by name; what do you think General?
A. Well what the Buergermeister of Patros told us was very unequivocal. This is why I assume he supplied us with the names. Without the assistance of leading Greek circles no such apprehension would be feasible, but there again it becomes clear what connections existed between certain elements of the population with either the British or the Bands, because a transmitting set was found and they were not used for private enjoyment but their purpose was to report items about troop movements and measures which we took either to the British or the bands. Once again this proves how intimate these connections were between the bands with certain elements among the civilian population.
Q In exhibit 466 on page 54 of the English and page 40 of the German text, there is an entry under 2 October where the threat is expressed that 12 arrested hostages may be hanged. That report, or shall we say this entry, is supplemented by a document contained in volume 24, It is NOKW 1761, Exhibit 544 on page 208 of the English and 159 of the German text.
It is the war diary by the 1st Panzer Division for the period of time between 1 June and 16 October 1943, it says there: -- in the entry of 15 October, as I said before, it is the war diary of the 1st Panzer Division for the period of time between 1 June and 16 October 1943, it says there in the entry of 15 October:
"As the weapons of the German soldiers who were attacked near Dimena were not delivered according to the imposed conditions 4 hostages will be hanged at 1300 hours in Chilimedon."
Incidentally it is the entry of 5 October and not 15 October. General, can you tell us anything about this?
A The war diaries of subordinate divisions were not submitted to the Corps and therefore no information about this incident reached me. Around this period of time I was in Athens and I was supervising the departure of the Italians, which was in full swing and under the pressure of business, we did not receive this report any other way.
Q On the activity report of the 1st Panzer Division, it finally says under 3 October:
"Well organized partisans, led by officers and wearing uniforms, they designated themselves as members of the Elas."
Will you give us briefly your comments about that?
A The activity reports also of the divisions did not reach the Corps. This particular report concerning partisans being particularly stressed, one can only conclude that here we are concerned with an exception because normally one does not report enemy armies or enemy soldiers as being in uniform, as that in taken for granted, but as it is stressed here it simply proves that otherwise they did not wear uniforms.
Q Document NOKW 1245, which will be the next document to be discussed, is exhibit 468 on page 60 of the English and 44 of the German text, We find an order signed by you from the LXVIII Army Corps concerning the transfer of the 1st Panzer division. It is on page 44 of the German, according to the order the 117th Light Infantry Division will assume on 6 October 1943 the command of all forces serving in the Peloponnes. Will you please give us your comments on that order?
A The 1st Panzer Division having been withdrawn a military leader had to be appointed for the Peloponnes and in this case it was the commanding officer of the 117th Division. I regard this as a perfectly natural tactical measure which you have to report in cases like this, as you have to have one responsible leader in the area.
Q. Further down it says under Roman numeral 1, "Political situation, 3000 persons...." This is on page 61 in the English book: "3,000 persons will be sent to the Reich for forced labor in order to pacify the country." The same fact is reported in the 1c daily report of the Corps of 25 October, 1943, contained in document NOKW 1363, which is exhibit 471 on page 79 of the English and page 56 of the German. There we are concerned with a situation report by the 117th Division, addressed to the headquarters of the LXVIII Army Corps under the date of 30 October 1943. Will you please give us your comments about that, General?
A I am bound to assume that the deportation for forced labor into the Reich was ordered from higher up, by the O.K.W., but without any further information I cannot state whether they were actually deported. That you cleanse occupied territory of suspected persons, that you arrest them, seems to me a necessary measure if you want the country quiet.