Meanwhile we received word from the OKW that they had consented to declare Athens an open city.
Q If the Tribunal please, at this point I would like to submit a document, contained in Felmy document book No. 3, it is Document No. 85 on page 54, it is offered as Exhibit 60. This is an affidavit by the former consul Alfred Escher. At the present time Escher is Legation Councillor at the Swiss Legation in London. On page 54, it says:
Prior to the time of the negotiations which are described further below, General Felmy was unknown to me. Since his departure from Athens I did not see him again now had I any contact with him.
General Felmy, who - if I remember correctly -- was in command of the LXIIV Army Corps, was the responsible commanding officer in Athens only for the last weeks after the Commander in Chief Greece, General Scheurlen, and SS General Schimana, had left Athens.
On 30 September 1944 I received a letter, written by a British officer, in which I was asked to inform the German Commander in Chief of the presence of a British officer in the vicinity of Athens, who was authorized to negotiate with the German commanding officer for the surrender of the German forces in Greece to the Allied High Command. I got in immediate touch with General Felmy who had hitherto been unknown to me. He declared that a capitulation of the German forces was out of the question, but as far as the surrender of the city of Athens to the British in the sense of "changing the guard" was concerned, he would listen to reason. To be sure, he himself could not make any proposals, but he would be ready to examine any reasonable suggestions made by time opposite side. He pointed out that similar proposals had already come into his hands through other channels.
I forwarded this information by messengers to the British and requested precise details on the credentials of the British officer and the submittal of concrete suggestions.
The messenger, who set out to the British post on 2 October and was expected to join me again after two days, because of technical difficulties did not return until. Monday, 9 October. The reply did not offer a satisfactory basis for negotiations, and as time was pressing, I suggested to General Felmy that I should go personally to the British station. General Felmy gave me a pass for two days, which permitted me to cross all German lines, promised me not to put my car and the goal of my ride under observation; furthermore, not to carry out any destructions and blastings during 48 hours, unless explicit orders were given him by higher echelons or enemy action forced him to do it.
I found the British post at Megara, situated on the road to Corinth, and the post established radio communication with Cairo; but once more no sufficient basis for negotiations could be found before I had to leave Megara, in order to keep within the 48 hours-limit. I came to an understanding with the British that they should send me a messenger if further useful news should arrive from Cairo.
General Felmy, whom I informed of the state of affairs, acquiesced in my putting up the British officer plenipotentiary,if necessary, in my house and permitted even the setting up of a radio station in my house for his use, if the Englishman would pledge his word of honor to use the station only in connection with the subject under negotiation.
The British messenger did not show up for want of further favorable news from Cairo. General Felmy had to leave Athens, left, however, a higher officer behind to make it possible for me until the very last moment to contact him, General Felmy, once more, in case fresh news should arrive. This was not the case, however, and the respective officer, who still called on me in the early afternoon of 12 October, had to leave the city without an agreement having been reached.
Permit me to add here that similar negotiations were conducted through other channels, above all through Mr. Sandstroem, the Swidish chairman of the administrative committee for aiding Greece, as well as through the Swedish Consul General, Mr. Thyberg. These negotiations, also led to no result.
Summing up, it can doubtlessly be said that General Felmy did all in his power to initiate an orderly surrender of the city of Athens, to prevent the disturbances which were to be feared and which would certainly have to be expected if there would have elapsed any length of time between the withdrawal of the German forces and the arrival of the Allied troops, and to prevent destructions unwarranted by military necessities. General Felmy told me during our first discussion that he realized what harm the occupation of Greece, which after all had been undesired by the German side had brought to the Greek population, and that he would do all in his power to prevent unnecessary suffering and damages.
Although, as I know from other sources too, the German local commanders were strictly forbidden to get in touch with representatives of the enemy, he did enter into negotiations, in the course of which, true, he did not make any suggestions on his part, but could merely accept possible suggestions made by the opponent. The fact that no agreement was reached, cannot be regarded as his fault.
The negotiations entered into through my intervention were most warmly supported by the Archbishop and later Regen Damaskinos, who authorized me before my journey to Megara to declare also in his behalf that General Felmy was a reliable, loyal person, who was well-disposed toward the Greek people. Such a declaration I passed on to the English plenipotentiaries in the name of Archbishop Damaskinos as well as in my own name.
Although it came to no formal agreement, General Felmy did his best to prevent unnecessary destructions. According to sources which seem to me reliable, it can be ascribed to General Felmy's personal credit that the originally ordered blasting of the Marathon Dam did not take place. Furthermore, General Felmy, shortly before the evacuation of the last troops, declared Athens an open city. According to the statements made by a member of General Felmy's staff, who seems to me reliable, he sent on a directive received from higher echelons relative to the blowing up of the power station to his subordinate officers with the remark that he himself did not approve of that order, which, according to a statement by a technical expert, had the result that the blasting charges, which would have put the plant out of operation for at least six months, were reduced in such a way that the plant could again be put into operation already a few days after the blowing up. Finally it is said to be likewise due to General Felmy's initiative that on 5 October 1944 an agreement was reached between Army Corps Headquarters LXIII, LXVIII it should read not LXIII. (represented by Korps-intendent, Oberfeldintendent BergHofer), the Special Plenipotentiary for the German Reich, Dr. Overcott, and Dr. Sandstroem, to the effect that the foodstuffs which were no longer required by the German Wehrmacht were handed over to the International Red Cross.
During my term in Athens, no complaints whatsoever with regard to General Felmy's personal attitude or to that of his staff towards the Greek population came to my knowledge from Greek sources either.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I object to the reading of the last paragraph. It can have no meaning whatever unless we know precisely during what period the affiant was in Athens and that period is not indicated in the affidavit itself.
THE PRESIDENT: That objection will be sustained.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, during what period of time did consul Escher serve in Athens?
AAt least in September and October of 1944, possibly for longer but I did not know him before.
Q If the Tribunal please, an affidavit by Archbishop Damaskinos I unfortunately am in no position to submit. Your Honors will recall that at the time I made an application to go to Athens to collect a number of affidavits. This trip was turned down by Berlin and we then attempted to put questions to the Archbishop, which were sent to Athens in the official way, but even through official and diplomatic channels, through Washington, but no answer has been received from Archbishop Damaskinos and the other gentlemen, this is apart from the former welfare minister, Louvaris, whose affidavit I hope to be able to submit to in due course.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I know of no application on the part of counsel to make a trip to Greece and I know further of no attempt on his part to get in touch with the prosecution to have it use its good offices or the Greek delegation who for a long time was part of the prosecution staff. If that had been done, I am sure that the prosecution would lend its efforts and make an effort to secure the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I know of an application of some sort of that character having been submitted. Unfortunately the proceedings for this Tribunal and perhaps other Tribunals seems necessary to have the cooperation of the prosecution.
I am not directing that toward the representative of the prosecution in this Court. That is about all I have to say, perhaps that is enough.
BY DR. MUELLER TORGOW:
Q General, did you then carry into effect this decision to declare Athens an open city and did you announce it to the Greeks?
A On the 11th of October I asked the Lord Mayor to call on me and I told him this important decision, highly delighted, he asked me whether he could broadcast this over the Greek broadcasting system. I agreed, but the Greek General Spiriotopoulos, whom the British had appointed as the city commandant of Athens did, as he had on the next days, prevent that this news should be broadcast. What purpose he had there I do not know, because this news spread like wild-fire through the city.
Q Was then an official surrender to the Greeks of the city of Athens effected?
A On 12 October at noon, in accordance with my agreement with the Lord Mayor, the surrender of the town of Athens to the Greek authorities was carried out in front of the castle. A company of honor had marched up, the German flag was solemnly hauled down from the Akropolis and a wreath was laid on the grave of the Greek Unknown soldier. The combat commandant of Athens was in charge of the ceremony, his name was Lt. Col. Meier.
Q Was this surrender published in the papers?
A On the same morning, I announced this in the papers and the same wording was communicated to the Lord Mayor on the 11th. When I heard it first, It said roughly this:
"I have the honor of informing you that the Wehrmacht has declared the city of Athens to be an open city. The withdrawal of German troops has commenced. The measure is being taken with the expectation that the enemy will approve it."
Q General, what became of these large depots and supply goods which had been stored up in Athens?
A Large quantities of supplies had been stored up in these depots, which could not be taken to Crete, because we did not have enough shipping space, we had at least a few thousand tons of food, supplies and clothing stored in the depots with various equipment, beds, tables and other furniture. Some of these things were handed over to the International Red Cross and some to the Greek Minister of the Interior Louvavis. Actually we had the order to destroy those goods less the enemy would capture them. I did not carry out that order in view of the suffering of the Greek population, because I could not detect any military necessity in this. Later on finally during our retreat in Thebes, Lamia and Larissa the food supply depots there were turned over the local Greek Red Cross in those cities.
Q May it please the Tribunal, it is my intention......
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt please? We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, before the recess we discussed the delivering up of the large stocks in Athens. I had intended at this point to submit an affidavit contained in Document Book Felmy III, Document 86. It is an affidavit executed by Berghofer. This man Berghofer resides in Nurnberg and, therefore, I will call him here as a witness on the stand and examine him concerning the points dealt with in his affidavit.
Q General, how long did the Corps Staff remain in Athens?
A My Combat Staff withdrew on the 12th of October toward noon, Athens was left completely undestroyed to the Greeks.
Q And what happened with the port sector Pyraeus?
AAfter dark in the evening of the 12th of October in the war harbor Pyraeus the blowing ups took place according to plan. The orange harbor which served exclusively trade purposes and the coal harbor where the Swedish Red Cross ships were anchored, these harbors remained undestroyed. In the town area of Pyraeus the electric plant was merely rendered unusable but was not destroyed; as I learned shortly afterwards, it could be used again.
Q Had this destruction been ordered?
A The electric plant was contained on the list of objectives to be destroyed. The last troops withdrew from Kyphissia, a suburb of Athens, in the morning of the 13th of October.
Q What was the attitude shown by the British?
A The British did not pursue at any point. Also the air landings which we had expected did not take place. The withdrawal and further retreat movements took place without enemy contact at any time. We succeeded, therefore, despite the misgivings which we had previously had, in leaving behind the towns of Pyraeus and Athens which harbored almost one quarter of the Greek population entirely without any bloodshet whatsoever.
Q General, I have one last general question to put in conclusion.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
What is your attitude to the reproach made by the prosecution that you have terrorized and exterminated the Greek population?
A We waged a fight against the destructive elements within the Greek state. That was fully in the interests of the country itself. The same opponent is being fought now by Greece after four years. Large circles supported us in this from the Democrats right down to the Conservatives. If I had wanted to terrorize and to exterminate the Greek nation I would have had abundant opportunity, at least during the last months, to do that. Then I could have blown up the Marathon Dam as had been ordered; then I could have taken the many surprise attacks in the suburbs of Athens as cause to counter these with armed force.
As previously mentioned, discussions -- and I only mentioned the most important ones, the leaving behind of the stock of food and other supply goods, and distributing it to the suffering population, the declaration of Athens to an open city -- all these prove unequivically what feelings I personally had at the time. They were not foolish and senseless measures, to use a term used by the prosecution, which I ordered.
The Motives which guided me personally had a good amount of sense and meaning. "What motives these were will have to be decided by the Tribunal.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, this brings me to the conclusion of my direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the defense counsel who desire to examine the defendant now on the stand?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
EXAMINATION BY DR. WEISGERBER (For the Defendant Speidel)
Q General, did the Military Commander of Greece have towards the troops in his area any official jurisdiction or supervisory functions or even the duty to check up on these troops concerning reprisal measures ordered by a troop commander?
A No, he did not have this authority. For instance, the troops of the 68th Corps were not subordinated to him.
Q Then the Military Commander Greece could, therefore, not have given a divisional commander subordinate to you, an order not to carry out a reprisal measure ordered by such a divisional commander?
A You mean a divisional commander subordinated to me? No, he did not have the right to do that.
Q General, I am now having reference to the so-called Loehr Order, which is the order concerning reprisal measures, dated 22 December 1943. It is Prosecution Document NOKW-172 contained in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution. It was Exhibit 379 of the Prosecution. The pages are 48 and 49 in the English, and page 99 in the German text. In this order it is mentioned that reprisal measures of the troops have to be carried out in agreement with the sub-area administrative headquarters. If the two agencies do not reach an agreement, the Military Commander has to make the decision. I will show this passage to you. It is on the page which is turned up, under capital "C".
Is it known to you whether, for instance, the 117th Light Infantry Division carried out its reprisal measures on the Peloponnes in conjunction with the sub-area administrative headquarters Corinth?
A It doesn't look like it, because yesterday, from the Activity Report of the 117th Division, the passage was read here - where the 117th Division reports that after lengthy negotiations with the subarea administrative headquarters it had invested the rights and duties for reprisal measures in the Division. I believe that report is dated the beginning of November, and the Activity Report as such was not sub Court No. V, Case No. VII.
mitted here, but I discussed these facts on the basis of the documents.
Q The order to which I just referred is dated December 1943.
A That came later.
Q I see. Do you happen to know whether this so-called Loehr Order effected a change in the situation on the Peloponnes?
A I don't believe it effected any change; or, at least, not to the best of my knowledge.
Q General, yesterday you mentioned that on the Peloponnes there were two Naval commanders. Did the Military Commander Greece have any official jurisdiction or supervisory authority over these Naval commanders regarding any such reprisal measures as were ordered by these Naval commanders?
A No; nor did I have such an authority. They had their own channels.
Q My last, but one, question: Yesterday you discussed the great raid which took place in Athens in August 1944, where there were more than one hundred wounded, and five thousand arrestees. You mentioned that at the time, on request of the Military Commander, you and your troop participated in this raid. I would like to know from you now, General, who was, in August 1944, Military Commander in Greece.
A In August 1944 General Scheurlen was Military Commander. S-c-h-e-u-r-l-e-n.
Q In my last question I had reference to a passage in the War Diary of the 68th Corps. This entry is dated the 8th of May 1944. It is contained in Felmy Document Book IV, and has been submitted by Dr. MuellerTorgow. The page number is 50 of both the English and the German texts. I am reading from the passage which is approximately towards the middle of the page, I quote:
"Ths Higher SS and Police Leader Greece, Major General Schimana, states by teletype (see enclosure), that he will be able to pacify the Peloponnesus within two months with the SS-Police Mountain Infantry Regiment No. 18. The Army Corps is of the opinion that Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the Boeotian area, in which the SS-Police Mountain Infantry Regiment No. 18 is employed at present, is not pacified at all yet, and does not think it expedient to transfer the SS-Police Mountain Infantry Regiment No. 18 to the Peloponnesus."
I will show this passage to you, General. My question is the following: Did Major General Schimana mention anything to you concerning the fact that he negotiated with you concerning the taking over of the Peloponnes by order of the Military Commander Greece?
A No; I remember the events quite well, because they were somewhat significant, for the way in which the SS acted. Where we with two divisions fought for more than one year, the SS -- not, in this case, General Schimana, but his superior agency -- imagined that they could, alone, with the SS Police Regiment No. 18, have to appear on the Peloponnes, and that would solve the whole problem. I rendered him somewhat ridiculous when he came with that request, and I remember quite well that he said, "Well, that is coming from higher up from our central office for the combatting of bands -- or something like that. There was one certain department in Himmler's staff which dealt with the combatting of bands. This left me with the impression that he himself did not believe in the behaviorism which he was trying to express. Since the highest SS leadership pressed for this measure, we actually -in June, July -- transferred this SS regiment to the Peloponnes and to the area Boeotia which thus had been left unprotected, the 7th SS Regiment was transferred as replacement for the 18th SS Police Regiment. The Military Commander was not the one who initiated this suggestion. I know that quite definitely.
DR. WEISGERBER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there other counsel who wish to examine this defendant? Apparently not. You may cross-examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Felmy, just now in answer to a question by Dr. Weisgerber you touched upon a dispute which apparently existed on the peloponnes peninsula between the 117th Division stationed there, and the administrative sub-headquarters. Isn't it true, General Felmy, that the dispute there was whether, who had the right and the jurisdiction over reprisal measures, and the administrative sub-areas headquarters in that particular instance waived its right to carry out reprisal measures and permitted the Division to do that?
A That is correct. And a remark of the 117th Division in its activity report proves that.
Q Did the administrative sub-area headquarters have the jurisdiction over reprisal measures originally, and simply yielded it in that particular case to the Division?
A I have no exact information about that. That was only made completely clear in the Loehr Order of the 22nd of December 1943.
Q The administrative sub-area headquarters were subordinate to General Speidel, were they not?
A Where sub-area administrative headquarters existed, they were subordinate to the Military Commander.
Q Who carried out most of the reprisal measures on the peloponnes -- the divisions subordinate to you, or the administrative headquarters subordinate to General Speidel?
A The divisions subordinated to me.
Q You then take the responsibility for these reprisal measures?
AAs far as I ordered them myself, certainly.
Q You also take the responsibility when they were carried out in compliance with orders which you had previously passed on?
A I cannot answer that in this general manner. I would have to know of one specific instance. The OKW had in basic directives ordered the carrying out of reprisal measures was up to the divisional commanders. Earlier, in summer 1943, even regimental commanders were allowed to order reprisal measures. I don't know the exact year when this was changed, but I believe it also was in the late summer months of 1943.
Q Do you consider yourself responsible, General Felmy, for actions taken by units subordinate to your command?
A No; where I did not order then myself I do not consider myself responsible.
Q You testified, General, that you were dismissed from the Air Force in January of 1940 because you were hold responsible for an action of a subordinate officer -
A Yes, that is correct. What I said was that I, personally, was charged with having given the secret document involved, which was lost in this incident, to the Air Force units concerned, and that was somehow involved with the emergency landing which took place. Soon afterwards, the Fuehrer order was issued which, as I might say, was posted on almost every door of every house , approximately, that no agency was to know more about any task than fell within its own sphere of competency, and that was to be upheld during combat time, and the whole order was meant to make the secrecy even more applicable.
Q One of your affiants, General Felmy, in your Document Book I, at page 46, states -- regarding that particular incident -- that there the OKW held you responsible for actions of a subordinate over whom you had no influence. Was it usual for the OKW to hold commanders responsible for what their subordinate did?
A That depended on what those people happened to fool like. It also depended on the esteem in which the person who might have been involved was held in higher agencies. One could not know that beforehand.
Q Was the "Fuehrerprinzip" applied within the German Army?
A I don't understand what you mean by this question?
Q I mean by that, the Leader Principle of holding a leader responsible for what those under him carried out. I believe that was the principle applied within the Nazi Party, of which you were a member.
A No, I don't believe that was the principle which was applied. Besides, this had nothing to do with the fact that I was a member of the Party, Neither did I draft the points of the Nazi program, nor did I disseminate the ideology in any written documents or speeches.
Q In what month of 1940 did you join the Party, General Felmy?
A Presumably it was September when I announced my joining, and then the application would run for some time until the formalities were dealt with. And then one was accepted into the Party, and the date which counted was the date of the first application. About three months passed since that application.
Q Then you testified, I believe, on direct examination that in October 1940, that is, one month later, you went back to Berlin on duty with the Air Corps.
A No, that is a mistake. In October 1940 an old friend of mine asked me to come to Berlin, and to help him.
He was in charge of several cartels, which is a civil occupation, and had nothing to do with flying, by the way.
Q YOU don't believe that your joining the Party had anything to do with your restoration to active service?
A No.
Q At the time you joined the Party, General, did you know about its political, religious and racial theories?
A Points of the Party program had been published, but I did not concern myself very much with them. After all, every Party publishes its program. I entered the Party, as I have stated, in order to --during the time of war -avoid disputes and to take special ways -- during the war we were not so much interested in the Party - we were only interested in Germany.
Q I believe you testified, General, that after the incident which caused your dismissal in January of 1940, you were considered persona in grata with the Party, and thereafter received no promotions.
A Whether the Party already at that time influenced promotions, I don't know. At a later time obviously that was the case. But whether it was so at that early time, I don't know.
Q Then your first position after you were restored to active service was as chief of the military mission to Iraq?
A That is correct.
Q Before you took that position you had an interview with both Hitler and Ribbentrop, did you not?
A Yes.
Q Your mission there was more political than military?
A I don't think that they pondered that problem very much.
I think they just wanted to show a gesture to the Iraq people. If one had intended to commission me with the execution of a political mission, that should have been done earlier. On the 21st of May I was reactivated, and towards the end of April the dispute between Iraq and England had developed to a local state of war -- and that was almost three weeks later. At that time the facts had been fairly much established.
Q You first became deputy to Field Marshal List, I believe, in July 1941. Do you recall the exact dates?
A 23rd of July until the 23rd of August. These are the exact dates, I believe.
Q General, is a deputy a figurehead when he takes over for another commander, or does he actually have a good deal of power?.
A Well, as a deputy he has full authority. For instance I as deputy had also judicial authority.
Q You then would take full responsibility, so far as OKW was concerned, for what went on within the area of the 12th Army while you were deputy to Field Marshal List?
A Yes, formally so.
Q Why do you say formally so?
A Because there were many things which took place, and which I really learned here from the files -- which doesn't, however, exclude that it was already reported to me at the time, only I don't remember it any longer. I cannot recall it. I don't recall any single major incident; and generally it was known that excesses took place in Serbia, and that constant surprise attacks took place in Serbia.
Q When you talk about excesses in Serbia, on whose part do you mean ... on the part of Germans, or on the part of occupied peoples?
A I mean excesses committed by the Serbs.
Q Did you ever hear during the period while you deputized for Field Marshal List, of any excesses on the part of German occupation troops?
A No.
DR. LATERNSER: I want to make a statement with the permission of my colleague, Dr. Mueller-Torgow. I just established that there was a mistake in the translation just now which changes the meaning. General Felmy said that it was generally known that in Serbia "Schweinereien" took place. With this he does not mean excesses; and it was also added that counter measures were taken ... no, instead, this word means, according to what General Felmy said in German, surprise attacks from partisans. But he did certainly not mean -- and it was quite clear -- that they were excesses committed by the Germans.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, please, I think General Felmy can state exactly what he means without Dr. Laternser, and I believe, as a matter of fact, that he has clarified precisely what he meant.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I had not quite finished yet. The later question was based on this misunderstanding in the translation and can only thus be explained.
INTERPRETER: May I say something, your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
INTERPRETER: The word "schweinerei", which was used in German, is a derogatory word, and I have translated it as "excesses", which I believe is correct. The fact that the word "excesses" was used in this trial fairly much in conjunction with the German troops, does not mean that it cannot be applicable also to excesses by other people, and I believe the word "excesses" is correct for the German word used.
DR. LATERNSER: If it please the Tribunal, I listened to the statement of the interpreter, and it is quite correct; but it has only been interpreted in a way as if the excesses had been committed by German troops.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we can clarify this by a question by Mr. Fenstermacher to the witness as to his interpretation of the word in question; and that he may, if he so desires, make any statement in explanation of his previous statement that he may care to make.
BY MR FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Felmy, when you characterized certain actions which occurred in Serbia during the time that you were the Deputy for Field Marshal List, will you kindly explain what you had in mind?
A I wanted to say by the expression which I used, that a number of surprise attacks and other sabotage acts took place, they were committed by the Serbian population and directed against the German occupational troops.
Q When you were appointed Deputy for Field Marshal List in July 1941 -- you were appointed Deputy for Field Marshal List in July 1941, when he went on leave, because you were the Senior Corps Commander within the 12th Army, is that not so?
A I was the ranking officer. I was no corps commander, I had no corps headquarters, but at the time I was the ranking officer in the Balakans and as such I was made Deputy of Field Marshal List.
Q That was a customary procedure for OKW, to appoint the senior ranking commander a deputy when the top commander left?
A Yes, that is how it was handled in most cases.
Q Field Marshal List has said he became ill about the 15th of October, and General Kuntze did not come down to replace him until 27 October, 1941; were you not as the senior ranking commander in the Balkans at the time, also placed in charge of the 12th Army during General List's illness and prior to General Kuntze's arrival?
A No. I said on direct examination quite clearly, and General Foertsch in his examination also said how the circumstances came about. He explained how he telephoned the OKW, and how the OKW appointed Kuntze, and, at the same time ordered that for the time being the Military Commanders in Serbia, Northern Greece, myself in Southern Greece, should act independently. The OKW apparently had the opinion that General Kuntze would arrive very shortly down there; that his arrival was somewhat delayed could at the time not be be expected.