Q Did the OKW know when General Kuntze would leave and when he would arrive in the Balkans?
A I can not very well tell what the OKW knew, but since in most cases the personnel office mentioned and appointed the deputy, and since the personnel office is not always quite correctly informed of the situation, this error could thus come about; that is my explanation.
Q Whom did the OKW hold responsible for the excesses -- by excesses this time I mean excesses on the part of German troops, if they occurred within the area of the 12th Army, when List was ill and prior to Kurtze's arrival?
A The Military Commander, the commanders concerned within their own area; that would be my person for Southern Greece, the Northern commander for Serbia, and the one in Saloniki-Aegean for Northern Greece.
Q There is nothing in the documents mentioning that particular subordination or arrangement, is there General?
A No, but if the OKW does not expressly appoint a deputy on the spot, it is quite obvious that everybody is responsible for his own area; after all, he has his assignment.
Q You were not expressly appointed Deputy in July by the OKW, were you, General?
A Oh, yes, I was. Under a statement made by General Foertsch, I was expressly appointed Deputy for the total area of the 12th Army.
Q Did you ever receive from Field Marshal List the Keitel Directive regarding execution of hostages at the rate of fifty and one--hundred to one, the order dated 16 September 1941?
A I said on direct examination that I know the order; when I received it, I don't know. In the document submitted by the Prosecution my agency was not mentioned. In September 1941 I was in Germany for a conference, and on leave, and after my return I suppose my chief of staff informed my about the order, which had in the meantime been received.
Q General Foertsch presented his book which showed the dates on which he had been on leave. General, have you one of those?
A My pay book which contained such dates had been taken away from me while in an American camp, though I protested against this, and, therefore, I can not at the moment show any certificate for the truth of my statements, but since I can make my statement under oath, the days are correct, even if I cannot give you the very day on which I might or might not have been there. I know that in September 1941 I was in Berlin for a conference, and I was on leave in Salzburg and Brunswick.
Q Do you recall Field Marshal List's testimony that he received the OKW Directive of 16 September 1941 in many copies, in enough copies to simply pass them to his subordinate units?
A How many copies, I don't know, but to the best of my recollection there were three or four copies mentioned, which were intended for the subordinate agencies, and by these are meant the Military Commanders, the Commander in Serbia, the Commander in Northern Greece, and my person, and possibly the Commander for Crete; he should have had three or four copies to pass on.
Q Have you any doubt that you received that order?
A No. I don't doubt in the least that I received it.
Q Did you pass that order on to your subordinate units?
A I don't know whether I passed them on to Crete, or whether for Crete there was a special copy which had been enclosed. At the time I had no troops except the three rifle battalions as Commander of Southern Greece.
Q Did you pass the order on to those of your battalions?
A No, I don't believe that I did that. They only served the purpose of guarding, etc., and they had nothing to do with reprisal measures. Furthermore, there were no actions which could have been retaliated, because the Greeks were very sensible, and they remained peaceful, and there was nothing to do except the difficulty of supplies and food.
Everything else was normal.
Q You did not refuse to pass the order on because you thought it was unlawful, did you?
A No, I didn't consider it unlawful.
Q Did you also pass on the Keitel Order of 28 September 1941, regarding having hostages ready at all times in the occupied territories?
A If a copy had been enclosed intended for Crete, then I passed it onto Crete, for the whole supply traffic went via the agency of the Military Commander of Crete, and mail was part of this. My good rifle battalion members did not receive this order because they had nothing to do with it.
Q Would you look at Document Book I General Foertsch, at page 91 of the English, and page 71 of the German. This is General Foertsch's order which was issued from the 12th Army Headquarters on 29 July 1941, at the time when you were deputizing for Field Marshal List, do you recall it?
A I can neither say yes or no to this question, since I am under oath. It is dated during the period of time when I was deputizing. It is signed Armed Forces Commander Greece, 12th Army, with the I-c reference number; whether it was hurriedly reported to me at the time I can no longer tell you.
Q General, Felmy, you have quite a good recollection of the days when you were on leave. Why do you not have a similar vivid recollection regarding orders of this kind?
A Leave days form an exception, especially so during the war, when they represented recreational time which one remembers gladly. Orders such as the one which I have just looked at, and similar orders you just mentioned, the Keitel Order, establishing the hostage ratio, and then also around that time comes the arrest of hostages for political reasons, a third order of that kind, and so one might easily get mixed up in these orders.
I don't think that has anything to do with a good memory.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Fenstermacher, before adjournment may I make this statement and request that you advise the messenger as to what document books we may need for this afternoon, so we may have them for examination.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I will be glad to do that, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:30.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 hours.
(Noon recess until 1330 hours, 5 December 1947)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing convened at 1330 hours, 5 December 1947) HELMUTH FELMY - continued CROSS EXAMINATION - resumed BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Felmy, prior to the luncheon recess we were discussing the period during which you deputized for Field Marshal List in July 194, and, we were looking at Document Book I, page 91 of the English, and on page 71 of the German, that's an order issued by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, on 29 July 1941. What is meant, General Felmy, if you know, by the words "All other means of intimidation which are customary with residents in the country."
A The provision shows that death sentences for sabotage acts should be carried out by hanging, so that the people guilty should not be shot. What it means by way of addition, "All other means of intimidation which are customary with residents of the country should be employed." I don't know what that remark is supposed to mean.
Q Did it mean concentration camps, perhaps?
A I can not say that.
Q Do you know General Felmy, on page 48 of your book, page 67 of the English, Your Honors, the notation for the 19 July 1941, about your deputizing for Field Marshal List, about which I believe that you said you didn't take over until 23 July, was Field Marshall List still in the Balkans between the 19th and the 23rd, do you know?
A The 23 July, my period of deputizing started, and it lasted until 23 of August. It had been ordered prior to this because Field Marshall List didn't stay throughout his leave.
Q Will you turn now to page 67 of your book, page 87 of the English, Document Book I, in the SD report, there is mentioned the execution of one-hundred Jews on 25 July 1943; as a matter of fact, I believe the execution didn't take place until 29 July 1941, in reprisal for an action which occurred on the 25th.
Did you hear about that reprisal measure when you were deputizing for List?
A I could not tell you that. I don't recall it, anyway. At any rate, not even after looking at the document here.
Q It would have been General Foertsch's duty to inform you of such an event at the time, would it not?
A Yes, if he knew about it, and I am quite sure he would have informed me. But this here is a report of the Chief of Security Police, which I am sure that Foertsch didn't get. He could have only received a similar report which had been made to the Army Corps from Serbia. It is possible that he informed me, but I can at this point no longer say that I remember it.
Q You remember this same incident in other reports which General Boehme in fact sent to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A To be quite honest, I am getting a little confused. In the comparatively short time I had to read and to deal with twenty-five document books, the whole thing is by now a little involved. After all, I didn't have one year to prepare myself for this.
Q Will you look now, General Felmy, at Document Book II, on page 8 of the English, and page 11 of the German, which is a daily report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast for the 15 August 1941, and, it states on the 14th August Skela was burned down, and fifty Communists wore hanged as a reprisal measure. You were List's Deputy at the time. Do you recall this incident, or perhaps whether General Foertsch mentioned it to you?
A No, I can not tell you that with certainty. The situation is that during the war we did not only receive the reports which were selected here for the document books, but instead of that, the flood of papers was very much larger than this selection. There were all kinds of organization cases, provisional cases, and the purely daily and situational reports. If we would have had only to deal with these reports, I suppose I would remember that better than I do, but that was only a small part of the reports which we actually had to deal with.
I know whenever my chief of staff took up the courier briefcase, he could not carry all the mail, as he had both his armsfull, and his orderly was also carrying two arms full of mail, and that would be the mail received during the four to five days.
Q Foertsch would have told you about a reprisal measure, would not he, General: They were not that unimportant? Were they?
A I assume that. What in detail General Foertsch report already to me I do no longer recall. It might have also been done in the shadow of later events, and the incident Kalavritz didn't take place during the time when I deputized for Field Marshal List.
Q I don't ask first for your detailed recollection, General, but don't you have a general recollection of the reprisal measures during the time you deputized for List?
A I said just before when I was misunderstood, that in Serbia the devil was loose; sometimes sabotage expeditions were carried out by the population, and directed against the occupational forces, in contrast to our peaceful southern Greece. I realized that this contrast existed, but I did not realize the details which might have prevailed.
Q Do you recall, General Felmy, that in October 1941, on 1 October 1941, twenty--one persons were shot in reprisal for the murder of twenty-one German soldiers near Biprowa, and that on 15 October 1941, 1736 persons were shot in reprisal at Kraljevo, and on 21 October 1941, twenty-three hundred were shot at Kragujevac; that two of those incidents, the one on 15 October and the other on 21 October, occurred when Field Marshal List claimed he was ill, and before General Kuntze arrived to take his place, and, am I correct in believing that you placed the responsibility for those two reprisal executions on the deceased General Boehme?
A These incidents at Topola and other localities, which you also mentioned, I only learned of here while looking at the documents in this courtroom, as just before when we received the documents I learned of this for the first time.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, I would like to object to this question because it has nothing to do with the complex of General Felmy's case. General Felmy said this morning that he didn't deputize for General List during that time, in October 1941.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I am finished with the complex in any event, Your Honor -----
THE COURT: It is a little hard to restrict as to the time, after the answer having been given. The objection will be overruled.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Felmy, will you look ad the document in the same detail that you did the events in Kilssura and Distomon. This document is found in Document Book 41 Your Honors.
The account of Distomon, your Honors, is on Page 19 of the English and Page 14 of the German document book. How many persons were killed at Distomon, General Felmy?
A. I couldn't tell you that by heart. In the report which we made, and which afterwards was found out to be wrong, more than 100, I believe 134, were mentioned, but I really can't give you the figure by heart. It could only be seen from the entry in the war diary of the Sixty-Eighth Corps, unless it is here in this document we are looking at, here some place. I don't know that.
Q. On the first page, I believe in the first sentence, I believe, General Felmy, it mentions there were about 250 to 300 persons killed. Do you remember what the German losses were?
A. At any rate they were not as high. There was no relation between the German losses and the figure given here. Possibly 16 or 20.
Q. As a matter of fact there were 3 German dead and 18 wounded, isn't that so?
A. Approximately so. Yes, roughly 20.
Q. Do you consider this whole Distomon incident an excess on the part of the German troops?
A. Yes, I do. There is no doubt about that.
Q. But why, General? Wasn't the population an instrument in assisting the bandits, didn't the population refrain from informing the German troops of the nearness and the proximity of the bandits and of the fact that the bandits had stayed overnight in their village?
A. Afterwards it was discovered that the first report made by the SS regiment was a false report, that what was stated in it was not correct. I had that cleared up by investigation.
Q. You don't believe that the partisans had in fact stayed overnight in this particular village?
A. In Distamon, you mean? I couldn't know that. Since they had at one time made a false report I became suspicious, of course, and distrusted their statements. There is a German proverb, "He who lies once cannot be believed even if he in future speaks the truth," and the same applies here.
Q. After you had the incident investigated, what did you learn to be the truth? Did the partisans in fact remain overnight in the village of Distomon prior to the attack?
A. I can't give you any details about that now. All I said was, which I remember exactly, that the report as such was a false report, I mean the report submitted by the regiment. I can no longer recall the details and I can make no statements about it.
Q. General, if you don't recall the details, why do you feel authorized and competent to characterize this as an excess?
A. At the time I realized things more clearly and I was better informed than I am now, four years later. To the best of my recollection now, NCO Koch reported to me that there was no resistance at all in Distomon, but that the troops stayed for a few hours in Distomon without being fired at. That is why it was an excess, because it was directed against a more or less peaceful village.
Q. Suppose the population of Distomon had, in fact, refrained from announcing to the German troops the nearness of the partisans and then in fact the events at Distomon occurred. Would you then have considered them to be an excess on the part of the German troops?
A. That is a hypothetical question, and I wouldn't like to reconstruct anything on the basis of such a question because that would look as though the grounds were correct and the conclusion which one draws than would be wrong.
Q. Isn't it a matter of fact though, General, that on many occasions reprisal measures were taken within your corps area for just that very thing, failure on the part of the inhabitants to warn the troops of the nearness of partisans?
A. In that case I would like to ask you to deliver the proof of that.
Q. You don't believe that occurred?
A. No. One thing is very obvious, that if a reconnaissance patrol which assists the troops comes into a village and asks an inhabitant, "Is the enemy here?" But that's all, the people can only give me information if he really is in the same locality and not somewhere in the vicinity.
Q. Do I understand you then to say that you disapprove of reprisal measures which are taken only because partisans were in the vicinity of a particular village?
A. Well, that depends on what conduct they show and whether they shot, for instance - whether they shot at us, for instance, or not.
Q. Suppose the partisans were about five kilometers away from the village, and from that five kilometers distance fired upon German troops who were also within their range but not within the vicinity of the village either. Would you then take reprisal against the village?
A. Well, that again is an artificial reconstruction now, because the partisans could not possibly shoot with rifles, at that distance. They would have to shoot with artillery. The new mortars fire that way, particularly so the Russian mortars.
Q. You testified, General, that while you had tactical jurisdiction over SS units, you did not have any disciplinary jurisdiction over them. What do you mean by tactical jurisdiction?
A. That is correct. I said that I only had tactical jurisdiction or tactical authority, but no justification to take disciplinary measures. By tactics or by tactical orders one means that I could give directives for combat actions. For instance, a certain regiment secures a certain sector between a certain river and a certain mountain or in an area between the villages of Lamia-Levadia or Distomon. A regiment, a certain regiment secures the area against band attacks or similar orders, an order purely meant for attack for instance. The regiment advances via a certain line and attacks a certain village.
Q. Now, suppose you gave orders to a regiment or battalion or division to take reprisal measures, would that be considered a tactical order?
A. No, reprisal measures never constituted a tactical order. It is possible that from tactical combat actions such reprisal measures can result as General Lanz, I believe, described in great detail. One reconnoiters a certain locality; one is fired upon; one employs heavy weapons in order to diminish one's own losses, Mortar fire or whatever artillery is at one's disposal; and under fire one approaches such a village, storms it, eventually conquers it, and finds out who of the inhabitants had remained in the village, whether they participated in the fighting, that's now such an incident can develop.
Q. General, if reprisal measures are carried, out, not with tactical considerations, if they are concerned with security, why are they not also tactical orders, that is orders to take reprisal measures?
A. Because there is a basic difference. I just described to you a case how it could, possibly take place, and before that I gave you a few examples of tactical orders which I could give to a regiment.
Q. Do you consider reprisal measures matters which concern combat and security?
A. Well, I just said that that would make an exception.
Q. Now, would you look, General Felmy, in Document Book 12, at Page 94 in the German and Page 112 in the English. This is General Loehr's order of 10 August, 1943, when he was your commander. In Paragraph I he states that the execution of retaliation measures and evacuations are not matters of administration but rather measures of combat, and are of combat preparation and of security. Do I understand that you disagree with General Loehr in this regard?
A. I believe that General Foertsch has explained this situation here on direct examination or on cross-examination. I remember that he referred to this passage and said we wanted to get reprisal measures away from the bands of police officers and administrative officials, and in that sense he regarded it as a kind of combat measure. I believe that is why this particular word was used here.
Q. And if General Loehr had meant that retaliation measures were in fact measures of combat without exception, I take it you would disagree with him?
A. One would have to discuss that. In a brief passage of an order you cannot possibly express everything which one person means or interprets.
Q. Do you recall General Felber's testimony, General Felmy, to the effect that reprisal measures could not be distinguished between matters of tactics and matters of administration?
A. I believe that had some connection with the question of executive power, those commanders who held executive power were authorized to order reprisal measures.
Q. General Felmy, if a commander was subordinate to you for tactical purposes and you gave him an order, for example, to attack a given position, and he failed to carry out that attack, what could you do with him; could you arrest him; could you court martial him; could you relieve him of his command, perhaps?
A. Well, first of all that would depend whether I have disciplinary that is judicial authority over him. Let's assume he had been an officer, and then I would have to report the incident to the Army Group because I had no judicial authority over officers. I would have had the right to relieve the officer in question of his duty until a decision from the higher agency had been made.
Q. Let's consider the case of General LeSuire of the 117th Infantry Division. Suppose you had given him an order and he had failed to carry it out. You could have relieved him of his command, but the ultimate decision would have awaited the opinion of the Army Group, is that what you say?
A. Yes, but that again is a hypothetical case. General von LeSuire would have attacked if I had ordered him to do that
Q. General Felmy, what do you mean by disciplinary authority. If you have it, what can you do to a subordinate?
A. Well, there are any number of provisions which deal with questions of furlough, at certain times how the commanding general can grant furlough for soldiers. Then certain punishments have been laid down and according to them how the men under him could be punished. An officer could have fourteen days confinement to barracks. How long I could grant furlough to an officer, I do not oven recall by heart. The complex has something to do with promotions, with decorations, awards, etc. Under certain conditions I could award the Iron Cross to soldiers belonging to units tactically and disciplinary subordinate to me, but I could not award it to a member of my staff.
Q. General, if I might interrupt you, is disciplinary authority an important authority, or is it a relatively unimportant one?
A. No, it is an important one because it is connected with authority.
Q. Does it include the power to court martial?
A. Yes, I can court martial a subordinate. With certain ranks of officers I have to request such a court martial. I mean, I have to request that a court martial procedure be started against the officer concerned.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Would you look now, General Felmy, at Document Book II, Page 137 in the English, Page 105 in the German. In this order General Felmy, you are given disciplinary authority over the Detachment Rosenberg, and I believe when you testified on direct you were asked what that meant, and you said it meant your jurisdiction to ask members of Rosenberg Detachment to salute properly and to wear their uniforms properly, and all of that. Did you mention the power to court martial at the time you discussed this document, do you recall?
A. Yes, the Rosenberg Detachment, as far as they were soldiers were concerned. What else was about there in that Rosenberg Detachment I can't tell you. With Lt. von Ingram there were five or six or even ten people who appeared in uniform. They were real soldiers.
Q. If any of the members of the Detachment Rosenberg had looted libraries and tried to find Jewish material in the libraries and archives you would have had power to court martial them if you disagreed with that activity by virtue of this power, would you not?
A. If that had been reported to me they would have been punished. If it is a more difficult and serious case to that it cannot be punished with disciplinary action, they would have had to be court martialed, because they were soldiers, and as long as they committed offenses of a more serious nature, crimes, they had to be, as soldiers, punished in a military manner.
Q. You never heard of the Detachment Rosenberg committing anything unseemly?
A. No.
Q. General Felmy, as I understand your testimony on direct, you ordered an investigation of the Distomon incident for two reasons, one because there was a false combat report made by the unit involved, in that they reported certain persons in Distomon were executed in the course of a combat action when in fact they had been executed in the course of a reprisal action, and secondly, you ordered the report because the unit involved had reported that twelve prisoners had been executed in the course of flight when in fact they had been executed in reprisal and contrary to Hitler's order to turn all captured partisans back to Germany for forced labor.
Have I summarized your testimony correctly?
A. On direct examination we did not discuss those details. The Distomon incident had two aspects where I was concerned. One was the unjustified reprisal measure. I reported this to the Army Group, and the Army Group reported it higher up. The second aspect was the false report, that the people had, so to speak, lied to me, which I discovered through the investigation.
Q. The Distomon incident occurred on the 10th of June, General Felmy. Do you recall when you ordered the investigation to be made?
A. On 10 June, I believe, according to the war diary, we received the false report which was later found out, about the Distomon events, when the report came in which was made by N.C.O. Koch of the General police. I believe that was the 12th of June. Subsequently a report was made to the Army Group, that was, which, so to speak, canceled our first report, the combat report, and instead established that on the basis of observations made by N.C.O. Koch the event took a different course. That is what I called excess. As a consequence the Army Group commissioned me to investigate the incident, which I did, in due course.
Q. You didn't order the investigation because of the reprisal measures which had been taken in Distomon, did you, you simply ordered it because there had been a false combat report?
A. Yes. After we had found out that the actual facts had been dressed up in a false report, it had become quite clear and obvious that the regiment had ordered reprisal measures which it was not entitled to order. Thy otherwise would they have falsified the report only to cover up for what they did? And as we can see from the files, they had succeeded in doing that once before. Otherwise the Army Group would not have accepted one of my reports with the remark, "This is parallel to the Klissura case".
Q. The Klissura incident by the same unit, the same regiment, General Felmy, occurred in April?
A. Yes, as can be seen from the files, that took place in April.
Q You testified that you never heard of that incident, the Klissura incident.
A. No, and I didn't hear about it.
Q. Where were your headquarters when you were commander of the Sixty-Eighth Corps, in Athens?
A. In June or April, 1944, in October, 1944, we left the Peloponnese and came to Sychico, near Athens. Sychico is a suburb of Athens, possibly about ten minutes distant by car. It is situated along a read leading to the east.
Q. In April -
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: General, I believe you said 1943.
THE WITNESS: 1944 when we came from the Peloponnese.
Q. (By Mr. Fenstermacher) In April, 1944, at the time of the Klissura incident, then your headquarters were not in Athens?
A. Sychico is very near Athens. It is a suburb. It is quite close to Athens. One could almost call it Athens. I only wanted to make it quite clear, and that is why I mentioned this suburb, Sychico.
Q. There were General Loehr's headquarters at that time?
A. In Salonika. I myself was in Salonika around that time. I deputized for General Loehr from about the 21st of March, 1944, until the 30th of April, 1944, because General Loehr was, during this time, deputizing for Field Marshal von Weichs, as Field Marshal von Weichs at that time had gone to Hungary.
Q. And then you were General Loehr's deputy at the very time when the Klissura incident occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. And yet you never heard of it?
A. No. That can also be seen from the documents, that only after the objection raised by Minister Neubacher, who somehow through some channel heard about it, these investigations were started.
Q. General Felmy, the Klissura incident occurred on the 5th of April, 1944?
A. Yes.
Q. At the time when you were deputy to General Loehr as commander of Army Group E?
A. Yes.
Q. The SS Grenadier Regiment 7 which committed the deeds in Distomon was subordinate to an SS division, which in turn was subordinate to Army Group E, is that not correct?
A. Yes, it is correct. There was an SS unit which served reserve purposes and was subordinate to the Army Group and was located somewhere in the area of Salonika. I really don't know just where.
Q. Even though the incident occurred by a division under your command as deputy to Loehr you never heard of it?
A. No, for the reason that the report which the division of the regiment submitted was incorporated into a combat report and sounded like a combat report, and therefore, one had no suspicion. Only after Envoy Neubacher's interference, who heard about it through different channels, the Army Group's attention was directed to this incident, and then an investigation was ordered.
I believed this investigation was carried out in May and June, 1944. I believe that that must be quite clear from the files because General Tucher who was commander of Salonika -- Aegean, and to him the division was subordinated for tactical purposes, was in charge of the investigation, and he was taken in by the false report. That is why at that time in April it happened nobody suspected anything. It was just a combat report like all other combat reports. At that time it had not yet become obvious what the regiment had actually done. That only was found out much later.