Q. Would you look now, General Felmy, at page 16 and 17 in your document book, page 24 of the English, Your Honors, still on the Distomon incident. Page 17 of Document Book 21 in the German. You will note there, General Felmy, that Lautenbach's commander writes to you: "I request to be permitted to punish him by disciplinary action."
A. Yes.
Q. If you had no authority over the SS division, why is the SS commander requesting you to be permitted to punish a subordinate of the SS commander?
A. I can't tell you that.
Q. Will you look now on page 17, at the bottom, of your book, page 26 of Your Honors' document book, where the SS regimental commander says again:
"I request that the matter rest with the disciplinary punishment of the case and not to direct further measures."
Did you have the authority to direct further measures for the disciplining of the company commander involved?
A. No, I didn't have that, in no case.
Q. If you had no authority, why did you deign to agree to the procedure suggested by the regimental commander? Why did you not simply say: "I have no authority. You may do as you like?"
A. Yesterday I tried to make that clear on direct examination I said the note which I wrote under the text here is illogical. Logically, I ought to have said: "I am not competent to give authority in this case," and I also said at the moment I do not know why I did it at that time. Sometimes one is apt to make mistakes.
Q. Will you look, General Felmy; at page 42 of your bookpage 55 of Your Honors' document book. Here is a communication from the C in C South East Field Marshal von Weichs, to the OKW, and Field Marshal von Weichs writes that the commander asked you for permission Courts 5, Case 7 to limit investigation in the case to disciplinary punishment."
That would imply, General Felmy, that disciplinary punishment is not particularly severe, is that the case?
A. Court martials are, of course, more severe than disciplinary punishments. I don't know why Field marshal von Weichs wrote these words. He makes the same logical mistake as I did. Really, all he ought to have written is: "That has nothing to do with General Felmy. He is not competent in this case."
Q. Von Weichs writes that you have agreed to a disciplinary procedure. Could it be assumed that von Weichs thought that you had the power to disagree?
A. I don't know what von Weichs thought. One thing is certain, he knew that those people were not subordinated to me in a disciplinary way.
Q. He made the same mistake, so far as clarity is concerned, that you did?
A. Yes. That happens quite frequently that a mistake goes on from one channel to another. That can happen.
Q. General Felmy, throughout this whole incident of Distomon, and the Klesura incident as well, there were protests on the part of Minister Neubacher and those protests are addressed to OKW and to Field Marshal von Weichs, but there is not one single mention of the protest addressed to Himmler, who was the Reichsfuehrer SS, and I take it from your testimony, the ultimate commander of the SS unit involved here. Does that strike you as particularly peculiar?
A. First of all, I don't know what Envoy Neubacher wrote to Field Marshal von Weichs who was the Armed Forces Commander, South East. I don't know what discussions they had. I believe both of them were together in Belgrade. At least, for sometime. Furthermore, I don't know what steps the Army Group took on their own. I wasn't informed of that. They didn't inform me, so that I do not know what steps were taken in the matter higher up than my own agency and I was in no position to know it.
Q. Was it customary for SS units under your tactical jurisdiction to make requests of you regarding the disciplining of their subordinates ?
A. There was only this one case which I experienced. That was the only time when SS units were tactically subordinated to me in Greece.
Q. Do you know what happened to SS Standartenfuehrer Lautenbach, who was responsible for the Distomon incident?
A. I can't tell you that because, at the end of July, the regiment was withdrawn from that area and committed somewhere else. Police Regiment 18 left the Peloponnes and returned to its old area of Commitment near Levadia.
Q. You never inquired what the SS had done by way of disciplining Lautenbach?
A. Whom should I have asked at the SS?
Q. Well, I'm sure I don't know, General Felmy, but weren't you particularly interested in view of the terrible atrocities and exe excesses that had happened to the person responsible for that?
A. I said that the incident Distomon had two aspects where I was concerned. What I was interested in was to uncover the false report. The excesses, as such, had been reputed to higher agencies and were dealt with and pursued by higher agencies. Furthermore, the events of the war took such a course that something else happened four or six weeks later and one could not pursue one individual case. Above all, the unit did not even remain in my own area and so I did not follow up the incident.
Q. If you had wanted to, General Felmy, could you have asked the SS to court martial and relieve of his command the Standartenfuehrer Lautenbach?
A. I didn't have that idea at all because, as I said, the SS unit did not remain in the area and until an investigations starts which has been reported to higher headquarters, always takes some time.
Q. The SS and the Wehrmacht were very competitive. They were great rivals, were they not, General Felmy?
A. Competitive is perhaps not quite the right expression. We didn't have any inferiority complexes, but it was apparent that the SS was privileged where awards, promotions, and decorations and other things were concerned. That made our soldiers and officers rather angry at times. we old soldiers, did not stoop to those things.
Q. You weren't jealous of the SS's favor with the Inner Circle?
A. Jealousy! No, Mr. Fenstermacher. I did not love them. One is only jealous of a person who one at least likes.
Q. You wouldn't be trying to push any responsibility off on the SS here, would you, General Felmy?
A. How do you mean, push any responsibility over to the SS? I don't know what you mean.
Q. Do you recall, General Felmy, that in the report of the regimental commander on the Distomon incident, he states that he was convinced that higher authorities would have ordered reprisals in the case of the Distomon attack"
A. Please, on what page is that?
Q. I believe that's on your page 16 - page 23 of Your Honors' document, book.
"The regiment - in complete accordance with SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach - is convinced that the competent authorities would have ordered reprisal measures against Distomon. This would have meant renewed enemy resistance and attacks and it would have meant a high fuel consumption because of the required large amount of troops."
Would you have ordered reprisal measures in this case, General Felmy?
A. There was no reason to take such measures.
Q. You disagree with the regimental commander's observations here?
A. That seems a bit far-fetched, what he says.
Q. Will you look now, General Felmy, at page 32 of your book page 43 of Your Honors'? You state there:
"The shooting to death of prisoners is a transgression against the order of the Fuehrer who has determined that all prisoners of war are to be sent to Germany for labor employment."
A. Yes.
Q. Do you consider that order a tactical order?
A. You mean the Fuehrer Order?
Q. Yes.
A. Generally speaking, the OKW did not issue any tactical orders. The OKW gave operational directives and sometimes, where it intervened more strongly, it gave an operational order, but a high agency like that does not give tactical orders. That is a matter of subordinate agencies.
Q. You go on to say that you no longer have any lever to take steps against the District Chief of Levadia. What did you mean by that?
A. What page is that, please?
Q. On page 32 of your document book and page 43 of the English.
A. Yes, I've got the passage you mean. It says here:
"Through the conduct of the SS Sturmbannfuehrer and battalion commander Rickartz, not only the counter-propaganda is rendered invalid which has been started by the general command. Therefore, I have no longer any lever to take measures against the District Chief of Levadia."
If I had discovered that the report of the regiment had not been falsified and that the events had actually taken place in the way they were reported by the regiment, then I would have put the district chief of Levadia before a court because of slander.
Q. Who was the District Chief of Levadia?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Was he subordinate to you?
A. No, he was subordinated to the military commander and I would have approached him. We quite often felt the effects of this exaggerated propaganda and that is why I say the counter-propaganda started by the general command has been rendered invalid because it was now senseless. Obviously, we could not just lie in any way we pleased, because what had happened was against us. But at first it did not look like this. Therefore, it doesn't speak against me that I rather believed a report submitted to me than I believed Greek propaganda. I believe that's fairly obvious. After I had learned the true facts, and after I had established the fact that the regiment had actually lied to me, this prerequisite no longer existed for me.
Q. You say that the area of Levadia was within the jurisdiction of General Speidell as Military Commander of Greece?
A. Yes, the whole area was under the jurisdiction, except for the time when the Peleponnes was declared a combat zone, but Levadia the whole area up to Salonika was under the jurisdiction of the Military Co Commander of Greece in accordance with the order of October, 1943, when the Italians left the German alliance and the part that, up to then, had been occupied by the Italians was now occupied by the Germans.
Q. The 18th Police Regiment, which you testified on direct examination was operating in the area of Levadia, was also subordinate to the Military Commander of Greece?
A. Yes, it was subordinated to the Military Commander of Greece but, to the best of my information, it had special instructions for the band combatting from Himmler, but I believe that General Speidell will be better informed about this than I am. Officially, and in accordance with the service regulation as I have seen it here, the high SS and police were subordinate to the military commander.
Q. General Felmy, if you had jurisdiction over combat matters in the area, did you not have jurisdiction over the 18th Police Regiment that was conducting warfare against the bands also in the Levadia area?
A. No, that was the strange part of it. I myself was surprised that Regiment 18, which was normally subordinated to the Military Commander, and the SS Regiment which was newly transferred into the area, was not subordinated to the military commander for that time but to the 68th Corps instead. That was one of the many measures which appeared illogical at the time, but I am afraid, in some cases, things did not always take a logical course.
Q. On these pages, General, from 30 to page 32 in your book and page 41 to 44 in the English document book, you order the SS Division to conduct an investigation regarding the events at Distortion.
A. Yes.
Q. How did you have power to order an investigation if you had no control over this unit?
A. Because this also refers to the tactical subordination as far as it was ordered by the Army Group to me.
Q. You simply had the power to order an investigation but, once you learned that atrocities had been committed, you had no power to go any further?
A. Personally, no.
Q. Did the Army group?
A. No, the Army group had to report it to higher up, and only the OKW and Himmler could clear the problem up between them. Even Field Marshal von Weichs, Army Group F, which was the official channel at the time, could not have done anything officially against the SS.
Q. The Army was simply a fact-finding agency?
A. Yes, and it had to report them.
Q. In this communication of yours, General Felmy, can you point out perhaps the passage where you protest because on the excess had been committed? You go on to report that the report is false. Will you perhaps indicate where you have protested because a substantive atrocity has been committed?
A. I don't say it in that report at all. Here I am only proving that the report is false.
Q. Did you ever protest to Army Group E, General Felmy, that you were outraged because an atrocity had been committed within your area?
A. To the best of my knowledge, as soon as I received information from NCO Koch, I reported to the Army Group about the incident. I cannot tell you now by heart the actual wording of this report.
Q. But did you demand an investigation?
A. The Army Group ordered me to be in charge of such an investigation.
Q. Did you request the Army Group to give you permission to conduct the investigation?
A. The Army group ordered me to do this. Following my report, the Army Group ordered that I conduct such an investigation in order to establish whether the report of NCO Koch, member of the Secret Field Police, was actually correct in actual fact.
That had to be made sure of.
Q. I am wondering whether you yourself took the initiative in demanding the right to conduct an investigation.
A. That was not necessary because simultaneously with my report the order arrived and the problem was also discussed over the telephone. I remember distinctly that the then Chief of the General Staff of Army Group E, General Schmidt-Richter, spoke to me about this on the telephone.
Q. Would you look, General Felmy, at your own document book 3 at page 38? The affiant Hammer says here, at the bottom of page 38:
"Also, however, as far as I can recall, the Fourth SS Armored Police Division was, in the meantime, no longer stationed within the area of command of the Army Group. The whole matter was transferred for further action to OKW."
If the division had remained within the area of the Army Group and of your corps, would the matter have had to be transferred to OKW or could you have done certain things yourself?
A. In any case it would have to be referred to the OKW because the OKW would have had to clear up the problem with Himmler. The OKW had to cause Himmler to have an investigation started on the basis of this report because an SS division, subordinate, in the final analysis, to him, was concerned. The OKW, as such, had no right to order the SS to do anything.
Q. The transfer of the division out of the corps area then is an unimportant incident so far as the power which the Army had to discipline the SS unit commander here involved?
A. I could not follow that trend of thought quite. A connection between the Distomon incident and the fact that the SS division was withdrawn from the area, is that what you mean?
Q. I mean, General Felmy, the fact that the division was transferred out of your area is of no importance in this connection?
A. No, I do not believe that is so in this case. It is possible, but I don't know.
Q. You returned to Greece for the second time, General Felmy, I believe in May, 1943?
A. Towards the end of May, 1943. That is quite correct.
Q. And in July, the change of government between Mussolini and Badoglio took place, and on the 8th of September Italy capitulated to the Allies?
I believe you said that on the 9th of September, 1943, you were in Patras dining with an Italian commander?
A. Yes, I dined with him on the evening the capitulation or the collapse of Italy was announced. That was in Patras, that is correct. That was on the occasion of one of the usual Pelopponesus inspection trips which I undertook. We had to take great interest in the Italian bases because, in our opinion, old fashioned kind of tactics were pursued there. That is how it happened that by pure chance, on the 7th and 8th, I believe, or on the 8th I was in the Patras area and in the evening I was the guest of the Italian admiral who was stationed in Patras. I don't know his rank. He was a kind of Naval commandant such as we established later on.
Q He confirmed to you that Italy had, in fact, capitulated. Did he also tell you that he had received orders from Badoglio not to ** surrender to the Germans?
A No, he was not so tactless as to refer to the capitulation on that particular evening. On request of Mr. Rapp I described in the preliminary investigation to this trial, in great detail, that we had been invited for 8:30 in the evening; Germans were there, the Commander of the Division Piermonte was also there as a guest. As is customary, we had some cocktails before we started to dine. Just around that time, outside in the street -- the house was situated rather away from the town--heavy shooting started. Now we knew that Italians were apt to shoot at every opportunity, whether it made sense or not, but that went a bit too far even for the Italian Divisional Commander, and he took up the telephone and alerted his guard companies or one might say his "raid companies". Then we started dinner and about half an hour later the shooting had somewhat subsided. During the meal, immediately after the first famous course which was always served at the admiral's house, namely curry rice, I was called to the telephone and the German liaison officer in Patras who was stationed with the Piermonte Division, informed me that Italy had collapsed and had asked the Allies for an armistice. However, this news was not yet authentic, he had only heard it on the radio. I told him that that might well be a trap - one of the many propaganda tricks particularly used during war time, to loose balloons, but I told him to be on his guard and keep his eyes open because it was not quite impossible that such an event might take place. I also told him that I would soon return to my own quarters and cut the evening short. After me, other gentlemen were called to the telephone, also the Italian Divisional Commander, and I assume that they received the same information as I had. It was really not suitable to deal during the meal with this subject, which was not very praiseworthy in Italian history, and so the evening ended in friendship and we separated.
Q Would you look at your document book V, General Felmy, on page 52?
This is your announcement of 9 September 1943 regarding the Italian surrender and you give, as an alternative to the Italian units, the opportunity to "cease the fight and to return peacefully to your homeland." You knew that the Italians who surrendered would not be returned home to Italy, didn't you?
A No, we had to transport them there. How could they have got to Italy if we didn't send them there?
Q Didn't you know that in the Keitel Order of 9 September 1943 the Italian troops who surrendered were going to be used for construction work on the German East Wall and that they were not going to be sent home to Italy at all?
A What date did the Keitel Order bear, please?
Q 9 September 1943.
A Yes, this decree was much earlier. I said on direct examination that we suspected something like that might happen and that we wanted to be prepared for the event. When the code word Axis was announced, or even before that, I was supposed to go to Athens and negotiate with General Vicchiaelli, which was afterwards done by General Lanz. In actual fact the code word of the O.K.W. reached me too late, but in expectation of things to come I prepared this announcement to the Italians, had it printed and handed over to the garrison commanders in Patras, in Sparta, in Amalias, Argos and in Corinthia. In all these places this proclamation lay in a sealed envelope in their desks and was only to be opened when the code word Axis came. The contents of this proclamation was composed from my own opinion and attitude. I did not think it at all impossible that the Italians would be dismissed and seat home, as were the Greeks. During that time, in September, the fighting was going on far south of Rome.
Q General Felmy, did you seriously believe that several hundreds of thousands of Italians were going to be sent back to the Italian Mainlard - to a mainland which had been occupied then by your enemy, the Allied troops?
A Yes. The invasion had only just started in the South - it had only been nibbled at, so to speak. That was at the very beginning, when the Allied offensive against the Italians had been started. We are talking now about September 1943 - and Rome, as far as I remember, fell in the spring of 1944, I believe, around Easter.
Q General Lanz had told us that there was a severe German shipping shortage along about that time; and that in fact, the British and American Navies dominated the Mediterranean. Where did you anticipate all the ships were going to come from to transport the Italian troops?
A By rail, as we actually did. They all left Athens and went by rail.
Q You mean you would have transported them from Athens through Greece and Yugoslavia to Italy?
A Why not?
Q I thought the railroads were being severely sabotaged throughout Yugoslavia during that period.
A Of course there were occasional sabotage acts, as there were in Greece too in Northern Greece more than in Southern Greece where there were hardly any surprise attacks at that time. One bridge, the Komotopos Bridge, was blown up in November 1942; such sabotage acts happened occasionally. They happened in Serbia more frequently than they happened in our area, but in spite of this the supply and traffic continued. These Italians from the Athens area, I believe there were roughly 160,000, according to Italian information, and a division on Crete,-all these men were transported by rail in actual fact and arrived where they were supposed to arrive.
Q Now, General, a few questions regarding the sources of information that were available to you as a Corps Commander. You have testified that the War Diaries and the various situation reports of Divisions never got into your hands. Isn't it true that the important events which were laid down in the War Diaries were also made a part of the reports which the division sent on to you at the Corps Headquarters?
A The Corps used to get daily reports from the divisions. These reports were passed on to the Army Group, twice, once as the morning report and once as the evening report. Furthermore, the Corps transmitted to the Army Group all those events which occurred in its area other than those reported, irrespective of whether or not units subordinate to the Corps were involved, or other troops.
Q Isn't it true that even though you did not actually have physical possession of the War Diaries of the Divisions subordinate to you, you did, in fact, have knowledge of all the important events which were written down in the War Diaries?
A Whether all events were treated in this way I do not know. That depended on what the division reported and that would be laid down in the reports of the Corps Headquarters. All the more important events, I believe, were actually reported to us by the division. I was in no position to make a counter-check, when I had the total information - war diaries as well as activity reports of the division.
Q You have no doubt do you, General Felmy, that you had knowledge, when you were Commander of the 68th Corps, of all the important events which had transpired within that corps area do you?
A Whether I personally gained knowledge of them I cannot state with certainty. That depended on what was orally reported or submitted to me. The Chief of Staff had certain duties and was in between myself and the subordinate units; every military commander is only too grateful not to be swamped with papers of a minor importance. All more important events in some channel or other would reach my knowledge.
Q You had a duty to know everything that happened in your Corps, didn't you?
A Well, if it was submitted or orally reported to me. After all, I could not be like a terrier and follow the trace of a hare and be here and there and everywhere, to see whether anything happened in this or that area.
That is not how the activities of a commanding general actually are.
A Would the OKW have taken as an excuse, General Felmy, that you did not know about an incident because the chief might not have reported it to you or because you yourself did not physically see the report -would that have been acceptable to the OKW do you believe?
A Probably not. Those people were well known because of their ruthlessness and inconsideration and quite frequently did not see reasons when reasonable objections were made.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Felmy, you mentioned during your direct examination that there was a possibility in reading the reports of your corps of holding your corps responsible for certain things committed in your area, but which were committed by other units not subordinate to you simply within that area?
A Yes, I said something like this. By operation we of course mean a combat action of some scale and in this case we were particularly concerned with band fighting.
Q When your reports, General Felmy, talk about the execution of hostages and that mention is made under the LXVIII 77th Infantry Corps, can there be any doubt that those hostages were executed by units subordinate to your command?
A There cannot be any doubt if the unit concerned is named, for instance, "by the 117th division" or "by the SS Police Regiment 18," if this is included, but where it is not mentioned, doubts are entirely possible.
Q Do you take responsibility for every mention of reprisal measures mentioned by Police Regiment 18 within your corps area?
A Would I take the responsibility? In no case, I could not give orders to Police Regiment 18.
Q As a matter of fact, General Felmy, in all of your reports it is mentioned when a regiment or a unit not subordinate to you committed certain actions; isn't that so? Look for example at document book 17 on page 66 in the German and page 88 in the English. There under the LXVIII Infantry Corps there is mention of the reprisal action in Calavrita, there is also mention of the burning down of the village by the Police Regiment 18.
A There are two sentences. Under LXVIII Infantry Corps, It says: during the course of reprisal actions in the area of Calavrita one village and two monasteries destroyed.
There is no doubt that the first sentence concerns the 117th Division because the cause for the Calavrita action was the murder of the 78 German soldiers of the 5th Company of that Regiment. Then it goes on to say after the period "during local operations in the area of Levandeia by the Police Regiment 18 after contact with the enemy in the area of Evandelistra, the village was burned down." There again it is quite clear that the burning down of Evandelistra was done by Police Regiment 18, which was not subordinate to me, although it served in the area of the LXVIII Corps.
Q That is exactly what I mean, General Felmy, anyone reading your reports would know precisely which unit committed which act, so that there could be no confusion when your lists, the lists of activities committed in your Corps area, when even an action is is committed by a unit that is not subordinate to you that unit is specifically mentioned just as in this case, is it not?
A Well, as far as I can remember we also had different examples. I recall the famous Island of Santhorin, where the wireless station of the Navy was eliminated and this was also reported under the heading LXVIII Army Corps." I am sure there are individual reports, which are not quite clear because the unit is not named, which may well happen because these reports are usually compiled rather hastily, after all they are not a thesis and mistakes are often possible.
Q Now, General Felmy, in document book No. 20 on page 58 in the German and page 81 in the English, there under the report of the 24th December, 1943 for the LXVIII Corps, it is noted that the SS arrested one bandit leader and 10 bands in Levadia. Isn't it true whenever a unit not subordinate to you carried out a particular action in your Corps area you specifically mentioned that fact?
A Well, it is probably mentioned quite correctly for the reason that it was not subordinate to us, that was to be emphasized.
Q So that when actions are reported within your Corps area and there is no specific mention of a unit involved one can assume that it was committed by a unit in fact subordinate to you?
A I would not say that 100%. It depends entirely on the individual case and only the men who really know the local conditions geographically speaking can decide this. Frequently things were reported under the LXVIII Army Corps, which did not occur in the area of the Corps. I remember for instance Voles Katherini and Florina and such examples generally. Therefore I cannot answer this question with you in general.
Q Look, General Felmy, in document book 18 on page 54 of the German and page 50 of the English. These are reports of General Speidell as military commander of Greece and you will note there is specific mention of the activities of the XVIII Mountain Police Jeager Regiment. Didn't you also carry out the same procedure in making your reports as General Speidell, that is by noting which unit committed which act so that the OKW would not be confused?
A First of all, I did not draw up the reports, that was done by the Ic, and of course he reported as precisely as he could, but he had to rely on the information and documents, which he received, which he checked on by telephone calls, but if he was not in a position to do that then our reports were less complete or shall we say perhaps less clear. In the case of the higher agencies the position was not that they could not differentiate between the LXVII Corps and the Navy, but what I tried to explain before was this, the maps concerning the situation were with the higher agencies at a one to one million standard, because after all we had many theaters of war unfortunately, and if you take a map at the standard of one to one million this tiny bit of Southern Greece is not very large on it and then if you find a little flad with "LXVIII Corps" on it not much space is left for entries for other command agencies.
Moreover in the event of an Allied landing, that is to say if war should really break out down there, we were to be the commanding agencies for technical and operational masters. In that event we would have received the command power of those particular units which were then stationed in the area without actually being subordinate to them.
Q Now, General Felmy, do you have any serious doubt that the hostages that are mentioned in these various documents as being executed in the reports of the LXVIII Corps were in fact executed by units subordinate to you?
A If units of the LXVIII Corps arc specifically mentioned as having shot hostages in reprisal, then it must have been our men who did it.
Q Otherwise, if it is not mentioned in the reports you assume they were not executed by units subordinate to you?
A Yes, such as in the example of the naval commandant who reported on one occasion and as did the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q When the SS and police leader executed hostages you mentioned that fact in your report such as the one we looked at in Document Book XX, and when the naval commander takes reprisal measures it was mentioned that "naval commander reports such and such." Wasn't that the usual procedure adopted in making up your reports?
A Yes, but nevertheless it happened that the unit would not be mentioned in that particular report of the agency which had caused the particular reprisal measure to be taken.
Q How many hostages do you believe were executed by units subordinate to your command while you were in command of the 68th Corps?
A Well, we don't keep books on these things.
Q Can't you hazard a guess?
A No. I know that in Calavrita 696 were reported and that the General told me that he did not observe the rate of 1 to 100: The General later told me because, as I have said before, 78 soldiers of the company had been murdered and in the final report by the division 696 Greeks shot to death are mentioned.
Q General Felmy, you have testified on direct that you went through the war diary and other documents available to you and ascertained that there were about 90 sabotage actions over a certain period and in only 60 cases were reprisal measures mentioned and again you testified that there was an average of, I believe, 55 sabotage acts committed per month within your corps area. Did you not count up the number of hostages with the number of villages that would be burned in reprisal over the same period?
A No, I did not count them because the documents are incomplete. The 91 acts be sabotage, 60 of which were reprisal measures being taken for, referred to the period of time between July 1943 and December 1943.