The 55 acts of sabotage per month concerned on the average the period of time between January and June 1944; nor were they all sabotage acts. Fifty-five times a month they were either sabotage acts or engagements with the bands. I remember from my examination that in these first six months of 1944 as an average we engaged the enemy bands 29 times a month where we actually exchanged shots. That was the figure I mentioned.
Q You have no recollection whatever, General Felmy, about how many hostages were executed within your corps area by units subordinate to you?
A No.
Q You believe hostages were executed every day, perhaps?
A We did not execute hostages every day, Mr. Fenstermacher. Hostages were executed and reprisal measures were taken if and when a particularly regretable cause existed. It was not our daily occupation during the period of time when we were in Greece nor were we in Greece to execute hostages. Those reprisal measures had to be taken sometimes if and when the population gave us reason to do so.
Q Even though you were down there from May 1943 until October 1944, you can't hazard a guess as to whether there were 100 hostages executed or 5,000 or 1,000 within your corps area by your units?
A I must say this chapter is too serious for me to hazard a guess. I am quite sure there are more than a hundred because I said before that in the case of Calavrita a total of 696 hostages were shot; nor can I state how many German soldiers were murdered by the bands because, rather strikingly, in the documents which were were, given by the prosecution all compilations concerning German losses are omitted and they were not on a small case of scale. In some cases I could reconstruct them from the war diaries, but total figures I could not give you because I do not have the information at my disposal.
Q You said, General, that you didn't take retaliation measures in the case of every act of sabotage. As a matter of fact, you had a duty to take reprisal measures in every case, didn't you?
A We did not take reprisal measures when we could not establish the connection of the reprisal hostages and the perpetuated act.
Q Would you look, General Felmy, at Document Book XII on page 94 of the German and page 112 of tho English? This is General Loehr's order of 10 August 1943 which we have looked in before. On the second page of the order which is page 95 of your book, page 113 of the English, you will note the paragraph which states:
"Surprise attacks on German soldiers, damage to German property must be retaliated in every case with shooting or hanging of hostages, destruction of the surrounding localities, etc. Only then will the population announce to the German offices the collections of the bandits in order to remain protected from reprisal measures."
Did you mean you did not carry out this order when you say you didn't carry out reprisal measures for every act of sabotage upon members of the German Wehrmacht?
A Yes, I assert that reprisal measures wore not taken for every case of sabotage, I have attempted to explain in one case why I did not in that particular case resort to reprisal measures and what the success was thereof.
Q General, did General Loehr ever ask you whether you carried out his order of 10 August 1943 to the letter?
A No, he never asked me that. Why should he ask me that?
Q Wasn't General Loehr interested in having his orders obeyed?
A Of course, he was interested as any officer would be, but concerning the hostage order, the retaliation order, he did not discuss the details with me. I think he granted me a certain amount of latitude because, after all, I was not a high school boy. I was fully aware of the responsibility I held.
Q What orders for the execution of hostages did you pass on to your subordinate units, General Felmy?
A How can I know that in detail? There were many similar orders, orders which contradicted each other, in some cases there were orders which cancelled some of the earlier orders.
Q You don't recall whether you passed on an order for 50 to 1?
A The 50 to 1 order was issued in September 1941. September 1941 I was Commander in Chief Southern Greece and at my disposal I had a force of three local defense battalions who were mainly on guard duty. I am sure I didn't pass it on to those. I think before the recess we mentioned that the order was probably passed on by me to Crete.
In 1943 when I returned to Greece again I had a completely different unit under me. I did not know the 1st Panzer Division before nor did I knew the 117th Infantry Division and I did not roam about the world with the retaliation order of 1941 in my waistcoat pocket. It rested with the files of the Military Commander Southern Greece and I didn't take it out of there. It didn't occur to me when I returned to Greece.
Q Do you say you never got any orders for hostage quotas between May 1943 and October 1944?
A We mentioned just now the order of September 1941, Mr. Fenstermacher. I admit I said before, and I mentioned this on direct examination, that orders which reached my agency in 1943 were passed on as was ordered and if it became necessary, but individual orders from among these 15 months cannot be mentioned now under oath. It is quite impossible for me.
Q Do you recall any new 50 to 1 order that was issued between May 1943 and October 1944 to units subordinate to you?
A In the order of December 1943, which is known as the Loehr order because he issued it -- he signed it rather as the deputy of Field Marshal Weichs -- the ratio was rescinded. I remember that very well. Whether before that time, in the summer of 1943 there was in one of the many orders mention of a reprisal quota or rather a higher agency referred to such a thing -- namely, to an earlier order -- I could not tell you offhand from my memory; I couldn't possibly; but if you show me an order which I can read, then perhaps my memory would be refreshed and then, at least, I would be in a position to say "it may be assumed that I received and passed on that order at the time." That is what I said on direct examination when when I mentioned that the order by the Army Group -- I believe dated.
July 1943 -- which was to come in to force in the event of an Allied landing providing certain measures -- that we passed that one on; but it did not come into effect because the Allied did not land.
Q You don't recall any fifty-to-one or ten-to-one order which you passed on within the period May 1943, October 1944?
A If it were submitted to me I could answer that question, which has just been sketched, otherwise not.
Q Without the document you don't know?
A No, I don't know. At least, not with certainty -- which is required under oath.
Q General Felmy, you talked about executions carried out by this Greek volunteer corps under a certain Colonel Papagondonas. Why was he called "Colonel"? In whose army was he a colonel?
A He was a colonel of the old Greek army. Would you want us to have taken a Bulgarian, or a Chinese, officer? -- quite apart from the fact that he himself volunteered, and he must have had his reasons for that.
Q He took the initiative? It was not taken by the German army, to draft him for the military service?
A He approached us for the first time in July or August of 1943. He approached the 117th Division when the staff of that Division was still stationed in Tripolis, and he offered at that time to establish volunteer formations. Around that period of time the Edes formation already existed in the Peleponnes. I recall Captain, or "Rittmeister" Poetaccos -- apart from the Elas bands. At that time he imposed a sort of condition in connection with this proposal, which was that the Italians must not be told about this, which was quite impossible to do anyway, because you can't keep a matter like that a secret, and the Italians would have been very angry; and at that time we did not have the desire to later come back to the offer because relatively little was done against the German soldiers in the Peleponnes -- I think I discovered three ambushes in the documents, or perhaps four.
Q Now, you talked about a Greek government, too, General Felmy. Do you consider that was an independent government, or a puppet government?
A It certainly was not a government in exile, anyway, because the government, in exile did not even have any authority in the country which could issue orders. It was miles away, and played a somewhat, different part, shall we say, -- some times also they are puppets.
Q I am afraid I didn't ask you that, General Felmy. I asked you whether you considered the Greek government in Athens to be a puppet government of the Germans. Would you care to answer that question?
A It was not a puppet government of the Germans. That was not the impression which Premier Rallis made on me when I became closer acquainted with him the last year. He had entirely independent ideas, and was not always in agreement with what the Germans ordered, or with what happened by forced measures, and he was also in contact with Cairo.
Q Do you suppose this non-puppet Greek government formed an army volunteer movement without first procuring German approval to the mission?
A The Greek government did not arm these units, because they did not have any arms. The Greek volunteers -- they uniformed the volunteers with Greek uniforms. I supplied weapons. But another much more important matter was that the Greek government passed a law for the establishment of these volunteer formations, so that these people would be backed by something.
Q Is it true that that was taken by the German occupation force, do you know, or was it taken on the initiative of the Greek government, and without the permission of the Germans, of course?
A No; of course, we had discussed it before. The establishment of the volunteer units can much better be described by the witness Professor Stadtmueller, whom we hope to hear here. He personally was in change of the negotiations. He sneaks Greek, and he negotiated with officials of the extreme right to the decidedly left of center.
Q How many members of these Greek volunteer units were there?
A You mean how large was their number? The number of soldiers -"members" is usually only used for a club -- in the Peleponnes we had 5,000 men -- to give a rough figure.
On direct examination I stated that we could have had twice that number if I had had the arms for them, which I did not have to spare: particularly, we were very short of signal installations, equipment, and all other equipment which are needed for a modern war, particularly in a mountaineous area such as we had to cope with in the Peleponnes, where, without radio installations I couldn't do any thing.
Q Who gave orders to these units? Who told them what to attack, and where to go, and when to go?
A These units either attached themselves to our operations which was agreed upon before-hand, or on their own initiative they would carry out operations. Usually on a small scale, it is true.
Q Suppose a member of one of the Greek volunteer units had been killed by a bandit. Would the Greek volunteer unit have executed hostages without express permission of the commander in which the unit was operating?
AA highly hypothetical case -- and I don't know what the consequences would be like. I really don't know.
Q Well, suppose a member of the German forces was killed by a bandit, would the Greek volunteer units carry out reprisal measures, such as the shooting of hostages, in retaliation for that murder, on their own initiative, and without first securing the permission of the German troop commander?
A They did that only once, in the case of General Krech and his escort. There were special reasons, I suppose. Otherwise, they did not carry out any reprisal measures for losses suffered in surprise attacks on German troops.
Q You worked hand-in-glove, then, with these volunteer units, alone -- that is, when you wanted Greek hostages you went to the colonel to secure other Greeks to be executed, and he procured them. Is that the way it worked?
A No; on the contrary. We had hostages on the basis of the information which we had gathered, and they became reprisal prisoners, and those hostages were checked up on by Colonel Papagondonas and his staff; and only if and when he was certain that in his own judgment they were really band suspects would they be shot.
Q You mean the Germans rounded up certain persons that they considered suspects, and then they asked the colonel to check quite clearly that those suspected persons were, in fact, really bandits or bandit helpers?
A That is how it was handled when we worked down in the Peleponnes. According to our information gathered by the secret field police, and other information gathered by the troops, according to statements by confidential agents and other people -- let me recall the case of Patras, where the mayor helped to have Communists apprehended... he knew his people better than we did, and that was how hostages were selected; and then Papagondonas was the final screening agency.
Q Do you consider this Greek colonel a German puppet, General Felmy?
A No, I think he would have been highly indignant at this suggestion had you told him that. Colonel Papagondonas, a man of about -- well, at least five or six years my senior, if not more at the time in other words, he was in his sixties at the time -- he came from the Peleponnes. I describe him as an officer of the old school, who loved monarchy, and were the royal crown on his shoulder, and admitted that he would not fight the British - only because he was worried about his homeland, and because he was worried for my area, would subject himself to that task, and a number of people thought likewise, because otherwise we would never have established our volunteer formations.
Q This Greek colonel, General Felmy, if he was a monarchist, didn't he owe a duty to the Greek monarchy who was at that time in Athens -- I beg your pardon, -- who was at that time with the Greek government in exile, as its chief in Cairo, and later in London?
A Well, I think it was his opinion that King George in exile had nothing to say in the country, and was no longer familiar with internal conditions.
Q. Now, General, I call your attention to Document Book No. 20, page 100 of the German Book and page 139 o.f the English. These are entries in the war diary of your 68th Corps, and you will note under the entry of 11 March 1944, under paragraph 4, which is perhaps on page 101 of your volume, "shooting to death of 200 hostages and Communists from the entire hostage camps". What was meant by "The entire hostage camps". Was there more than one, or did you take these two-hundred, some from one camp and some from another camp?
A. Originally I only knew that there was a hostage camp in Tripolis. I have revised my memory, and I see here and found that there was one in Sparta and at Corinth; that I think is the reason for the expression, "From all hostage camps."
Q. What do you suppose was the goal that they were taken from, taken from several camps rather than from one camp?
A. I could not tell you.
Q. General Felmy, you say that Colonel Papagondonas says that executions should be carried out by Greek volunteer units under German supervision , and approval will be given. Is it true that if any execution was carried out by a Greek volunteer unit, they first had to be approved by the German and the actual execution itself supervised by the German?
A. No. I don't even think that Greek volunteer units actually carried this out. A short time afterwards we went to Tripolis and this matter was mentioned in a discussion, and I found out that the executions had not yet been carried out, and in actual fact from this report in this book, it may be seen that they were carried out a week later, where it says, "So and so , many hostages shot in Tripolis, and 59 granted pardons, so and so many shot in Sparta," that is part of the war diary. I got it from there. It was changed again, to the effect that nowhere the Greek volunteers should carry out those reprisal measures, because they were not immediately connected with it, since German soldiers had been killed. Whether the Greeks had in the first place volunteered to do this, I don't know.
Q. Who did in fact carry out the executions?
A. The 117th Light Infantry Division, on whom these ambushes had been made.
Q. Do you know General Felmy in this same entry in your war diary on 11 March 1944, there is a notation of the number of the Germans losses and this statement: "That the commander 117th Light Infantry Division, General Felmy requests approval of following reprisal measures." Did Colonel Papagondonas ask your permission before the 200 hostages mentioned in paragraph 4 were actually executed?
A. Yes, that becomes clear from this: "He asks for permission for the following reprisal measures," and then it is mentioned that all transports and traffic on certain roads must remain at a standstill, that a certain station so and so had to be established; the curfew had to be observed, and finally the execution of hostages; that it says: the decision concerning the burning down of villages known as "band nests" had not as yet been taken , and, I said, on direct examination yesterday, that I remember the details of this incident very well, because the high ranking party, Colonel Papagondonas told me of the situation at the "band nests", and that he confirmed everything and that it was only then that I released these villages for destruction. In the same connection it was mentioned that not the 200 hostages that were shot but that in case of 59, it was found out that they were not connected with the reprisal attack, and decided that only 141 hostages were shot, in view of the fact that the Germans listed 21 dead and 42 wounded.
Q. It was with your permission to execute these 200 hostages?
A. No, the 141 , which I explained just now.
Q. Is it a fact that Le Suire requested approval, the approval of the following reprisal measure, that he requested the approval of it from you as the commander?
A. He requested it from me.
Q. And you gave him that permission?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. And after you gave him that permission, in fact, 141 hostages according to your testimony were executed?
A. Instead of the 200, it is 141.
Q. That is a particularly high ratio for the German dead and wounded isn't it?
A. No. The German list counted to 63. The German list amounted to 63.
Q. How many of those were dead and how many were wounded?
A. Twenty-one were dead, and forty-two were wounded, as the report said.
Q. Now this same Major General Le Suire carried out the Calavrita operation. Do you consider the Calavrita operation an excess on the part of the German troops?
A. Yes, I said so, yesterday on direct examination.
Q. Why do you think that, General Felmy? You testified that Calavrita. was a band-nest, and in fact they were around there with fighting and attacks upon your troops in the neighborhood. Wasn't that what the various reprisal orders instructed the divisional commanders to do in that case?
A. It was one of the many reasons, but I regarded it as an excess, because when the hostages were shot, it had not been clearly established which one of them was really connected with the bands, and that the destruction of villages which however were highly set in the area of the bands also seemed to have been selected not diligently enough, not as it had been done before. This was the direction which the German soldiers followed.
Q. How did you go about to find out who was really connected with the bandits; what procedure did you use?
A. The best method later on became the volunteers, they called them , they and Papagondas staff.
Q. He was another Greek, or a German?
A. Well, to inform you, Mr. Fenstermacher, if you could see how these poor farmers fought at the time. They knew the inhabitants of the various villages far better, they spoke their language.
Q. But it is a fact, is it not, General Felmy, that only a Greek who had spite, or vengeance, or haired, perhaps, would inform on another Greek falsely, and then you or your German troops would execute the man as a hostage, when really, in fact, he had nothing to do with the band?
A. That might have happened, often, yes. I could not deny that, but, of course, I don't know it. It is hardly quite possible to realise, you can see it now, how people denounced each other, how the people would work against one another, as they do now here in the denazification trials, and so forth.
Q. What method did you take to insure against that happening?
THE PRESIDENT: How would this man know that, Mr. Fenstermacher?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: He testified, Your Honor, of course, that he was dealing with this Colonel, the Greek volunteer commander.
THE PRESIDENT: How could you tell us whether one Greek farmer was testifying or reporting falsely on another? I am afraid we arc getting a little far afield in a matter which pertains to some details that can not be very helpful. I don't want to restrict you, but how this man here can tell about something that was in the mind of a Greek farmer's who is trying to, as you suggest, testify or reporting falsely, it seems rather impossible for this man to give that information.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, Your Honor.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Felmy, did you hear how many persons were in fact executed during the course of the Calavrita operation?
A. I said before that from the activity reports, or final report of the 117th Division, it may be seen that 696 Greeks were executed -- were shot.
Q Do you consider that a particularly high ratio in view of the fact that 78 Germans had, as you claimed, been executed by the bands?
A Well, the ratio is not even one to ten, as General LeSuire pointed out. On the other hand, it is quite a few human beings, I admit.
Q Were you concerned -- Withdrawn. Do you call the Calvrita, operation an excess because the ratio was as high as it was, or rather because not enough deligence was used in ascertaining which villages to burn down and which persons to execute? What is the main reason, the ratio itself, you believe, was not particularly high.
A That would only take second place.
Q Now, prior to the murder of the 78 German soldiers, you had demanded of the bands that they release them to you , isn't that correct?
A The regiment had reported that they were negotiating with the bands to have the prisoners released or exchanged, and these mutual negotiations did not lead to anything.
Q Was there a demand on the German part, General Felmy, to return the German soldiers?
AAs far as I know they were to be exchanged for other prisoners.
Q You didn't believe that by negotiating with the bandits you would be rendering them a certain amount of recognition as a belligerent entity?
A No, that has nothing to do with it.
Q You said that if you had asked to have General LeSuire disciplined as a result of the excess at Calavrita, the OKW and Hitler would probably not have upheld your request.
A Yes, that is what I said.
Q Calavrita occurred in December, 1943, General Felmy, and as you know -
A December, yes.
Q And as you know, in that month, I believe it was on the 22nd of December, 1943, an order came out, agreed upon by Field Marshal von Weichs and Minister Neubacher that political considerations were thereafter very important and that reprisal measures should only be taken after first clearing with him, and that no strict reprisal ratio was to be enforced after that date.
A It is not entirely correct. The political aspect is correct; the period of time is correct; and the fixed ratios are no longer mentioned, which up until then were valid and were based probably on the Keitel Order of September, '41. But reprisal measures remained in force should the population give such provocation for this, and are to be carried out by officers with at least the disciplinary authority of a divisional commander, or by the military commanders who also have disciplinary authority of at least a divisional commander. Usually they had the rank of a commanding general.
Q Minister Heubacher was very much interested in not having excesses occur within the southeast area, since he had a great deal of power along about that month of December, would he not have upheld you had you asked for LeSuire's dismissal because of the excesses in Calavrita?
A Well, whether he would have interfered in purely military matters, I couldn't say.
Q Do you think Field Marshal von Weichs who had agreed with Neubacher on the order of 22nd December, 1943, would have upheld you if you had asked for LeSuire's dismissal?
A That is entirely possible, but Field Marshal von Weichs was not the decisive agency.
Q Why didn't you ask Firle Marshal von Weichs to support you with the OKW and with Neubacher regarding LeSuire's dismissal?
AA dismissal of General LeSuire did not seem to be indicated at all in my opinion.
Q You don't think that LeSuire should have been dismissed because of his troops having committed this excess upon his orders?
A He should have been disciplined, yes, but that would not have been carried out. He should have been put before what was known as a Generals' Court and the decision would have been the Fuehrer's, namely the sentence to be reached by the court.
Q You never took any steps to initiate that type of procedure, did you?
A No, because I realized from the beginning that it would be hopeless.
Q Did you ever recommend LeSuire thereafter for a promotion?
A No.
Q Will you look at this document General Felmy, NOKW-1446. This is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 628, Your Honors. You will note, General Felmy, under date of 1 March 1944 you state as follows regarding General Karl von LeSuire: "Holds tight reins on his Division which was reorganized in spring and summer 1943. Has perfected training in particular in the cooperation of all arms. Up to now, only employed in combating bands. His well defined temperament does not permit him to be daunted by any difficulty. Mentally and physically above average, National-Socialist. Pronounced leading personality. Above average. It is suggested that he remain at his post." I understood you to say on direct examination that LeSuire should, have been disciplined. Did you really want LeSuire to remain at his post under your command, or would you have preferred, in view of the Calavrita excesses, that he be removed from your area and your jurisdiction?
THE PRESIDENT: Your question, Mr. Fenstermacher, was as to whether or not he had recommended his promotion, was it not?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I am coming to that in just a minute, your Honor. There is another entry by General Felmy in this same particular personnel file.
Q. (By Mr. Fenstermachcer) Perhaps, General Felmy, we should have the bulk of your comments at the same time. You note on Page 3 of the document which you have an entry under the date of 16 July 1944 where you say this of LeSuire: "Energetic soldier, leading personality. Holds tight reins on his division and has perfected training. Up to now, only combating bands. His well defined temperament does not permit him to be daunted by any difficulty. Mentally and physically above average. National-Socialist. Pronounced leader personality. Lately an exaggerated touchiness and feeling he is in the right. Above average. - Commander of a Mountain Corps." You were there recommending LeSuire to command a corps, are you not?
A. Yes, I do, but that doesn't mean that he would become one. These are simply the sort of judgments reached at regular intervals on the men concerned, namely, whether they can be left in their positions or whether they were to be promoted to next higher position, and that in accordance with all his soldierly past and abilities he was quite suitable.
Q. Did you hope that he would not become a corps commander?
A. Would I hope that, do you mean? Well he was next in turn.
Q. Did you want General LeSuire to become a corps commander and get a promotion, is that why you wrote this recommendation for him?
A. I certified here that he had the ability of leading a corps.
Q. Why did you call him a National-Socialist, General Felmy?
A. Well, that has been mentioned often before, that there was a stipulation that we had to add this, and as officer -
Q. You will note under General Loehr's recommendation and General Weich's recommendation, on page 4 of the document which you have, that they don't mention he is a National Socialist. Neither does General Jodel or General Stettner or General Schoerner. As a matter of fact, you are the only commander who mentions that he is a National-Socialist, are you not?
A. I don't know what judgment the others arrived at concerning him. There was a regulation that a remark of that sort had to be included in the personal file, and this has been discussed so often before.
Q. Did the regulation on that point come only to you, or was it generally distributed throughout the German Army?
A. I know that in the case of the Luftwaffe this had been initiated before the war. In the case of the Army it became acute only later on. I cannot give you the date when the Army received the regulation.
Q. Why did you recommend in March 1944, that LeSuire remain in his post?
A. He had been in command of his division for just a year. I think it had been established in the early part of summer, 1943, I mean the 117 Light Infantry Division, and it was customary for him to stay in command for about a year. Had he not had that, he still would not have been promoted commanding general before, because our theater was not a largescale theater of war where people could distinguish themselves personally. Things on the whole were a quiet routine.
Q. He had commanded a division for quite sometime, had he not, General Felmy? You will note on the first page of has personal file he was deputy commander of the Forty Sixth Infantry Division as early as February, 1943.
A. Well, that probably was with his personal file at the time when I wrote down his qualification? You are sure it was in with his personal file? At the time I didn't read it, what he had done before, because I was to judge him from my own experience of him. In the case of every written judgment we had to write a new judgment, and I do not remember that the compilation was worded in the way it is reproduced here, that as it were his whole military career could be deduced therefrom. All personal papers usually rested with the next higher agency. In this case, in the case of the corps command, if a new file had to be started new forms were asked for.
When I wrote out these judgments, not only in the case of General von LeSuire, but in all others, I did not look at the whole of the career so that my own judgment would be objective amid without prejudice.
THE PRESIDENT The Tribunal will recess at this time until Monday morning, December 8, 1947, at nine-thirty in the morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 8 December 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Court No.V, Case No. VII.
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 4 December 1947, 0930, Justice Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom, with the exception of the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
HELMUTH FELMY - Resumed CROSS-EXAMINATION - (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q Thank you, Your Honor. General Felmy, last Friday we spoke somewhat generally about the subject of hostages and at that time you said you were unable to ascertain an approximation regarding the number of hostages executed in your Corps area during your second sojourn in Greece. Would you look now at document book No. 20, page 38 in the German, page 53 in the English. This is an excerpt from your own -from the war diary of the 1st Panzer Division, who was subordinate to you, and it reports that on 22 August 1943 a Corporal was disarmed and beaten up and that ten hostages were to be shot to death unless the culprits are named, you will note the statement "with the approval of the Corps headquarters"; did you give approval for the execution of those hostages?
A Without doubt, if it says so here. I suppose an inquiry reached the Corps Headquarters and the answer which is contained here can be Court No. V, Case No. VII.