A Not the 68th Corps, because, Athens, as such, was not under it.
Q Who did order them?
AAccording to what I read in the newspapers, that was always signed "The Higher SS and Police leader", so they could be traced back to him.
Q As I understand it, General, in Athens there were three units: Yourself, as Commander of the 68th Corps; General Speidel as Military Commander of Greece; and the 18th Police and SS Regiment under the Command of General Schimana.
A No, excuse me. The 18th Police Regiment, or rather the majority of this regiment was stationed in Boeotia. Only one battalion was in Athens, but the Schimana staff was stationed in Athens. That is correct.
A Schimana was both Higher SS and Police Leader and Commander of the 18th SS and Police Mountain Regiment?
A He was not commander of the regiment. The regiment was subordinate to him, it had its own regimental commander.
Q Now, you mean to say, that when you were in Athens as the Corps Commander you did not know who ordered reprisal measures in the City of Athens for acts of sabotage or attacks upon German troops?
A I said that for the town of Athens reprisal measures were carried out by General Schimana because I saw in the newspapers announcements indicating that. For instance, quoting from memory: "For the murder of 10 Greed gendarmes, 20 or 30 Greeks were hanged or shot this morning. Signed: Schimana, Higher SS and Police Leader." Approximately like this such announcements in the newspapers would read.
Q All you know about the reprisal measures in the City of Athens during the period you were Corps Commander there is what you read in the newspapers?
A Such announcements could be found in the newspapers quite frequently. 7280 Q But you didn't know anything other than what you read there?
Did you know anything officially in the course of your duties as to who ordered reprisal measures in Athens?
A Officially I didn't know anything about it. I was only too glad not to have anything to do with Athens personally because that was quite a hot spot, as was found out during the last weeks, and I was always very worried about Athens and what the situation there might lead to, particularly so if the Allies had landed anywhere.
Q Who had executive power in Greece and in the City of Athens?
A The executive power was held by the Military Commander.
Q Who was that?
A General Speidel, and after him, General Scheurlen. I have to assume this because I couldn't possibly imagine that executive power which had been transferred to the Military Commander South-east was executed by him personally. I would assume that he invested it in the Military Commander Greece, in turn. I am not quite sure that he did that because, after all, I was not Military Commander and I didn't know his service directives. The period of time when I was Military Commander Southern Greece and the time we discuss now are completely different because now the Italians weren't there any longer.
Q During the period October, 1943 to October, 1944, when you were in Athens, to whom was Schimana subordinate?
A I do not know Schimana's service regulations and directives. He received orders from Himmler and he received orders from the Army Group. To what extent he received orders from General Speidel and to what extent he was subordinate to General Speidel, I'm afraid I can not make any statements in detail. These are matters which did not concern me very much so I took no interest in them.
Q Now, you talked about the evacuation of Athens in October, 1944, General Felmy. You said that you had received an order for the destruction of the Marathon Dam, I believe.
A The Marathon Dam, that is correct, yes.
Q From whom did you receive that order?
A There were a lot of objectives to be destroyed. Who drew up that list, I don't know. I assume they were experts who worked in conjunction with some of the high agencies.
Q You received that order from Field Marshal von Weichs, didn't you? Look at your document.....
A No, I don't think so.
Q Look at your Document Book III, at page 60. Your affiant there, Robert Berghofer, stated in paragraph 5, second sentence:
"The OKW and the commander-in-chief in the South-East had ordered the destruction of all military property which could not be removed and which could, directly or indirectly, be of help to the enemy in his waging of war."
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW (Defense Counsel for Defendant Felmy): Your Honor, I object against the discussion of this document because it has not been submitted by me.
JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that there is no objection about inquiring about the fact, but the exhibit, not having been offered in evidence, the reference should not be made to that.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Very well, Your Honor.
Q. You do not know from whom you received the order for the destruction of the Marathon Dam, General?
A No, I don't know.
Q Why was the destruction of the Marathon Dam ever even considered? Was its destruction a military necessity?
A You have asked me too much. I can't answer that. I don't know. As a reservoir, it had certain military importance for the troops stationed in Athens, but it was just as important for the civilian population in Athens because water, after all, does not take into consideration uniform or civilian clotnes.
It serves man. For the conduct of war within Athens, or course, it was very important indeed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
JUDGE CARTER: If you prefer, we might adjourn until after lunch at which time you might continue the redirect examination.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Very well.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal stands in recess.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. MUELLER TORGOW:
Q. General, you said on Friday, as far as the things were concerned which were carried out by units of the 68th Army Corps, you were responsible for all those things which you ordered yourself. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is roughly what I said.
Q. In this connection, Mr. Fenstermacher used the term "Fuehrer principle". What is the "Fuehrer principle"? Particularly in the military field. Speaking quite generally, not only in the Wehrmacht but in any armed force?
A. One orders and the other obeys.
Q. It does not mean, in other words, that the leader, the Fuehrer, bears the responsibility for acts committed by his subordinates, which he has not caused in any sense of the word. Did you want to say that?
A. If I have no knowledge of the events or if I am not informed through some channel or other, of incidents which occur in my area, I mean, then I can scarcely be held responsible for them.
Q. General, you said further, concerning the period of time when you were deputizing for Field Marshal List - that is to say, between 23 July and 23 August, 1941 - when you were asked about the units then under your command, you being the commanding general, whether you felt yourself to be responsible for the things which occurred in that period of time in the Army area and you said "formally speaking" you were responsible for the events which had occurred in that period of time. What did you mean by "formally responsible?"
A. Well, perhaps it's a slightly clumsy term. By "formally", I meant from outward appearances as far as others were concerned. I deputized for him, but I was not really the commander in chief.
Responsible I was for the things which occurred in the Army area if and when I ordered them myself or if and when I was informed about them.
Q. You mean, when you tolerated these things, or when you took steps against them? I am only supplementing you.
A. If these things came to my knowledge, and if I tolerated them I did so because they were I considered them a military necessity.
If they had been done according to the directives and orders concerned.
Q. In other words, you think the same applies for the time when you deputized for List as what you said concerning the 68th Army Corps?
A. Yes.
Q. General, I would briefly come back to the order concerning the hostage ratio, where the OKW, on whose behalf Keitel signed, fixed the ratio of 1 to 50 and 1 to 100. You testified that at that time you did not regard this order as illegal and you were not quite sure it reached you at that time. What did you want to express by that expression?
A. I regarded it as necessary, under the prevailing circumstances. Prevailing at the time it was issued, I mean.
Q. It came from the OKW, didn't it?
A. Yes, it did. It did indeed dome from the OKW. The date was the 16th of September, as I found out here. I said that in September I had been on leave and I held conversations in Berlin because of these Arabic problems and I was informed about them, probably in an oral report by my chief of staff. The document which the prosecution has submitted here does not mention my agency but somehow or other it may well have reached my agency. As I say, I was not present when it came in, but I know about its contents.
Q. As far as this order is concerned, when you used the term "unlawful" does the same apply which you said in a different context this morning - namely, that the OKW checked the order as to its status under international law? In other words, formally speaking, it was lawful?
A. I must admit that we did not worry about problems like that at the time. The order came from our higher superior agency and we were committed by it, unless there was a certain amount of latitude allowed in its wording. My personal view about this order I have explained on direct examination, but that is scarcely the essential aspect. Nobody had asked me for my opinion beforehand. I received the order and, as a soldier, I had to carry it out. I believe that would be so in any army.
Q. Now, about the question of passing this order on. You said that you did not pass it on to the local defense units because they were only in charge of guard duties. They were guarding important enterprises such as food supply, depots, etc.
A. Yes.
Q. Concerning the island of Crete you were not quite sure. Should it have been passed on - lest I should use the technical term of directing it - to Crete .... Should it have been passed on to Crete, what would have been the significance of that?
A. That would be purely a matter of postal communications as far as we were concerned. Any mail for Crete had been sorted out. Any private mail was passed on to the main post office which was located in Vienna. It was put together in bundles for Crete. Official mail which came from the Army Group had also been sorted beforehand for Crete. We did not sort out the mail. Anything destined for Crete went through the ordinary normal postal channels. The post was usually carried by aircraft, and anything else - packages, etc., God knows what - was sent by sea with all the other supply goods.
Mail was mainly sent by air because that would be quicker and more reliable. The air was completely clear at the time whereas you could not say that of the water. A number of Greek and British submarines roamed about in these waters and frequently torpedoed our ships to and from Crete.
Q You want to say, therefore, if that order reached the staff of the Corps at all, it merely reached the registry office from where it would be passed on to Crete, but it was not put on the desk of some expert or your own so they could formulate their own point of view; is that correct?
A Mail would be passed on quite automatically without our going into the details of the contents and then it was in toto sent on to Crete.
Q. Then there is one question concerning the affair of Distomon. It seems to me, General, that on Friday you did not quite understand what Mr. Fenstermacher wanted to ask you, you said that the SS was the only authority competent for the disciplinary actions of that Regiment, that not only you but above that the Army Group and O.K.W. could not give any measures in that respect?
A Yes, I think I used the term O.K.W. and Himmler had to get together to settle this.
Q And the decisive agency was?
A It was Himmler.
Q I see. Is there any difference in the treatment of this business, in the fact that this Regiment came from your area, or was it always the same? I mean let us suppose that the Regiment had remained in your area, would it then have been the same state of affairs concerning competence, would again the Reichsfuehrer SS have been the only competent authority for disciplinary and judicial problems?
A But of course, it was an SS formation, it was not subordinate to the army, but to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q Now, a brief word about the Rosenberg detachment, how many soldiers were there in that detachment roughly?
A Roughly speaking, five or six, nothing like a hundred or more, it was a small unit, there might have been ten.
Q Now, on direct examination you told us that detachment had been attached to you for economic matters and subordinate to you in disciplinary problems?
A That I did say.
Q And I think there was another misunderstanding here. Mr. Fenstermacher asked you whether you, as the disciplinary authority, whether you had been competent if soldiers plundered archives or libraries. Let me ask you generally, quite apart from the Rosenberg detachment, if any other unit a disciplinary subordinate to you suddenly went off and looted libraries; would that have been a case for which you would have to take disciplinary action?
A By looting or plundering is meant a theft in order to enrich oneself, whether these are books or jewels or pictures, as soon as you enrich yourself you become chargeable and subject either to my disciplinary authority or, if that was not adequate enough, you would be subject to the legal department of the army or of the navy if you were a member of the navy, of the Luftwaffe if you were a member of the Luftwaffe.
Q Well, now, to come back to the Rosenberg detachment, was the case there that these five or six members of this detachment went off and plundered archives in order to enrich themselves, or was the situation a different one?
A Well, it depends first of all what the prosecution means by plundering. In this particular case, as I see it and from what has been established in this trial, members of the Detachment Rosenberg confiscated the political literature in these archives and libraries, to which they were fully entitled. Any occupying power does that in the occupied country, they confiscate political literature because from there all sorts of conspiracies and other plans might be brought to light. Therefore, I regard it as entirely justifiable that the occupying power in Germany confiscated the party index, or the documents of the foreign ministry, because politically speaking they were interested in them and they were highly enlightening on many questions which were possibly not cleared up.
Now, as far as the Rosenberg detachment worked in that direction, as I explain now, we had confiscation on behalf of the state, because what the occupying power is doing here, you would not call plundering. I did not see it that way. Quite aside from the fact was that I did not know the detachment or what the task of the Rosenberg detachment was, I saw that in the documents offered and from the various questions in the course of the trial. I knew Rosenberg's name and knew he wrote this crazy book, "The Myth of the 20th Century," I believe it is called and that is about all.
Q Well, in this case, the decisive factor was the fact that factual orders had been issued to this detachment by a Higher Agency to search various archives. Were you in any way connected with these factual orders, irrespective of whether you regarded them as proper or improper, as expedient or non-expedient, did they have anything to do with the disciplinary power?
AApart from the fact that I did not know anything at all or did not hear about it until later, this had nothing to do with the disciplinary command in Greece.
Q General, this brings me to a different chapter. I think there is one point which has not been made quite clear by you. You were discussing a report by the LXVIII Army Corps where units were mentioned which were not subordinate to the LXVIII Corps as it happened frequently; in this case it was the SS Regiment XVIII. Quite generally, I would like to ask you once again when the report by the LXVIII Army Corps or the war diary some units are mentioned expressly by name, then it was clear whether or not it was subordinate to you, anybody who knew the conditions would realize that. And it would become clear from the organization or arrangement, if it was the 117th Division or the 11th Luftwaffe Field division or any other battalion belonging to the division, a connection existed. On the other hand, if an SS unit was mentioned explicitly, which was not subordinate to the LXVII Corps, then I think it was equally clear and if a unit was not mentioned, but only some occurrence, what about that?
A Well, then it was unclear, but we had to report it all the same to Higher Quarters, because the Army Group was interested in all incidents.
Q It was unclear you mean?
A That this unit was not subordinate to the Corps.
Q A question about the volunteer units, on Friday, General, or some day last week you said on direct examination that Colonel Papadongeas was subordinate to the Greek Ministry of the Interior. Could you order him to take, or carry out, or order any reprisal measures, could you order him to shoot 100 reprisal prisoners, or were you not entitled to do that?
A I was not entitled to do that. He regarded himself as an independent agency. We cooperated for tactical purposes, that is we informed him when we went out against a guerilla operation and he informed us when he attempted to do something, so that we could adjust our operation and help each other.
Q. Now, General, this brings me to the two opinions given for General Lesuire, which were submitted on cross-examination, let me ask you first of all what are these opinions, there is one of 1 March 1944 and the other is dated 16 July 1944?
A. May I look at this document once again? The prosecution asked me whether I had suggested that General LeSuire be promoted and I answered "no" and I can prove that. In this efficiency report I gave about the General, on 1 March 1944, which is the sort of annual efficiency report which we used to issue once a year, it says there among other things that he should be left where he was. In the opinion of 16 July, 1944, it says "command of a mountain corps". That was caused, as the documents prove, because, on 10 July, in other words, roughly three months after the opinion came in March, the commander of the 117th Division had been transferred to the officers reserve of the High Command of the Army without my having done anything about it. That was an indication of the fact that he should have asked to be used elsewhere and now on the basis of that transfer to the officer's reserve, I gave what we call the final opinion on 16 July, as he had been transferred to the officers' reserve, I suggested him to be the Commander of a mountain corps, that is not a promotion, a promotion would have been if I had written and suggested that he become a General of the mountain troops. Had he been in a Panzer action, I would have said commander of a Panzer corps.
You had two possibilities, let me say, to suggest somebody for promotion. One was promotion out of turn. If some officer or other had acquired special merits, be it in the field of technique of commanding troops or had he distinguished himself particularly in an engagement, then independent of what I said in March, I could suggest for the reasons mentioned that he either be given a decoration or promoted out of turn.
The second possibility was given in the regular annual opinion, which became due in March. Then under the opinion of 1 March 1944, I would have to insert or suggest that he be promoted to the next rank, which is not the case. I described his personal and soldierly qualifications both in March and in July, but I did not suggest that he be promoted.
That he was transferred to the officers reserve in July, having commanded the division for more than a year, because the 117th division had been put in his charge on 10 March, 1943 and on 10 July, 1944 he had been in charge for one year and three months, and therefore it seems natural for him to be used elsewhere. Losses among Generals in the east forced us to use younger men and then on 5 August, according to the documents, he was entrusted with the command of a Mountain Corps, but it was not until 1 October, 1944 when he was promoted commanding general, having left me three months ago. I don't know if there are any more questions with regard to this order or if I have been sufficiently clear.
Q. There is only one more point, General, you say that you had not suggested his promotion, the commander of a mountain corps was not a higher rank, but only a higher position, as compared to the division commander. When General von LeSuire went to the officers reserve on 10 July 1944, did you realize what that meant at that moment?
A. As he had not been given a bad record sheet militarily because there was no reason to do so for military reasons, I expected that in the near future he would be put in charge of a corps.
Q. Were you of the opinion that this transfer to the officers' reserve was the prelude for this; was it usual in the German Wehrmacht?
A. Yes, I expected this, and it was usual.
Q. Your remark, "commander of a Mountain corps" in the second opinion, was that in any way the cause for General von LeSuire being entrusted with the command of a Mountain corps as from 5 August, 1944, or were the two things independent of one another in your opinion?
A. There might have been a connection of cause and effect, but secondly, the personnel office need not have observed too strictly the recommendations coming from me, but it seems relatively logical, he had experience in our mountain troops, and it was logical for him to take over a mountain corps if he was to be used as a soldier at the front.
Q. Was your opinion rendered at a later time than his transfer to the officers' reserve?
A. True.
Q. Then this transfer to the officers' reserve seemed to make it proper that he had been car-marked for something else, namely as commanding general for a mountain corps?
A. Yes, that could be assumed with almost 100% certainty.
Q. Then very briefly, I would like to mention the magic term N.S.; what is the significance of that, General? Did you on your own initiative include it in your opinion and thereby mean to say that he had been a convinced or even a fanatical National Socialist or was that a regulation?
A. That was according to regulations in the case of the Luftwaffe, and I am in a position to judge that there was a regulation in peace time too, to include a remark of that sort when this applied to the army, I don't know. It meant that the man concerned was at least not prejudiced against the state and its institutions. Had I written "an enthusiastic National Socialist," one could have intensified the term, but, as it stood, it was merely a remark which was in accordance with regulations.
Q. It did not have the meaning that the man was a particularly enthusiastic National Socialist, it was a mere formality where you need not have any special idea. Was that a general custom?
A. It was a formality, which had to be fulfilled without any ulterior motives. Had I inserted he is not a National Socialist, then it would have meant the end of his career. People at least would have seen that his attitude was at least a hostile one toward the National Socialist State and in all fairness, that could be expected of the people so that they would not take an attitude against him at least particularly not in the officers corps.
Q. This remark was not made by you on your own initiative and particularly was not connected with the fact that you were a member of the party?
A. No, not at all. My membership in the party was resting while I was in the army, these two facts were not connected with each other at all.
Q. I did not mean the formal act of membership, but your political opinion?
A. I see what you mean; I had no private connections to a higher party agency.
Q. You said just now, General, the fact that you had been a member of the party had been in abeyance while you were a member of the Wehrmacht?
A. Yes.
Q. How long were you than a member of the party for practical purposes?
A. If you take the date of my application as the date of my entry, I was in the party from October of 1940 until May , 1941.
Q. General, I have one more question which is connected with this morning's cross-examination. You said that these reprisal measures which had been carried out in the area of the LXVIII Corps had been necessary with the exception of Kalavrita, militarily speaking, and may I add here first that you also described Distemen as an excess; Kalavrita and Distomen you described as militarily not necessary?
A. In the case of Kalavrita at least there was some reason, namely the murder of 78 German soldiers. In the case of Distomen there was not reason at all, as we found out later.
Q. Well, this was only in anticipation, but I would like to ask you this; you said in the area of the LXVIII Army Corps it was necessary, did you want to include all these measures as well which had been ordered and caused by other agencies, which although stationed in your area were not subordinate to you, or did you not want to include these?
A. I cannot give you an opinion about the others, I wanted to say those carried out by units of the LXVIII Corps.
Q. I have no further questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Are there any questions by other defense counsel? The prosecution?
RECROSS ELIMINATION BY MR. FEMSTERMACHER:
Q. General Felmy, during the period you were Field Marshal List's deputy, if you had opposed reprisal measures which had taken place in Serbia during that period, could you have intervened and prevented them?
A. I did not hear about them; at least, I do not recall them. Therefore, I cannot answer that question.
Q. If you had heard about them. you as Deputy would have had full power to intervene, would you not?
A. This is one of those hypothetical questions which it is so difficult to reconstruct now; in other words,"would I have done, did I not, would I have?"
Q. This only concerns your powers as deputy. I am asking you did you have the power as deputy to intervene?
A. Of course, the deputy had the authority, had the same authority as the original holder of the office. I was deputy judicial authority, for instance, and as such I had the same authority as had Field Marshal List.
Q. Now as a matter of fact, you never worried about the lawfulness of orders you received from OKW, did you? When you got orders you simply obeyed them.
A. The lawfulness, as it is now being doubted here, is being discussed here, I never worried about, I can say with a clear conscience.
Q. Did you ever hear about the Rosenberg units being particularly concerned with looking for Jewish literature and Jewish works of art in various libraries and archives in the occupied territories?
A. No, all I heard was that they wanted to inform themselves about Free Mason lodges.
They were not only Jewish matters, because Free Masons are not only Jewish organizations.
Q. Now, with regard to your disciplinary powers over the Rosenberg units, if you had considered the activities of any of those units criminal or unlawful, you would have had power to intervene and court-martial the perpetrators, would you not?
A. The Rosenberg detachment -- all I know was that there were five or ten men under one Lieutenant and I heard nothing of any looting on their part in the sense which I define plundering just now relatively clearly.
Q. That is not quite what I asked you, General Felmy. I asked you whether or not you could have court martialed the perpetrators of any activities by members of the Rosenberg units if you had considered their activities unlawful. Did you have the power to courtmartial because you had disciplinary power?
A. Disciplinary power does not always entail a judicial authority. I could take steps against any member of the army, the Luftwaffe or the navy in my position as Commander in Chief Southern Greece only in a disciplinary sense -- that is to say, I could give them "confined to barracks", for instance, but if any judicial measures became necessary those measures were initiated by the field courts of the air force, the navy or the army.
Q. You mean you did not have the power to court-martial a Rosenberg member by virtue of your disciplinary power of the Rosenberg units in your area?
A. No, I could only move that a member of the army, the navy or the air force for this or that reason should be put before a courtmartial which had nothing to do really with the Rosenberg detachment. It applied to any soldier.
Q. So the power of discipline over a non-Wehrmacht unit is not particularly important, General? The power of discipline does not include the power to court martial?
A. Not in the position held by the Commander in Chief Southern Greece. Some garrison regulation had always to be borne in mind in a somewhat complex affair. If I remember rightly, it said he hold disciplinary punitive powers such as is held by the Commander for a fortress in peacetime.
Q. Now, if the power of discipline over a non-Wehrmacht unit did not include the power to court-martial, then your lack of disciplinary power over the SS units was also not very important because there, too, it did not include the power to court-martial?
A. No, I couldn't.
Q. Perhaps, you didn't quite follow. I said that if you did not, if the power of discipline did not include the power of courtmartial, then the fact that you had no disciplinary power over the SS units was also not very important and the fact that you did not have disciplinary power over the SS units was not particularly important to you, was it?
A. I don't quite see what you mean quite frankly.
Q. Well, we'll let it go, General Felmy, and turn to another question. I don't suppose you happen to know where Colonel Papadongeas is at the present time?
A. The Greek military mission told me that during the December unrest, from December 1944 to January 1945, he was murdered by ELAS which I deeply regreted. He was a strong opponent of the ELAS and it seems entirely possible to me that this is true. A friend of mine wrote this to me. Of course, I had no personal contact with the Greek military mission in Berlin.
Q. Now, regarding the personnel file of General von LeSuire, when you stated on the 1st of March 1944 that it is suggested that he remain at his post you had in mind the fact that he had three months earlier committed an excess in the course of the Kalavrita operation, did you not?