A No.
Q Then how do you know that, in the most cases of these attacks, reprisal measures were taken?
A I only know this from hearsay, not for certain.
Q Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I take it there's no further questioning by either defense counsel or the prosecution. That being true, the witness, subject to questioning by members of the Tribunal..... Judge Carter?
(None indicated)
JUDGE BURKE: I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may be excused.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Your Honor, I would now like to present my last witness and, with the permission of the Tribunal, I call Professor Dr. Stadtmueller to the witness stand.
GEORG STADTMUELLER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn.
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Witness, would you please state your full name?
A Georg Stadtmueller.
Q When and where were you born?
A On the 17th of March, 1909, in Burstadt in Hesse.
Q What is your profession?
A I am a university professor.
Q Where are you living at the moment?
A I am now living in Scheuern near Munich.
Q What is your sphere as a university professor?
A Since late autumn 1938 I was professor of Balkan history at the University of Leipzig, the only one of this kind in Germany.
Q Professor, would you please - I think this would be rather good for your legitimation - would you please state, as briefly as possible, your training?
A It was the usual one. After humanistic high school, I studied for four and one-half years at the Universities of Freiburg and Munich. I mainly studied history and comparative languages, particularly Balkan languages. Since 1928 I was very interested in Balkan history and geography and specialized in this. The external dates of my academic career are the usual ones. I took my referandar examination, my doctor's examination, my assessor examination. I had a position as assistant in a historical seminary and then I became a lecturer and then a professor,
Q And even before the war, did you travel to the Balkans and especially to Greece for scientific purposes?
A Before this war I made a few extensive journeys and stayed in certain places for the purpose of studying various countries in SouthEastern Europe, especially in the Southern Balkans, Albania, Greece, Macedonia and Bulgaria.
Q When and how long each time were you in Greece?
A Here I would only like to state my longer stays. In 1932.....
Q How long?
AAbout two, three to four months. 1934, 1936 and 1938. Then, in 1943, I went again to Greece in the service of the army.
Q And were you also active as a writer in that sphere in which you specialized?
A Well, to this I can only say that this is the only sphere in which I have done any scientific work at all. I published about this four independent books and some twenty special investigations in journals.
Q Professor, then you were drafted into the army in the last war, were you?
A First of all, in 1940, I was drafted for military basic training for four months and then I was given leave again in order to continue my teaching activity at the university. In May 1943, I was again drafted as an interpreter for Greek and Bulgarian.
Q Might I interrupt here? How many languages do you speak?
A Well, of course, this is rather a problematical question. It depends on what you mean by "speak".
Q I mean so that you can make yourself understood.
A So that I can read a scientific book without a dictionary?
Q No, so that you can make yourself understood.
A So that I can read a scientific book without a dictionary, all the languages of South-Eastern Europe, with the exception of Turkish.
Q And which languages are these?
A That is Czech, Hungarian, Roumanian, Serbo-Croat - of course, that's only one language - Bulgarian, Greek, and a little Albanian.
Q And then you spoke Modern Greek?
A Yes, Modern Greek.
Q And then when did you come to Greece, witness?
A I arrived in Athens on 18 June 1943 and reported at 1200 hours of the following day to General Felmy in the headquarters in Megalopefke.
Q Where is that?
A That is on the road from Megara to Athens, about seven kilometers east of Megara.
Q Witness, would you please show us where that is on the map?
A It is here opposite Salamis.
Q And then did you meet General Felmy for the first time?
A Yes, at that time I saw General Felmy for the very first time.
Q And what sphere of tasks was then alloted to you in the staff of the LXVIII Corps?
A I arrived as a Greek interpreter and then General Felmy kept me as his personal interpreter.
Q And on what occasion did you interpret?
A In the three and one half months when we were on the Peloponnes, I accompanied General Felmy daily on his inspection trips and interpreted the necessary discussions and conversations. In addition to the Greek at that time were the Italian conferences with the Italian commanders. This was before the Badoglio capitulation.
Q And to which detachment of the Corps staff did you formally belong?
A I belonged to the Ic department.
Q Professor, now as a first subject, I would like to talk about the band situation as you found it when you arrived in Greece. I would ask you to describe the developments of this situation also from the point of view of a historian?
AAs I said, I arrived on 19 June in Megalopefke and remained with the staff about two weeks and then the staff went to the Peloponnes to Vitina in Masere, which is in the middle of the Peloponnes and here we remained until the 1st of October, about three months.
If I am supposed to characterize the partisan situation, then first of all for an introduction, I can say, along about this time on the Peloponnes there was no partisan problem at all for the Germans, but only for the Italians because it was like this and for me it was not surprising because I had known the Balkans for many years and I knew that the natives supported the antipathy of the Balkan population even more by their contempt for the Italians.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: May I interupt please. The witness is merely giving his personal conclusions. I don't believe they are at all admiseable or material. In addition, I don't believe he is qualified to describe what the band situation was. From the evidence which has been elicited so far, I think he is just a professor who arrived in Athens and he is not qualified to speak for the band situation.
THE PRESIDENT: This witness has to the satisfaction of the Tribunal qualified himself as an expert. We have heretofore admitted testimony of this character. The objection will be over-ruled.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Please continue professor.
THE WITNESS: This question is closely connected with the development of the partisan problem therefore the Italian and Greek relations must be mentioned in connection with it. Under all circumstances. When during the first days of July we arrived on the Peloponnes, we were told by the Italian headquarters very much about it, that in the mountain districts there were strong bands of partisans and there had already been a number of major attacks on Italian units and how for our troops, it was the greatest surprise that no partisan attacks took place on Germans.
Q How do you explain that?
A I explain this to myself, but I don't need to explain that to myself at all because the Greeks explained this to me in numerous discussions. They told me, we are happy if the Italians leave and are substituted by a German occupation. I remember especially one visit in Maseka. Maseka is about here on the map. In this district, which was thought to be the main center of the partisans, General Felmy right at the beginning of July went there in order to inspect a German company, which was stationed there.
I accompanied him as usual as his interpreter. The German company commander there reported about the situation and the Italians had warned us about partisan danger. He himself had information that all around there were certain bands, but attacks against German troops did not take place. When the report of the German company commander was finished, the Greek Mayor and the Greek priest of the village, as is the custom as Greece is a country which is very hospitable, these two people came to visit the General and after the ceremony of such a visit, then they came with a request which told us at once what the situation was. In a neighboring village an incident had taken place. Some Italian soldiers had raped Greek women, thereupon four Italian soldiers fell victims to the Greek revenge.
Q Was there still fueds and vendettas for revenge in Greece?
A Greek follow student of mine from my Munich days around about 1930 at the university of Munich wrote a paper on the subject when taking his doctor degree.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute, it seems to me this witness in the capacity in which he comes here should restrict himself to his observation, rather than that which has come to him in the form of hearsay. He is here testifying as to Balkan history and Balkan background and the result of his observations and study. Necessarily we should not go into that which is purely hearsay, at least as to incidents. With that restriction, you may proceed.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Would you please continue then Professor?
A The Italians thereupon set up a punitive expedition and burned down this village. The Greek priest and the Mayor......
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to the testimony of this kind unless it is especially shown what the nature of this man's information are in that regard.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
THE WITNESS: My information arises from the fact that I interpreted this conversation.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Therefore you are explaining what the Mayor and Priest told you and General Felmy?
A Yes, I literally interpreted this conversation from Greek into German. The Priest and the Mayer asked the General to see to it that these Italian attacks should not take place anymore. The General told me as interpreter that I should avoid the subject. On the return journey from Masoka, he said to me in the car, unfortunately at the moment we cannot do anything against this because the Italians have territorial sovereighty in Greece that is a political admission, which we must make to the Italians in order to keep them in line somehow.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 10 December 1947.)
Official transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on December 10, 1947, 0930, Justice Burke presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all of the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Torgow.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) GEORGE STADTMUELLER BY MR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Professor, before you continue with your statements would you please tell us quite briefly the sources from which you, as collaborator on General Felmy's staff, not as historian yet, where you obtained your own knowledge about events which happened in Greece while you were there.
A If I testify under oath here as a witness, then I confine myself to those facts, which I myself experienced with my own eyes and with my own cars, or which I remember from my immediate knowledge of the affairs. As an eye witness and an ear witness, I experienced the following things:
I accompanied General Felmy as his personal interpreter on the inspection trips and there I interpreted the discussions with Greeks and Italians.
The most important discussions were in Department 1-C, which I experienced for the most part. I learned to know without exception all of the Italian generals in the Peloponnes since October 1943. In Athens I was present at the negotiations with the most important officers of the Greek Government, and I led these discussions on behalf of General Felmy, and with relative independence. Especially there were present the following Greek officers: The Prime Minister Rallis, the Minister for the Interior, and for the Police Taboularis; the Education and Welfare Minister; the Minister for Defense, Ferdilis; the Commander of the Gendarmerie General Dakkos; the Minister for Police, Colonel Zeronikos.
In addition, I often heard discussions with Minister Neubacher, who came over from Belgrade to Athens, with the Deputy Envoy in Athens, Herr von Graevenitz, and in addition I know a number of Greek men and numerous Greek scientists from peacetime, in whose families I often visited.
In order to complete the whole thing I would like to mention that in the great retreat from Greece to Hungary, for about 6 weeks I belonged to the Staff of Army Group E surrounding General Loehr, and therefore when I testify here about Greece, and especially political events, then this is testimony on the basis of ear and eye witness, and when I talk about political considerations which were made by the German side, then these are not my own private views, but principally the views of General Felmy, which he expressed in numerous discussions with me. Under the Greek point of view, from conversations with Greek agencies or Greek friends.
The second group of facts about which I can testify on the basis of knowledge of files, so far as I can still remember, this is knowledge. The following files were available to me, the official files from Department 1-C; Also the top secret matters, -- that is, I was able to read them.
I didn't have to read them all, and furthermore, if I talk about general events, then I base my statements on the scientific knowledge which I gained from former scientific research. I will testify nothing from hearsay.
Q Professor, I would then like to ask you to continue in your testimony about the development of the band situation in Greece at the time of the German occupation.
A Yes.
Q Can you describe the Greek-Italian relations? Would you please continue?
A The Staff of the 68th Army Corps arrived on the first or the second of July on the Peloponnes. The situation was such that the Italians told us about numerous attacks by the partisans and told us that already numerous Italian units had been attacked by partisans. Here I would only like to talk about the most important of these attacks and I would like to characterize them.
As an example of the situation on General Felmy's first visit to the Italian Corps Command of General Maginotti, in Xylocastron, -this is here on the map, -- in which I interpreted the discussion, General Maginotti described the most recent attack. It took place in the rear of Patras. The bands had formed there, and they presumably came from the center of Greece, via the Gulf of Corinth.
An Italian company had been attacked in Gursumistra, -- which is here on the map, -- and the Italians capitulated after slight resistance, and they were taken prisoner. The partisans took their clothes off and sent them away naked. For centuries in the Balkans this was the usual custom as a gesture of contempt for the enemy.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to any accusations by the witness as to what constituted Balkan customs for hundreds of years. I submit that there can be no expert testimony on matters concerning the personality or culture of a people or of a nation.
I believe export testimony is admissible on technical and highly scientific matters, but I submit that we are not at all concerned with that type of material in this case. I am not aware of precisely what counsel for Felmy is trying to show by this type of testimony. I do not know whether he is suggesting that the Balkan peoples are somehow unique, and that their lives are of less value than the lives of any other nation.
I submit that the testimony is incompetent and completely immaterial.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The principle has been rather liberal in the admission of evidence in this case. I do not feel that we should suddenly adopt a different attitude.
The objection will be overruled.
A It would be easy for the history of the Balkans to prove events of this kind. This was a first attack by the partisans on the Italians. The second took place near Leonidion on the edge of the Parnon mountains, on a weak Italian Garrison, perhaps a platoon strength of company strength, who were surrounded and forced to retreat to Nauplia.
The third rather large partisan attack was in Artemision. It is here on the map. There was a sawmill there which was secured by a platoon, led by a Sergeant. The Italians were attacked and taken prisoner. The Sergeant succeeded in escaping. I interrogated him at that time as an interpreter, in order to get some kind of insight into the partisan situation then.
The interrogation was particularly interesting because it showed to us quite clearly for the first time that also in this partisan movement which was just beginning, in the Peloponnes, the Communist elements were the stronger.
These attacks on Italians took place in the months of July and August. At that time no attacks on German troops were taking place.
Q Excuse me. In 1943?
A Yes, in 1943. The partisans who were still at the time rather weak on the Peloponnes, first carried on their fight exclusively against the Italians, and this could also be shown with numerous examples, but I limit myself to one single incident, which I still remember from the files.
About the end of July, a survey party in the neighborhood of Patras, was attacked by surprise and taken prisoner by partisans. The partisans thought that they were Italians, but when they saw their mistake, they treated the German prisoners with extreme friendliness, and gave them fruit and cigarettes, and sent them with a letter of apology back to the Commander, saying that it was a very regrettable mistake.
Q How do you explain that, Professor?
A This difference in the Greek attitude toward the two occupation powers, as it existed in the beginning, can only be explained from the whole historical conditions, and then one must continue from there.
Q Would you please do that, quite briefly?
A The Greek relations to Italy was for a long time burdened with fear of Italian Mediterranean expansion. Italy is near and Germany is far away from Greece. They were afraid that even after the war the Italian occupation power would remain in Greece, and it was assumed that a German occupation power would go away again. The Greek fear of Italy has historical roots, and through the religious contradiction between the Orthodox and the Catholic Church received even more drive from the conflict of 1923, which every Greek still feels to be a national humiliation. It is the so-called Corfu conflict as it was designated by historians and experts on international law.
It took place on the Albanian Frontier.
An Italian was wounded or offended or murdered, and thereupon Italy, in an extremely harsh manner, placed an ultimatum before Greece, and occupied the Island of Corfu temporarily. This opposition to Italy was then strengthened by the occupation of Albania on Good Friday, 1939.
Q Professor, would you please make this as brief as possible?
A Yes. That is more or less the Greek attitude toward Italy. The Greek attitude toward Germany is quite different. First of all one must think back that that country after the domination by the Turks was thrown off, for 3 decades was under Bavarian domination.
Q When was that?
A This was 1832 to 1862. The basis of the new state was the work of this Bavarian Administration, also the basis of the spiritual life mainly, and so it happened that these close connections came between the Greek and German scientists. Then in addition, King Constantin, married a sister of King William the II, and other things, and so one can say that in the first World War and afterwards, the Greek Royalists were predominantly pro-German. They are called in Greece simply the Constantinians, to differentiate between them and the Venizelists.
The "Constantinians" were strongLy represented in the Greek Officers' Corps.
At the beginning of World War II there then arose the strange position for Greece that she wanted to remain neutral. Italy was afraid of Greece; Greece was afraid of Italy and wanted to remain neutral, and had to rely on British help, and so the long, tragic situation, shown by the Albanian campaign in Italy, arose which the Greeks described to me again and again in discussions, this increased the tragedy.
Here I would just like to say one word which a Greek general once said to me, to illustrate the situation.
Q When was that?
A That was approximately in March, 1944. He said: "the fact that you have conquered us is not degrading for us, but it is a shame, and one we can never forgive the Germans for, that they have placed our country under an occupying power which we have conquered in battle in Albania.
Q Might I interrupt here, Professor. You said formerly, the "Bavarian" administration; might I ask how that was interpreted? I just received a note that "Bavarian" was translated as "barbarian", which is not, of course, correct.
A It should be "Bavarian". I repeat, the Bavarian administration.
Then in June, 1943, the provincial population in the Peloponnes was also friendly toward the German people.
Q How can it be explained that six months later it was so fundamentally different?
A I confine myself to a few facts. The first attack on German soldiers took plane in about the second half of August
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think it would be desirable to give the year when you refer to a month.
A -- 1943. On the road from Olympia to Tripoli two German driver were shot, near Langadia. (Indicates on map). That was the first of that kind of incident, and it had an alarming effect. First of all, we thought that they had mixed us up again with the Italian drivers.
Q Why?
A Because until then no German soldier had been attacked and, therefore, as a precautionary measure it was ordered that on this one road from Vitina to Olympia, which ran through especially difficult mountain country, German soldiers were to drive only in convoys of four. The whole of the rest of the Peloponnesus, until the end of September, 1943, one could drive without military escort Approximately at the end of August, a second incident took place August 1943 - when the road from Vitina to Naseka was destroyed overnight. A German troop unit which reconnoitered the country found out that the population had fled, and they arrested three civilians. At that time I interrogated these three civilians. They stated the following. On the evening a strong partisan band appeared and forced, with threat of arms, the population to destroy the road. Then the partisans went away again and the population fled. Thereupon I told the civilians that the population should come back again to the village without fear. It was the village of Dara. The mayor was to contact us; the next day the mayor came and I talked to him. His statements confirmed the same picture.
That was the situation at the end of August 1943. A complete change then took place through the Italian capitulation, on the evening of the 8th of September, 1943. At that time, in the first days after the capitulation, it was not possible to disarm all the Italian troops, and the Italians have given large stocks of arms and ammunition to the partisans, and so the partisan movement received an enormous drive.
In any case, there were thousands of rifles, in my estimation; and in any case more than a hundred perhaps hundreds - of machine guns, and many mortars. Since then the partisans had mortars for the very first time. This military fact is the one pre-condition for the increase of the partisan movement. The other is, if I may put it like this, a psychological or a political factor. After the Italian capitulation, it was generally expected that in the shortest possible time Germany too would collapse and also it had been reckoned on the German side and people were considerably surprised when the war was prolonged more. And so the retreat of the Germans from Greece appeared to be only a question of days or weeks, and many more people joined the partisans.
Q How do you explain that psychologically, that after this more people joined the partisans. Was the reason economic or human or political? What was the main reason?
A The partisan movement was, at the very beginning, not politically clear. The reports which we received from July to September 1943 reported about Nationalist and Communist bands. It was also reported that fighting took place between the two groups both in Achaia and Taygetos (shows on map). And we also received reports that British liaison officers were trying to overcome these conflicts and to unite the two rival groups against the Germans. From October 1943, onwards, it became clear that the Communist group on the Peloponnesus was completely in command. The Nationalist groups in Achaia and in Taygetos were overcome, and the leader of the Nationalist group, the officer Telemadios Repadios, from Sparta, was conquered in Taygetos (shows on map), was taken prisoner, and there are contradictory reports about his end. Since that date, since about the end of October 1943, the partisan movement on the Peloponnesus was clearly Communist, and what remained of a desire for Nationalist resistance could no longer build up an independent partisan movement, but tried again to obtain some kind of support from the German occupation power.
A Professor, now would you please describe the further development of the band situation after the Italian capitulation, quite briefly?
A There were various band centers whose geographical position was predestined by the nature of the terrain. The Band Center I was in the mountainous country of Achaia, a territory very difficult to negotiate, with mountain peaks as high as 2,500 meters; the Band Territory No. 2 lays in Taygetos, a high mountain about 3,000 meters; Band Center No. 3, in the Parnon mountains; and Band Center No. 4, which was not so important, in the southwest. A Band Center 5, of very slight importance, was in the center of the Aygolis peninsula. In addition, the strong Communist organization must be mentioned in the port of Kalamata. These various groups, after the Italian capitulation, were then joined together more securely by the Communists. In the winter months, 1943-44, it was shown in the reports which we received that the beginning of a quasi-military organization was formed: military designations appeared such as battalions, regiments, and finally even brigades. And in this period also the first large attacks took place on German troops.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date that you gave just a moment ago as to the time of the formation of these particular units which you describe?
A I said, Your Honor, that from the reports which were received by the 68th Corps this organization was shown to have formed in the winter months of 1943-44.
Q Were the battalions and regiments such in our sense of the words, or what did you understand by these terms at that time?
AAt that time we received a very interesting report. A German NCO of our corps staff, Ruff by name, was captured in or near Sparta by the partisans.
During October and November 1943 he was in a socalled "Headquarters" of the bands in the north of Taygetos. In these villages Kastania and Neo-Chorion. And then he succeeded, after about six weeks, in escaping, and he gave us a very detailed report about the situation with the partisans, about the organization, the food and the propaganda. Since we then heard later on from other reports that there a regimental staff was supposed to be stationed, it was quite clear that this designation had nothing to do with what in a regular army one called a regiment.
Q. Professor, when, in the subsequent period, did you hear about individual cases of band attacks from your own activity?
A. I know the full reports about band attacks. I myself was once involved in an attack on the road between Vitina and Sparta. But I would like to mention too larger band attacks which took place in the months October, November 1943. The one attack or skirmish took place near Kalavrita, which is here on the map (indicates). The second was near Eleusis and Thebes, near the Kiteron mountains. Those were surprise attacks in which presumably hundreds of partisans took part. The other actions were much smaller, and they were mainly raids on motorized convoys.
Q. Would you please tell us something quite briefly about the raid which you yourself experienced?
A. We were driving with a supply convoy with about 10 or 11 trucks from Gythion, and about half-way between Gythion and Sparta we were suddenly fired upon, from the right. We jumped out of the trucks and hid, and shot back. The partisans were probably at a distance of about 400 to 600 meters. They had machine guns--no trench mortars. The firing lasted about ten minutes and then our convoy was able to continue. One truck was shot up. There were no other casualties.
Q. How do you explain the partisans' retreat?
A. The partisans never fought properly with regular German troops. Therefore, every so-called partisan operation was a "drive into the blue." From immediate knowledge I can say this because for three weeks I myself took part in such a partisan operation. At that time I went on foot with a mountain light-infantry company through the Taygetos mountains in order to get a real, personal impression of the situation.
The march took the following route: from Sparta on the east edge of the mountains toward the south; down as far nearly as Cape Matapan; then over on the west coast and along the west coast northwards as far as Kalamata, and from Kalamata northeast to Taygetos; back again to Sparta. The enemy who, according to very clear reports, was very strong ly situated in Taygetos, never faced us for battle.
In two places there was only a very light exchange of fire. The first time it was near the monastry of Panajia Tatrissa, just above Kastania. The second time it was from the slopes of the Taygetos range near Allagonia and Neo-Chorion. And so the result of such a partisan operation--or this partisan operation--was such that the partisan units were thrown into confusion and that we took a few prisoners and detected a number of supply depots. They were oil depots of the EAM organization and in one place, as a kind of transient supply depot, a large herd of sheep, about 300 to 400 head.
Q. You just said the first raid which you yourself experienced took place near a monastary. Did the partisans have any kind of connection with this monastary?
A. If one talks about Greek or even Serbian monastaries, one must be quite aware that the majority of these monastaries are no longer inhabited today, or are only inhabited by a very few, very old Monks. In the Balkans, Monks are gradually disappearing. We received at the Corps numerous reports, all of which confirmed that the monastaries were used by the partisans. I know that in the monastary of Panajia-Tatrissa, which had been uninhabited for some time by Monks, I knew that there partisans had taken shelter, and that is how the battle took place there, the skirmish.
Q. And so therefore this was not an individual case with the monastary, but it was more or less a general policy?
A. According to the reports which we received, one must assume that, but this one case I know of as an eye witness.
Q. Professor, then would you please tell us quite briefly something about the partisan organizations which were on the Peloponnesus? You have already mentioned the EAM. During the course of the trial we have heard a lot about the right organization, the EDES. What about this organization on the Peloponnesus?
A. The EAM organization is a completely parallel matter with the corresponding Yugoslav organization. There, there is a political masker organization.