He was the prototype of a Royalist "Constantin" officer. He was an old follower of King Constantin. He was very friendly inclined towards England and, in discussions with us Germans, he did not hide this fact. Just as, on the other hand, he was convinced that the struggle against Communism, according to the situation as it prevailed at that time, could only be carried out in connection with the German occupation troops. He hated Communism to the utmost and was prepared to work together with Germany in this struggle against Communism, but only where this one point was concerned.
Q Did he, at an earlier time, make comments of the same type against Communism?
A In August, 1943, when he approached us with such suggestions ......
Q This is a misunderstanding. I mean, much earlier.
A He was well known as an opposer of Communism.
Q After the first World War, I mean?
A Colonel papadongonas was a member of the small British expeditionary group which, after the first World War, was committed in the Odessa area and fought against the Bolshevics.
Q Will you please continue now?
AApproximately towards the end of August, 1943, this officer, who, at the time, lived in Kalamata, which was the main nest of resistance of the Communists, proposed to the 117th Light Infantry Division to organize a Civil Defense organization. This was intended to secure Messenia and the whole of the Southern Peloponnes. The division contacted the corps and two conferences resulted from this question. The following people participated in these conferences:
Colonel papadongonas and Colonel Georgiu of the Greeks. The German participants were the 1-C of the Corps and the 1-C of the divisions, another interpreter and myself, and an Italian liaison officer participated in the first conference. Regarding the second conference which took place, after the Italian surrender, General von Le Suire, he was the commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
Q One interpolation. Why did Colonel Papadongonas not contact the corps directly?
A That could easily have been by accident. The division was stationed in Tripolis which was the central point of traffic in the Peloponnes, whereas the corps was stationed in the very isolated Vitina Valley. Thus it was quite natural that the Greek approached the German command in Tripolis, first of all, with his suggestions.
Q What course did these conversations and conferences take?
A Colonel papadongonas made the following suggestion. He described how the Partisan,problem was not a purely military one, and, therefore, could not be solved with purely military means. He stressed even at that time that the EAM/ELAS movements wore of a Communist nature and he stated that non-Greek forces alone could not cope with this problem.
Q Why not?
A Because we did not know the conditions of the country and the personalities concerned well enough. After all, we were not in a position to know who was a Communist and who was not. Therefore the conclusion he drew was that the Communist EAM - ELAS movement could only be eliminated by Greek troops. He suggested to organize a battalion of one thousand Greeks, they were to be reliable Nationalists and he was to select the officers and N.C.O. The German occupation forces were to make 1,000 rifles available, machine pistols were valuable, but not entirely necessary. That was before the Italian surrender and at that time the bands were poorly armed, mortars or heavy weapons were not at their disposal. He set the following conditions: this battalion was to be exclusively a Greek unit, it was not to be under any German command, but it was to work together with the German occupation forces through a liaison officer. Furthermore these troops were to fight in the event of an invasion not against the British or Americans and in this case, he assured on his word of honor that they would remain neutral.
Q And what was the German attitude toward this proposal?
A There were two different opinions. The Corps and General Felmy on the one hand and the division and General von LeSuire on the other. General von LeSuire, who was present at the second conference, answered Colonel Papadongonas proposal with the following demand, the units were to be directly subordinate under Germany's command and he demanded the assurance that in the event of a movement to the other side against the British and Americans, this battalion was to swear faithful allegiance to the Germans. Furthermore he only wanted to make available 400 rifles instead of 1,000. Colonel Papadongonas refused, above all he refused to give an assurance that in the event of an invasion these units would be fighting against the Allies in case of a lauding. He stated that the common interest between these units and German occupation forces only extended to the extermination of Communism.
Q When did this second conversation take place?
A This took place a few days after the Italian capitulation sometime in November, 1943. This basic point of view of Colonel Papadongonas did not find any understanding with General von LeSuire and that is why for the moment the whole plan could not be carried out and it was only realized a few months later.
Q How did it happen that it was eventually realized, through whom?
AAfter the conference, which I mentioned, this ended with a bitter clash between Colonel Papadongonas and General von Le Suire. Colonel Papadongonas took his leave with the words, in a few months we Germans would see that he was right in his prediction. By this he meant that the partisan problem could not be solved with purely military means and toward the beginning of November he came to Athens and again visited our official offices. Together with this, the three brothers took orders from Sparta, thus it happened that negotiations were taken up again. However, this time the 117th Light Infantry Division did not participate.
Q And what was the result of these conferences?
A In the meantime in several places on the Peloponnes several defense units had been organized. As the main ones there was one in Gythion and also one in Sparta was organized by the brothers Bretakes, one in Molai, one in Monimassia and one in Philiatra and also one near the district of Levki and Major Steupas organized small units for self protecting purposes for his farmers province. These are the most important groups, but they were disjointed. In the meantime the danger of the partisans became more and more threatening and the serious surprise attacks near Eleusis had occurred and the ones near Kalavrita. That was in October, 1943 and the highways could only be used in convoys, armed convoys, and the situation had within a few weeks of the Italian capitulation changed completely. The question which arose now was what could be done and so General Felmy took up once again the proposal made by Colonel Papadongonas. He had full understanding for the political stipulations and restrictions made by Colonel Papadongonas. He showed in that, and Colonel Papadongonas stated it quite frankly, a proof of his human decency.
Similar conferences with Colonel Papadongonas in Athens took place after this and in January 1944 yet another large partisan operation had been planned in the Taygetes mountains and also in the Parnon mountains, which was the so-called operation "Amsel" where as I said I myself participated. As I mentioned, the results were small and I forgot to mention that in the Parnon mountains near Kesmas more than 100 national hostages, who were captives of the EAM/ELAS had been liberated. I myself interrogated one of these liberated captives later in Athens. He was an attorney from Molai, after this operation "Amsel" a resolution was made that the civil defense units of the Greeks should be supported in every possible manner and that they were to be supported in such a way that no other relapse would occur. Before Christmas 1943, such a relapse had broken out in Molai, the national civil defense organizations had been overtaken by the EAM/ELAS and about 200 Greeks had been massacred. Then there were negotiations with the Greek government agencies and with the 117th Light Infantry division, which later on did not show any understanding f or the political element of the situation. The civil defense organizations were reorganized and were organized in gendarmerie battalions, that was the official designation used. The law used by the Greek defense ministry of the Interior in February, 1944 formed the local basis for these organizations. After that, it was determined how these men were to be armed through an order of the corps and the supplies were taken over by the commander of the ordinary police. The work of those battalions, these volunteer battalions, was the following: there was a staff in Tripolis under Colonel Papadongonas. The 117th Light Infantry division only agreed to Colonel Papadongonas; choice after serious debates. There were battalions in Tripoli, in Sparta in Cythion and one battalion was stationed in Meliata and Kalamata and this was intended to be extended to become two battalions.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Professor, you have already mentioned that Colonel Papadongonas could not be given any orders from German agencies. Could General Felmy order Colonel Papadongonas to carry out reprisal measures?
A. When I described how these volunteer battalions were organized and developed I emphasized that the Papadongonas plan was, at first, not carried out because General von Le Suire would not agree to the volunteer battalions' being independent. I said that later on General Papadongonas was given this independence inasmuch as the deviating opinion of General von Le Suire was simply ignored. By this I mean the Corps simply ordered how the channels of command were going to be.
Q. Just a brief supplement to characterize Colonel Papadongonas: Was he a puppet -- a Quisling, as the expression has been used?
A. If Colonel Papadongonas had been a Quisling the 117th Light Infantry Division would probably have not made any difficulties. However, Colonel Papadongonas was in every aspect the exact opposite of a dependent nature. He had a clear-cut point of view, and he was through and through honest and decent. He maintained the point of view that there was aggressivism on the German side and aggressivism on the Greek side and that, for some part of the way, these two nations could go together -- that is to say, just where Communism was concerned -- no further.
Q. In this connection I would like to ask you another question: How about the Greek Government? Was the Greek Government a so-called "quisling" Government?
A. The individual Greek ministers were of varying types. I myself consider as a absolutely honorable man beyond any doubt the Greek Minister Louvaris, who was a man of international reputation. He had only taken over this difficult task under the German occupation because of his own personal feeling of responsibility.
He always made frank and open difficulties for us, and he never hid his point of view when he was of a different opinion. A similar case is the Prime Minister Rallis, but with certain restrictions. The other ministers were not very clear cut and strong characters. There is one man whom I would like to mention as having shown backbone against us Germans; he was Secretary of State Colonel Pakojanis.
Q. Did you have any discussions with other Greek ministers bout the organization of volunteer units?
A. Yes, I mentioned Pakojanis, Taboularis -- also, the General Constantin Taboularis with whom I talked. He is the very Constantin Taboularis who later on excelled as the co-worker of the British Generals Office.
Q. Did any negotiations take place with the partisan units? I mean the EAM/ELAS movements.
A. To the best of my knowledge there were never any negotiations of any kind with these units within the Corps area. Concerning EDES, at first we took up contact with them at a time when there were small EDES movements on the Peloponnas -- in August and September 1943. Then there were vague attempts to contact them. In September, 1944, which was immediately before the German withdrawal--with the EDES General Zervas, who pursued the aid of opening for the EDES movement the road leading to the capital of the land, Athens, --in order to prevent Communist terror in the capital of Athens between a German evacuation and the British taking over. Concerning this I do not know any details about this contacting of the Zervas movement; I only know of this fact through indications of the then Ic, Major von Stettner.
Q. Professor, this brings us close to the events which occurred at the time of the German evacuation of Greece. Will you please, as a introduction, describe quite briefly the development of the general political and economic situation up till that date?
A. The economic situation was in many aspects similar to the present situation of Germany--such things as a lack of housing, rising of prices, black-marketing, etc. In Athens and Pyraeus a copulation of about two million people was concentrated.
Q. How many inhabitants were there altogether in Greece?
A. Roughly seven million. After the political desertion of Romania and Bulgaria in August 1944 it became obvious that the German troops would eventually have to evacuate Greece and the Balkan area. That was a desperate situation for the National Greeks. They did not love the Germans, but to them they still represented the protection against Communist terror--at least the larger towns were opened. Therefore, all Greeks were horrified when they reflected that after the German evacuation there would be a certain vacuum until the British arrived, and that during this period the Communist ELAS movements which approached Athens from all sides, according to our information, would take over the capital and that this would finally result in a "blook bath." Some prominent Greeks of a national attitude approached us from all sides with the purpose of making us come to an agreement with the British in order to -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, there is not a single word in the whole Indictment charging the Defendant Felmy with any alleged crimes in connection with the evacuation of Athens. I submit that all of this testimony is irrelevant and immaterial.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal has permitted great lattitude thus far; but there should be a limit beyond which even this Tribunal will not go. I think you should confine yourself to matters of some materiality.
The objection will be sustained.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. Professor, will you please, then, very briefly restrict yourself to the main issues and tell us only what you can relate from your own observations?
A. I know, from my own observations, that several prominent Greeks made representations to General Felmy, and these people wanted an agreement to come about of the type which I described before. This agreement did not come about. The only thing that happened was that Athens was declared an open city. General Felmy consciously and deliberately spared Athens by not carrying out numerous orders for its destriction. I was an eye and ear witness, and I can testity as follows: I myself made available large stocks of clothing and food for the suffering population to Minister Louvaris, which, according to orders, we were to have included. Another question was the problem of strengthening the Greek Government executively and altogether strengthening and backing up the Greek Government. I believe that in this particular aspect General Felmy did an enormous service to the Greeks--even if partly in the well-thought-out German interest. The SS Cirles had the following plans; Briefly, before the German evacuation, -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I understood that my objection to this testimony in connection with the evacuation of Athens had been sustained. I put my objection again.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE; Your objection was sustained, and the Tribunal is of the same opinion still.
BY BR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. Witness, you frequently accompanied General Felmy on his official trips, and while you were a member of the Corps Staff you frequently spent time with him. I would assume that you gained an expert picture of his personality and that you have your opinion.
What was General Felmy's attitude towards the Greek population?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I object to any personal characterization by the witness in this regard.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will accept his views for what they may be worth.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: With this limitation, it should be briefly given.
A. I believe that the main characteristic of General Felmy was his humane and chivalrous generosity shown both towards his German subordinates and towards the Greek population. That seems to be the main feature.
Q. Was he only a military man?
A. General Felmy realized fully that the dangers in Greece were not only of a military nature and he vary clearly saw the borderline of a purely military force used and he stressed that we had to bear in mind to leave in Greece a good memory of us even after the war.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I have no further questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Are there further questions on the part of other defense counsel?
Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for defendants List and von Weichs): If it please the Tribunal, we had intended to have the witness, Professor Stadtmueller, here as the witness for the whole of the defense. Since the witness, however, can appear only once on this stand and since he is to be in particular a witness for General Felmy, this witness has been heard during the Presentation of evidence for General Felmy. There are only a few question which I want to put to this witness in the interest of several of my colleagues. I shall be as brief as I can.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well, Dr. Laternser; you may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Professor, you know Jugoslavian also, do you?
A. I do.
Q. And you speak the language?
A. At the end I was an interpreter with Army Group E in Slavonia for the Serbo-Croat language. I would like to stress that I don't speak the Serbo-Croat language as well as the Greek language.
Q. Were you during the war in Jugoslavia?
A. I was on a march through Jugoslavia from about the 15th of October 1944 until the 3rd of December 1944.
I was mainly in Sarajevo where I stayed for five weeks and then I was for two or three months in Slavonia, f February until April.
Q. During the war did you pay any particular attention to the event in Serbia?
A. Yes, certainly; for scientific reasons and historical interests because the present to me is the continuance of history.
Q. What were the foundations, the historic foundations, of the band movements in Serbia, very briefly, Professor, please?
A. The basic foundation is a tradition of an ethnic fight against the Turkish domination where there is no difference made between those who bear arms and those who are the bulk of the population. Old Serbian and Slavonian history which would lead too far in this connection is full of examples of this sort.
Q. How did it happen, then, according to your experiences, that the band fights in Jugoslavia took place?
A. This came about because of this very special type of a national feeling of honor which is particular and which is according to our own standards exaggerated, . The kind of loyalty towards the occupation power such as the population of Germany at the moment observes under occupation is very far from those people.
Q. Can these band fights, in your opinion; be traced back to the fact that there were Germans on the Balkans or would people like the Serbians oppose any occupier of their country?
A. Yes, they would certainly oppose any occupier of their country. The proof of this can be seen from the events in Greece after the German evacuation.
Q. Professor, concerning the methods of the band fighting, you have made a few statements just before. Is there anything else which you can tell in addition concerning the band fights in Serbia which might be of importance
A. Do you mean in a historical aspect?
Q. Well, quite briefly, a historical aspect and then can you tell in the last year what happened under the German occupation power?
A. There was the burning down of villages and the extermination of individuals and whole families; then this horrible occurrence of Vendetta which is at present still very much alive amongst these people.
I would like to draw attention to the very dangerous part in this sen of the Serbian national poetry which educates the young people in this sense.
Q. How is the human life and life of fellow citizens judged in the Balkans?
A. One can certainly not compare this with the conditions in other states which have a century-old legal tradition. Such a thing does not exist there.
Q. If in the Balkans measures were taken by an occupation power to counter the band fights and if such measures become necessary, how do these measures have to be in order to be effective.
A. Above all, they have to attempt to find the actual perpetrator a if this man cannot actually be seized, the man around, him.
Q. I did not intend to direct my question in this way. I meant the strength and stringency of these measures.
A. Small measures will make no impression at all because they are a daily occurrence.
Q. Since you are very well informed about conditions in the Balkans through your historical background, I want to ask you the following: do you know whether it is correct that during an uprising in 1904 or 1906 in Bisnia to Austrians at that time had ordered a ratio of 1 to 100?
A. I do not remember that particular detail. I do know that in those years there was an uprising on the Bosnian-Dalmatian frontier. What measures were used to suppress it, I do not know.
Q. Do you know anything else about how customary reprisals were?
A. One could point to the stress of the Geneva League of Nations. During the years after the first World War concerning atrocities in connection with the Turkish-Greek forced expulsion of the population a whole volume of documents was published at the time, which I owned formerly but don't have no
Q. Two more brief points, Professor; was the occupation force interested in playing out these ethnic differences against each other?
A. These contrasts were bound to turn out against us. Therefore, we were interested in mitigating contrasts and differences but we had no intention of inciting them against each other.
Q. What was the attitude of the Italians in this connection?
A. The Italians in our corps area, which is the only one about which I can give an opinion, tried in a very small tactics to incite one against the other, even in the case of Papadongonas. When I and General Felmy in August 1943 came to Kalamata we were told in the Italian offices by the regimental commander, Colonel Pagoni, triumphantly, as a proof for his cleverness, that he had immediately passed on the plans of Colonel Papadongon to the ELAM and ELAS movements in a distorted way in order to thus increase the differences which existed.
Q. And one last question, Professor: what attitude was shown by the German soldier towards the civilian population on the Balkans?
A. The German soldiers as an individual is well disciplined, forgetting for the moment all those exceptions, of course, which exist in any army. All Greeks agreed on one point and praised the German soldiers: there no excesses against women. There was no difference of opinion amongst the Greek about this at all. It just didn't occur.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: This will conclude the forenoon session. We will resume at one-thirty.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until one-thirty.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1330 hours).
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 10 December 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Any further questions on the part of defense counsel 2 Apparently not, Mr. Fenstermacher, you may proceed with the cross examination.
GEORGE STADTMUELLER - Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Professor Stadtmueller, did you see all of the orders which came into General Felmy's headquarters from higher headquarters, as well as all the orders which went out from the Corps to subordinate units?
A. I have already answered this questioning direct examination. All orders were available to me. I did not read them all but I could read them. I did not read them all because I had a lot of other official business to do.
Q. Were all of the reports which came into the Corps headquarters from subordinate units and all the reports which went out from the Corps to higher headquarters also available to you?
A. All the correspondence was available to me including secret matters.
Q. Did you ever hear of a dispute between the Italian and German occupation authorities in Greece because the Italians wanted to release certain hostages and the German authorities wanted to execute them?
A. No.
Q. Can you recall what orders were outstanding in the Corps area at the time you were there regarding the execution of hostages?
A. On the part of the Corps, no execution of hostages was ordered directly. Hostage shootings and other reprisal measures were carried out by the subordinate offices, especially by the two independent divisions.
Q. Were there orders for the execution of hostages at fixed ratios of 10 to 1 or 50 to 1 outstanding in the Corps area at the time you were there?
A. In the Corps area there was no standard regulation about this because there was no Corps order about it as far as I remember.
Q. Do you recall whether hostages were executed within the Corps area at the ratios of 10 to 1 or even higher in some cases?
A. I remember the case of Kalavrita; at that time for the murder of about 70 German prisoners, approximately the 10-fold number of hostages was shot, approximately 10-fold.
Q. Is that the only incident you recall in which hostages were executed at the ratio of 10 to 1?
A. I don't know anything about the ratio because the reports came to us from the divisions. They went through us to superior offices and then, for instance, it looked like this: on one day it would be reported that during an attack or during a blasting operation so and so many soldiers were killed, and two or five or ten days later there came a second report where it stated, for instance, as reprisal for that attack so and so many hostages have been executed. I cannot remember and it probably was not the case -- it is probably not the rule that in these reports a ratio was mentioned.
Q. Except for the Kalavrita incident, according to your recollection, there were no other hostage executions at which a ratio of about 10 to 1 was applied?
A. I know about numerous hostage executions having actually taken place and it is possible that ratios of 10 to 1, or even other ratios were applied but I can't say in detail where and when these ratios were used.
Q. Now, as a historian you are probably able to make generalizations; would you be able to generalize regarding the number of hostages that were executed within the Corps area while you were down there?
A. It depends on what you mean by executions. If you include Distomon and Klissura, which were rather turbulent affairs, then the figure is very high, or it is rather high, and I remember the following figures Kalavrita , about 600 or 700; Distomon, perhaps just as many , or less the Distomon case is rather different and cannot be regarded as hostage shooting, in the usual sense ; and for the rest I remember a number of hostage shootings for which in each case 50 or 100 were mentioned or, perhaps, even a smaller figure, perhaps 20.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. How many would you say altogether were executed?
A. In the Corps area?
Q. Yes.
A. Without those who were executed by the SS in Athens or with them?
Q. You might give us both figures, first without including the SS units, and then including the SS executions.
A. I don't know about the number executed by the SS. I don't know at all. If I take the Corps area without Distomon and Klissura, -- then I don't think that it was more than 1500 to 2000 at the most.
Q. That includes about 700 at Kalavrita.
A. Yes.
Q. Now did you ever hear of the execution of hostages in retaliation for the murder of General Krech and three of his companies?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you happen to recall how many hostages were executed in reprisal for that attack?
A. So far as I remember that was at the end of April or the beginning of May, 1944. At that time large numbers of hostages were executed in Athens. As far as I can recall; I cannot tell you the number. Apart from that in Tripolis an additional number of -- I think -- 100 were executed by the Greek Volunteer Battalion.
Q. Do you happen to know the number of German losses there were in that attack?
A. Which attack?
Q. The attack upon General Krech.
A. There was one Division Commander and a few men of his escort.
Q. You don't recall the number of hostages that were executed in retaliation for that attack?
A. As I said; not in detail. There were a rather large number in Athens, and about 100 who independently of the German Wehrmacht, were shot on the Peloponnesus by the Greek Volunteers.
Q. You don't know whether any particular ratio was used in the course of that retaliation measure?
A. No.
Q. Do you think it might have been mere than 10 to 1?
A. I don't know.
Q. Professor, did you hear anything about deportations of the civilian population for forced labor in Germany, from the Corps area of the 68th Corps?
A. No -
DR. MUELLER- TORGOW: I object to this question. It was not the subject of direct examination.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE: We covered a great many things in the direct examination.
The objection will be overruled.
A. I can say the following about that. First of all, through offices of the Corps, no deportation of civilians to Germany was carried out, or ordered. Secondly, I myself know of only one single transport. This was a so-called combing out of a communist quarter in Athens, about two months or three months before the German evacuation. This was carried out by the SS independently from the Corps. Thirdly, in Athens, there was a large recruiting Bureau for Greek workers, which recruited volunteer workers, and some transports of volunteer workers went to Germany, but that hasn't anything to do with the question.
Q. You never heard of a Corps order providing for the deportation of bandit suspects and hostages from the Corps area to Germany for forced labor?
A. I cannot remember about that with certainty.
Q. Now you spoke at some length about the partisan situation in Greece, Professor. Is it true that the partisans had large areas in the Peloponnesus in their hands during 1943 and 1944?
A. Not in 1943, -- not in 1943. It only started in the beginning of October, 1943.
That is only for the last three months did this enter into the picture at all. The answer is that these partisan groups only dominated the mountainous country and occupied it, which had no towns and no traffic centers, no reads and railways, while all of the traffic centers and all of the roads and all of the railways and all of the Ports , were firmly and undisputedly in German hands.
Q. You heard, did you not, about orders which came from the Allied Middle East Command to the various partisan units in Greece , and reports which the bands sent on to headquarters of the British Middle East Command?
A. The Corps had only highly contradictory reports about this. We knew that in a Achaia there were British liaison officers who tried to unite the Communists and the Nationalists, but these attempts were unsuccessful, i.e. the British lost control of the partisan movement and the Communist partisans went their own ways.
Q. Professor, you aid that you knew of no negotiations between the Germans, and I believe you mentioned, the Elas units. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes, in the Corps area.
Q. Were there ever any negotiations for the exchange of prisoners?
A. There may have been negotiations outside with local Commanders, but one has to take into account that until October 1943, we made not yet able to distinguish between Edes and Elas. It was only in October 1943, that this situation was finally cleared up.
Q. And then you did negotiate for the exchange of prisoners?
A. I don't know anything about that from the Corps.
Q. Now you talked about capturing certain prisoners. How were those prisoners dressed? Did they wear a Soviet Star?
A. I myself saw only a very few prisoners. That was after the band operation "Amsel" in January, 1944 in the Taygetos Mountains. They wore civilian clothes. One or the other had an Italian or a British or a German equipment of some kind on.
Q. They did not wear any arm bands or Soviet Stars?