It will be offered as exhibit No. 6. I thought this was an expedient procedure in order to abbreviate as much as possible the oral examination. General, I would like to ask the following question, did you compile this summary and is it in all instances correct?
A To both questions, it is yes.
Q Will you now briefly name a few of the most important tasks which you had as commander Southern Greece?
A I will summarize these tasks in three large catagories, first tasks concerned with the troops, then territorial tasks and then the task of executive powers. Troop tasks were the following, again briefly summarizing, training of units subordinate to me including the 11th Airforce Field division, second organization and planning of the coastal defense in the German coastal sectors and third and that was the most extensive task, the direction of all supplies to Africa, Crete and the other islands, The second category contains all those tasks which one can summarize under territorial tasks, the representing of the interests of the German armed forces toward the individual parts of the Wehrmacht, toward the German Legation, the political representatives and toward the Italians and also toward the Greek government. The third category is those tasks pertaining to executive power, the maintenance of law and order and judicial jurisdiction over the population.
Q By which organizational order had your tasks been established?
A That was the frequently previously mentioned directive, the Fuehrer directive 47.
Q That is a document of the prosecution contained in document book 9, which was offered under exhibit 242 and is contained on page 171 in the English text and page 168 of the German text. It is prosecution exhibit 242.
A Yes, I found it. Thank you. Nothing special is to be added to this Fuehrer Instruction 47. I can only stress that which has been established in this Fuehrer directive, which I pointed out on the map just before, that of the borders of the area under the command of the Commander Southern Greece. It has also been established that the military commander Southern Greece is not competent for Crete, hut in every aspect the commander of the fortress Crete. With regard to the authority of the territorial commander the last page of this O.K.W. directive states very clearly that the commander in chief southeast has the authority of a territorial commander in Greece and that in the operational area, which included all Greece, he had executive powers through the military commanders and was subordinate to them.
That seems to me the pertinent parts of the Fuehrer instruction No. 47.
Q That is all then about the channels of command and area of authority in Southern Greece. General, when looking through the documents of the prosecution pertaining to the year 1942, I cannot find you charged with any incident in that year, however, in prosecution exhibit 261 in document book 10 of the prosecution, page 76 of the English text and page 53 of the German text, I find a report of the commander in chief southeast addressed to the O.K.H., dated 7 January, 1943. This would be document book 10 of the prosecution, page 76 in the English text. In this report, under the heading "Greece" it is reported that eighteen hostages were shot. If it please the Tribunal, I would like to add here that 1 had informed the Secretary General in writing of the document books needed, during the examination of General Speidel, in accordance with the suggestion made by the Tribunal some time ago.
JUDGE BURKE: They will he here shortly.
BE DR. WEISGERBER:
Q Under the heading, "Greece" it is here reported that eighteen hostages were short. What does that report mean, General?
A This report of the commander in chief south east, dated 7 January 1945 addressed to the O.K.W. is undoubtedly addressed comes from the Commander Southern Greece. The report contains retaliation measures, however, it does not show up the connections and the causes for the events since the report is given in a very concentrated form and the original report we do not have available.
Q Do you recall those events, General?
A Yes. I do completely, namely because this was my first reprisal measure, which moved me at the time very deeply. To the best of my recollection, those were two different complexes of problems, which were somehow connected.
There were sabotage acts and the surprise attack on the Island Salamis and then there was serious sabotage on ships in the harbor of Pyreaus.
Q Did you find any details about this case in the documents of the prosecution?
A No, in the documents of the prosecution there are no indications about this case, however, in the documents sent from Washington I found an Ic report of the commander southern Greece, which explains the circumstances which led to the measure and thus I remembered all the facts.
Q If it please the Tribunal this Ic report has been included in document book Speidel 3. I know that this document book 3 is not yet in the hands of the Tribunal. To the best of my information this document will be in the hands of the Tribunal by tomorrow. I shall offer this Ic report in evidence at a later point, however, in this connection I would like to discuss the Ic report in question.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Doctor, do you wish at this time to offer it subject to its later production? You may do that if you desire.
DR. WEISGERBER: If the Tribunal agrees to this, I shall be glad to do it.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I assume there is no objection on your part, Mr. Fenstermacher.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No, if your Honors please.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well. You may make your designation.
DR. WEISGERBER: This is Document Speidel No, 54 in Document Book Speidel III on page 58 of the German text. I am afraid I can't for the moment state the Page in the English document book because I don't have the translation yet. I am offering this document as Speidel Exhibit No. 7.
Q General, can you, on the basis of this document explain to us which sabotage acts took place at the time?
A Since Christmas 1942 there were surprise acts, sabotage acts; raids had increased very suddenly and kept increasing continuously. I am going to subdivide these incidents into three groups.
Group 1 was concentrated on the island of Salamis. This island had been built up to be a naval fortress. Around the end of 1942, beginning of 1943, there were every night raids on sentries and on defense installations, instruments, et cetera. The report which is under discussion here mentions in five consecutive nights such raids on the island of Salamis. There were dead and wounded as a consequence of such raids.
Group 2 was directed against the place opposite the island of Salamis on the mainland in and near Pyraeus. There were further five sabotage acts of a smaller scale.
And finally Group 3 consisted of two serious sabotage acts on ships on the 3rd and 4th of January 1943 during the night in one case a mine would be removed from a transport vessel which was cone and another ship had been heavily damaged by this mine and the ship had to be stranded.
Those were 12 cases of sabotage within nine days and we did not succeed in a single one of these cases to get hold of the perpetrators.
Q Were these sabotage acts of a very serious nature, General?
A The sabotage acts which I described just now and which had started very suddenly were mainly directed against installations of the navy, one against the only submarine base, of the single German base in the eastern Mediterranean and against the wharves connected with this submarine base; and then the attacks were directed against the shipping transport area. Obviously, all these acts were based on one unified plan.
Q Was this unified plan of a very dangerous nature?
A Yes, it was and for reasons these planned sabotage acts could serve to be a preparation for a large scale action from the sea against the only naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. They could also aim at the elimination of this base with other means. Too, the obviously desired damaging and decimating of German shipping space indicated the same direction. This tendency also could only be understood within the scope of the whole of the war situation of that time in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The supply of Southern Greece depended to a large extent on the sea communications, mainly on the functioning of the sea route TriestePyraeus, but not only the supply and the defense of Southern Greece but above all Rommel's war and conduct of war in Africa depended on this supply.
Furthermore, of course, the defense of Crete and the other islands depended on this.
Q General, to what extend did the conduct of war in Africa affect your tasks in Greece or vice versa?
AAs Military Commander for Southern Greece I had, as I indicated initially, the task to supply the army of Rommel in Africa, his equipment and manpower; I had to organize and to direct this supply. The fighting force and life of Rommel's Army depended on the functioning of this supply route.
Q Were the naval installations within your area which also include shipping space of particular importance for your task?
A. That is correct. Athens-Pyraeus, which is one conception, presented the key for the supply of all fighting units in the Eastern Mediterranean area, Africa, Crete and the Islands. The maintenance of the supply means by which I means shipping space in particular and the possibility of repairing ships were of an operational importance for the total warfare within this area. Therefore, I had to see seemingly small occurrences involving a few persons within the framework of the whole war situation.
Q. There was then, according to your conviction, a connection between the sabotage acts in Pyraeus and on Salamis and the war events in Africa.
A. There can be no doubt about that. I had to see a connection here if I thought a little further than the area which presented my own area. The suddenly and starting sabotage acts against the means of warfare against the navy had an effect of reciprocal action on Rommel's conduct of war and it was a natural consequence that they also affected the then starting counter measures of the british.
Q Were these sabotage acts a serious danger and damage to the whole of the warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean area?
A. Yes, every ton of shipping space was precious -- precious because it was irreplaceable, It was irreplaceable because the means of repair were very poor. These possibilities for repair became increasingly restricted because the supply position became increasingly worse through every loss of shipping space. It was just a vicious circle and losses of shipping space occurred constantly by British submarine attacks on shinning bases. It was, therefore, quite obvious that the small available shinning space was not only threatened by enemy action but also by sabotage acts. However, shipping space at that particular point was of decisive importance because at the same time the land routes were endangered through intentional blowing up of railway lines, and thus they functioned less and less. I am only reminded of the blowing up of the Gorgopotamus Bridge.
Here, too, was a fact of cause and effect between shipping routes and the functioning of land routes. I have seen from this point of view it was a military necessity to take stringent measures in these incidents, because I had to prevent the further occurrence of sabotage acts on shipping space. There were no other means.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point, Dr. Weisgerber, we will continue with the case tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
THE MARSHAL: The court will he in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1947, at 0900 hours.)
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL V, CASE VII IN THE MATTER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AGAINST WILHELM LIST, ET AL, DEFENDANTS, SITTING AT NURNBERG, GERMANY, ON DECEMBER 11, 1947, 0930, JUSTICE BURKE PRESIDING.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all of the defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all of the defendants are present in the Courtroom, except the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION continued WILHELM SPEIDEL BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General Speidel, yesterday shortly before the recess, we had discussed the conditions in Athens, Pyracus and Salamis, around the turn of the year 1942 to 1945. On the basis of the 1-C report of your agency, dated 10 January 1945, you discussed sabotage cases and surprise attacks which occurred and gave details. Will you now please, very briefly, give us the reasons why you saw in these sabotage acts a serious danger for the total conduct of war in the Eastern Mediterranean?
A. I tried yesterday to explain why in this accumulation of sabotage acts within a small area, and through the sabotage acts on similar objectives, I had to see a unified plan; a plan, furthermore, which could decisively influence our conduct of war in the Southeast area.
It was intolerable from an operational point of view, because the existing small amount of shipping space being further reduced, not only by air attacks, submarines, etc., but even by the sabotage action mentioned yesterday. Shipping space at the time was particularly decisive for yet another reason, and that is because simultaneously and systematically the only weak land-route connecting Greece and Europe was disrupted by serious blowing-up of railroad lines.
I further said that between the disruption of the naval installations and shipping space, and the destruction of the railroad lines there was undoubtedly some connection. I would like to recall in this connection the blowing up of the Gorgopotamus bridge in Southern Greece, which has been discussed in earlier sessions here, and which considerably endangered our supply.
Based on all these perplexities, I saw that in this situation it was extremely necessary under all circumstances to take stringent measures.
Q. What were the reprisal measures you ordered?
A. One, I authorized the commander of the Fortress Salamis to carry out three reprisal measures. Two, I myself ordered 15 reprisal measures to be carried out in Pyracus, and, third, as a deterent and as a warning, I had 40 hostages arrested who were later on released.
Q. Were these reprisal measures successful?
A. Undoubtedly, they were extremely successful, because in Salamis the continued series of sabotage actions stopped very suddenly, and there was no sabotage on skipping space for months to come.
DR. WEISGRUBER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like further to offer in evidence from Speidel Document Book 3, the following documents.
I heard, to my regret, that the document book is not yet available, but I was promised that it would be available by noon today.
THE PRESIDENT: The Deputy Secretary General is down at the reproduction office now, or at the office of the Secretary General, and is making inquiries concerning it. I have endeavored to express to him the desire of the Tribunal that we must have this book here, and I am certain that he will make every effort to get it here very promptly. As soon as he returns he will give us a report on it.
You may proceed.
BY DR. WEISGRUBER:
With permission of the Tribunal I would like to give these documents which I would like to offer in evidence the exhibit numbers which they are to receive.
The first one is Speidel Document No. 44 contained in Document Book Speidel 3, on page 27. This document will be offered under Exhibit No. 8,- Speidel, Exhibit No. 8.
This is a 10-day report of the Military Commander Southern Greece, dated 1 February, 1943, and paragraph 1 of this report reads, "No new sabotage acts occurred".
A further exhibit in this connection will be Speidel Document No. 55, contained in Speidel Document Book 3, page 64, and this document will receive Exhibit No. Speidel 9. It is a report of the Military Commander Southern Greece addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated 20 January, 1943.
I do not intend to read this report. The report itself shows that the situation around that period of time became considerably more quiet.
Q General, that then was the first case in which you ordered reprisal measures?
A Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I am advised by the Deputy Secretary General that the reproduction of this book has been given Priority No. 1 and that as soon as it is ready for delivery, we will be advised.
BY DR. WEISERBER:
Q General, this then, was the first reprisal measure ordered by you?
A Yes.
Q What was, for you, the command basis upon which you ordered the reprisal measures?
A In Athens I had already found a reprisal order which had been issued by the 12th Army, and which had also been published. I remember very clearly the German version as well as the Greek version which was published, and which threatened reprisal measures in case of sabotage acts.
On the basis of this order I was authorized and entitled to order reprisal measures in cases which demanded it. Reprisal ratios to the best of my recollection, were not contained in that order.
Q General, surely you reflected about this order, did you consider it admissible under International Law?
A I would like to state principally that no military leader examines his orders from his superior as to whether or not they are admissible under International Law. That is presupposed as a matter of course. I further do not believe that any military leader in any other army customarily examines the orders of his superior in this direction.
In this case, however, it was slightly different, inasmuch as this had been the very first time that I, during my military career, had to concern myself at all with reprisal questions. Up to that date, this pproblem had been quite outside my sphere of work and my ideas.
It is comprehensible that such a decision, to have to judge over human lives, concerned and moved me deeply, so I asked my Chief Judge for an expert opinion in order to satisfy my own conscience. I asked him to give me an opinion about the admissibility under International Law of reprisal measures.
My Chief Judge confirmed the admissibility of reprisal measures under International Law.
Q Didn't you, beyond that, also try to get information about what your military superiors thought about this problem?
A Yes, I personally telephoned the Commander of Army Group E.
Q Who was he?
A That was at the time, General Loehr.
I described the situation to him and my intentions. I informed him of my decision, and asked him to give me his opinion and his consent. He agreed completely.
Q When you concerned yourself for the first time with the ordering of reprisal measures, you sought for confirmation from three sides concerning the admissibility of your intended measures?
A Yes, I did that.
The basis for me was, (a) the clear cut order, (b) the clear cut legal opinion, and (c) the decided agreement from my superiors.
Q We will now turn to the development of the situation in the first six months of 1943. The Prosecution has submitted the situation reports for May and June, of the Military Commander for Southern Greece from the year 1943, and they are contained in Document Book 24 of the Prosecution as Exhibit 546, an page 212 and subsequent pages in the English version, and German page 161 and subsequent pages.
Will you please, on the basis of these reports, give us very briefly the development of the situation.
A These two monthly reports are very informative in my opinion, because they give for the first time, a comprehensive picture of the development and the situation in Greece as far as I can judge this picture from my rather limited perspective in Southern Greece.
If I may briefly concentrate the sections of the reports, I would like to do it as follows:
We see that during the first months of the year 1943 the situation became considerably more acute. Sabotage acts increased considerably. Strike movements flared up here again again and for the first time large scale strikes occurred which bore a decided military aspect. Demonstrations took place in connection with the restricted, and for the first time at least as far as I was concerned, all of these actions allowed me to realize that they were well planned, and also that they were led uniformly by Communist leaders. It was very obvious that at this point, the EAM as a political organization, together with the ELAS, the fighting organization, had gained the domination over the insurgent movement, and directed it into the Communist direction.
Furthermore, these reports contained for the first time basic information concerning the organization of the bands, in which connection I would like to stress, that these reports have to be taken with a grain of salt. They do not contain any information checked or confirmed by German military agencies, but they contain a compilation of band information taken from a variety of sources. An examination and evaluation would hot be the task of my limited sphere but concern instead the superior agency Army Group E, to whom this information was given as a basis for its evaluation of the situation.
Q If it please Honors at this point I intended to offer in evidence the following document, Speidel Document No. 55 contained in Speidel Document Book 3, page 64. This document will be offered under Exhibit No. Speidel 10.
Your Honors, I beg your pardon. It is Document 56, contained in Speidel Document Book No. 3, page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: May I make an inquiry? The paging you are giving is the German page; you don't know now the English page do you?
DR. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, I do not at the moment know the English pages, but as a rule, the pages in the Document Books, in both the English and the German are identical.
Whether this will be the same in the case of Book 3, as it was with Books 1 and 2, I do not as yet know.
This is Document, Speidel No. 56, contained in Speidel Document Book 33 page 78, which will be offered under Exhibit No. Speidel 10. This is the translation of a proclamation to the Greek Youth and to the whole Greek population and its party organizations.
It is a proclamation as it was published and disseminated at the time by the EAM movement. This document was contained amongst the documents sent to us from Washington. I do not intend to read this document I recommend it to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
Q General, if in this report as it is contained in Exhibit 546, you turn up page 165, which is page 218 of the English text, you find here a report concerning the fact that an enemy transmitter was seized. I would like to ask you in this connection, was that perhaps isolated case?
A. This was by no means an isolated case. It was only a symptom I remember very well that at that time, inside six months only, in Athens alone, 12 enemy radio transmitters were seized and rendered unusable. Athens had at that time become a decided espionage center and it had 12 radio transmitters as a proof of this fact. In order to anticipate possible misunderstandings, I would like to add at this point that this seizure of enemy radio transmitters in Athens was carried out in conjunction with the Italian occupation authorities. It was, therefore, no independent action on the part of the German military authorities. The Italians had agreed to it.
Q. If you will now look at page 171 in the same document, which is page 229 in the English text, you will find mentioned here a second reprisal measure. It is page 171 in your document book.
A. Yes, I have found it, thank you.
Q. What are your comments on this incident?
A. This again is an incident concerning sabotage on shipping space, concerning the steamer Citta de Savona. This steamer had been used like all the other ships as a Wehrmacht transport and supply vessel and had been damaged very seriously in the harbor of Pyraeus by magnetic mine and could not be used for some time. For the same reasons, which I mentioned before, it seemed to me that in this case it was necessary to take stronger measures. All the more so as in this case too the perpetrators could not be seized in spite of every effort made in this direction. I, therefore, ordered that ten reprisal measures were to be carried out.
Q. May I ask you to tell us from this document when this sabotage act took place and when the reprisal measure was ordered?
A. The sabotage act took place on the 12th of June and the execution of reprisal measures took place on the 17th of June.
Q. In 1943?
A. Yes, in 1943.
Q. Why did you wait from the 12th of June until the 17th of June?
A. Just as I described in the previously mentioned case, I waited for a few days in order to grant a possibility of seizing the real perpetrators. The whole machine of investigation had been started for this purpose because I hoped until the very last minute to be able to seize the actual perpetrators. Above all, I did not want to hasten this measure. I only wanted to carry it out after the normal investigation had not had any result. In addition, I would like to state that the fact that I waited was not approved of at higher agencies because I remember the following incident in this connection. I cannot say for certain whether this was the first or the second case, but in any case on one of these occasions the following happened.
I was en route on an inspection trip between the period of time when the sabotage act took place and the reprisal measure. I was stopped at a telephone center. There I found a teletype from my chief in Athens and this teletype contained about the following: "The Commanderin-Chief just telephoned. He expects that you will finally take stringent and strong measures. Please send orders whether the reprisal measures are to be carried out today."
Q. One interpolation here in order to clarify the issue. Who asked you for an order to carry out the reprisal measures?
A. My Chief-of-Staff. The first sentence referred to a communication from the Commander-in-Chief, - I was finally to take stringent measures, and the second sentence had been added by my Chief-ofStaff who asked me to issue an order to carry out the reprisal measures immediately. My answer was brief and it so happens that I remember the exact wording. I sent off a teletype to my Chief-of-Staff containing the following words: "I am not going to be blackmailed. Wait for my return."
Late at night I returned and had the results--or rather the nonexisting results of the investigation reported to me and after a further five days I decided that the reprisal measure was to be carried out, and left again the next morning.
Q. Did you in this case also obtain the consent of your military superior?
A. I cannot answer this with the same certainty as I could answer it in the first case, but I am fairly certain that also in this case too I got in touch with him over the telephone.
Q. You said that you ordered ten hostages to be shot. In the first incident, as you testified just before, you consulted your Chief Judge. Did you do that in this case also?
A. Yes, I also discussed in this instance the problem in a very detailed manner with my Chief Judge. However, I did not do that in this case in order to clear the basis given by international law because this was quite clear and obvious. I discussed the problem for two other reasons. The first reason concerned the selection of the reprisal hostages which I made together with the Chief Judge. The order provided that reprisal prisoners were to be taken from those circles from which the perpetrators had supposedly come. That is a provision which in my opinion is mainly a theoretical one.
I did not want to detain anybody arbitrarily so instead I ordered that people were to be imprisoned as hostages who fulfilled two conditions: one, they were to be Communist leaders and, two, they would have to be imprisoned under the highest sentences for offenses against the German military forces, for which punishment they had been normally sentenced by court martials.
This selection "as to be made by the Chief Judge and he submitted the cases to me. I examined then and accordingly ordered the ten hostages to be shot. There was another reason why the Chief Judge was consulted and that was the following. There were a number of cases where some time ago a valid court martial death sentence had been pronounced. The execution of these people sentenced to death was combined with the execution of these hostages so that actually not only the ten hostages in the reprisal measure but these ten hostages plus a certain number of other prisoners were shot. Ten were reprisal prisoners and the others were men convicted to death by a valid court martial.
This measure achieved that only ten men were seized who had already been convicted of serious offenses against the German armed forces. Thus, I avoided that a further ten, possibly innocent men, would fall under this reprisal measure.
Q. General, if one looks at the reports of May and June, 1943, as they are contained in Exhibit 546, one finds that around that time quite a number of sabotage acts occurred. The effect of the first reprisal measure, at the beginning of January 1943, which you described, had been the cessation of the surprise attacks and sabotage acts or at least a considerable decrease in them. You did not order any reprisal measures with regard to the surprise attacks and sabotage acts which occurred in May and June, 1943? did you? At least, I could not find any proof that you did that in the documents submitted. Did you order reprisal measures at the time or didn't you?
A. No.
Q. Why did it happen that just in that particular case of sabotage on shipping on the steamer Citta di Savona you deemed a reprisal measure necessary?
A. I think that should have become fairly clear from what I said concerning the first reprisal measure. Therefore, I can at this point only repeat that every ton of shipping space was of a decisive importance for the very reasons which I stated just previously. The African problem, however, no longer had to be considered because of the development of the situation there, but the problem of supplying Crete and the islands still remained exactly the same as before. In other words, the fighting strength and the lives of ten thousands of German soldiers still depended on the functioning of the sea supply route, and for this reason it was an absolute military necessity to take measures in this case.
Q. I don't know whether I have a wrong conception in assuming that the steamer Citta di Savona was an Italian steamer?
A. That is quite correct. As the name shows, it was an Italian steamer.
Q. I am then interested to know why you retaliated after an attack on an Italian steamer. Why did you in this case consider reprisal measures necessary?
A. I did that for two clear and obvious reasons. The German-Italian shipping space represented one operational unit. The Italian ships naturally represented in the Mediterranean the largest part of the available shipping space. Therefore, Italian steamers made their trips in a majority of cases in the interests of German supply. Therefore, it was in this case immaterial whether it was a German or an Italian ship; it was part of our available shipping space for supply.
The second reason which is even more significant is that the sabotage act took place in an area of German sovereignty and I was responsible for that area.
Q. In the report of June, 1943, some paragraphs of which we have discussed, there are contained protest demonstrations in Athens against the shootings of hostages. Did you take any measures against these protest demonstrations?
A. No, I didn't. Athens was Italian area.
Q. Did the Italians do anything against these demonstrations? Did they take any measures?
A. Yes. In this connection I want to recall the Greek film which we saw and which showed this demonstration procession; it is quite surprising that such demonstrations were allowed in an occupied city. I don't believe they would be possible in Germany today. The Italians intervened and these demonstrations took a very bloody end.