This is an affidavit made by the former General of Mountain Troops Winter. It was given on the 20th of September 1947, and I quote:
"From the end of August 1943 until the middle of March 1944 I was Chief of Staff of Army Group E in Greece. The following statements concerning the organization and operation of the command relationships in Greece during the time mentioned are given from memory according to my best knowledge and belief. Therefore it can only be demanded that they be correct in fundamentals, and not in details.
"1. The Military Commander Greece was subordinate to the Military Commander Southeast, and not to the Commander in Chief of Army Group E.
"2. The Commander in Chief of Army Group E could give tactical directives to the Military Commander Greece, i.e. he could issue orders affecting the forces under the command of the Military Commander Greece (mostly police and other troops), which would coordinate those troops with the troops of Army Group E in regard to possible enemy landings as well as the security of strategic communications.
"3. The Executive SS and Police Officer for Greece was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece, by assignment and personally, so far as I know.
"Independently, he received directions (And this, of course, must be supplemented from the context that it is here meant the SS and Police Leader in Greece.) in police matters, including starting and organizing native police units, directly from the Reichsfuehrer SS. The High Command of Army Group E was not informed about the substance of these directives. I remember that Gen. Speidel also told me several times that the SS Executive and Police Officer either informed him not at all or only sketchily concerning the matters mentioned above.
"4. When the communistic insurrection of the EAM, which was ideologically and materially aided from the outside, gained momentum after the departure of the Italian Army in September 1943, and threatened the strategic communications of Army Group E, which was assigned to coastal defense, then the fight against the rebels gained in importance and required the commitment of regular army units, because the available police forces were too small.
As a result the army and police forces duplicated security measures in all areas. In order to make a reasonable use of all available forces and to assure a unified tactical command, the Commander in Chief of Army Group E made use, as I remember after 1943, of his powers, mentioned in paragraph 2, to issue directives, he assigned a regular area to the SS Executive and Police Officer and his Police Alpine Regiment 18, in which he and his forces alone were responsible for the security of the strategic communications. In return, the Military Commander Greece was released from responsibility for the tactical securing of the strategic communications outside of this designated area. His other responsibilities were not altered. The basic order for this measure went through channels from the Commander in Chief of Army Group E, i.e. through the Military Commander to the SS Executive and Police Officer. Therefore the Military Commander Greece was in this case only the transmitting official. This is how it may been with further orders that may have been issued in this connection by Army Group E to the SS Executive and Police Officer.
"The SS Executive and Police Officer regulated the details of the tactical operations of his forces in the area assigned to him on his own authority." It is signed and notarized.
Further, I would, like to submit from Speidel Document Book II Speidel Document No. 21, on page 23 of the text. I would ask that Exhibit No. 15 be given this document. It is another affidavit by the same General Winter, dated the 12th of October, and I quote:
From August 1943 until March 1944, I was Chief of the General Staff of Army Group E, and from March 1944 until October 1944, Chief of the General Staff of Army Group F. On the basis of the knowledge acquired in this position I am able to make the following detailed statements concerning divergences and shifting of responsibility between Wehrmacht and SSheadquarters in the south-eastern theatre. I remark that I make my statements from memory. Since I lack all particulars concerning details I must limit myself to enumerating exceptionally outstanding cases.
I take for granted knowledge of the peculiar command relationships in Greece during the period from Autumn 1943 to Autumn 1944, namely the separation of operational command from territorial authority to command.
The Higher-SS and Police Leader Greece, as far an he himself was concerned, was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece. This subordination however was limited dejure and de facto by the fact that he just like the Higher SS and Police Leaders or Special Deputies of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the other occupied territories or sovereign countries of the southcast - received instructions in the police sector directly through the Reichsfuehrer SS. The establishment and organization of native police forces above all were regulated by such direct instructions. In spite of continuous efforts to achieve ready co-operation by close personal contact, the Commander in Chief of Army Group E in Greece and I as his chief at that time, never succeeded in getting an insight into the activity of the Higher-SS - and Police Leader Greece in the sphere mentioned I may take it for granted that no unobjectionable picture was to be had of the activity of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD who was subordinated to the Higher SS- and Police Leader. I know that the Military Commander Greece. Air Force General Speidel was always confronted by surprises in the field of organization and use of native police forces.
The Higher SS and Police Leader had even at the end of 1943 adopted the policy of solving problems arising in this sphere by direct dealings with individual men of the Greek government. While outwardly the Commander in Chief of Army Group E (or his superior: Commander in Chief in SouthEast) or at least the Military Commander Greece appeared consequently to the uninitiated observer as inevitably responsible for organization and assignment of police forces, the responsibility was actually showed one-sidedly into the sphere of the Higher SS- and Police Leader. The Commander in Chief of the Army Group was from the start eliminated dejure, the Military Commander defacto.
I do not wish to read any further from this document. I would like to come back to guerilla fighting.
General, I would like to pose the following question: Was your interpretation, or the one I have just read from the affidavit of General Winter of directing guerrilla fighting confirmed by any statements from the side of the SS?
A. Not officially. However, unofficially the following happened: One day an SS Obergruppenfuehrer by the name of von dem Bach-Zelewsky, with the retinue usual with these gentlemen, paid me a courtesy visit and told me that he was the Plenipotentiary for Guerrilla Fighting for the Reichsfuehrer SS, and he had come to Athens in order to conduct an inspection of the Higher SS and Police Leader. I took cognizance of this visit, but we did not discuss anything important. Then he had, afterwards, a discussion with the Higher SS and Police Loader. How long he had been there and what was talked about I don't know. It seemed to me from the visit of this officer that the Reichsfuehrer SS had a very direct influence on the guerrilla fighting. I can't say more on this subject.
Q. Has it come to your knowledge, even only subsequently, ad to what role this SS General von dem Bach-Zelewsky played in the sphere of guerrilla fighting?
A. I really never heard, anything about it. I can't say that.
Q. In the first trial, when this General von dem Bach-Zelewsky appeared as a witness it was established that he was the nan who had drawn up the Guerrilla Fighting Directives at that time.
A. No, I never heard about it.
Q. Let us clarify once more the position of the Higher SS and Police Leader. Did you issue orders to him concerning guerrilla fighting or have you yourself taken a land in any way, in the guerrilla fighting of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A. I can only repeat that operational orders from Army Group E and were relayed by me to the Higher SS and Police Leader. How the first basic order came in, I believe I said this morning that it was on the basis of that authorization.
Q. Have you every seen the guerrilla area of the Higher SS and Police Leader? Have you ever been there and inspected it? Or that of Police Regiment 18?
A. It was my habit, when I was commanding troops, to be with them daily. It was always my attitude that which I had not seen and inspected I did not believe. I took care of all matters in person, but I was never in this guerrilla area. I was not with any troops. I did not take part in any combat, which I would have done if I had been there but to take only the role of battle trotter was not my business. In this regard, of course, I was forced not to go there, even though this interested me greatly.
Q. Well, it is only because you did not have anything to do with the guerrilla fighting tasks of the Higher SS and Police Leader that this was entirely outside your duties, that you did not go there?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. In the interrogation of General Felmy, we heard that for the Peloponnesus a combat commander was appointed for a certain time. He was the Commando of the 117th Light Infantry. Were there any leaders in the guerilla fighting area of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Boctia that is? Was there a corresponding organization?
A. At the time I didn't know about it but I have now seen from the War Diary of the 68th Corps that in a part of Boeotia the Commander of the Police Regiment 18 was appointed as Combat Commander. I think he was assigned there by the Army Group E, not by me.
Q. Did the Higher SS and Police Leader--ever make any suggestions to you concerning a transfer of guerilla area about the various tactical intentions? In other words, did he inform you in any way about his activities?
A. I can't remember any details from that time but I read here again in this War Diary of the 68th Corps, that the Higher SS and police Leader suggested to the 68th Corps that he would like to transfer his guerilla area from the Boeotian area to the Peloponnesus. General Felmy, as witness in his own case, has described very clearly and in detail this incident. From his testimony it became very clear that the Higher SS and Police Leader received the order to transfer his zone from Boeotia to the Peloponnesus, from the Reichsfuehrer SS and only for this reason he contacted the 608th Corps, probably so that the latter would take over his old zone.
Q. In order to summarize the service regulation for the Higher SS and Police Leader, then, I suppose I ought to say that this service regulation really consisted of nothing but the exceptions. Will you please once again specify in how far the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer really was subordinate to you?
A. Even here I must give you, first of All, a very negative answer by referring back to your questions. He was not subordinate to me, not as far as troops went, and not even as far as jurisdiction went. He was not subordinate to me in connection with his activity in guerilla fighting where he got some of his directives from the Army Group E and some from Reichfuehrer SS.
He was not subordinate to me in police matters because there, according to service regulations, he got his directions from the Reichsfuehrer SS. He was definitely subordinate to me as far as his territory was concerned, as was every other authority and troop in the Greek area; furthermore, he was subordinate to me in the commitment of his troops in the first time until the beginning of November. That is, until this regulation concerning the guerilla area came into force.
Q. You say then that during this time the Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to you for security purposes.
A. The police Regiment 18 first of all was subordinate to me from his arrival at the end of August immediately up to the moment when the Higher SS and Police Leader arrived and that was the middle of December. From then on, it was subordinate to me through the Higher Police and SS Leader until about the beginning of November, but it was not at all in a complete way. The Army Group E also during this time interfered continuously.
Of course I don't remember the detail, of that time. However, from the War Diaries, I can say that, for instance, Army Group E once took a whole battalion away from me which was assigned to a different command for guerilla fighting, that once a battalion from the Army Group was used for naval defenses, that another time a single company which was a subordinate to the Brandenberg regiment then stationed in Boetia, that even once two companies were used for the navy, I suppose for one of the island operations.
I mention these details which I have from the Diaries only because I wish to show that even in this very first state of the operations, first of all, I did not have the whole forces at my disposal and the second reason for my mentioning this is that the Army Group was continuously interfering.
Q. General, you have just said that the Higher SS and Police Leader received guerilla fighting directions from Army Group E and also from the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Is the last statement correct? I ask you the question because I have - my attention has just been called -- because the translation has not been coming through. The Higher SS and Police Leader also got his directives for Band fighting from the Reichsfuehrer SS?
A. I just would like to remind her of what I have just mentioned a few minutes ago that the SS and Police Leader in the spring of 1944, sometime in the spring of 1944, received the order from the Reichsfuehrer SS to transfer his activities to the Peloponnesus. I emphasize that I only know that from the statement of General Felmy, when he appeared as witness in his own case.
Q. A concluding question to this chapter, General. I can well imagine that it must be difficult for somebody who has not himself experienced the organization of authority in Germany, to understand these very complicated situations. They certainly gave reason for considerable friction. Could you tell the Court very briefly an explanation for this very strange organizational state of affairs.
A. This state of affairs and the conditions which I have just mentioned are not only incomprehensible to the outsider but also to us. They were incomprehensible to us but we had, somehow, to contend with them. They were caused by the conditions of power in the Third Reich, which are now a matter of history and which can only be judged by someone who has himself lived under them.
The following factors must be taken into consideration. First, the strong dualism in the authoritarian fuehrer state, the discrepancy between Wehrmacht and SS, and also the desire for power that the SS had. The principle of the highest quarters was division of power in order to weaken the various units that held power and to play them up against each other according to the famous principle of "Divide and Impera". It was thus that cause for friction was created deliberately and intentionally, and the conflicts which broke into flame over this of course were fought out lower down.
It was these factors that I have just mentioned which resulted in a dualism and sometimes more than two channels of orders in the Third Reich in general, but especially in the military sector in the Balkans. This SS order that I have mentioned before and analyzed in detail is the typical compromise which was so frequent at that time, in the course of which the powerful Reichsfuehrer SS wished to push the weak OKW, out of the way, so that he could get himself the power into his own hands, although from a purely military point of view it was an absolutely impossible situation.
Q. Will you please tell me in conclusion who was Higher SS and Police Leader at your time in Greece?
A. First, it was an SS Brigadefuehrer by the name of Strob from the middle of September until about the middle of October and about the middle of October, I can't remember the date, the SS Gruppenfuehrer Schimana arrived, who then had the command until the end.
Q. You said SS Brigadefuehrer and SS Gruppenfuehrer. What ranks do they correspond to in the Wehrmacht?
A. The SS fuehrer had various ranks. The SS rank of Brigadefuehrer corresponded to Brigadier General of the Wehrmacht and Schimana was SS Gruppenfuehrer which corresponded to General of the Wehrmacht.
Q. To what could we compare the rank of the higher SS and police leader in Greece?
A. General and division commander.
Q. Will you tell me now, General, what were the troops that were subordinate to you as military commander in Greece?
A. I am almost ashamed to say. I commanded the Security Battalion 596.
Q. Your statement is confirmed by prosecution exhibit 422, in document book 17, page 87 in the English transcript and 84 in the German version; and also on page 121 in the English and 116 in the German. Will you please give me in short the substance of those documents?
A. In the first document, as a concluding sentence of a monthly report from January 1944, it reports on the execution of the tasks that were assigned to the regimental leaders and it talks about the lack of troops. The tasks cannot be carried out with that one regiment. "An allocation of three to four security battalions is required urgently."
Q. Did you get any more battalions after that?
A. Not one.
Q. General, what organization existed for the administrative tasks in your sphere as military commander of Greece?
A. As I have already mentioned before, there was one Field 4Q, and 7 sub-area headquarters. I am afraid I can't show you on this chart because I haven't got the stick that is required, but there were assigned to me in the South, the field sub-area headquarters, Corinth, Athens, Chalkis, Larissa, Lamia; and in the west, Epirus, Messolunghi, Joannina, and finally the sub-area command of Salonika.
DR. WEISGERBER: In this connection, Mr. President, I would like to submit the provisional service regulation for the area headquarters 295, and others, as it is contained in document book Speidel No. 3. This is Speidel document No. 50 on page 39 of document book 3. I would like to submit this document as Speidel exhibit No. 16. I do not intend to read this temporary service regulation, and I would like to recommend it to the judicial notice of the Court.
Further, I have attempted to show the organization of the military command Greece in a sketch, and I should like to refer to document volume Speidel No. 2, the document Speidel No. 16 on page 8. I should like to submit that as Speidel exhibit No. 17. This is a chart. It is headed "Militaerbefehlshaber Griechenland", Military Commander Greece, page 8 of document book number 2. Mr. President, I don't know whether you have this chart at hand.
THE PRESIDENT: I have a chart in my book which has been marked page 8 which comes between pages 7 and 9. Apparently my associates do not have the same type of a chart that I have, though. Do you have smaller ones? I think it is the same thing. It is a small matter.
DR. WEISGERBER: Yes, Mr. President, it is the same.
Q. (By Dr, Weisgerber) General, on the basis of this chart, would you once again give a detailed account of the whole organization?
A. Up on top, as the supreme command, we have the Military Commander of Greece; immediately subordinate to him, lower down, is the Military Commander Greece. Then from the flag of the Military Commander lower down to the right we have the sub-area commander 395 who is at the same time military commander of Salonika, Then, reading from the right to the left, the seven field sub-area commands follow. Below that we see the security battalion 596 which I have just mentioned.
Towards the left we see the Higher SS and Police Leader and the SS and police regiment number 18 which is subordinate to him. Between these two complexes there is one line going farther towards the bottom. There you see the three command flags; that is, Army Air Force, and Navy which are only territorially subordinate. At the outside you can see the other various authorities of the OKW and the OKH which were not in Greece.
Now, only a few short remarks concerning the channels of command. They are designated by lines. The Higher SS Police Fuehrer is subordinate to the military commander Greece according to the service regulation as mentioned. Then, tactical directives from the Army Group E, and finally the subordination concerning distribution as well as police questions to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. And now, I would like you to look at the flag of the Army Group E. We must establish the communications line going from the Army Group E to the right bottom to the commander of Salonika in his capacity as tachical leader, finally, the lines that lead from the military commander directly to the right, designate cooperation with the Greek government and also cooperation with the German Special Plenipotentiary for economic questions, Minister Neubacher, who, at the same time, issued all the directives concerning the economic field. These mainfold conditions of subordination we tried to explain in this sketch, in a very primitive way.
DR. WEISGERBER: For the simplification of the tasks of the military commander of Greece I have added to the document Speidel number 17, a concentrated summary of this subordination procedure, and I would like to submit this summary as Speidel exhibit No. 18. I do not intend to read this document and would like to recommend it to the judicial notice of the Court.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) General, will you please give us in two or three sentences a short summary of your own tasks?
A. In short there were three fields of tasks: Those concerned, with troops on the one hand though they were the smallest part, territorial tasks, and third, they were administrative and executives tasks. The summary just submitted is not a theory but is a summary of the real tasks as they were practiced.
Q. General, when you mentioned that you are almost ashamed to mention that you commanded only one security battalion, one local defense battalion, I imagine your position as military commander in Greece as follows. It was a big facade and no foundation which could hold up this representative building. Is this a correct interpretation?
A. When the first witness here was sitting in my place, General Felber, he said that the military commander of Greece was only a torso. In cross-examination, he used another definition, which I do not remember now, which I have, however, noted down and which I would like to be permitted to read. It is quite short. He said the following: "A great name and lovely titles for the tasks, and something big should be done which, in actuality, could not be expected to live." I must say that this definition is not bad because in practice that is just how it was. The troops were taken away from me by the army Group E. Secondly, the Higher SS & Police Leader was subordinated to me to the extent which was shown today on the basis of the service regulations and my more detailed statements. Third, the administrative tasks, which really should take the foreground, kept me very busy, but they did not give me the authority to make any decisions because in this area of economy, finance, and administration, I was dependent exclusively on the Special Spenipotentiary of the Reich, Minister Neubacher, who, first of all, was a Special Plenipotentiary for Economic Tasks, and also the German Minister. He was a diplomat. I talked of the troops; I talked of the Higher SS & Police Leader; I spoke of economics. And, fourth, the tasks of the executive power-that is to say--was restricted and decreased in direct proportion to the increase of the combat activities. And the so-called pacified area became smaller.
After all, in the combat area, of course, the troops were supreme.
Q. To conclude this chapter, I should like to give the Tribunal a short explanation of the confusion with regard to subordination in the Greek area. We have heard from witness Berghofer, who a few days ago was on the witness stand for General Felmy, that he was probably the only one who could have known how many authorities there were in Athens. In order to give the Tribunal the possibility to know something about this question, I have made a chart of the organization or rather disorganization of the channels of command in the Greek area. I have included this in Document Book No. 2, and that is as Speidel Document 18, on page 17 of this document book, and I would like to give this document Exhibit No. 19.
Furthermore, I have included explanatory remarks to this chart on the following pages 18 and 19, and would like to request permission to submit this document 19 as Speidel Exhibit No. 20.
General, would you please explain to us this chart?
A. This organizational chart was designed by me. In the center of this chart is the Military Commander Greece, but in order to avoid misunderstandings, I would emphasize that the Military Commander Greece is in the center only in this chart, for actually at this time he was not the center of activity. In the numerous little squares around him are all the command authorities, official authorities, and civil authorities with which the military commander had to deal in any way whatsoever; be it that they gave orders or that they attempted to give orders: be it that they made demands on him or that they had to take instructions from him.
The lines that connect the little squares and the numbers can only be understood if one looks at the explanations which were mentioned by Dr. Weisgerber. Every connecting line has a number and that number designates the way of subordination and coordination in general. I should like to be very brief and mention only the essentials. The double lines are the definite directions of subordination. All the other lines are compromise symbols--of double subordination, triple subordination, and so forth. In order not to confuse the picture too much, I have only shown essentials. For instance, I left out the 68th Mountain Corps, the 22nd Corps and others, even though they were not essential factors; but I have put them together with the Army Group E. If we look at this, we first see a very confusing picture, and I only want to emphasize two factors: first, on the left is the Special Plenipotentiary for Economics, Minister Neubacher, who got his directives from the Foreign Office, as well as from the Reich Economic Ministry, and who, on the one side, was giving me orders in the economic field, but on the other side also to the Greek government. Let us now turn to the picture to the right.
The Greek government was influenced by the Higher SS & Police Leader, and it is characteristic for him to be dependent from three various command areas for orders, and he himself gives his orders to three different organizations. These few words might suffice to give you a picture of the confusing situation which could result from such a disorganization--and actually did result from it. The superior authorities of the military commander were not in the area; that is, they could not possibly judge the conditions in this particular area.
Q. In this connection, Mr. President, I would like to refer to the affidavit of Hermann Boedecker, as contained in Document Book 2, Speidel, page 27 and the following. I have already submitted this affidavit as Speidel Exhibit No. 12, and would like to refer to page 31 German and English versions. The affiant talks about the complex that General Speidel has just discussed, and says the following:
"In view of the parallel operations of so many German agencies, it really could not have been always easy for the Greek Government, at that time headed by Prime Ministery Rhallys, to know with which German agency it actually had to negotiate in a responsible manner. In this respect too, I have frequently experienced as an eye-witness that General Speidel again and again endeavored to act in mediating and settling of differences. I know that the then Prime Ministery Rhallys was extremely thankful to General Speidel."
The affiant continues: "Under these circumstances, only tasks of representation were left to General Speidel which found their visible expression in conventional association with the diplomatic representatives of other countries, troop parades, etc. But this very activity of representation helped in completely deceiving the Greek public with regard to General Speidel's responsibility, and the public was blaming him for matters which he had not caused and which he, on the other hand, could not settle, as, for instance, the measures carried out by the SS. Thus the minor importance of his position in Greece did not come to the attention of the public. He just knew how to hide his insignificant position from the outside world."
"I am convinced of the fact that the activity of General of the Air Force Speidel did not decisively affect the development and conditions prevailing in Greece at that time, but that General Speidel, as a result of the incompetence of the Nazi bosses in Berlin, was maneuvered into an almost impossible position.
General Speidel frequently expressed to me his indignation about this fact."
Now, General, after we have discussed the organization of the military command in Greece, I would like to come back to several concrete cases which are put to your charge by the Prosecution. I regard the chart of your position as Military Commander Greece, as necessary to explain your competency clearly.
I would like to start with the strikes in Athens at the end of August 1943 as are contained in exhibit 410 of the prosecution, document book 17, page 52 of the English and 38 of the German version, volume 17, page 52 of the English and page 38 of the German. According to this document, the shooting of 50 hostages because of sabotage was threatened in Kallithea, could you please in short describe this incident?
A The incident was the following, a general flareup of strikes with political background and in the course of this strike movement, there were incidents the last of which was the following: large scale street fighting, burning of Kallithea by arsony and the buildings destroyed up to about 50%. Everything burned that of course should have been an internal matter for the Greeks, but with this act of sabotage extremely important defense economic effects resulted. That is to say great numbers of workers that were employed in Wehrmacht works did not or could no longer get to work. Beyond that strikes as well as sabotage acts were threatened with heavy punishment. For this reason, I would like to say that I fired a blind shot and I ordered the shooting of 50 workers of this works with the hope that the real perpetrators could be captured.
Q And what happened?
A Of course every possible means of investigation were used and the frightened Greek population in Athens took part extensively so that the actual perpetrators were captured by the Greek population and were submitted to us. The results speak for themselves.
Q Were the hostages actually captured?
A No, that they were not shot can be seen from another document. In the same volume we will see that on page 64 of the German version, I don't know the English page number, we can read there.
Q Book 17, exhibit 418, page 84 in the English version.
A We can see in the daily report of 4 September 1943, "Several culprits participating in sabotage Kallithes (see daily report) arrested. 50 hostages kept under arrest until conclusion of the investigation."
I will furthermore be in a position to present an exhibit which will be proof that these hostages were released after a short time after as well as a confirmation from Athens, which Dr. Weisgerber will submit now.
Q In this connection I would like to submit from document book Speidel 3 document 59 of that document volume, on page 85, I would like to submit this document as Speidel exhibit 21. This is an affidavit by Konstantin Logothetopulos, a university professor and former Minister President of Athens. As far as the person of this witness is concerned, Professor Logothetopulos is a recognized gynecologist known at least in the scientific world, and he states the following concerning my client and this matter under discussion.
General von Speidel's attitude toward the Greek people was always benevolent. Again and again he pardoned condemned persons whereever he could. I know from my own experiences with him that he regretted those executions which, on account of the nature of the deed - espionage or sabotage - he was unable to prevent.
Through my own contact with him I know that he was greatly in sympathy with Greece. My view was confirmed when I listened to a lecture on Greece which he delivered in Deggendorf concentration camp ...........
Finally, as regards the 50 hostages of whose shooting General Speidel is accused, I declare that this shooting did not take place. It is, thanks to the same general that this bloodbath was not perpetrated, and that it remained a mere threat.
I must admit generally, that General Speidel was a reasonable and mild soldier, easy to get on with, and one who, as a gormer classical scholar, had an understanding for the soul of the Greek people.
Athens, 5 November 1947. Correctly signed and notorized.
Will you please now turn to the prosecution document exhibit 418, volume 17, page 83 in the English and page 62 in the German. This is a report that the 5th company of SS Mountain Jaeger Regiment 18 was surrounded near Abrachova by partisan troops, what do you know about this incident?