It was issued on the 15th of September; when it reached me I can't tell you. I know what you are referring to when you mention the 11th of October, but that is merely the passing on of the order by the Commander in Chief Southeast to the leading Field Director, but it is not addressed to me.
Q.- Do you believe you received the order on the 11th of September?
A.- Yes, that's what I wanted to say. I received it much earlier. The second error is that this is not a troop which could be used for assistance because the Police Regiment, which was the only actual troop in the area, had been tactically committed. Try as I may, I cannot define for you how strong such a police headquarters in a province was, because I just don't know. If operations take place any where, if there are any difficulties, unrests, insurrections, I don't think I can expect, even if the conditions and situations are not quite clear, that one unit will not assist another if people are attacked and massacred.
Q.- General Speidel, you referred on direct-examination to three occasions on which you pardoned certain persons who were in the prisons in Athens. They are all found in your Document Book No. III. Wasn't the pardoning of persons committed of crimes a police function?
A.- The pardoning is not a police function. It is the right of the Military Judicial. Those were perpetrators who had committed crimes or offenses against the German Armed Forces, and for that reason were sentenced to a certain punishment by my court, and I, as judicial, had confirmed this sentence, and the persons concerned were in the prison in Athens. It was my right and authority to pardon them. This is a judicial right, but not a police right.
Q.- Most of those persons in the prison were placed there after arrest by German or Greek or perhaps Italian police were they not?
A.- Not by the German police -- by the German agency or Field Police.
We must make a difference here -- not the SS, but the Field Police or Field Gendarmerie.
Q.- Were they subordinate to Schimana?
A.- They had nothing to do with Schimana.
Q.- If Schimana was in control of both German and Greek police would he not have been concerned with the question of who was arrested and for what crimes, and who was put in the prisons and who was pardoned?
A.- Schimana had, concerning all questions of a judicial type which touched on the interests of the Armed Forces, nothing to do whatsoever. I was the judicial in the Greek area where the interests of the Wehrmacht were concerned, and I did not allow anybody to interfere in this right, nor was, at any time, an attempt made to do this.
Q.- You stated, General Speidel, that you knew nothing about the concentration camp Chaidari I believe.
A.- I said that I knew that a police camp or prison did exist. What it looked like, where it was located, I did not know. I know of the fact that it existed, particularly so because in various instances I made representations to Schimana in order to liberate a number of people whom he had arrested. But I, as well as everybody else -- let us say the Greek Prime Minister, or the German envoy -- could come to him only making a request and tell him, "I would like to talk for a certain person," with the idea that he could perhaps do something about it. But I was in no position to give him orders in this purely police sphere of tasks. Just as little could orders be given by a deputy commanding general in Germany to a Higher SS and Police Leader. There could be no orders of this sort. That would be the parallel to it.
Q.- Weren't these persons who were pardoned confined in Chaidari?
A.- The prisoners were all accommodated in the so-called "prison", which was a modern Greek jail, and German soldiers were also kept in prisons. This prison was under me and under my responsibility. I inspected it on several occasions and found it in order, which again proved that I concerned myself with anything with which I was held responsible.
And the men in charge of the prison made regular oral reports to me about the conditions there -- the food situation, etc.
Q.- Didn't Prime Minister Rhallis, who, as one of your affiants stated, make protestations to you about Chaidari or any other concentration camp?
A.- It is correct that Rhallis came to see me regularly. I would like to say at least once a week, in view of one close cooperation. However, I cannot remember one single case where he mentioned Chaidari or even complained about conditions there. Rhallis knew far too well that in such questions, if he had complaints, he would have had to turn to the Higher SS and Police Leader immediately. In this particular sphere he worked together with him directly and immediately. Rhallis, as Minister of the Interior, was also responsible for Greek police units.
Q.- Weren't there any other concentrations in or near Athens that you knew about?
A.- I don't know of any.
Q.- Would you look at Page 85 of your Document Book No. III, General Speidel? There Constantin Logothetopoulos, who I believe you said was the Prime Minister of Greece preceding Rhallis, states that you gave a lecture at Deggendorf Concentration Camp.
A.- Yes.
Q.- Where is the Deggendorf Concentration Camp?
A.- That was an American Concentration Camp, in Natternberg, which I mentioned yesterday. And Prime Minister Logothetopoulos was in this concentration camp, and I was there together with him.
Q.- You called it a prison. He calls it a concentration camp. They were both the same?
A.- Well, yes, he called it that. I didn't write this affidavit.
Q.- Do you know now, General Speidel, that the concentration camp at Chaidari was only eight kilometers from the City of Athens?
A.- I know where Chaidari is situated on the map, and I know quite well how it happened that I knew where Chaidari was because I did archaeological research there. But perhaps I might recall the affidavit of the Commandant of the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters in Athens who confirmed that it was only July 1944 when he learned of the camp in Chaidari, a man who ought to have known the area around Athens bettor than I did.
Q.- Returning now for a minute to the question of whether any police troops were subordinate to you, would you turn to your Document Book I, to Page 11?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think, Mr. Fenstermacher, if you simply wish to identify it at this time that will be all right, but we will not proceed with any inquiry with respect to it until after the noon recess.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, Your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(The Tribunal recessed at 1215 to resume at 0130).
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Fenstermacher, before you resume the cross-examination the Tribunal is prepared to submit its decision on the matter of the application for the Defendant von Weichs, with regard to a deposition.
The Chief of Counsel for War Crimes has moved the Tribunal for an order to require the defendant Maxmillian von Weichs, a defendant in the case at bar, to submit his testimony by deposition in lieu of his personal appearance as a witness.
The motion is based on the following facts: On 6 October 1947, the defendant von Weichs became ill and, on motion of his counsel, he was permitted to absent himself from the trial for the purpose of obtaining hospitalization. This was done with an understanding made in open court that it was to be without prejudice to either the prosecution or the defense. The defendant has remained in the hospital continuously since 6 October 1947 and it has been ascertained that he will not be able to appear in court in his own behalf before the present trial is concluded. We find further that said defendant is mentally competent to testify and to give testimony in the form of a deposition. The record discloses that defendant von Weichs was present in court during the presentation of the prosecution's case in chief and has been confronted by all witnesses.
In ruling upon the motion presented the Tribunal will assume that the purpose of the motion is to require the defendant von Weichs to continue as a defendant even though he is unable to be present in court because of physical disability and to be required to submit his testimony by deposition if he desires to become a witness.
Article 12 of the Charter annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 provides that proceedings against a person charged with a war crime may be had in Ms absence if he has not been found or if the Tribunal finds it necessary in the interests of justice to conduct the hearing in his absence.
We are of the opinion that the interests of justice do not require that the defendant von Weichs be required to submit his testimony by deposition to avoid a suspension of the present proceeding as to him. The Charter, Control Council Law No. 10 and the established rules of procedure contemplate that each defendant shall receive a fair and impartial trial. One of the most fundamental concepts of such in a criminal trial is the right to appear personally in court and answer the charges made against him. If illness intervenes and makes it impossible for a defendant to appear only the most cogent reasons necessary to the interests of justice would authorize a denial of that right. When flight or contumacy prevent his appearance, an altogether different question is presented.
Whether this defendant is tried now or at some future time is of no particular moment insofar as the interests of justice are concerned. The defenses submitted by other defendants are in no manner jeopardized nor is the prosecution's case made any less effective. The right of the defendant to appear in his own behalf appears to be paramount to any necessity based on the interests of justice here shown. For the reasons stated, the motion will be overruled.
You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, Your Honor.
WILHELM SPEIDEL - Resumed CROSS-EXAMINATION - Continued BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Speidel, before the luncheon recess we were discussing the question of whether you had any police troops subordinate to you, either directly or by way of Schimana. And were were looking particularly at your own Document Book No. I, at Page 11. In Paragraph 2 of that affidavit of General Winter's, who was, at that time, Chief of Staff of Army Group E -- that is at the time when you were Military Commander of Greece.
He states that the Commander in Chief of Army Group E could give tactical directives to the Military Commander Greece. That is, he could issue orders affecting the forces under the command of the Military Commander Greece, mostly police and other troops.
Do you know why General Winter is there attributing to you command of police and other troops?
A Well, that's quite obvious, Mr. Fenstermacher, but it can only be understood in connection with what he says afterwards in this paragraph. It is quite obvious here that he speaks of the first period of time which, as I said before, lasted from approximately the end of August until the end of November 1943. That was the period of time when the Police Regiment 18 was first alone, and, then including the Higher SS and Police Leader, was put at my disposal for security tasks as specified to safeguard the roads leading from the north into the area. Then we come to a second period of time, which is mentioned on Page 12. It says there in Paragraph 4: "In order to guarantee a rational commitment of all forces and assure a unified tactical command, the Commander in Chief of Army Group E may use his powers in assigning a regular area to tho Higher SS and Police Loader and his Police Alpine Regiment 18, in which he and his forces alone were responsible for the security of the strategic communications. In return the Military Commander Greece was released from responsibility for the tactical securing of the strategic communications outside of this designated area."
This shows clearly the two different periods of time. First, carrying out of security tasks by the Military Commander with the police forces under his command; the second period of time, chronologically speaking, the use made of the Higher SS and Police Leader with the same police forces within the scope of band warfare waged with Army Group E.
Q General Winter goes on to say in Paragraph 3 that the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece was subordinate personally to you. What does "personally subordination" involve?
A In the Service Regulation the term "personally subordinate" is not used. What a "personal subordination" means I'm not quite sure myself. Personal subordination can only exist if and when the man concerned is subordinate in disciplinary matters, but this is included here from the beginning because a Higher SS and Police Leader is not subordinate in disciplinary matters to a Wehrmacht general.
Q Well, do you believe General Winter is in error then in stating that Schimana was "personally subordinate" to you in that affidavit?
A I don't know what he wanted to say by that term.
Q Isn't it true, General Speidel, that Felber in Serbia, as Military Commander Serbia, had the same relationship to the Higher SS and Police Leader in Serbia Meyssner that you had in Greece with Schimana?
A I'm not in a position to judge that because I do not know the details of the channels of command there, nor did I know the Service Relation issued to the Higher SS and Police Loader in Serbia. I was not in a position to make comparisons.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Is there any reason for you to believe that when both you and Felber were Military Commanders and when both in Greece and in Serbia, there were higher Police and SS Leaders assigned, that there was a different relationship of subordination in Greece than there was in Serbia?
A. I could not judge that at the time, because I knew nothing of the channels of subordination there. I had to rely on what I had at my disposal and that was the service regulation which, as I would like to emphasize again, was not a service regulation for the Military Commander but it read "Service Regulation to the Higher SS and Police Leader."
Q. Would you look at Document Book 17 at page 56 in the German and page 74 in the English? This is an order by Felber as Military Commander Southeast dated 23 October 1943 to the Senior SS and Police Leader for Serbia who at that time, I believe, was Meyssner and he orders in this order to Meyssner that in retaliation for the death of eight German and Bulgarian Wehrmacht and Police members that the Senior SS and Police Fuehrer is charged with carrying out the execution of certain reprisal measures which are ordered. Do you say that you did not have the same authority to give orders to the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece, that Felber had in Serbia?
A. From what we have heard about Serbia so far, I have deduced and I also deduce the same from this document, that in Serbia a different opinion concerning collaboration prevailed. I myself never conceived the idea, as is expressed here, to give a directive of that sort to the Higher SS and Police Leader to carry out reprisal measures.
Q. If Himmler, as Reichfuehrer of the SS in Germany, was so jealous of his power and if the various Higher Police and SS Leaders in the occupying countries were so jealous of their prerogatives, how are you able to explain, from your general knowledge I mean, that Felber was able to give specific orders to Meyssner for the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A. It would be necessary to know here what personal and local arrangements had been made there concerning this question, which I am unable to judge.
Q. You mean that under certain conditions, Wehrmacht Commanders do have the authority to give orders for the carrying out of reprisal measures or the retaliation of police losses to the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the occupied countries?
A. All I can say is that I did not handle it that way; and if the Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia would not have agreed to this practice, had he referred for instance to a directive by the Reichsfuehrer SS, it would have been conceivable that he would have said "I am not doing this" but in this particular case apparently both spheres of interest coincided and that is how this regulation came about.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If your Honors please, there are three references that I picked out in the documents which indicate that Felber was authorized to issue orders to the Higher Police and SS Leader for Serbia. I think I need not go into them with General Speidel but perhaps your Honors would wish to note them. They are in Document Book 18 at pages 3, 6 and 50 of the English.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Would you look now, General Speidel, at Document Book 17 at pages 124 in the English and I believe at page 89 or 90 in the German? This is the standard order of procedure for you as Military Commander Greece which came down from the OKW on the 21st of December, 1943. Here under paragraph 1-B, which is on page 125 of the English, you as Territorial Commander, are being assigned certain tasks; one of them is said to be the maintenance of order.
A. I beg your pardon, may I just ask for the page again? I haven't found it yet.
Q. I believe it is probably on page 90 of the German. It is subparagraph "3" of paragraph 1.
I am sorry for this interruption.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: It is quite all right. Would it help you any -- it is on page 84 of the original. That is the citation at the top of the English page.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I think it would be probably best, your Honor, if General Speidel and I discuss this somewhat generally, I think.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: He will understand my questions.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. In this order from OKW, General Speidel, you are given executive power and I believe also certain territorial problems among which is the maintenance of order. Am I correct in that?
A. You mean the Reich Defense Law of 4th September 1938? That is the document which has been submitted to me.
Q. Am I correct, General Speidel, that in that order from OKW on the 21st of December 1943, you are given executive power in Greece and also assigned certain territorial tasks among which is the maintenance of order in the area under your command?
A. This is the service regulation for the Military Commander Greece of 21 December or of a later date, as becomes clear from paragraph 2, the same service regulation which I discussed yesterday or on Friday. Yes, quite.
Q. And in sub-paragraph "B" of paragraph 2, you are assigned territorial problems as Territorial Commander among which is the maintenance of order.
The maintenance of order, so far as you were concerned in December 1943, was essentially a police rather than a tactical task, was it not?
A. In the tasks held by the Territorial Commander, I explained on direct examination, the maintenance of order was among the first tasks. In actual practice, it was like this. I was one of the factors who had to maintain order. The troops had to look after order which was the biggest factor. On the other hand, I was to look after maintenance of order and, thirdly, it was the Higher SS and Police Leader. All three factors were interested in the maintenance of order. In actual practice, I would look after this assignment only as long as I had sufficient forces at my disposal and that was in the period of time when the Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to me. As it says here, that it was among the tasks of the Territorial Commander to maintain order, that point from the beginning is only a torso because the most essential factor in the maintenance of law and order were the troops which were not subordinate to me.
Q. In paragraph 6 of that order, which is on page 126 of the English, your Honors, your staff in order to perform and carry out your territorial tasks among which is the maintenance of order, is listed, and there as a member of your staff is listed the Higher Police and SS Leader. Now if you were unable to carry out the maintence of order by way of giving orders to Schimana and his police units, even though Schimana was a member of your staff, why did you not protest to OKW and maintain that you were unable to fulfill the tasks which they had assigned to you?
A. A protest of that sort to OKW would have been of no avail in all probability because one had to, on the basis of existing facts, to do what one could. For the rest, as I have proved, I repeatedly pointed out that in order to carry out my tasks, I was lacking the necessary troops.
That statement and that report I passed on to my superior agencies. I added at the same time that, nevertheless, I had not received more troops.
Q. Isn't it true, General, that each of these first four persons mentioned as being on your staff were subordinate to you? The Headquarters Staff, the Administrative, the Economic Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer -- they were all directly subordinate to you, were they not?
A. No, that is not correct. That is a theoretical regulation by the OKW which they were very fond of doing. For instance, the Military Economic Staff was not subordinate to me nor was it represented on my staff. It was an independent agency which received its directives in their special field immediately from the Military Economy Staff in Belgrade which in turn received its orders from an agency in Berlin and I had no influence on these directives at all. This, on the contrary, establishes a parallel to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q. I understood you to say on direct examination that your primary tasks, those which occupied most of your time at least, were of an economic nature?
A. Well, I think you must make a very precise differentiation between military economy and economic tasks of a general nature. They have nothing to do with each other. They are totally different. I shall be only too glad to give you a precise explanation of it.
Q. This headquarters staff that is mentioned in subparagraph "A" -- was that subordinate to you?
A. What was known as the Kommando Staff? Do you mean the Command Staff?
Q. Well, is that the staff that is mentioned under paragraph "A" of paragraph 6?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. So that staff was subordinate to you?
A. That was my actual staff which I had taken over some time before.
Q. Now was the unit mentioned in sub-paragraph "B" subordinate to you, the administrative staff?
A. Yes, it was subordinate to me because that was one of the main fields of my work.
Q. The unit mentioned under sub-paragraph "C", you say, was not subordinate to you. Was the unit mentioned -
A. No, it was not.
Q. Nor was the Wehrmacht chief administrative officer mentioned under sub-paragraph "D" subordinate to you?
A. The so-called Chief Administrative Officer of the Wehrmacht was subordinate to me.
Q. What was the point of stating that the Senior SS and Police Leader was a member of your staff if you were not able to give him orders?
A. Well, I am afraid I can't think why it is included in the order by the OKW. When this regulation reached me five months after the reorganization, conditions had become more stable and therefore the regulation did not make any difference in the actual conditions.
Q. Could this reference here to the fact that the Higher Police and SS Leader as a member of your staff have been what General Winter meant in his affidavit when he said that the Higher Police and SS Leader was personally subordinate to you?
A. I don't know why General Winter made that remark.
Q. Dr. Altenburg, when he testified, stated that you had the power to revoke the executions of hostages and that when he wanted to interfere in that sphere he came to you. Was he correct that you did have the power to revoke hostage executions?
A. If I remember rightly, Dr. Altenburg didn't say that, that I had the power to prevent the police from carrying out hostage executions. He spoke of reprisal measures of a previous period of time. They were reprisal measures which allegedly I had intended and he believed that he prevented them by the steps he took. That had nothing to do with the SS and Police Leader, because Altenburg was no longer there at that period of time. He was usually absent then.
Q. Did Altenburg ever come to you and ask you to prevent the executions of hostages?
A. He said the other day, that he came to see me once with that request. I myself cannot recall that intervention but I am quite prepared to admit that it might have been so. On the other hand, I would like to say that frequently such interventions were made -- be it by the German ambassador or by the Prime Minister or somebody like that, and it was frequent that it was through the intervention that I heard for the first time that I was supposed to intend reprisal measures. If something happened somewhere, rumor immediately spread that reprisal measures would follow and then interventions were made and that was how I learned in some cases for the first time that I had a certain intention, allegedly.
Q. Dr. Altenburg said that he considered Schimana approachable and understandable in the relations which he had with him. What were your relations to Schimana? Did you find him approachable and understandable particularly with regard to reprisal measures?
A. My relations with Schimana were entirely correct and somewhat reserved, but Minister Altenburg is entirely correct, and I confirm what he said. General Schimana was a reasonable man and not a fanatic SS leader.
Q. Did you have frequent dealings with Schimana either in person or on the telephone?
A. I cannot recall any telephonic contact. Personal relations -- well he came to see me from time to time, but rarely.
Q. What was Schimana's rank at the time he was down there? You were a Lieutenant General -
A. He was a Lieutenant General.
Q. Would the court interpreter -- isn't "Generallieutenant" the equivalent of an American Brigadier General, or is it Major General?
THE INTERPRETER: It is the equivalent to a two-star General.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Would you say you were one rank higher, then, than General Schimana?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Schimana ever come to you and ask permission to carry out the execution of hostages?
A. He came to see me on one occasion at the beginning, roughly in October, and he told me that he had made up his mind, as a reprisal for a German policeman shot in Athens, to carry out a reprisal measure at the ratio of ten to one and publish that fact.
He asked me whether that measure was in accordance with regulations. I checked up on that and found that it was correct under the orders then in force and thereupon in his capacity as the SS Leader ruled that reprisal measure should be carried out.
Q. How many hostages were executed on that occasion?
A. If I remember rightly, ten.
Q. Did he ask your permission to carry out that execution?
A. He explained the incident to me and as it had been his first case he experienced, he asked me for my opinion and I thought at the time that he judged the situation correctly and that the measures he took were in accordance with the authority he had.
Q. Was your opinion that the hostages, the ten hostages, should be executed on that occasion? You agreed with him?
A. In this particular case, I thought that the decision which he had reached was a correct one.
Q. Were you able to assign Schimana's police units to carry out raids and make arrests within the city of Athens?
A. There again we must make a difference between the two periods of time. At first, when the Police Regiment under Schimana was under me, that is to say until the beginning of November 1943, I had the right to do that, to get them to carry out raids in the military sense of the word, but after the Police Regiment was committed to band fighting and I had no military units at my disposal, as is shown in paragraph 5-B of the service regulation, a pure police matter would be decided by the Higher SS and Police Leader on his own.
Q. Regarding the organization of the Greek police, I believe you stated that the organization and training and commitment of those police units were entirely the concern of Schimana?
A. Schimana, as the service regulation makes clear, was entrusted with the organization and the commitment of the police troops.
Q. You, however, determined how large the voluntary Greek police units would be allowed to become. Am I correct in that?
A. Not in every detail; what I said was that I decided on the over-all scope. I wanted to be informed what was being established and the reason I gave was that I thought it cannot be a matter of indifference to me whether companies or divisions are built up, whether those companies will be armed with guns or with pistols. I wanted to be kept up to date on how strong a force was being planned. And, about that General Schimana always informed me without my going into details.
Q. You are familiar, are you not, General Speidel, with Schimana's opinion regarding his subordination to you?
A. We never discussed it at the time.
Q. Don't you recall having been present during an interrogation with both you and General Schimana on this famous question as to who was subordinate to whom?
A. I remember that very well, at that time General Schimana took the view that he was subordinate to me. Opinions differ here.
Q. You said that this service regulation for the Higher Police and SS Leader, at which we have looked in some detail, concerned opinions which you always had regarding relations between you and Schimana, do you recall having told Mr. Rapp during the interrogation that the Higher SS and Police Leader was placed under your command on all questions concerning police troops to maintain peace and order?
A. I would like to say first that this is completely torn from its context and was a completely theoretical explanation without my knowing what case we were concerned with. Even when I was asked about these things I no longer remembered all the connections as I do today. As I said before the service regulation certifies what I said at that time and I maintain. I now, but you cannot expect me, if you put a question to me without any context, that I can remember all the details of the subordination.
Q. Wasn't that question put to you in the context as to who was responsible for retaliation measures in connection with the death of German and Greek police?
A. I don't know that anymore.
Q. Except for the one case, which you mentioned, when Schimana contacted you regarding the execution of ten hostages, do you state that he did not on other cases consult with you before carrying out reprisal measures concerning the death of German and Greek police?
A. I cannot remember one single concrete case where I could say that he made this suggestion to me of carrying out or not carrying out retaliations.
Q. Now, I think it will not be necessary for me to go over these specific instances of retaliation measures carried out by General Schimana in retaliation of the death of German and Greek police.
Now if Your Honors would care to make notes on the specific instances I have pointed out, I would like to give them to you: In document book 17 on page 109 and document book 18, pages 12, 13, 37 and 31. That is not a complete list, but they are the instances which I picked out to go over with General Schimana during the cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean with General Speidel?
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. I mean with General Speidel, I am sorry, Your Honor. If your Honors please, I would like to make this statement in this context. General Schimana had been interrogated by the prosecution on several occasions prior to the preparation of the indictment in this case and he had been maintained in the custody of the prosecution for some time in anticipation of perhaps this very problem of the jurisdiction and extension of the subordination of him to General Speidel, but he regrettably for us escaped from the Nurnberg prison about two weeks ago. When and whether or not we will be able to furnish him for reguttal testimony, I am unable to state.
Will you look now, General Speidel, at document book 18 at pages 69 and 70 in the German and the same pages in the English document book. On page 69 of the German and page 70 of the English is the report of the Commander Greece for 9 August 1944, that is to say at the time after your departure from Greece, in paragraph 5 there is a reference to the shooting to death of 15 of the 60 arrested people and the release of the rest of them by order of the Commander Greece, or rather not by order of the Commander Greece, but by order of the Commanding Officer of administrative sub-area HQs Athens, General major Eisenbach. Is that the same General Eisenbach who has given several affidavits for you?
A. Yes.
Q. Now to the question of the functions of the seven administrative sub-area HQs that were subordinate to your command as military commander Greece, just how did those administrative sub-area HQs figure in the execution of reprisal measures in retaliation either for losses suffered by troops, which were operating in their vicinity or for the losses and death of German and Greek police, or perhaps even Greek mayors or perhaps Greek administrative officers who were working for the Germans?