A. I beg your pardon, may I just ask for the page again? I haven't found it yet.
Q. I believe it is probably on page 90 of the German. It is subparagraph "3" of paragraph 1.
I am sorry for this interruption.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: It is quite all right. Would it help you any -- it is on page 84 of the original. That is the citation at the top of the English page.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I think it would be probably best, your Honor, if General Speidel and I discuss this somewhat generally, I think.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: He will understand my questions.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. In this order from OKW, General Speidel, you are given executive power and I believe also certain territorial problems among which is the maintenance of order. Am I correct in that?
A. You mean the Reich Defense Law of 4th September 1938? That is the document which has been submitted to me.
Q. Am I correct, General Speidel, that in that order from OKW on the 21st of December 1943, you are given executive power in Greece and also assigned certain territorial tasks among which is the maintenance of order in the area under your command?
A. This is the service regulation for the Military Commander Greece of 21 December or of a later date, as becomes clear from paragraph 2, the same service regulation which I discussed yesterday or on Friday. Yes, quite.
Q. And in sub-paragraph "B" of paragraph 2, you are assigned territorial problems as Territorial Commander among which is the maintenance of order.
The maintenance of order, so far as you were concerned in December 1943, was essentially a police rather than a tactical task, was it not?
A. In the tasks held by the Territorial Commander, I explained on direct examination, the maintenance of order was among the first tasks. In actual practice, it was like this. I was one of the factors who had to maintain order. The troops had to look after order which was the biggest factor. On the other hand, I was to look after maintenance of order and, thirdly, it was the Higher SS and Police Leader. All three factors were interested in the maintenance of order. In actual practice, I would look after this assignment only as long as I had sufficient forces at my disposal and that was in the period of time when the Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to me. As it says here, that it was among the tasks of the Territorial Commander to maintain order, that point from the beginning is only a torso because the most essential factor in the maintenance of law and order were the troops which were not subordinate to me.
Q. In paragraph 6 of that order, which is on page 126 of the English, your Honors, your staff in order to perform and carry out your territorial tasks among which is the maintenance of order, is listed, and there as a member of your staff is listed the Higher Police and SS Leader. Now if you were unable to carry out the maintence of order by way of giving orders to Schimana and his police units, even though Schimana was a member of your staff, why did you not protest to OKW and maintain that you were unable to fulfill the tasks which they had assigned to you?
A. A protest of that sort to OKW would have been of no avail in all probability because one had to, on the basis of existing facts, to do what one could. For the rest, as I have proved, I repeatedly pointed out that in order to carry out my tasks, I was lacking the necessary troops.
That statement and that report I passed on to my superior agencies. I added at the same time that, nevertheless, I had not received more troops.
Q. Isn't it true, General, that each of these first four persons mentioned as being on your staff were subordinate to you? The Headquarters Staff, the Administrative, the Economic Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer -- they were all directly subordinate to you, were they not?
A. No, that is not correct. That is a theoretical regulation by the OKW which they were very fond of doing. For instance, the Military Economic Staff was not subordinate to me nor was it represented on my staff. It was an independent agency which received its directives in their special field immediately from the Military Economy Staff in Belgrade which in turn received its orders from an agency in Berlin and I had no influence on these directives at all. This, on the contrary, establishes a parallel to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q. I understood you to say on direct examination that your primary tasks, those which occupied most of your time at least, were of an economic nature?
A. Well, I think you must make a very precise differentiation between military economy and economic tasks of a general nature. They have nothing to do with each other. They are totally different. I shall be only too glad to give you a precise explanation of it.
Q. This headquarters staff that is mentioned in subparagraph "A" -- was that subordinate to you?
A. What was known as the Kommando Staff? Do you mean the Command Staff?
Q. Well, is that the staff that is mentioned under paragraph "A" of paragraph 6?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. So that staff was subordinate to you?
A. That was my actual staff which I had taken over some time before.
Q. Now was the unit mentioned in sub-paragraph "B" subordinate to you, the administrative staff?
A. Yes, it was subordinate to me because that was one of the main fields of my work.
Q. The unit mentioned under sub-paragraph "C", you say, was not subordinate to you. Was the unit mentioned -
A. No, it was not.
Q. Nor was the Wehrmacht chief administrative officer mentioned under sub-paragraph "D" subordinate to you?
A. The so-called Chief Administrative Officer of the Wehrmacht was subordinate to me.
Q. What was the point of stating that the Senior SS and Police Leader was a member of your staff if you were not able to give him orders?
A. Well, I am afraid I can't think why it is included in the order by the OKW. When this regulation reached me five months after the reorganization, conditions had become more stable and therefore the regulation did not make any difference in the actual conditions.
Q. Could this reference here to the fact that the Higher Police and SS Leader as a member of your staff have been what General Winter meant in his affidavit when he said that the Higher Police and SS Leader was personally subordinate to you?
A. I don't know why General Winter made that remark.
Q. Dr. Altenburg, when he testified, stated that you had the power to revoke the executions of hostages and that when he wanted to interfere in that sphere he came to you. Was he correct that you did have the power to revoke hostage executions?
A. If I remember rightly, Dr. Altenburg didn't say that, that I had the power to prevent the police from carrying out hostage executions. He spoke of reprisal measures of a previous period of time. They were reprisal measures which allegedly I had intended and he believed that he prevented them by the steps he took. That had nothing to do with the SS and Police Leader, because Altenburg was no longer there at that period of time. He was usually absent then.
Q. Did Altenburg ever come to you and ask you to prevent the executions of hostages?
A. He said the other day, that he came to see me once with that request. I myself cannot recall that intervention but I am quite prepared to admit that it might have been so. On the other hand, I would like to say that frequently such interventions were made -- be it by the German ambassador or by the Prime Minister or somebody like that, and it was frequent that it was through the intervention that I heard for the first time that I was supposed to intend reprisal measures. If something happened somewhere, rumor immediately spread that reprisal measures would follow and then interventions were made and that was how I learned in some cases for the first time that I had a certain intention, allegedly.
Q. Dr. Altenburg said that he considered Schimana approachable and understandable in the relations which he had with him. What were your relations to Schimana? Did you find him approachable and understandable particularly with regard to reprisal measures?
A. My relations with Schimana were entirely correct and somewhat reserved, but Minister Altenburg is entirely correct, and I confirm what he said. General Schimana was a reasonable man and not a fanatic SS leader.
Q. Did you have frequent dealings with Schimana either in person or on the telephone?
A. I cannot recall any telephonic contact. Personal relations -- well he came to see me from time to time, but rarely.
Q. What was Schimana's rank at the time he was down there? You were a Lieutenant General -
A. He was a Lieutenant General.
Q. Would the court interpreter -- isn't "Generallieutenant" the equivalent of an American Brigadier General, or is it Major General?
THE INTERPRETER: It is the equivalent to a two-star General.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Would you say you were one rank higher, then, than General Schimana?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Schimana ever come to you and ask permission to carry out the execution of hostages?
A. He came to see me on one occasion at the beginning, roughly in October, and he told me that he had made up his mind, as a reprisal for a German policeman shot in Athens, to carry out a reprisal measure at the ratio of ten to one and publish that fact.
He asked me whether that measure was in accordance with regulations. I checked up on that and found that it was correct under the orders then in force and thereupon in his capacity as the SS Leader ruled that reprisal measure should be carried out.
Q. How many hostages were executed on that occasion?
A. If I remember rightly, ten.
Q. Did he ask your permission to carry out that execution?
A. He explained the incident to me and as it had been his first case he experienced, he asked me for my opinion and I thought at the time that he judged the situation correctly and that the measures he took were in accordance with the authority he had.
Q. Was your opinion that the hostages, the ten hostages, should be executed on that occasion? You agreed with him?
A. In this particular case, I thought that the decision which he had reached was a correct one.
Q. Were you able to assign Schimana's police units to carry out raids and make arrests within the city of Athens?
A. There again we must make a difference between the two periods of time. At first, when the Police Regiment under Schimana was under me, that is to say until the beginning of November 1943, I had the right to do that, to get them to carry out raids in the military sense of the word, but after the Police Regiment was committed to band fighting and I had no military units at my disposal, as is shown in paragraph 5-B of the service regulation, a pure police matter would be decided by the Higher SS and Police Leader on his own.
Q. Regarding the organization of the Greek police, I believe you stated that the organization and training and commitment of those police units were entirely the concern of Schimana?
A. Schimana, as the service regulation makes clear, was entrusted with the organization and the commitment of the police troops.
Q. You, however, determined how large the voluntary Greek police units would be allowed to become. Am I correct in that?
A. Not in every detail; what I said was that I decided on the over-all scope. I wanted to be informed what was being established and the reason I gave was that I thought it cannot be a matter of indifference to me whether companies or divisions are built up, whether those companies will be armed with guns or with pistols. I wanted to be kept up to date on how strong a force was being planned. And, about that General Schimana always informed me without my going into details.
Q. You are familiar, are you not, General Speidel, with Schimana's opinion regarding his subordination to you?
A. We never discussed it at the time.
Q. Don't you recall having been present during an interrogation with both you and General Schimana on this famous question as to who was subordinate to whom?
A. I remember that very well, at that time General Schimana took the view that he was subordinate to me. Opinions differ here.
Q. You said that this service regulation for the Higher Police and SS Leader, at which we have looked in some detail, concerned opinions which you always had regarding relations between you and Schimana, do you recall having told Mr. Rapp during the interrogation that the Higher SS and Police Leader was placed under your command on all questions concerning police troops to maintain peace and order?
A. I would like to say first that this is completely torn from its context and was a completely theoretical explanation without my knowing what case we were concerned with. Even when I was asked about these things I no longer remembered all the connections as I do today. As I said before the service regulation certifies what I said at that time and I maintain. I now, but you cannot expect me, if you put a question to me without any context, that I can remember all the details of the subordination.
Q. Wasn't that question put to you in the context as to who was responsible for retaliation measures in connection with the death of German and Greek police?
A. I don't know that anymore.
Q. Except for the one case, which you mentioned, when Schimana contacted you regarding the execution of ten hostages, do you state that he did not on other cases consult with you before carrying out reprisal measures concerning the death of German and Greek police?
A. I cannot remember one single concrete case where I could say that he made this suggestion to me of carrying out or not carrying out retaliations.
Q. Now, I think it will not be necessary for me to go over these specific instances of retaliation measures carried out by General Schimana in retaliation of the death of German and Greek police.
Now if Your Honors would care to make notes on the specific instances I have pointed out, I would like to give them to you: In document book 17 on page 109 and document book 18, pages 12, 13, 37 and 31. That is not a complete list, but they are the instances which I picked out to go over with General Schimana during the cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean with General Speidel?
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. I mean with General Speidel, I am sorry, Your Honor. If your Honors please, I would like to make this statement in this context. General Schimana had been interrogated by the prosecution on several occasions prior to the preparation of the indictment in this case and he had been maintained in the custody of the prosecution for some time in anticipation of perhaps this very problem of the jurisdiction and extension of the subordination of him to General Speidel, but he regrettably for us escaped from the Nurnberg prison about two weeks ago. When and whether or not we will be able to furnish him for reguttal testimony, I am unable to state.
Will you look now, General Speidel, at document book 18 at pages 69 and 70 in the German and the same pages in the English document book. On page 69 of the German and page 70 of the English is the report of the Commander Greece for 9 August 1944, that is to say at the time after your departure from Greece, in paragraph 5 there is a reference to the shooting to death of 15 of the 60 arrested people and the release of the rest of them by order of the Commander Greece, or rather not by order of the Commander Greece, but by order of the Commanding Officer of administrative sub-area HQs Athens, General major Eisenbach. Is that the same General Eisenbach who has given several affidavits for you?
A. Yes.
Q. Now to the question of the functions of the seven administrative sub-area HQs that were subordinate to your command as military commander Greece, just how did those administrative sub-area HQs figure in the execution of reprisal measures in retaliation either for losses suffered by troops, which were operating in their vicinity or for the losses and death of German and Greek police, or perhaps even Greek mayors or perhaps Greek administrative officers who were working for the Germans?
A. I cannot give you the details of the orders which I gave these sub-area administrative HQs, I can only repeat that what was known as the Felber order, I passed on to the administrative sub-area HQs in October, with the provise that I reserve the right for all decisions. That order was then overtaken by what was called the Loehr order of 7 October which was exhibit 379, which I could not recall myself.
Q. But the Felber order to which you refer did not come to you until late October, 1943, did it?
A. I cannot give you the precise date, but I said that it reached us by the end of October or beginning of November.
Q. Were these administrative sub-area HQs subordinate to you between the end of August and the end of October, 1943?
A. The sub-area administrative HQs arrived after September, the last one I believe arrived in December or thereabouts.
Q. How many were subordinate to you during the interim period between August and October.
A. Well, I cannot give you the exact figures, but I know for instance that the Joannina one arrived only on 9 November, the one in Larissa arrived later still and the Chalkis a little earlier. The majority of the sub-area administrative HQs were there by the beginning of November.
Q. Did you ever hear of any reprisal measures being carried out by those sub-area administrative HQs, which were in existence at that time?
A. I know of no cases at the moment.
Q. They did have the authority, did they not, to carry out reprisal measures?
A. I had reserved the right to make decisions by the so-called Felmer order.
Q. I am speaking of the period prior to the Felmer order.
A. I see. I cannot say with certainty how it was handled then.
Q. Would you look, General, at document book 15, page 97 in the German and page 69 in the English. This is an order of General Loehr, dated 22 August 1943 to the Commanding General and Commander, Serbia and you will note at the bottom of the first paragraph he states: "The revolts and unrest which are constantly flaring up in the Southeast area makes it necessary for the local territorial office Administrative Subarea Headquarters or Town Headquarters to be in a position, if necessary, to apply severest reprisal measures immediately." Did that command of General Loehr have any meaning for the Administrative Sub-area Headquarters that were under your supervision prior to the Felber order?
A. Mr. Fenstermacher, had you read more of this order it would have become clear that in this order and the reprisal measures concerned consisted in imposing collective files. The order is addressed to the Commanding General Serbia and the distribution list merely shows that I, who was in charge of Southern Greece, merely received a copy for my information. What steps, if any, I took in consequence I cannot say today.
Q. You will note, General Speidel, that the sentence following the one I read seems to indicate that severest reprisal measures include are not limited to, the imposition of fines. Could reprisal measures in that context include the execution of hostages as well as the imposition of fines?
A. Speaking quite generally, yes. Reprisal measures include executions and the imposition of fines, but here we were exclusively concerned with the imposition of fines.
Q Did these Administrative Sub-area Headquarters that were subordinate to you have anything to do with the administration or control of hostage camps in the various areas in which they were situated?
A I don't know whether hostage camps were established at all. An order once reached us to establish hostage camps, but from some reports of mine, I have read, I find that this order was not carried out because it was not possible for guards. Whether or where hostage camps were established, I am not able to say and I do not recollect anything about it.
Q Would you look General Speidel at document book 17 at page 85 in the German and page 117 in the English. This is your report as Military Commander Greece, dated 18 December 1943 and on page 87 of the German and on page 120 of the English you talk about counter measures and you mention the erection of hostage camps in various cities. Were these camps within the administration of your sub-area headquarters?
A I am afraid I cannot tell you, Mr. Fenstermacher, but I may recall here that I have taken counter measures in this paragraph in order to explain that the measures listed therein were not always to be regarded as measures taken by the Military Commander, because further down on the same page it says that the erection of hostage camps must not be carried out because we have no guards at our disposal. If the counter measures include all the measures I took myself, then you would have to conclude that I was in charge of watching the railroad, that I took the measures against Greek hospitals, but I already contradicted that.
Q You talk in page 87 of the German and 120 of the English about new erection of hostage camps being discontinued, apparently because you did not have sufficient forces at your disposal to do so. Is it true that if you had sufficient forces at your disposal, your units and your subordinate troops would have been in charge of the construction of such camps?
A What I would have done under certain conditions, I cannot tell you. If I had the order and the possibility to do so, I would have carried it out.
Q Isn't it true, General Speidel, that no reprisal measures could have been carried out by the troops before they had first cleared the matter through the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters?
A You are referring now to the so-called Loehr order of 22 December, 1943, exhibit 379?
Q Yes, that is in document book 16, page 98 of the German and page 47 of the English.
A This is the new regulation on hostage measures of 23 December, 1943. I said about this before that unfortunately I do not remember this order because it was issued when I was ill, but that it was merely passed on to me is quite clear to me. In paragraph 3 on the second page it says that reprisal measures are to be carried out by a divisional commander by arrangement with the Sub-Area Administration Headquarters concerned. To what extent this cooperation really existed is beyond my knowledge and I do not recollect it. It says in the next sentence that if no agreement can be reached, the territorial commander competent will decide, which would have been me, but I do not recollect a single case where an application of that sort reached me, because that application would have drawn my attention to this order and it would have then refreshed my memory.
Q Wasn't this the way it operated, General Speidel, in case of an attack upon a troop unit and the death of German soldiers, the unit involved call the Sub-Area Administrative Headquarters Commander and decided what reprisal measures if any would be carried out and then the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters took care of executing the hostages and if it needed assistance for the execution squads, it asked that an execution squad be assigned from the unit.
Isn't that the way the procedure at least was outlined in the Loehr order?
A The Loehr order did not order that. You really cannot construe that from it. It really was like this, which may be seen from all the reports. In the area where there was fighting against the bands, the troops made their own reprisal measures by attacking back and the Subarea Headquarters was informed about it if they were lucky enough and had good connections and then they passed it on. The Sub-Area Headquarters was not an execution squad, it was an administrative agency.
Q Look, General, on page 99 of the German and page 49 of the English, in the paragraph where General Loehr states that all reprisal measures are to be ordered by the competent field commanders and that the unit is to support the Administrative Sub-Area HQs in carrying them out. Doesn't that mean that the Sub-Area HQs were the execution squad?
A I am afraid I have not found that passage yet, I am sorry.
Q It should be on page 99 of the German.
A In what paragraph please?
Q The paragraph beginning: "All other reprisal measures, for example for German Civilians, etc....."
A Yes, if I may say so it does not say those reprisal measures, it says all other reprisal measures which is something entirely different. First of all we have reprisal measures by the troops and then it simply says, "All other reprisal measures, for example for German Civilians, persons employed by the occupying powers, the troops have to support the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters." In other words, a clear-cut difference is made between measures taken by the troops and those taken by the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters and all other matters which are confined to a small radius, the SubHeadquarters has to carry them out and rely on troops for the support.
Q In the paragraph preceding the one I read there, it states, General Speidel, that reprisal measures for losses in the air corps, navy, police and the Organization Todt are to be ordered principally by the territorial commanders.
You were a territorial commander, were you not?
A Quite true, it says so but in actual fact I never did so because I apparently did not know all the details of this order and because no such applications reached me.
Q According to this order, you would have the order as territorial commander for your reprisal measures for losses of police would you not?
A Losses of police of course means German police. Inasmuch as they were not suffered during band fighting, because the area of Boeotia where band fighting occurred these measures, were taken, for the pacifying of the country by the Higher SS and Police Leader, otherwise measures taken by the police in this case would mean measures by other police during their duty.
Q Now look at the paragraph below the one I have just referred to, where it states that "The organs of the SS and Hoeh.Pol. Fuehrer and counter intelligence detachments are likewise to be followed in all hostage cases." That means the Area Sub-HQS units there was to select the hostages supported by the units and then later carried out?
THE INTERPRETER: Could you repeat, Mr. Fenstermacher, the interpreter did not follow.
Q Does this mean that the units of Schimana would simply select the hostages which the Administration Sub-Area or military submitted by the units involved then carried out?
A It cannot mean that, but what it meant at the time I cannot say because it did not come into effect. It says if necessary the organs of the SS are to be called in. I cannot recall a single case where I called in the SS in order to select reprisal prisoners. Quite apart from that, I myself never carried out any reprisal measures in which I had need of the SS.
Q Would you look now at document book No. 20 at page 66 in the German and page 94 in the English. This is from an activity report of the 117th Jaeger Division, which at this time was subordinate to the LXVLLL Corps and stationed on the Peloponnes. You will note in paragraph V there is reference to an apparent dispute between the Administration Sub-Area HQs and the troop units with regard to which of those two units had the authority to carry out reprisal measures. There is also reference, General Speidel, to the effect that the execution of reprisal measures has come to naught, because the sub-area headquarters complained on the basis of a decree of the Military Commander Greece and the authority for carrying out such measures. Can you recall the decree of yours which is referred to there?
A No, I do not remember any such decree. Some order must have been given that is one of those which I don't know. I myself read this passage on direct examination in order to show that in the Peloponnes command, decisions had been established in the beginning and that an order had been issued does not mean that the Sub-area Headquarters would carry out reprisal measures.
Q Was it usual for the Administrative Sub-Area HQs to have disputes with the troops regarding who would carry out reprisal measures or was this situation on the Peloponnes somewhat exceptional?
A This is the only case which I have found here in the documents.
Q But you cannot recall any other incidents where there were disputes between the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters and the troop units?
A I cannot recollect any details. It is entirely possible that disputes arose, but I cannot recall any.
Q Isn't it true, General, that you and your Administrative Sub-area Headquarters were very jealous about your authority to carry out reprisal measures and insisted on it on many occasions.
A That is entirely wrong, Mr. Fenstermach, I had to insist on the fact that my rights as a General were not curtailed and that the Administrative Sub-Area HQS could go on doing their work, but as for reprisal measures they are not important in this context at all unless in the opposite sense of the word, because in the carrying out of reprisal measures no one chose them and we thought they were an inevitable and unpleasant duty in the war.
Q In this paragraph 5 of the activity report of the 117th Jaeger Division, it talks about long drawn-out negotiations after which the the administrative subarea headquarters was persuaded to transfer to the division its obligations and duties regarding reprisal measures. It would not appear that the subarea headquarters were reluctant to give up its right to execute hostages and take such other reprisal steps.
A Mr. Fenstermacher, I was not present when they had these conversations and I cannot say how intense the dispute became.
Q Will you look now, General, at your document book No. 5 at page 50? This is one of your orders dated the 28th of November 1943 and you state in the second paragraph, paragraph 2, that if the troop issued orders or instructs contrary to those of the military commander Greece representations have to be made to the troop immediately; should the latter insist on the carrying out of these orders a report must be submitted to the Military Commander Greece.
Isn't that an indication that you wanted your administrative subarea headquarters to -
A Mr. Fenstermacher, where does it say this? This paragraph is concerned with reprisal measures. If I give you an example for this paragraph -- if, for instance, I issued the order that land must not be sold out and it is sold out all the same, then this order applies.
Q There is no limitation mentioned here regarding the type of orders which the troop might issue, General Speidel.
DR. WEISSGERBER: I object here, your Honors. This document has not been offered by me.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I believe that Dr. Weissgerber is correct in that, your Honors. I withdraw my question.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
A Nevertheless, I am quite happy to say that such basic -
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I take it the witness chooses to answer notwithstanding the objection.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I didn't quite understand, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I take it the witness chooses to answer in any event.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: It is agreeable to me if it is agreeable to Dr. Weissberger.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
A If I issue so basic order an order, not all possible events can be enumerated which might crop up in these cases. They might be disputes in the economic field, disputes in the field of billeting or anything else. It may be anything among the many fields in administration. There is no possibility given here to discuss from here the fact that reprisal measures are being referred to.
Q Would you look now, General Speidel, at Document Book XIX at page 150 in the German and page 139 in the English? This is an order of General Stettner the Commander of the 1st Mountain Division, dated 25 October 1943 in which reference is made to a 50 to 1 reprisal quota.
In sub-paragraph "a" of paragraph "1" of that order it refers to a retaliation quota of 50 to 1 in case a member of the German Wehrmacht is killed in a territory considered pacified. The areas of your administrative subarea headquarters were considered pacified territory, were they not?
AAs a general rule, you could describe the immediate vicinity of the subarea headquarters as pacified. This was not a fixed term. It fluctuated pending the situation.
Q General Stettner goes on to say that if that reprisal quota is to be applied in a territory considered pacified application must be made to you or at least through you as military commander Greece.
Isn't that an indication, General Speidel, that the troop units operating in the area of your administrative subarea headquarters would also have to consult your administrative subarea headquarters commander before they would apply this retaliation quota?