A In order to put that right immediately, the administrative sub area headquarters did not have to ask for a consent from Schimana on anything. That was quite out of the question, but there is something else which I remember very clearly. That is that I myself felt very calm because I was under the impression that reprisal measures which were ordered in my area of jurisdiction, I would be consulted about, before they were carried out, but I do not remember any such inquiry.
Q Would you turn now to page 19 of this original document which you have, page 9 of both the English and the German. This is an entry in your War Diary for the 10 March 1944, which refers to the execution of 100 active communists from the Salonika and Larrissa hostage camps in reprisal for an attack on an express train in the area of Larissa? Did you know about those two hostage camps at Salonika and Larissa?
A No, I don't remember knowing them. But in connection with this particular incident I would like to say that for, one, it took place during my absence, and two, it is a reprisal measure for a surprise attack on a railroad. The Military Commander for Greece, however, was not concerned with the safeguarding of the railroad lines. This was the concern of the repeatedly mentioned railroad security at Larissa which in turn was subordinate to Commander SalonikaAegean and Army Group E. This then is merely a 1-C report which was passed on.
Furthermore, I compiled all of these reports which you are mentioning here in my Document Book 3, where I made statements about them.
Q If these hostage camps were not under the jurisdiction of your administrative sub area headquarters in Salonika and Larissa, under whose jurisdiction might they have been?
A It may well be that they were subordinate to the area administrative headquarters. I don't know that. It is just possible that they were subject to somebody else. To the best of my knowledge I don't know anything about any hostage camps, but I have to admit that it says so.
Q Now you said on direct examination that you could not recall the reprisal action in retaliation for the murder of Frau Maders. Do you recall that?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A. You mean the Mayers incident?
Q. Yes, that is correct.
A. That is an incident which was clarified yesterday I believe. In the document there is one report, according to which the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters Lamia reports that for the murder of Frau Mayer reprisal measures were carried out. At first I assumed on the basis of that report that it was a measure of the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters taken on my direction, but by pure chance I received an affidavit which was presented here yesterday, and, according to which reprisal measures at the time were refused by me. That affidavit only confirmed my personal conviction that at that time I did not order any reprisal measure. But these reprisal measures were carried out, as can be seen from the Ic report; therefore, we can only assume the following: the place where the crime took place is located in the middle of Boeotia. On that particular farm there were, during the whole time, troops of the Higher SS and Police Leader stationed. I can only assume, therefore, that this reprisal measure was carried out in agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader and that seemed to me to clarify this case.
Q. When you say by agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader do you mean that the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters consulted the Higher SS and Police Leader, or what do you mean?
A. No, I don't mean in agreement with Sub-area Administrative Headquarters and the Higher SS and Police Leader. I mean in agreement with the local troops and the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q. The husband of this Frau Mayer -- was he subordinate to you in any way?
A. No, he was not subordinate to me. He was the German administrator of this farm, and this farm, in turn, was under the administration of the Military Administration.
What his relations were to the Military Administration and what his employment was -- whether he was under free contract or not -I don't know, but I do know that he was not a member of the Military Administration. He was a German civilian.
Q. As I recall, the affidavit in that regard, which has not yet been furnished but which Dr. Weissgerber read into the record, the affiant mentions that you were very indignant at this murder of Frau Mayer and that you forbade reprisal measures to be taken. Is that what the affidavit says to your recollection?
A. It doesn't say it quite so strongly, but it does say something similar. I, after all, did not write this affidavit.
Q. If the ordering of reprisal measures in that case was taken in agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader, then the reference to the fact that you forbade reprisal measures would not be quite accurate would it?
A. I beg your pardon. I didn't say that this was an agreement between the Higher SS and Police Leader and me in this case. I didn't say that at all. I didn't even discuss it with him. That must be an error. An agreement existed in connection with the local troop units and the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q. If the affiant is correct in this case, then you yourself personally prohibited reprisal measures from being taken. Am I not correct in that?
A. In this particular case apparently, according to the statements of the affiant, I rejected reprisal measures.
Q. Now, would you turn to Page 3 of this Document Book which you have, Page 2 of the English and the German mimeographed copies? The entry for the 7th of December 1943 in your War Diary states: "While going from Wehrmacht station Kopais to Thebes on 7 December the car of the German Director Dr. Mayer was fired on with submachine guns by unknown perpetrators.
The wife of Dr. Mayer was mortally wounded thereby. Reprisal measures are being initiated." And then in the entry in your War Diary three days later on the 10th of December 1943 it states: "As reprisal measure for the murder of Frau Mayer (Wehrmacht station Kopais) the shooting of 10 hostages was carried out."
Does that refresh your recollection in any regard on this incident?
A. No, I'm afraid it does not.
Q. Now, you will note, General Speidel, if you will turn through your War Diary that there are many references to the fact that the Senior SS and Police Leader in Greece executed hostages, or ordered the execution of hostages. You will note that on Page 1 of the English and German, at the bottom, the entry for 30th November 1943, Page 2 of the original document; again on Page 3 of the German and English, Page 6 of the original document, the entry for the 18th of December 1943; again on Page 4 of both the English and the German, Page 7 of the original document, the entry for the 8th of January 1944; and so on.
Isn't it clear that whenever the Higher SS and Police Leader executed hostages or ordered their execution you made a specific reference to that fact in your War Diary, and when those measures were taken on your own initiative or on the initiative of the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters you made no such specific reference?
A. I don't know from what aspect the author of this War Diary has compiled these reports. One has to visualize the situation as follows: The recipient of the reports entered them in the War Diary in the same way in which he received them; that the reports of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which had to be gathered, could be received easiest and quickest is quite obvious because he was stationed in the same town.
Other reports concerning actions of the troops were entered and passed on in this same way, without any further additions. Therefore, the entries in the War Diary can not tell us anything about spheres of responsibility. It is just a registering activity, where the reports were copied verbatim, the way they were received.
Q. Now, a few questions regarding the orders which you issued to your Sub-area Administrative Headquarters. Did you ever issue an order for the execution of hostages at a ratio of 10 to 1?
A. Not that I remember.
Q. But you do know about having issued an order which you had earlier received from Felber regarding the ratio -for the execution of hostages at a ratio of 50 to 1, I believe you said?
A. Yes, indeed; that is correct, but with the reservation which I made at the time.
Q. Were you Sub-area Administrative Headquarters in a position to carry out an order to execute hostages at a ratio of 50 to 1?
I believe you testified that those Sub-area Administrative Headquarters only had sixteen men. How was it physically possible for them to executive such an order?
A. If such an order had to be carried out then the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters would have had to approach the nearest unit and would have had to ask them for assistance, which I believe is expressed in this way in the so-called Loehr Order.
Q. Then, it was possible for your Sub-area Administrative Headquarters to execute this 50 to 1 order which you had issued to them?
A. Under the condition that they had my consent.
Q. I believe you said that you did not examine that 50 to 1 order which you received from Felber, from a legal standpoint. You were particularly concerned with the order's being inadvisable from a psychological standpoint. Am I correct?
A. I believe that is the way I put it, and I did not check this order from the legal standpoint because it was an order from the OKW, and, as such, I assumed a priori that it had been examined from this point of view. I knew that the OKW had a legal department. Also, I was satisfied about the legal aspect of the order because my legal advisor had informed me that reprisal measures as such are admissible under International Law. There were only then those reasons which you mentioned also, but not the legal reasons.
Q. Did your legal advisor tell you that there were no restrictions or limitations upon the taking of reprisal measures?
A. What his statements were in detail I couldn't say today -- after four years. I only remember the decisive fact that he confirmed that there have to be no misgivings concerning International Law in regard to these reprisal measures.
Q. You stated that you yourself had no recollection of the execution of 200 hostages in Athens as part of the total of 325 or 335 hostages executed in reprisal for the attack upon General Krech and his company.
A. Yes, that is correct. Try as I may, I cannot remember it.
Q. If those hostages were executed in Athens couldn't that only have been by units under your command?
A. No, I had no troops.
Q. You had several security battalions I believe.
A. I had one security battalion -- Battalion 596.
Q. General Schimana's 18th SS and Police Regiment was, at that time, in Boeotia on tactical operations was it not?
A. The 18th Police Regiment was ordinarily stationed in Boeotia in order to combat the band activity there.
Q. And the LXVIIIth Corps simply had a staff headquarters in Athens. Its troops were on the Peloponnes so that they could not have executed the 200 hostages?
A. Even if I had wanted to do it I couldn't have done it because I didn't have the forces to carry out this measure, with the exception of the 596th Security Battalion.
Q Might you not give an order to the police to carry out that execution?
A In the situation of that time, where the police units were no longer subordinated to me, I couldn't have given an order. I could have asked, I could have made a request.
Q Then the attack in that case on General Krech occurred in the Peloponnes, 200 hostages were shot in Athens. I don't suppose you have any understanding as to why that occurred?
A I can give no explanation for that. It is a mystery to me and since I do not recollect the incident, I went into it thoroughly on the basis of the documents here and I know now the historical development of this incident.
Q Now regarding the evacuation of the Jews from Athens, which you said was done by the SS, you state that you ordered the confiscation of their fortunes and property and placing them at the disposal of the Greek government in a kind of trustee relationship, is that correct?
A Yes, quite. I didn't say that I had any part in it. I said that the Greek government took it over as a trustee in the interests of those concerned.
Q They did that at your order, did they not?
A Yes. As I stated, I gave this order after a thorough discussion with Minister Neubacher who was the person who suggested this solution. I would like to stress again that I saw this measure as one in the interests of the Jews and not one directed against them. Else, I could have remained passive and just watched the spoliation of Jewish property.
Q Didn't you know that the Jews whose fortunes had been confiscated at your order would never return to Athens?
A That again I have commented on, Mr. Fenstermacher. What you might have possibly known at that time and what we only learned during our captivity in 1945 -- that is facts concerning concentration camps, Auschwitz etc.
-- we had no idea of at that time. How could we have known? You will have to visualize that I had stayed in Rumania and for 20 months had not been in Germany. Also, from grief I had not come to Germany for a period of 20 months. How then could I know such things? They were certainly not transmitted to me in writing.
Q Didn't you know that a few months earlier all the Jews from Saloniki had been evacuated to the East?
A I mentioned on direct examination that it was only after the Athens incident that I learned that the Jews had been deported from Saloniki. It is entirely new to me that they were brought to the East.
Q How was it that the SS permitted you to interfere in their operation to the extent of confiscating the money of the Jews and putting it at the disposal of the Greek government when, as you state, you were unable to interfere in the basic operation concerning their evacuation?
A In that particular case, I did not interfere with any authorities of the SS unless you want to call the plundering an authority of the SS. The situation was such that property had no master and was exposed to looting and plundering, and I took measures against that.
Q Now on the subject of deportation of Greek civilians to Germany for labor, as I understand your direct testimony, you say that it was no concern of yours but that the Greek civilians went to Germany voluntarily rather than by compulsion?
A In any case, that group of people which I mentioned.
Q Now would you look at this document, General Speidel, NOKW-2520?
This is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 631, your Honor. This is a report, General Speidel, from you as Military Commander in Greece dated the 14th of April, 1944. Would you look at page 10 of the original document, page 2 of the English and German copies? Under labor commitment you state "In March and up until 6 April 1944 a total of 1424 workers were sent to Germany. In the first quarter of 1944 a total of 2499 new workers were conscripted for the German armament industry." What did you mean by using the word "conscripted?"
A First of all, the word "levy" and then the word "contract" and I would like to state that these terms fall into the sphere of sending labor to Germany as I have mentioned. There are in Germany "labor exchanges" e.g. for commercial employees -- that is offices where workers are engaged on a voluntary basis and are sent to places of employment through the labor exchange and the word "contracted" merely means that they are after that under contract, and I don't believe that this says anything else than what I said when I discussed the subject before.
Q Do you not believe that this indicates that the workers were recruited by force for the German armament industry, I take it?
AAccording to the German wording, that word "contracted" means merely that from that time on the persons concerned were under contract. That I don t doubt in the least.
Q Now you spoke yesterday afternoon about total war and its consequences. Were you suggesting that a Military Commander may take any means at all in order to achieve security and that the laws of war should play no part whatever in the decisions that he might make in order to achieve the pacification of an area to which he has been assigned?
A No, I don't think you understood me correctly there. I only tried to clarify a fact which comes under my own experience and that is that the last war was characterized by totalitarianism and by the fact that all forces were mobilized. I believe that is not only something which I stated but it is a generally recognized fact.
Q In other words, military security may not be achieved by any means, legal means must be used?
A I don't understand what that question is driving at in this connection.
Q What I mean, General Speidel, is that you are not of the opinion that a Military Commander who is assigned an area to pacify and to make secure, may take any measures which he decides upon without restriction or limitation?
A Nobody can be unrestricted when choosing his means. Their very nature restricts them. A restriction in choosing one's means can be implied in their extent or through the laws of war, written laws or unwritten laws, whichever case may apply. What I wanted to express was that the concepts of war and the concepts of a pacification and securing accepted so far were out of date as a consequence of the development of technique and of totalitarianism; one through bomb attacks on localities which were not military targets, and the other expression which I used was the waging of war of the whole of the population against an occupation force. I mentioned these two examples to express that in the meantime the usages and laws of war had superseded tho formal provisions of international law because there was nothing stated in international law about airplanes bombing or even about atom bombs and that is how I would like to see my statements understood.
Q You are not yet ready to say that there are no longer any laws of war, though, are you?
A On the contrary, it is my opinion that never before it was so necessary to formulate laws of war as clearly as it is necessary today and that never before the means of war were such as they are now that one can easily misuse them.
Q You spoke of the difficulty of a German general when he received certain of the orders which we have concerned ourselves with in this proceeding. You pointed out that on one hand he faced a court martial by the German authorities and on the other Nuernberg. Do you not believe it would have been much better for the Wehrmacht for Germany and for the Greek and Yugoslav peoples if more generals had chosen the route of the court martial when they received certain of these orders from their higher headquarters?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, it is difficult to judge upon such a thing today in retrospect. At that time we faced a task which we had to solve, not just because we wanted to solve that particular task but for an ulterior purpose, and I don't believe that anybody was afraid of a court martial if his conscience forced him not to carry out a certain measure which he might have considered contradictory to law or contradictory to international law, but in our case there was no instance where we considered an order contrary to law, or contrary to international law.
Q You don't consider the Kommando Order or the Commissar Order in violation of the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war?
A Concerning the Kommando Order, I would like to state that I can't judge because I don't know what conditions initiated this order.
Concerning the Kommando Order, I would like to state that I myself under direct examination gave my opinion to the effect that I had severe misgivings concerning this order. However, lest I be misunderstood, not on account of a contradiction to international law but because of its effects on the future, for the Kommando Order was seen from a certain aspect as a reprisal measure. It was a counter-measure directed against a measure by the enemy which we might consider wrong and in violation of international law. But if as a consequence of the Kommando Order which is like a so-called reprisal measure, the opposing side would take reprisal measures again, and this would have led to a conduct of war and to usage of the laws of war which would have made the concept of a prisoner of war impossible altogether.
Q. You don't know of a single German General do you, General Speidel, who ever allowed himself to be court martialed because he believed that orders from his superior agency were unlawful?
A. I don't know of any such case and one in the normal case of events would not learn of such a case, because that would be kept strictly secret. These cases which were reported here during the trial were most of them new to me.
Q. You talked at some length yesterday of your own interest in Greek classicism and Pan-Hellenic studies and I believe at one point you compared yourself to Lord Byron, the English poet and your interest in classical Greece. I wonder if you recall these lines of Marathon:
"The mountains look on Marathon And Marathon looks on the sea;
And musing there an hour alone, I dreamed that Greece might still be free.
For standing on the Persian's grave I could not deem myself a slave."
Do you know these lines?
A. I know these lines and they speak right from my heart. Anybody who has stood on the battlefields of Marathon or anyone who has looked down from the Akrepolis of Athens realizes this and the Hellenic in me made me a foreigner among my contemporaries of that time, but the tasks of the war had to be solved as hard as they were for me. I therefore tried to bring together the tasks of the war and my love for Greece, but of course there was at certain times a difference between two duties, that is duties and reasoning.
Q. Byron died while he was fighting for the liberation of Greece against the Turks?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. You also made a reference to the spirit of Goethe; I wonder if you know these lines from "Faust"?
"Yes! To this thought I hold with firm persistence;
The last result of wisdom stamps its true;
He only earns his freedom and existence, Who daily conquers them anew."
A. I am grateful to you, Mr. Fenstermacher, for quoting me the lines which are nearest to my heart from the second part of Goethe's "Faust".
I can only agree with you completely in those lines.
Q. Do you believe that these lines sum up, at least from the Greek point of view, the attitude of the Greeks toward the German occupation?
A. By this same right, I demand that the demands of Goethe be applied for the German people, who at this time fought for their liberty during the World War.
Q. I have no further questions, your Honor.
JUDGE BURKE: Dr. Weissgerber, do you have any further questions?
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. WEISSGERBER:
Q. If it please the Tribunal, I would like to first of all have Mr. Fenstermacher agree to clarify a number of passages in documents, which Mr. Fenstermacher quoted during cross-examination and which I could not find exactly in the document books.
Mr. Fenstermacher quoted from document books 17 and 19 and he read a number of passages there where I believe he referred to police reprisal measures. Mr. Fenstermacher said that he was only mentioning these passages to the Tribunal without discussing them in detail, but I would be very grateful if Mr. Fenstermacher could give me these passages briefly, which I did not know.
JUDGE BURKE: I wonder if we couldn't save the time of the Tribunal if at the end of the session you and Mr. Fenstermacher could possible reconcile any misunderstandings with regard to the passages?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I would be glad to do that your Honor.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed with another matter.
BY DR. WEISSGERGER:
Q. General, I would like first of all to follow up exhibit 631, which was the last document with which the prosecution confronted you. It is the situation report of the Military Commander Greece, dated 16 March until 15 April 1944. Mr. Fenstermacher discussed with you sub-paragraph (d) and I don't believe there are any questions about this paragraph, but I would like you to also look at paragraph VII, where it says:
"Upon instructions from the R.S.H.A., the sudden arrest of all Jews, with the exception of those living in mixed marriages was carried out in the period from 23 - 25 March 1944 by the SD offices; evacuation to Germany carried out for the most part already."
Did you know anything about that event at the time, or was the intention told to you before the evacuation was carried out?
A. It is completely new to me and I see it here for the first time.
Q. You tell us you read it here for the first time?
A. In the documents here.
Q. I see. What is it that is now to you in this context?
A. It is now to me that from 23 to 25 March there was apparently a second action which took place, while I only know the one that took place in September and October 1943.
Q. Were you in touch officially with the R.S.H.A.?
A. No.
Q. General, is it known to you how and through whom the deportation of Jews from Salonika was carried out?
A. I never heard anything about it.
Q. In connection with the evacuation of the Jews from Salonika was at any time the name Ruenner, I spell it, R-u-e-n-n-e-r or Wislicency, did these names become known to you?
A. I never heard the first name, the second probably I heard, as I remember it because it has a foreign sound, but I don't know in which connection I heard it.
Q. General, do you know when the first evacuation of Jews from Salonika was carried out?
A. No, I don't know that. I believe I remember that afterward I was told. It was in the beginning of 1943.
Q. I shall submit to the Tribunal excerpts from the records of the International Military Tribunal, which show clearly that this whole anti-Jewish action, dating from the year 1942 onwards, that is at a period of time when General Speidel was not in Greece at all was carried out by a special staff of the Reichs Security Main Office, the R.S.H.A. on direct order by Hitler and Himmler.
Now, General, would you like to look at the two following sentences of this document where it says:
"Property of the Jews of Greek citizenship handed over to the Greek State (ministry of Finance) property of Jews of neutral citizenship handed over to the representatives of the states concerned, property of Jews of Italian citizenship handed over for the present to the former Special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office for the purpose of appointing a trustee administration."
Do you remember that measure?
A. No, not at all. I only knew of the measure which took place in September 1942 but concerning this one here I know nothing.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, that will bring to a rather long chapter. Do you want me to start with the questions now?
JUDGE BURKE: I had been observing that situation with some interest myself, so we will continue the hearing tomorrow at 9:30 o'clock.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 17 December 1947)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 December 1947, 0930, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom except the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with your re-direct examination.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION DEFENDANT SPEIDEL BY DR. WEISSGERBER:
Q. General, the prosecution has yesterday discussed with you the strike decree issued in June, 1943. Was there a military necessity for this strike decree issued in June, 1943?
A Undoubtedly, there was a military necessity to issue this decree. The continuous and extensive strikes which took place in spring, 1943, had indicated that danger. It had become apparent that these strikes had not been instigated for economic reasons but had instead a definite political purpose and took place under communist direction. As a consequence, we had received an order from higher level according to which strikes were threatened with severe punishments and above all those strikes which bore a political character.
On the basis of this order, but above all on the basis of my own observations and knowledge of the situation, I then issued the socalled anti--strike decree which we discussed yesterday. This decree threatened severe punishment in case of strikes, possible reprisal measures, without, as I said yesterday, establishing reprisal ratios in the scope of this order.