And then he proceeds to give a few examples which he has experienced but I shall not read those.
The next document is Document 127, on page 24. It is an affidavit by Ernst Joachim Bradel, who was formerly an active colonel. It is offered as Exhibit 123. I shall read only a few passages from this affidavit; paragraph 2:
"According to entries in the military pass the 1st Armored Division, of which I was a member, was in Southern Greece in the period from 6 June 1943 until 22 October 1943.
During this time until the beginning of July 1943, I was the commanding officer of the reconnaissance battalion in Pyrgros, after that commanding officer of the Tank Regiment 113, with chief garrisons in Tripolis and Sparta. I knew the then General Felmy very well, as he often visited troop units and as I, being the commanding officer of Tripolis, his headquarters town, was his neighbor and frequently his guest."
And the last paragraph on this page:
"Concerning Count 3, page 17, Subsection 12i: This order according to which Italian officers and enlisted personnel were to be shot, was not promulgated at the 1st Armored Division. The Tank Regiment 113, under my command, at that time disarmed and interned the Italian Division 'Cagliari.' I personally with my adjutant took the pistol away from the Italian commanding officer of the division and imprisoned his staff. At no point of this operation did any incidents occur. It could hardly be prevented that the Italians sold weapons and equipment to the partisans formation. On several occasions German soldiers had to protect the disarmed Italians from attacks by the Greek population, as they were furious about the Italians, I know that during this operation not one single Italian was shot."
On page 25, the 4th paragraph:
"When General Felmy visited me in Pyrgos, at a time when the troops had to build their own bakeries because the bread supply system had broken down on account of the intensive heat, he went from one bakery to another and convinced himself personally that no hardships were imposed on the population, also giving an order that a laid-up bakery should be taken over, although it had to be renovated first, and was not as suitable as others.
"After the Italians had left the country, the people felt extremely relieved. Trand and commerce, which had entirely bogged down under the Italians, not under our rule, gradually returned to normal. On orders, we supplied vehicles for procuring food supplies, and, in addition, also convoyed freight, and mostly passengers, when out trucks travelled back empty. The population was very grateful for this."
And, finally, the last paragraph:
"I do not believe that the ten General Felmy has given orders to effect the severe reprisal measures, as mentioned in the indictment. I cannot conceive this, as only a four months before, during my time, this was not the case. As a soldier, a person knows well enough whether his superior is a very strict man, or inclined to be lenient. The latter, anyhow, was the case as far as General Felmy was concerned. He is one of those military leaders who endeavor to assist, and who will intervene personally, if there are any difficulties. I was often his guest, and I am able to state that, by this fact, I knew him quite intimately. I am of the opinion that it is fundamentally wrong to put him in the category of war criminals."
The next document, No. 128, on page 27, is an affidavit by Franz Eisele, offered as Exhibit No. 124. I shall not read it.
The next document is 129, on page 29, an affidavit by Helmut Hagelauer, offered as Exhibit 125. I should like to read this affidavit.
"Following an airplane crash on 17 October 1944, in the area round ARJA-Greece-at the time I was duty officer to the 68th Army Corps under the command of General Felmy - I fell into the hands of the ELAS partisans.
During the period from 3 December 1944 to 20 January 1945 I was a prisoner at the prisoner camp Larissa. My experience gained then is hereby summarized as follows:
"The German prisoners of war, who were in the hands of the ELAS partisans in the Larissa area, were mainly billeted in the barracks near the Larissa airfields. The partisan battalion MO (Mecanicos Olympos ) was in all respects responsible for their accommodation and supplies; this battalion was billeted in the barracks at the same time.
"At first, the German camp inmates consisted of 3 officers and approximately 150 enlisted men, of whom approximately 80 enlisted men and 2 officers were members of the crew of the former German torpedo boat TA 18, and members of the German Armed Forces stationed in Greece, including units of the German Navy and the Mediterranean Shipping Company Mittelmeer-Reederei. The following conditions given in detail, prevailed in the camp in December 1944:
"Billeting: We were billeted in 3 hutments with concrete flooring. Hay, which was completely infested with lice, was at the disposal of only one hutment. There was no kind of illumination, nor any heating facilities. Under the danger of their lives, the camp inmates stole fire wood for their self-made stoves. Wool blankets were not in existence; the blankets which had been sent by the Greek Red Cross had been taken away by the partisans.
"Guards: A barbed-wire fence surrounded the billeting area. The guards in and outside the camps were mostly adolescent Greek boys who handled their fire arms more than frivolously. The prisoners were pressed into performing unofficial work.
"Clothing: There was hardly one of the camp inmates who was wearing shoes; the majority had their shoes taken away under threats and beatings with carbine butts. Because of the wear and tear, the outer garments did not offer any protection against the then extra ordinarily grin cold.
In spite of the rains, and later on snows, the prisoners were daily compelled by the partisan officers, who threatened then with their weapons, to work in the open.
"Food: The following items were supplied, mostly in irregular intervals:
Approximately 7 - 8 kilograms of legumens daily, for 150 men Approximately 1250 grams of olive oil weekly, for 150 men Approximately 625 grams of bread daily, for one person and some cooking salt.
"During all that time we had only once an issue of meat, approximately 25 kilograms on the day, when the representative of the International Red Cross announced his visit. Beverages were not issued. For cooking their meals the prisoners had only a gasoline barrel which they had converted; fire wood was only rarely issued, however no tools to cut it with. The food was mostly issued in very corroded cans of preserves; there were no spoons.
"Sanitary-and Hygienic conditions: An Italian army doctor acted as medical officer, who inspite of his numerous attempts, could not obtain any medicaments, although the partisans were in possession of medicament stocks, which had been deliberately left behind by the German Armed Forces. Because of the living conditions, the place was infested with lice and other vermin to such an extent, and skin rashes were so prevalent, that they could not be mastered even by a hotsteam delousing, which took place on one occasion. The water supply was very irregular from tap-water. We only received insignificant Quantities of soap from a donation of the Greek Red Cross. A request to supply tools and building materials for a usable latrine was rejected. As the season advanced, diseases from lack of food and ailments of the respiratory organs increased, and, apart from those that died during that time, many prisoners were later on in sick-bay in British hospitals because of these complaints. The Commander of the 301 Transit Coy.
(British unit, at that time Volos/ Greece), who took over 40 inmates of this particular camp on 20 January 1945, ordered more than 20 men to be immediately supervised by a medical officer. Those that were wounded in combat received medical care in only some isolated cases.
"Welfare: During the whole of my stay in Larissa I was able to have only one single conversation with the representative of the International Red Cross. All my complaints, which I was forced to submit in the presence of the partisan officers, were denied by them respectively were excused by untrue explanations. Twice only, we were permitted to write letters to our closest relatives; however, I myself witnessed how, on 19 January 1945, all forms, which we had handed in to the camp leaders, as well as all personal documents which referred to us, were burnt. Greek civilians, who wanted to assist us with material donations, were prohibited with threats to their life to enter the camp, or to get in touch with us.
"Miscellaneous matters: Approximately on or about 6 December 1944 2 officers, 3 master sergeants, and 1 corporal were collected from the camp and taken away on a motor truck. Later on the last survivor, Heinz Gerd Fengler, reported to me about the shooting of the five others. According to him, this took place in the Tempi Valley on or about 8 December 1944. As all my notes were taken away from me, I can only furnish the names of the two officers: Kapitaenleutnant Schmidt from Liegnitz in Silesia, and 1st Lieutenant Fey from Coblenz. I myself was refused any information by the partisans concerning the fate of my comrades. On 20 January 1945 I and approximately 40 men were handed over to the combat forces stationed in Volos. Even on the evening before our departure, the young partisans, threatening us with their carbines, stripped us of all garments that appeared of any use to them. All moves, made by various persons, including Greek civilians, to prevent that the prisoners' health was inpeded, were rejected by the camp leadership without giving any reasons."
The next document, Felmy No. 130) on page 32, is an affidavit by Hans Dyckhoff, offered as Exhibit 126. I should like to read this affidavit:
"I served as captain in various official positions under General Felmy in Greece from 1.4.1944 until I was taken prisoner on 25.9.1944; in particular I was entrusted with the task of the "Chief of the Liaison Staff with the Headquarters of the Greek Volunteer in the Peloponnesus".
"During this time I came to know General Felmy as the model of a soldier trained and bred in the correct principles of the imperial army, who thought and acted in a chivalrous way towards the enemy. As a man he was of a fundamentally humane disposition and thoroughly kind character. It is characteristic that the members of his army corps spoke of him as "Papa Felmy".
"Conditions with respect to the chain of command in Southern Greece were extremely confused and there was never any clear limitation of jurisdiction. Throughout the entire period special difficulties existed with the agencies of the SS. When I once expressed the opinion to the Adjutant of the Higher SS and Police Leader that one measure which he had ordered could bring him before a court martial I received the stereotyped answer: "For such views, of the ossified Wehrmacht we have only a weary smile. We have the short wire for this purpose". (He meant a telephone call to Himmler, which could always be quickly put through.)
"The difficulty of the situation in which General Felmy found himself also becomes clear from the following occurrence: Some time after the accomplishment of "Operation Kalavrita" I was invited by the Chief of Staff of the 68th Army Corps, Colonel Goerhardt, to a dinner at which, besides the other gentlemen of the Corps Staff, the Field Intelligence Staff Officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division was also present. Colonel Goerhardt deliberately directed the conversation to the execution of reprisal measures.
The Field Intelligence Staff Officer of the Division, Captain Weber, remarded that he had recently accompanied the Division Commander to the Fuehrer's Headquarters. During tho discussions which had taken place there they had received the impression that Very severe reprisal measures were considered absolutely necessary in the Peloponnesus.
"The leader of the Greek Volunteer Units in the Peloponnesus, to whom I was assigned by the 68th Army Corps, was Colonel Papadongonas. As a reprisal measure for the death of General Krech he had 100 Greeks shot. In spite of the regular investigation of all prisoners by the Volunteer Units he specified that only such prisoners should be shot as were guilty of such serious crimes that they would receive the death penalty from the Greek courts in any case.
"In conclusion I should like to describe another experience which shows that even the British Liaison Officers with the ELAS bands were unable to assert any authority and were helpless in the face of their generally recognized atrocities:
"At the end of September 1944 in Tripolis a British captain called upon me and my 2 friends, Durst and Dr. Jansen, who had been assigned as a liaison team by the 68th Army Corps to the Volunteer Units of Colonel Papadongonas, to leave Tripolis. I thereupon requested him to make out an escort pass to Corinth, in case the Greek officers desired our disappearance in their own interest. The British captain declared that he naturally could make out such a pass, but that I should not overestimate the influence of a British liaison officer. He said that such an escort pass would probably be good only as far as the next fairly large body of partisans and there they would probably cut our throats. He proposed that we should surrender to him as his prisoners and he would then bring us to the British base in Kalamata by his own personal efforts. He said that he hoped in this way to get us through alive, even if here too there was no 100% safety.
"The events after the evacuation of Greece by the German Wehrmacht the revolt of the "ELAS" and "EAM" against the British in the winter of 1944/45, the fighting still going on in Greece between Communist bands and troops of the legal Greek Government, and not last the charge brought by Soviet Russia and her satellites that the present Greek government is made up of collaborationists, should confirm the correctness of the above opinion."
Document 131 on page 35 is an affidavit by Mathias Dicks, offered as Exhibit 127.
"From 1942 to 1944 I served in Corps Signal Detachment 468 as a technical sergeant.
"On 18.10.44 our airplane flew against a mountain in the region of Antanati in Greece as a result of a sea fog, broke apart and immediately caught fire. By jumping out in time I was able to save myself from certain death by burning, but nevertheless suffered very painful burns in my face and on my hands. We had hardly regained consciousness when a band of about 60 partisans appeared and brought us to the above-mentioned village in no very courteous way. Here we were received by the population with kicks and blows with sticks, and after it had been decided not to shoot us right away were lodged in a partisan billet. We were denied any medical aid, but were relieved of everything we had in our pockets; I was not even allowed to keep a photograph of my family. On the following morning an enraged crowd of people demonstrated before the house in which we were lodged and called for our immediate execution. The partisan captain, however -- after he had calmed the crowd with some words which we did not understand -- got us out of the house by another exit and after a very painful 6-hour donkey ride we reached the village of Aiga (about 20 km. north of Larrissa). Here we were received by 3 English officers and conducted to a doctor. In view of the fact that there were neither medicine nor bandages available the Englishmen asked that we be sent back to German lines. However, this was vigorously refused by the partisans. We then lay here for 3 days with festering wounds without any kind of help. After our clothing had been torn from us down to our shirts we were brought to Larrissa in a truck loaded with coal. In the meantime I became blind and only owe the recovery of my sight and my life itself to a captured Italian doctor who was working in the military hospital. After 2 weeks the latter was forbidden by the partisans to treat us any longer. When he still continued to look after us he was sent to a camp. The treatment now employed by the so-called partisan doctors was in every respect highly inadequate.
On lb December, although by no means healed, we were driven into a prisoner of war camp clothed only in a shirt and some rage which could no longer be described as pants. The conditions in this camp were horrible. There was no clothing, no blankets, no straw, no stove, and we lay on a concrete floor covered with some lousy chopped straw. Our food consisted of a quarter of pound of bread and half a liter of watery soup per day, as Christmas and New Year's presents received no food whatsoever. Since we no longer had any toilet articles at all in our possession we became visibly lousy; in spite of our extremely scanty clothing and lack of shoes we had to work in cold slush. Each of us received kicks and blows with a stick according to the whim of the overseer. In a very short time we were all exhausted and sick; in 2 weeks we had 4 cases of death. As the result of an oversight by the camp directors I myself was sent to Volos to the British at the end of January 1945 with the seriously sick. The Englishmen who were held prisoners by the partisans did not fare much better than we did in Larissa."
The next document 132 on page 37 will become Exhibit 128. It is an affidavit by a former British captain, Robert McGregor. In this affidavit he mentions a letter by Guenter Kleykamp of 26 August 1947. I therefore would like first to read the letter on page 37.
"Dear Sir, when, in spring 1944, you were made a prisoner in an action of German troops against Greek "andartes", in the region west of Theben, I dealt with your and Lt. Capsis' interrogation at Athens.
I was then a captain in the Headquarters of the 68th corps. You stated your having had the order of blowing up a bridge and having carried it out. Later on you and Lt. Capsis had been in charge of liaison duties to Greek ELAS units.
"You and Lt. Capsis have never been regarded and treated by me otherwise than as POM British officers. Your caution in disclosing military affairs I did respect. But you will probably not be aware of the fact that the corps' superior authorities took another view of these things, i.e., they looked upon you and Lt. Capsis as members of so-called commando-troops, who, according to a strong order by Hitler of October 18th, 1942, had to be treated not as POW's but had to be handed over to the SD.
I need not add what such a procedure would have meant to you.
"Considering the fact that you and Lt. Capsis had carried out military orders and that you had been caught in regular uniform I tried to persuade the Army-Group Command and tho OKW to take another view of your cases. My endeavours remained fruitless. I therefore thought it best to give your names to tho Swiss Red Cross at Athens' who safeguarded the interests of British POW's. In consequence, this organization took care of you and supplied you with food parcels. Moreover tho Red Cross people made inquiries with me on your well-being and especially on your possible transfer from Awerow-prison into a POW camp. I was now in the position to report to my authorities that, owing to a mistake, the Swiss Red Cross was acquainted with your case. Thereupon the OKW decided to agree to another application from our side to acknowledge you as POW, and treat you accordingly. You and Lt. Capsis' transfer from Awerow-prison into a camp could now be carried out.
"The Commander-in-Chief of the 68th corps, general Felmy, know about these facts. He was in unrestricted agreement with my outlook and measures regarding your case and covered them by his name in his reports to superior authorities. He did that in spite of Hitler's menace that those officers who proved themselves to be weak in the execution of his orders regarding "Command Troops" had to be severely punished.
"In normal circumstances this matter of course treatment of British POW, by German officers would not be worth mentioning. I only refer to this event because General Felmy with other generals of the south-eastern Command stands a charge before the American Military Tribunal at Nurnberg. One of the Charges of the execution of the above mentioned "Command Order" of Hitler."
"In this situation I request you, Sir, to give a statement in favour of General Felmy; for you and Lt. Capsis have been our only prisoners who would have to be treated according to that order, which, however, has been frustrated by our measures."
Now, this Captain McGregor says himself, it may be found on page 37, the beginning of this document.
"I, Robert,McGregor, Captain, demobilized from H.M.Forces, do solemnly and sincerely declare that I was captured by tho German Forces in Greece it the Spring of 1944, and the circumstances of my capture and the subsequent treatment given to me were as stated in the attached letter dated 26th August 1947 and signed by Guenter Kleykamp.
"I further declare that I was never at anytime subjected to physical violence and that during my captivity in the area of the 68th Corps I was treated as a Prisoner of War.
"It is my opinion that General Felmy, C.C. 68th Corps must have known of my circumstances and concurred with Captain Kleykamp in mentioning my case to the Red Cross and thus possibly preventing my execution."
In this connection, I would like to recall the affidavit given by Kleykamp which I have submitted sometime before.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Has it been determined who is to follow you in the presentation of testimony?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: It doesn't come through your microphone sir.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I said, has it been determined who is to follow you in the presentation of the -
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Would you try once again, sir, the line isn't very clear.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I said, has it been determined who is to follow you in the presentation of further documents or evidence?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I am afraid I don't know, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Will you see to it that when you got through that someone is ready to take up our time when we reconvene next year?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Certainly, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess at this time until Monday, January 5, 1948, at 9:30 a.m.
(The Tribunal recessed at 1631 hours, 23 December 1947 until 0930 hours 5 January 1948.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 January 1948, 0930 hours, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom.?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Mueller-Torgow for General Felmy. If the Tribunal please, in the last session last year, I had not entirely completed presenting my document book Felmy No. VI. From that volume I should like to present the last four documents and I should like to continue on page 40. Page 40 in Volume VI.
I beg to present Felmy Document No. 133 which is offered as Exhibit 129. It is an affidavit given in English by a former captain of the British Army John Lodwick who says, initially, that he was a member of the Special Boat Squadron (Commando) -- in other words, a special commander.
The second paragraph of the affidavit reads as follows:
"I was taken prisoner, together with my Sergeant, Raymond Nixon, on the night of 23/24 July 1944, near the village of ALIKIANOU, in Crete. The occasion was the Attack by my unit of several widely dispersed enemy petrol dumps in Crete. My Sergeant and myself were the only prisoners made by the enemy, and indeed the only casualties suffered by my unit.
The Germans, on the other hand, lost , besides a great deal of petrol, 16 killed and about the same number of their troops wounded. In the area in which I was myself operating 2 Germans and I Italian Fascist were killed."
I Should then like to continue from page 41, the third paragraph: "On reaching Athens, on 25 August 1944, we were lodged in the Averoff Prison. There we were visited, within a day of two by Franz Borsdorff, whom I understand to have been an interpreter upon General Felmy's Staff.
"Borsdorff having declared publicly (that is to say before other Germans) that our situation was exceedingly grave, later visited me in my cell and declared that he would do everything possible on our behalf, He explained that a High Command order existed, under the terms of which, we should have been shot long before; but that this order had been circumvented, and would continue to be circumvented.
"In support of this statement, Borsdorff pointed out to me five or six other Englishmen, also in the Averoff prison. Several of these men were known to me; some personally; some by repute. All had been prisoner longer than myself. All were still alive, in spite of the fact that some had been captured with the Greek Guerrila forces. All are still alive to-day. If the Prosecution would like a sample name I offer Sergeant Dryden, of my own unit, captured in Kalymnos, June 1944.
"We were treated with humanity in the Averoff prison. In the perfectly legitimate interest (from his own point of view) of obtaining a Statement from me, Borsdorff even took me to lunch at his depot. As Borsdorff now knows the statement obtained from me was almost entirely false, for I was most anxious to conceal that I had ever been parachuted into France(January 1943). Borsdorff's methods were not coercive. Nor were those of his Colonel, to whom he introduced me.
I formed a high opinion of both these men, whom I now know to have been upon General Felmy's staff."
The next document, if the Tribunal please, I would like to offer Document No. 134 on page 44. It is offered as Exhibit 130. This document is an affidavit given by Professor of Archeology Roland Hampe, and I shall read from the second paragraph.
"In the autumn of 1944 two conferences took place between the former Commanding General of the IXVIII Army Corps, General of the Airforce Felmy and the Archbishop Damaskinos. Both conferences took place in Felmy's Staff building at Athens-Psychiko, the first one according to my memory early in September 1944, the second one a few weeks later. I acted as an interpreter for both conferences, my rank was a Master Sergeant of the Reserve.
"I do not possess any notes on this conference and therefore can only state what remained in my memory about the contents without pretending completeness. Since during the conferences I was strongly absorbed by the job of interpreting I am in no position to relate the discussion in the order in which it took place or much less can I give a word by word report. As regards the contents I do remember well what I am stating in the following and under oath:
"Both conferences concerned the fate of the city of Athens during the last critical weeks of the occupation period. The Archbishop was worried lest the Germans would destroy vital installations, while retreating from Athens, especially the Dam at Marathon. This dam supplied all Athens with water.
"Felmy feared that similar occurrences as took place in Warsaw and Paris could be repeated in Athens, be it through attacks upon the daily decreasing German Troops, be it through fighting of Greeks among themselves, which could force the Wehrmacht to interfere in order to maintain public order.
"The Archbishop broached the question, if the city of Athens could not be declared an "Open town". Felmy objected that in three cases on the Italian front bad experiences had been made with that. In these cases the enemy misused the situation for attacks. Nevertheless Felmy agreed to institute the necessary steps.
"He did not intend to order destruction of civilian installations in Athens. He declared his willingness, in order to demonstrate the good will on the part of the German Army to obtain a peaceful solution, to hand over the Marathon Dam to the care of Greek Security Troops. This was certainly the most important result of the first conference. The dam actually was handed over to Greek Security organs and the daily papers referred to this fact.
"The second conference developed around the question of declaring Athens an "Open City" Damaskinos urged such a declaration. Felmy replied that such a declaration would have to be mutual. Also that the attempts at peaceful surrender are being endangered by attacks by left, radical bands. He demanded of Damaskinos to take a stand publicly against such methods. The Archbishop rejoined that as a church leader, he could not take a partisan attitude. It was his task, constantly to counsel conciliation in the Christian spirit. This he had done emphatically in his last pastoral letter. "Felmy feared that through an eventual approach of further bandforces from Boeotia the Wehrmacht might be forced to establish a front in the north and northwest. This would necessitate a withdrawal from Athens of the last available reserves. This moment would in his view be used by the Communistic and anarchistic elements to seize power in the city and fall upon the middle-class population. Felmy declared his willingness to give advance notice of day and hour of the German withdrawal and to transfer all important points in the city to the regular Greek Security organs, so that no vacuum should develop, which the Communists and Anarchists could use to seize power.
"Furthermore it was discussed that the notion "city of Athens" did not include the outer districts, especially Piraeus. The Archbishop requested to include these districts also. Felmy agreed to that also under the condition that the English would in this case give the assurance for several days not to use the harbour of the Piraeus for troop landings. The Archbishop explained that he was in no position and not authorized to give such guarantees. He could only try to influence the Greek population to behave calmly and reasonably."
Although this second conference resulted in no direct, concrete result, it nevertheless revealed Felmy's resolution to do everything in order to avoid bloodshed and destructions in Athens. That the destruction of vital installations was avoided in Athens was not a matter of course. On the contrary: This had been ordered expressly. At that time there was talk about a "Fuehrer-order", which was supposed to have demanded the destruction of all vital installations in case of withdrawal. This order even was supposed to have carried the mad argument "because during the retreat in France too little was destroyed". I never saw this order. But Felmy dropped a remark in this respect, when I departed from him after the first conference with Damaskinos. When I expressed my horror at such an order, Felmy said approximately: He did not feel like carrying out this order either.
Felmy received no assurance from the British and then decided to declare Athens an "open town" unilaterally. This must have been on the 10.10.1944 according to my memory. The evacuation of the city was carried out according to plan and without incidents, That during the last weeks of the occupation period it was possible to prevent the eruption of a conflict must afterwards appear as a miracle. Because already then the same gun-powder was flying around which after the liberation of Greece in December 1944 led to those frightful, bloody events in Athens. Concerning the attacks on German troops by leftradical bands, mentioned by Felmy during his second conference with Damaskinos, one case remained clear in my memory; because it almost nullified the endeavours for a peaceful solution. On the road AthensDaphni near the Pyritidopeieion (powderfactory) a retreating German unit was suddenly attacked by Infantry fire from a settlement. A counter-attack was attempted but repulsed. Only after anti tank guns had been brought up the settlement could be taken. I myself read the battle report of the unit concerned.
This incident demanding victims on both sides became the more grave, as big placards were posted on street corners in Athens carrying the heading "Ist Army Group" (A Soma Straton). In it the attack at the powderfactory was praised as a heroic deed of an Elas-unit.
The conclusion was drawn from the incident that the Elas-troops were the only liberators of Greece.
I then just happened to be in the city and went to see Herr F. W. Herzog, editor of the "German News in Greece". He received me with the words: "Do you know already?" I: "No, what?" He related to me that he just heard that in the fact of this newest provocation the Chief of Staff, Goerhardt, was about to issue an order, according to which the headquarters of the Communist bands in the city-district of Pankrati should be levelled to the ground by artillery. It was clear to us that such a bombardment would effect innumerous civilians and that everything had to be done to try to prevent this. We decided that Herr Herzog should warn the Greek families in Pankrati and ask them to seek safety. I myself returned immediately to Psychiko to see Gen. Felmy.
While on my way to Psychiko I once more pondered the reasons. which I should have to put forward. It was clear that artillery fire would cause many bloody victims among the civilian population. In the immediate neighbourhood of the danger zone lay antique monuments like the temple of the Olympic Zeus. It was to be feared that the planned artillery fire would cause general chaos and that this would have unforeseeable consequences, yes that even the Akropolis might be effected in such a case. (The tragic events after the liberation of Greece in December 1944 have borne out these apprehensions only too well). Finally it could be assumed that by the firing on Athens one would put an odium upon oneself, which for centuries could not be washed away.
In Psychiko I was admitted to Felmy after a short waiting and advanced my misgivings. He listened to me and said that he shared my opinion and that the order that was placed before him should not be carried out. Felmy decided to compose a pamphlet, which should have a calming effect. The pamphlet was rained down over Communistic city districts by a JU 52.