The Tribunal has acquitted the defendant Vogt under the indictment and since he also was an auditor, a comparison between him and Hohberg is inevitable. The difference between them lies in the fact that at no time was anything but an auditor, whereas Hohberg, in addition to being an auditor, was an active participant in the economic enterprises of the SS in the several capacities of Chief of Staff W, financial director and economic advisor.
Hohberg testified at great length on his opposition to the Nazi regime and how he participated in the resistance movement. While actually working with the SS-Enterprises, it is not apparent that he did anything to slow up the Juggernaut of oppression over concentration camp inmates. However, after he left the WVHA it is not unlikely that he did lend himself to the underground movement working against the regime and organization with which he had at one time cooperated.
The Tribunal does not deny that Hohberg may have played an active part in that movement and will give that fact due weight.
The Tribunal finds Hohberg guilty under Counts II and III of the Indictment. He is not charged under Count IV of the indictment.
HANS BAIER Hans Baier joined the National Socialist Party on May 1, 1933.
In 1937 Pohl induced him to enter the SS and had him transferred from the Navy in which he was then serving. From April 1937 until August 1943 Baier conducted instruction courses on SS administration. He states that in these courses he never mentioned concentration camps, but one of his former students, Philipp Grimm, declared in an affidavit that at this school he was taught:
"Everything in connection with the administration of troops in a concentration camp."
Baier's work as instructor apparently so well satisfied the demands of Nazi and SS ideology that it brought from Pohl the compliment that Baier's students could be appointed immediately to the Deathhead Units as administrative leaders.
Baier may not have mentioned concentration camps in his lectures but he could not help knowing about them, since in 1941 he had inmates from the Dachau concentration camp at his very school, employed in enlarging and extending it. Inmates worked there daily.
In August 1943 Baier became Chief of Staff W of the WVHA, following Hohberg. His counsel states that it is open to discussion whether Baier could be called Dr. Hohberg's successor. But the minutes of the W-Chiefs of Amt meeting on September 29, 1943, written up by Dr. Volk, carries this item:
"He (POHL) recalled Standartenfuehrer Baier, Commander of the school in Dachau, and appointed him Chief of Staff W."
As successor to Hohberg, Baier is as much involved as Hohberg in crimes against humanity arising out of his activities as Chief of Staff W. It is unnecessary to relate again the functions of the Staff-W Chief, since that matter was sufficiently covered in the discussion of Hohberg's case. However, Article 8 of the WVHA Code of Procedure may be quoted to show the important role the office of Chief of Staff W was given in the organization set-up:
"The Chief W Article 8.The Chief W is the economic advisor of the Chief of the Main Office.
In this capacity he is especially responsible for the supervision as well as the economic and financial counseling of the companies and offices; he moreover assists the Chief of the Main Office in his leadership tasks."
It has been advanced in Baier's behalf that his work was confined to the spheres of auditing and taxation, but the references in the document books in this case are legion as to Baier's activities beyond that of auditor and tax expert.
On February 29, 1944, Baier received a long report from Weber on the expenditures for prisoners in comparison with the wages paid to free workers.
On March 3, 1944, Baier ordered that the various offices involved report to him on the industries employing prisoners.
On March 17, 1944, Maurer of Amtsgruppe D wrote Baier asking for a conference on the subject of wage scales for prisoners in the armament industries.
On March 27, 1944, Baier wrote a memorandum on the "effects of a pay raise for prisoners working with the Deutsche Ausruestungswerke" (German Equipment Plants). This constant reference to wages for the prisoners is not to be understood as meaning anything for the prisoners, but only increased revenue for the SS. In fact toward the end of the war, Baier had from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 RM in one account, sums which had been collected from individual enterprises. In an affidavit, made prior to the trial, he admitted that -- "the fact that the inmates themselves did not receive any compensation obviously was an exploitation."
One of the most amazing documents presented at the trial on the subject of prisoner labor is a letter sent by the Allach-Munich GmbH to Staff W, demanding reimbursement for losses incurred on account of the absence of prison labor. Part of the letter reads as follows:
"In consequence of the typhoid epidemic which broke out in the Dachau concentration camp in January 1943, no prisoners were available to us, as workers from 26 January 1943 up to and including 2 March 1943. On 4th, 5th and 6th March 1943 only 20 prisoners worked for us. For years our plant has been completely dependent on prison labor. A sudden withdrawal of these workers as it occurred in January this year, means the closing down of the whole plant.
"We are convinced that the losses incurred by us, through the withdrawal of prisoners in the period from 26 January to the beginning of the month of March, fall under Paragraph 2 of the business regulations for the Financial compensation office and should, therefore, be reimbursed.
"Without the typhoid epidemic in January and February 1943 we should have made a profit of about half the amount of the total for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1943, that is to say, about 21,300 RM, because operating conditions, apart from these circumstances, were the same. Instead of this profit we suffered losses of about 10,500 RM. Thus our losses resulting from the shortage of prisoners amounts to about 31,800 RM."
In a letter written by Pohl under the date of February 18, 1944, he states that he charges Chief-W, SS Oberfuehrer Baier with certain duties:
"regarding the management and supervision of all enterprises which are under the supervision and administration of WVHA."
But it is argued that it was impossible for Baier to exercise any management or direction in business enterprises because commercial law did not permit it. It is not apparent from the evidence in this case that SS-Enterprises or SS officers were halted from a performance of any self-serving function or deed by commercial law or any other law.
Baier was aware of the long hours of employment to which concentration camp inmates were subjected, having received from Pohl on January 22, 1943, a communication which reads: "I should like to point out that the working time of prisoners, laid down by order, which amounts to 11 hours daily, has to be kept up also during the winter months."
Baier was involved with Volk in the matter of the acquisition of real estate for the proposed concentration camp at Stutthof, already discussed in the Volk opinion.
Baier also had full cognizance of the OSTI operation. On April 16, 1944, he received a report from Dr. Horn on the state of the liquidation of the Ostindustrie GmbH. In one of his reports, Dr. Horn in winding up the affairs of OSTI, declared:
"As the SS members are no longer needed they are sent back to the personnel office of the SS Economic and Administration Main Office if there are no other orders from the SS-WVHA."
This in itself demonstrates how completely the OSTI was a WVHA activity. The Tribunal does not find that Baier participated in any of the early phases of OSTI, but it does find that his office trafficked in the ill-gotten gains from OSTI.
Baier states that he never visited a concentration camp, even though the Dachau concentration camp was only a 15 minutes' walk from his school. In any event he can scarcely claim ignorance of concentration camps. On January 19, 1944, he signed a document with a notice of Pohl's order converting into concentration camps the forced labor camps at Cracow-Plaszow, Lvov, Lublin and Radom-Blizyn. He does admit having visited some of the DWB factories which employed concentration camp inmates, but declares that he never heard of any irregularities in the treatment of prisoners. He then qualifies this with the statement that he confined his visits to the office rooms of the factory. But even though he never set foot inside a concentration camp, he was satisfied that the inmates were all criminals, having been all duly adjudicated so by authority of the State.
The Tribunal rejects Baier's explanation that he believed all inmates were criminals confined by due process of law. It was a matter of common public knowledge that merely the expression of opinion, no matter how innocuous, which could be interpreted as adverse to the interests of the Reich or of the Nazi Party, would land one in a concentration camp. It was a matter of general information that populations were brought in from other countries and thrown into concentration camps. That one as close as Baier to concentration camp activities could not know the real state of affairs is simply incredible unless it can be shown that Baier is mentally deficient.
It was not necessary for Baier to visit concentration or labor camps to learn of the dreadful living conditions existing in many of those establishments. Reports were sent to Staff W on what was transpiring in the field. One report dated 4 December 1944, and directed to SS-Main Economic and Administrative Office Staff W, reveals the horrible state of affairs at Camp Bisingen:
"The camp was occupied in the first days of October by 1,500 mostly Polish prisoners. It is situated on an an extremely wet meadow; there are no pathways. The ground has become completely bogged; the wetness is almost beyond control. The hygienic installations, which are of the most primitive kind, such as toilets, dispensary and washrooms, are absolutely inadequate; further, they are too far apart, and hard to reach under these muddy conditions. Consequently, extreme filth and vermin are prevailing, and the health situation has become unjustifiable. On 1 December 1944 there were about 420 persons sick, mostly from diarrhea and a general debility and weakness of the heart. Since the camp has been in operation 233 deaths are on record (in 8 weeks); of these only 6 were shot whilst trying to escape, and 6 committed suicide."
With Volk, Baier also knew of the need for guards at the Erzingen labor camp.
Baier's deputy signed many letters for Baier regarding the setting up of camps for prisoners engaged in forced labor. Baier states he did not hate the Jews and never inveighed against them, all of which may be true. Nonetheless, he was an important part of an organization which exploited, oppressed, tortured, robbed and eventually exterminated the Jews.
On January 24, 1944, Dr. Horn wrote Pohl, making a report on the Ghetto plants at Litzmannstadt. A copy of this report was sent to Baier. On June 8, 1944, Mummenthey wrote Baier recommending that a diamond cutting factory be established in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp to be run by Jews, because the diamond-industry of Amsterdam had come to a standstill as a result of the deportation and extermination of the Jewish workers there.
One document (NO-3839) revealed that Baier was called upon to obtain barracks at the Auschwitz concentration camp for the housing of suitable prisoners to be used by the Getwent, GmbH (Company for Technical and Economical Development, Ltd.).
It is not claimed by the Prosecution that Baier, or for that matter, any of the defendants in this case, physically manhandled Jews, or other detainees of the Reich. But it is maintained with reason that the systematic persecution, impoverishment, confinement and eventual slaying of these persecutes could not have been possible without the vast machinery of the SS, of which the WVHA was one of the most important parts.
The Tribunal finds that Baier, in his position as Chief of Staff W, took a consenting and active part in the exploitation of slave labor. In this he comes quite clearly within the purview of Control Council Law No. 10 defining war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The Tribunal finds Baier guilty under Counts II and III of the indictment.
The Tribunal also finds him guilty under Count IV.
LEO VOLK Leo Volk joined the NSDAP on May 1, 1933, stating that this was required of him in order that he might finish his legal education.
Further, that on orders of the Young Lawyers' Organization he was compelled to join the Allgemeine SS. In December 1939 he was requested by the SS Main Office Administration and Economy as an expert on legal affairs. According to his statement, he refused to leave his work as information specialist with the Professional Trade Society of German Cities and Communities, and was therefore drafted into the Waffen SS and detailed to legal work in the Main Office III/A-4, of the Main Office Administration and Economy on January 3, 1940.
In the summer of 1941 he was assigned to legal work with the DWB which was part of Staff W. Later he became the head of the Legal Department in Staff W, and acquired, as time went on, the titles and functions of deputy chief of Staff W, Procurist for DWB and referent or private secretary and legal advisor to Pohl. For one month, in the absence of Hohberg, he acted as Chief of Staff W. Volk wwas undoubtedly a very busy man. There were so many facets to his unique position that at times he did not know himself in which capacity he was functioning.
Volk's attorney seeks to dim the lustre of his client's versatility and to cry down the importance of his work by stating that Volk merely prepared notarial documents, carried on law suits and generally gave legal advice. The evidence, however, overwhelms this modest appraisement of Volk's capacities. It has been demonstrated by the documents and by Volk's own testimony on the witness stand that he was a vital figure in Amtsgruppe W charged with the handling of vast SS-Enterprises employing unnumbered concentration camp inmates.
It has been argued in Volk's behalf that he cannot be convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity because the prosecution has not established that he personally ever killed, maltreated or robbed a concentration camp inmate. The prosecution never attempted to prove that Volk directly and physically abused a human being. It has been further argued that in order to convict Volk of any crime it must be shown that, if he knew of maltreatment of concentration camp inmates, he had to have the power to prevent the maltreatment in order to be convicted of crime. The law does not require that the proof go so far. It is enough if the accused took a consenting part in the commission of a crime against humanity to be convicted under Control Council Law No. 10. If Volk waspart of an organization actively engaged in crimes against humanity, was aware of those crimes and yet voluntarily remained a part of that organization, lending his own professional efforts to the continuance and furtherance of those crimes, he is responsible under the law.
But it is submitted that he was not aware of any crimes and it is this which the prosecution must establish before it can ask for a conviction.
Volk's contract with the DWB provided:
"It is Herr Volk's duty to manage the business transactions of the DWB with the care as befits a proper business man."
In a letter to Pohl as early as September 1, 1941, Volk displayed his grasp of the entire SS-Enterprise set-up by making recommendations for various changes in business managers and recommending himself as successor to Mummenthey as manager of Cooperative Housing and Settlement Co., Ltd.
The DWB has been charged with exploiting concentration camp labor, but Volk argues that since the DWB was only a holding company, it could not use the services of physical labor. Academically this is correct, but the various subsidiary companies of DWB employed concentration camp labor on a vast scale and Volk could not avoid knowing this. Oh July 13, 1943, Gluecks, Chief of Department D, wrote Volk aTibut the allocation of prisoners from the labor camp in Neurohlau for the "Bohemia" firm. Paragraph 2 of this letter reads:
"I too considered it advisable that all questions connected with the allocation of prisoners should be settled by a concentration camp and at the beginning of June of this year, I therefore subordinated the detachment of female prisoners from Ravensbrueck to the official supervision of the concentration camp Flossenburg. 'Bohemia' is therefore being cared for, as desired, by Flossenburg only. The camp commanders both camps have been instructed accordingly and will receive a copy of this letter today."
On February 28, 1943, the defendant, Bobermin, W-1 office chief and manager of the Golleschau Portland Cement Company, which used concentration camp labor from Auschwitz, designated Volk as Syndikus of this company. In January 1942 in Stutthof Volk participated in a conference having to do with the conversion of the civilian internment camp at that place into a concentration camp. This camp wasto house 25,000 inmates including prisoners of war. On January 12, 1942 Volk wrote a long memorandum on the Stutthof concentration camp project. In this memorandum he analyzes in detail the various phases involved in the concentration camp plan, dwelling at length on the lucrative brick works within the area. Volk's inspection of the site, his conferences on the subject, his reports and memorandum demonstrate convincingly his familiarity with concentration camp policy.
In February 1944, Volk accompanied Pohl to Litzmannstadt on the same kind of a mission which had engaged him at Stutthof. The fact that Himmler had, prior to Bolk's visit to Litzmannstadt, ordered the transformation of the Ghetto there into a concentration camp, and the later fact that the plan was abandoned does not take away from the charge of the prosecution that Volk was actually involved in concentration camp affairs. And the fact that Volk himself advised against taking over all the enterprises at Litzmannstadt adds to the logic of the prosecution's charge.
In July 1942 Volk attended a conference which had to do with the Hermann Goering works at Linz. A memorandum on this subject points out that inmates of the Mauthausen concentration camp were to be used in erecting a factory which wasto utilize the klinker returns of the Linz foundry. The fact that a change in the plan dispensed with the use of prisoners here does not wipe out Volk's knowledge of how concentration camp inmates were being employed.
On December 12, 1944, Volk asked that 79 guards he sent to a labor camp at Erzingen. This certainly would establish that he was aware of the use of prison labor.
Volk denies all knowledge of the presence of prisoners of war in concentration camps. Yet on March 10, 1942, he countersigned a letter from Kammler, Chief of Department C, WVHA, to the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Gluecks, wnich contains this significant paragraph:
"In view of the increasing shortage of civilian workers the execution of the construction tasks devolving upon the SS-Economic-Administration Main Office in the 3rd year of war 1942 requires the employment of an increased number of prisoners, prisoners of war and Jews."
On July 1, 1943, Mummenthey wrote the commandant of the concentration camp at Flossenburg that he and Volk were coming to visit him and specifically asked him to make arrangements so that Volk could visit the camp. Volk later denied that he went into the camp but only saw it from a distance, but this does not eliminate Mummenthey's declaration of his (Volk's) interest.
Volk's counsel in his final plea argued that even if concentration camps were employed, this was no crime. He stated:
"It is therefore very doubtful whether the mere use of prisoners for unpaid work alone is sufficient to comply with the definition of the crime of enforcing so-called slave labor."
But, if forcibly depriving a man of his liberty and then compelling him to work against his will without remuneration does not constitute slave labor, then the term has no meaning whatsoever.
Volk seeks to disassociate himself from complicity in the OSTI operation by stating that he was in Switzerland when OSTI was formed on March 12, 1943.
However, he attended one of the first conferences on this project. He states that at this conference, which occurred February 13, 1943, its aims were not obvious and therefore he could not be charged with knowledge of its illegal objectives if any. But the memorandum on the subjects discussed at the conference lists as the first two items: (1) the utilization of the Jewish manpower in the Government General; (2) the utilization of the Jewish movable property.
Since it was obvious that these two utilizations would be without compensation to the Jews involved, the criminal aspect of the operation must have been obvious at once. Volk, however, seeks to explain away his participation in this conference with the statement that he had been summoned to deal with any legal questions which might arise and did not know the subject of this discussion. It is rather difficult to accept that Pohl would ask Volk for a legal opinion without outlining to him the subject matter. Volk goes further and says that he never saw the questionnaire which was the basis for that discussion until the trial:
The evidence establishes that Volk was cognizant of the OSTI operations and the Reinnardt Action. On August 31, 1943, he joined with Baier in requesting a loan of 2,500,000 RM to OSTI. On June 26, 1943, he approved a memorandum signed by Hohberg on the transferring of funds from the Reinhardt fund to the German Industrial firms.
Volk's indefatigable and far-flung efforts in behalf of the SS-Enterprises exploiting concentration camp labor, his close collaboration with Pohl, his initiative and energies exerted for the W-Industries bring him inevitably within the purview of Control Council Law No. 10 defining war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The Tribunal finds Leo Volk guilty under Counts II and III of the indictment.
It is not clear, however, that Volk is guilty under Count IV. The fact that he had a written contract with DWB would indicate that his connection with the Waffen SS was not as binding as military service implies. The fact also that he did not give up his position with the Deutsche Gemeindetag (German Community Day) when he was drafted into the Waffen SS also attacks the exclusive authority of the SS over his movements. He continued to draw a salary from the civilian firm until May 1941. Volk's connection with the Waffen SS is not sufficiently free of ambiguity to justify the conclusion that it has been established beyond such reasonable doubt as to bring him within the provisions of the I.M.T. decision on this point. The Tribunal, therefore, finds him not guilty under Count IV.
KARL MUMMENTHEY Karl Mummenthey joined the Allgemeine SS in 1934.
In 1938 he became a legal assistant in the Administrative. Office of the SS under Dr. Salpeter. In 1940, in order to avoid being drafted into the Army he arranged, with Salpeter to be taken into the Waffen SS and placed on detached service with the WVHA.
In his direction and management of the German Earth and Stone Works, known as DEST, none of the defendants was more directly associated with concentration camp inmate labor than Earl Mummenthey.
In January 1939, Mummenthey made an investigation of the Company, and because of his recommendations, a separate legal department was set up under himself. In September 1939 he became second business manager of DEST, and in September 1941, first business manager.
When the Main Office Administration and Economy, and the Main Office Budget and Building amalgamated to form the WVHA, Mummenthey became Chief of Office W-1, and as such continued to control DEST.
DEST had brick works and quarries at the Flossenburg, Mauthausen, Gross-Rosen, Natzweiler, Neuengamme and Stutthof concentration camps. The ceramic works of Allach and Bohemia were also subordinated to Office W-1 under Mummenthey. The gravel works at Auschwitz and Treblinka, the granite quarry at Blizyn, the klinker works at Linz all formed part of the vast DEST establishments employing concentration camp labor. Mummenthey testified that plants subordinated to Office W-1 used a maximum of from 14,000 to 15,000 inmates at one time.
The DEST industries were strictly concentration camp enterprises. Each DEST plant had a works manager appointed by pohl upon recommendation by Mummenthey. These works managers made monthly reports to Mummenthey's office. Mummenthey frequently visited these plants and often called on the concentration camp commanders, Schwartz and Schondorf, in behalf of Mummenthey, also made periodical inspections of the plants.
Mummenthey's attorney in his final argument before the Tribunal said: "Without the connection with its HoldingGesellschaft and Pohl's power of command, and without Mummenthey's membership in the SS, the DEST and thereby Mummenthey also, would hardly have to defend themselves before this forum." But it is precisely this which condemns Mummenthey. It is like saying that were it not for a robbery or two a robber would not be a robber. It was Pohl's command, and by his command the entire WVHA is involved, plus Mummenthey's command as an SS officer, which made DEST what it was, an organization engaged in human slavery and human degradation.
The Tribunal must also renounce defense counsel's contention that Mummenthey did not accept the responsibility of chief of Office W-1. All the evidence points to the contrary.
It has been Mummenthey's plan to picture himself as a private business man in no way associated with the sternness and riger of SS discipline, and entirely detached from concentration camp routine. The picture fails to convince. Mummenthey was a definite integral and important figure in the whole concentration camp set-up, and, as an SS officer, wielded military power of command. If excesses occurred in the industries under his control he was in a position not only to know about them, but to do something. From time to time he attended meetings of the concentration camp commanders where all items pertaining to Concentration camp routine such as labor assignment, rations, clothing, quarters, treatment of prisoners, punishment, etc, were discussed.
The evidence in this case reveals that there was perhaps no industry which permitted such constant mal-treatment of prisoners as the DEST enterprises.
prosecution witness Angler, testifying to conditions in the DEST plants at the Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg concentration camp, declared that the inmates worked 12 hours a day, that the food was insufficient, the clothing inadequate and beatings constant, and that because of the heavy work and inadequate food there was an average of from 800 to 900 deaths per month. As a result of a report made by Angler on deplorable conditions at the camp hospital he was sentenced to a punitive company, 6½ days a week. In one months's time 19 out of 65 men in this company died. Angler stated that the average life duration of a punitive company worker was four weeks.
Mummenthey could not help knowing about concentration camp labor in the DEST enterprises. In SachsenhausenOranienburg the inmate workers daily passed by the very building in which Mummenthey had his office. Their poor physical condition was obvious.
The Prosecution witness, Kruse, a German citizen, testifying to conditions at the Neuengamme concentration camp, declared that the monthly death rate in the camp was from 8,000 to 12,000. During the construction period of the Klinker works of DEST, the death rate went up to about 20,000.
Mummenthey called in his behalf the witness Helmut Bickel, a German citizen who served from 1939 to 1940 in the Klinker Works at Sachsenhausen, and from 1940 to 1945 in the Neuengamme Works of DEST. No witness gave a more harrowing account for concentration camp conditions than Bickel, this defense witness. He testified that the food was not adequate for the work required of the inmates. "Proof of that is the extremely large number of inmates who died directly or indirectly of starvation." He further stated that reports were submitted by the works managers to Mummenthey's office every month and that these reports showed indirectly the intolerable conditions under which the inmates worked and lived. Mummenthey could not have failed to know the plight of the inmate workers.
Bickel described Mummenthey as a "white crow", but it is obvious that he used this characterization because Mummenthey had done him a favor of some proportions. If Bickel is to be believed at all, it cannot be accepted that Mummenthey, amid all these excesses, atrocities and mal-treatment, could remain so white a crow. It is not an unusual phenomenon in life to find an isolated good deed emerging from an evil man. Because of convenience, caprice, or even a sudden emhemeral gleam of benevolence forcing its way through a calloused heart, even a murderer can help a child to safety.
A grim humor can cause a slayer to save his intended victim. But whatever the cause which motivated Mummenthey's benevolence to Bickel, the kind deed is not enough to obliterate his indifference to the wholesale suffering of which he could not but be aware, and to alleviate which, in spite of his protestations, he did little or nothing.
Mummenthey is not an aggressively vicious man. He is too lacking in imagination to conjure up the planning of murder and equivalent enormities. His criminality lies in cuppable indifference to humanity, the sacredness of which demands respect in all parts of the world.
Mummenthey attempted to evade responsibility by first stating that there were no atrocities and no human treatment of concentration camp inmates; secondly, that if they did occur, they were caused by concentration camp guards over whom he had no control, and further that the treatment of inmates was subject to the supervision of the Messerschmidt and Junkers firms and other employers of inmates. But on cross-examination he admitted that he personally dealt with labor allocation. In fact his monthly report on W-1 for May, 191A referred to the shortage of 1,500 inmates in the Gusen quarry, but declared that "this calamity" would be overcome when a new shipment of inmates arrived from Auschwitz the following month.
Mummenthey has argued that DEST had nothing to do with food, clothing and billeting for the workers, and that it was impossible for him to know whether or not the inmates ate well since only the midday meal was consumed in the plants. Still he has testified that he was certain the inmates were sufficiently nourished because his plant managers so informed him.
He even stated that through the ruse of misleading statements he was able to supplement the fare of the workers with extra rations. This, in spite of his assertion that so far as he was concerned the workers were well fed.
Mummenthey's defense is almost naive. He stated that he did not know whether the inmates received any monetary compensation for their work. He went so far as to say that he tried to find out but never got a "satisfactory" answer. With the right spirit he could have found the answer in every document that he examined, and in the face of every concentration camp prisoner. Mummenthey's assumed or criminal naivete went to the extreme of assorting that inmates were covered by accident insurance. We can imagine the tragicomic scene of a Polish Jew, half beaten to death by a concentration camp guard, applying to the concentration camp administration for workmen's compensation for the injuries inflicted upon him by the very organization from which he claimed compensation.
Mummenthey even professes an ignorance as to the hours of work required of concentration camp inmates. Aside from the inherent improbability of such a statement the record shows that Mummenthey received a copy of Pohl's order that inmates must work at least 11 hours a day and half day on Sunday in case of emergency. In his own letter to Baier on May 2, 1944, he revealed his knowledge of the 11 hour rule and said: "I have directed Blizyn to increase the production of the undertaking by making all efforts, and to be particularly anxious that the best use be made of the Polish prisoners."
Mummenthey conceded that he visited the DEST gravel works at Auschwitz in 1940, 1941 and 1943, and at Treblinka in the Spring of 1943.
Whether he knew of the Jewish extermination program at Auschwitz is not demonstrated by concrete proof, but it is difficult to assume that with his position and opportunity for gaining information he could go to Auschwitz and not learn of what was transpiring in the gas chambers and crematorias.