AThe remainder of the command, namely, myself and the interpreter, Mueller, and 7 men in the orderly room remained in Sokal.
QWas another command of the SK 4a active in Hracow?
AHracow was part of the area of the sub-command in the Sokal area.
QWhat was the situation, more specifically, about the retaliation measures referred to in the document we have mentioned, namely, the shooting of 1,160, plus 300, plus 20 Jews in Luck?
AAccording to the reports, knowledge of which I received later on-
THE PRESIDENT:What page?
MR.HORLICK-HOCHWALD: Page 81, second paragraph from the top.
A (Continued) According to the reports we had received later, atrocities had been committed while German troops marched
QWitness, will you please start again with your answer?
AAccording to the reports which came to my knowledge at a later stage, atrocities of the Russians had been found out when the German troops marched into Luck. Four German pilots had been split up alive with oxygen welding machines. 2,000 Ukrainians, about 2,000, had been shot in the jails, and a few of then were still alive. A retaliation measure was ordered by the Commander in Chief of the OAK 6, Field Marshal von Reichenau; under the leaders of the Higher SS and Police Leaders or by a plenipotentiary of that Higher SS and Police Leader, it was carried out.
QDid you attend the carrying out of the retaliation measures ordered by the Commander in Chief?
ANo.
QWere you competent and responsible for the carrying out of such a measure?
ANo.
QYou did your part that the Security Police and the Armed Forces be called in?
ANoo not even that.
QOn whose directive was this measure carried out then?
AOn the directives of the Commander in Chief of the AOK 6, in agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln.
QWhen did you have knowledge of these developments for the first time?
AIn August, 1941, the beginning of August. I should say.
QNow what was you next aim on the march?
AOur next aim on the march was Luck.
QWhen did you reach Luck.
AOn the same day; that was the 7th or 8th of July, 1941. It must have been one of those two days.
QThe retaliation measures which had been ordered and which I have just mentioned, were they already carried out when you arrived at Luck?
ANo.
QDid you aim in Luck?
ANo.
QWhy not?
AI had fallen ill alrady in Sokal and when we arrived at Luck I was in bed with a high fever. A staff physician ordered that I be transferred to the hospital during the same night, because I was suspected of having contracted typhoid fever and a nervous breakdown. I was transported to Lublin and put in quarantine.
QHow long were you in quarantine in Lublin in the hospital there?
AThe whole month of July, 1941.
QWitness, when did you come back to the command?
AThe beginning of August, 1941.
QWhere was the SK 4a during that period?
AAt Shitomir.
QWho was in charge of the SK 4a in your absence?
AThe Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer in charge of the SK 4a and who was Liaison Commander with the Higher SS and Police Leaders and for the Group C. He had been assigned and he was with the Higher SS and Police Leaders at Luck. The Group C had Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Baier, who had been sent to the SK.
QWhen you returned to SK 4a, did that cause any changes, and, if soo what kind of changes?
AThe orderly room of the SK 4a had orders to remain at the location of the Einsatzgruppe C. The official exchange of orders with the AOK 6 was taken over by the Group Staff. Radetzky personally remained in contact with the Department Economy of the AOK 6 for reasons of reporting. The Liaison Commander Haefner received the assignment to report on negotitations with regard to the Ukrainian question. to remain in contact with the AOK 6 or with the 29th Army Group, which was under the command of the AOK 6. The sub-kommandos were attached to the front line divisions toward the north and towards the southeast; the orderly room remained at Shitomir.
QIn what did the fact that the Einsatzgruppe C and SK 4a had the same location result?
AA direct contact of the orderly room of the SK 4a to the AOK 6 did not exist any longer, because the Group C wanted to avoid a duplication at the same location and, therefore, they had prohibited all direct contact of the SK 4a with the AOK 6. Einsatzgruppe C from that moment onward was responsible to the AOK 6 for the affairs of the SK 4a.
QWhat other changes could you tell us, apart from that?
A 28 to 30 sub-commanders and enlisted men of the SIPO and two detachments of the Waffen SS, 55 to 60 men with three leaders of the Waffen SS had been ordered to the Kommando.
QWhat task and duties did the Schutzpolizei have, the Security Police, which had been attached to this Kommando?
AIn the south eastern are, the Security Policy was attached to the Sub-Kommando South for Security Police Tasks and guerilla fighting.
QTo whom was the Waffen SS attached?
AThe Waffen SS in the northwestern area was assigned near the sub-Kommando North.
QWhat task did the Waffen SS have when they were commanded to join the SK 4a?
AThe Waffen SS had been ordered to join the SK 4a, for technical and military task and especially for guerilla combatting.
QUnder whose orders were they?
AIn the vicinity of the Northern Sub-Kommandoo they were committed by the responsible Army commander for the Guerilla Warfare. The Waffen SS in its command was independent, also, as far as administration and food supplies were concerned.
QAs the leader of the SK 4a, could you issue orders to the Security Police or the Waffen SS that had been attached to this group?
ANot to the Waffen SS, because they were commanded by the responsible tetachment commander of the armed forces in their assignment. As far as personnel was concerned, the Waffen SS was also independent. The Security Police had been submitted to the orders of the sub-kommando leader and they were not independent units.
QThese command conditions, did they make necessary a reorganization of SK 4a and did they result in such a reorganization?
AYes, now the SK 4a consisted of two sub-kommandos.
QOn whose initiative was that carried out?
AThe AOK 6 had made the request via the Group Staff C.
QAt what period and how did these reorganizations take place?
AAt the beginning of August, 1941, the sub-kommandos when they marched to the front line areas received orders from the armed forces and the same applied to the Security Police and Waffen SS.
QWhere were the two sub-kommandos committed when the SK 4a had its location in Shitomir?
AOne sub-kommando was assigned northeast of Shitomir in the region east of Radomiszl and Malyn. The same applied to the Waffen SS, a little more northeast in the same area. The other sub-kommando was assigned southeast of Shitomir in the region Wassilkow Byala Zerkjew, together with the Security Police.
DR. HEIM:Your Honor, now I should submit Document No. 2 and have the witness comment about it, and, therefore, I dare to suggest to the Tribunal that maybe we should start our recess now.
THE PRESIDENT:The suggestion is welcomed and the Tribunal will recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours)
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
DR.HEIM (for the defendant Blobel): With the permission of the Tribunal I will continue with the questioning of the defendant Blobel. We stopped talking about August 1941, and I take the liberty, Your Honors, in this connection to submit the Document Blobel No. 2 as Exhibit No. 2. It is the second photostatic copy in Document Book 1 for the defendant Blobel, and it is headed, "Division and Subordination in Sonderkommando 4-A at the end of August 1941." BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, please describe, following this plan which you have in front of you, the division and subordination of SK-4-A at the end of August 1941.
AIn the left upper corner of the chart the Higher SS and Police leader is mentioned. From his a channel of commend exists to the Ukrainian Battalion and the police regiments, and an exchange of information with the AOK 6. And finally, a channel of command of Einsatzgruppe C. Subordinate to AOK 6 was the Section C, which was at the same level, concerning orders, as Einsatzgruppe C. Between Section C of the AOK 6 and Einsatzgruppe C, there was an information service and also a channel of command. The SK 4-A, as the line from Einsatzgruppe C to SK 4-A shows, received the instructions and orders immediately from Einsatzgruppe C whereby the channel of command was between the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe C and the Chief of the SK 4-a. As the chart also shows, the two sub-kommandos of the Security Police were in the area of the territory of the Army Commander, and also the Waffen-SS. Immediately subordinate to the AOK 6 were the security divisions with the Ukrainian militia in the army units, the local commandants throughout the territory, together with the Ukrainian security units which were attached to them. On the left side of the chart it shows that the orderly room consisted of three officers, six *CO's and privates, one cook and helper, and also one or two interpreters.
QIn what manner was the commitment carried out for the territories mentioned?
AThe sub-commandos were subordinate to the Army units for that territory. In the south it was the 29th Army Corps; in the north, a front - or a security division. The sub-kommandos had to discuss, screen, interrogate, make out documents, and to carry out executive measures, together with the Army, or units with whom they worked. At the same time, the sub-kommandos helped with the combating of partisans, together with the army, the local commanders, and Ukrainian militia in the Army units.
QAt whose order?
AAt the order of the AOK 6 alone, or the AOK 6 with the Higher SS and Police Leader; over the Gruppe C or through G-2 of the AOK 6, via G-2 of the Division.
QWhich units took part?
AThe Army units took part, including the Ukrainian militia in the Army units, and the units under the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln. There were police regiments of the regular police and battalions of the Ukrainian militia, who were subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
QYou just mentioned the name of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and said his name was Jeckeln. Can you give us a characteristic of Jeckeln?
A The Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln carried out a totalitarian way of using his power, which extended down to the Security Police, and, beyond that, to the local commanders. Jeckeln did not allow any contradiction. His manner was inconsideration of others; given orders should only be reported when they had actually been executed.... His instructions were supported through the SS and Police Court of which he was the presiding judge.
QWere the Ukrainian militia units the same as the Army units?
ANo; there were Ukrainian security units with the local commandanturas; secondly, Ukrainian militia units within the Army - that is, with the Security Division of the Army. And Ukrainian militia units who were subordinate and attached to the Police Department of the Higher SS and police leader.
QI refer to Document Book of the Prosecution II-C, on page 18 of the German text, which is the Document Exhibit No.71, Document NO2952.
DR. HOCHWALD:Page 16 of the English Document Book, Your Honor. BY DR. HEIM:
(continuing) It says there, I quote: "In Shitomir itself, Gruppenstab and Vorauskommando 4-A in cooperation have up to date shot, all in all, approximately 400 Jews, Communists and informants for the NKWD. Thus, Einsatzkommando 4-A has carried out 2531 executions."
Witness, will you please comment on these reports?
AI was not present during this event. It happened when I was absent, at the time I was at the hospital in Lublin. In this connection, however, I want to point out that this report is not correct, and that there is a discrepancy in it. In the Situation Report No. 37 of 29 July 1941, Document No. 2952, Exhibit 71, the execution of 400 persons in Shitomir is mentioned, by the SK 4-A. In the Operation Report No. 47, of 9 August 1941, Document 2947, Exhibit 82, from the Book II-C - there it also says that in Shitomir 400 people were executed.
DR. HOCHWALD:Page 66, Your Honors. BY THE WITNESS:
(continuing) Therefore, in the Situation Report two weeks later the same figure is mentioned.
DR. HEIM: Your Honors, may I state where you can find the two documents the witness just mentioned? The Document NO-2952, Exhibit 71,is contained in Document Book II-C of the Prosecution, on page 18 of the German text. The Document 2947, Exhibit 82, is contained in Document Book II-C, on page 72 of the German text.
DR. HOCHWALD:The first document, Your Honors, is on page 16 of the English; and the second one is on page 66. BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, how can you explain the total figure mentioned there, of 2531 executions?
AThe figure 2531 is an addition of those figures in the documents in Document Book II-C, 2934 Exhibit 78; Document Book II-A, 2936, Exhibit 44; Document Book II-C, 2952, Exhibit 71. Adding up the figures in the documents, results in the figure 2494, while the document says 2952. Exhibit 71 mentions the figure 2531 as a total of those figures. But in the figures mentioned last, shootings by the Army, the Police, the Ukrainian Units, and SK 4-A are all put together and reported here.
QPlease give a short description of the situation in the Ukrainian territory as it developed after the German Army had occupied it.
AIn the Ukrainian territory after the occupation, several movements in the population could be felt. Some were in favor of the Germans, and some strongly disapproved of the Germans. The armed civilian resistance was carried out by civilian agents of the Russian NKWD who organized it and carried out by them. Civilian snipers, partisans, spies, agents, saboteurs of traffic, railroads and streets, of communications and army property, could be found. Russian agents formed resistance groups against the German army. Partisans and guerrilla bands were active. Excesses took place, murders and arson were committed, they tried also to destroy the harvest and the machines. The Russians helped these partisans and guerrillas and suddenly a great number of people moved from the east to the west. Parachutists acted as agents.
QWhat results came about owing to this situation,concerning the division of this territory from a military point of view?
AThe territories where these destructions and the disturbances of the security of the units had taken place, were large territories. From the front to the rear they were divided in several sectors: the fighting area which varied had a depth of 20 to 40 kilometers and more; the rear area where the new .fighting units and the supply units moved; then came the Rear Army territory, and then followed the operational territory. All together from the front up to the rear it extended over 300 to 500 kilometers.
QIn which territory was the SK 4A active?
AThe SK 4A was active in the operations in the fighting territory near the front. During the advance the borders often varied owing to the enemy action,but if the front did not move for some time, the areas over-lapped owing to the constant movement from the rear area so that the rear army territory some times reached into the combat area almost to the front.
QWhat was the consequence of this over-lapping of the territory just described?
AThat apart from the Command Agencies of the fighting units, the agencies or the offices of the rear army territory and the rest of the operational territory were operating. At the same time the activities of these offices had to be carried out in the same territory. For example, the agricultural leaders were operating very near the fighting units. It was the same with the police and security tasks of the higher SS and police leader and the units intended for the army, such as the security division of the army, the secret field police, local kommandanturas with their local Ukranian security units and the Ukranian militia units as part of the security units. Also the front units with their security behind the front line or in the area near the front. In the same territory, the higher SS and police leader had his police regiments of the regular police and the Ukranian militia also subordinate to him. The sub kommandos were in the areas near the combat line subdivided into smaller divisions.
QWhat was the consequence of all of these agencies working in the same place?
AThe result was something similar. In the same territory the higher SS and police leader was with his advanced regiments and the regular police and the Ukranian militia units who were subordinate to him, and on the other hand the army with the subordinate units, security divisions and the Ukranian militia units, also the secret field police and the local commandanturas and the Ukranian security departments. And behind the combat area the front units with the army and their security units.
All of these agencies were active for the security in the same territory at the same time.
QIn what manner and in which territory were the sub-kommandos active at that time?
AAt that time the sub-kommandos were with the combat units in the combat territory. Some of them had been attached to troops when combating the destruction mentioned before and often they came across opponents who were not military.
QWere the Part Kommandos independent in carrying out their tasks?
ANo, no the Part Kommandos were not at all independent, they had to follow orders, which were given by leaders of the army through G-2 of the front or security division or by the army on their own responsibility orders directly from their leaders or to the higher SS or police leaders via group C, in doubtful cases, however, the G-2 decided where these kommandos had to be and to whom they were to be attached.
QThe G-2 officers of the division you just mentioned, did they have to follow orders?
AYes, these G-2 officers received orders from G-2 of the AOK 6, on the basis of information from the AOK itself, or upon instigation of the higher SS and police leader in agreement with the commander in chief of the AOK 6. There was an exchange of information between G-2 of the divisions and the G-2 of the AOK 6.
QWith regard to the assignment in Ukranian territory was there a special department with the AOK 6?
AFor investigation about Ukranian concerns in the AOK 6 there was a special Ukranian department of about 160 men who with a far reaching organization was active among the Ukranian population.
QWho was in charge of this department and what was its special task?
AThis section which was lead by German officers was active far beyond the combat area and particularly the task to solve the military and housing problems and also to bring the cultural ideas from the occupied territory to the enemy territory.
QWith the Part Kommandos were there also members of this section?
ANo, the liaison officers which the sub-kommandos get by and by came from the civilian population but were of minor importance.
QPlease tell us briefly from which agency did the sub-kommandos receive their orders?
AThe sub-kommandos had to follow the orders of the leaders of the army and of the fighting units and also of the security divisions. Also they received orders from the AOK 6 and from the higher SS and police leaders, the latter through Group C and of the office of the SK 4A. Other orders of the Group "C" were given directly according to the situation and to the events. In emergency cases every leader of the SK had to decide for himself.
QPlease give us a short description of this over-lapping of the various sectors and the crowding of agencies which gave orders at the same time and in what they resulted.
AThe over-lapping I mentioned before occurred in the entire territory of the army area. Reports about endangering the security came repeatedly to the Einsatz Fuehrer of the army near the front. The measures were carried out by the army leaders themselves, that is, measures according to the army orders were carried out independently or with the instructions of the competent Department "C" of the front divisions or the security divisions. The latter were executive organs to whom the local commandanturas with their Ukranian security units and the militia units which I have already mentioned, were attached. They were all subordinate. The local commandanturas were simultaneously informed by the higher SS and the police leader and carried out measures in the same territory.
QOwing to this what were the relations with the higher SS and the police leader on the one hand and the Commander in Chief of the AOK C, Field Marshal Von Reichenau on the other hand?
AThis over-lapping of offices and orders had the result that the higher SS and police leader got total power, even as far as the area near the combat territory. In carrying out security measures in this area the commander in chief of the AOK 6, Von Reichenau, with the higher SS and police leader, Jackeln, agreed on their orders. The latter was generally feared because he did not allow any objection to his orders.
QWhat measures were taken by the higher authorities to stop these conditions in this territory?
AThe Commanders in Chief made posters which said that any action which might in any way affect the German army, intended or actually carried out, would be punished by death. Streets and territory were searched by Army units. The Commander in Chief gave daily orders to all army units and recommended that strict measures should be taken against these people.
QWas the SK 4A participating in this and if so, in what way?
AApart from the current security tasks and the events mentioned, the SK 4A was ordered to control the movement from the East to the west and also to take measures to protect the harvest. In the same way for investigation about Ukranian national opponents and their armies.
QWhat other units were used to fight the increasing resistance of the civilian population?
ABesides the army units, the Ukranian militia and army units, the police units of the higher SS and police leader and also the Ukranian militia units of the higher SS and police leader.
QPlease describe the manner in which your tasks were carried out and give details.
AThe searching for Russian parachutists in the area near the combat area was one of the tasks. To seize the people who gave the information and their means of information were to be seized. Such persons had to be given to the G-2 section immediately to be interrogated. Apart from the military reconnaissance they had to transmit political information. The number of such persons who took part in this was very large on the whole and extended from place to place.
Another task was the reconnaissance about the whereabout of guerilla forces, their propaganda, their arms strength and their informations and channels of communication, and agents. Reports about these investigations to the competent agents in their territory supporting them, assistance when seizing such opponents, interrogation of the persons arrested, preparing of records and additional information to the information the G-2 officers had gotten.
QHow long was the SK 4A stationed in Shitomir?
AIn Shitomir the SK 4A remained until they advanced toward Kiev, that is, until the 17 September 1941, inclusive. On that day the battle of the Dniepre River East of Kiev had been decided.
QThroughout all this time were you not in charge of the SK 4A in Shitomir?
AExcept for the time when I was ill, about my birthday, the 13th of August until the beginning of September 1941.
QWhat kind of an illness did you have?
AI had caught the welhynian fever which was spread very much at the time and the staff physicians of the AOK 6 looked after me.
QWhile you were ill was somebody acting as deputy in your position, and if so, who was this deputy?
ANo special deputy was appointed. My chief had their spheres of work. The interpreters Mueller and Radetzky looked after the information service and the sub-commando leaders who were 100 to 120 kilometers away automatically arranged everything with the competent army agencies, the local commanders, the G-2 of the divisions and leaders and commanders of the divisions.
QWhat happened while you were ill?
AI still remember that while I was in Shitomir, there was a conference with Einsatz Group C where the higher SS and police leader made it a point that the measures against the Jewish population had to be sharper and that he disapproved of the manner in which they had been carried out until now because it was too mild.
QDid the members of the SK 4A take part in this discussion?
AI have already mentioned I had the wolhynian fever, no deputy was asked to go to this conference, information about it was handed on by the Group staff. Jeckeln reserved the subject of the treatment of the Jews for himself.
QWhat was the reaction to the measures which had been ordered?
AThe measures were not approved of. Dr. Rasch withdrew from the vicinity of the SS and police leader and went with some of his group staff to Novo Ukarinka, and the sub-kommandos of the SK 4A withdrew further back to the front.
QI refer to document book 2-C of the Prosecution on page 72 of the German text. I believe in the English text it is page 82, it is the document exhibit 82, document NO 2947.
MR. HOCHWALD:It is on page 66 of the English.
DR. HEIM:I beg your pardon.
QDo you have the documents?
AYes.
QExhibit 82, document NO. 2947, in this document it is reported and I quote:
"In Berdichew until the arrival of Einsatz Kommando 5, a unit of Einsatz Kommando 4-A was committed. 148 Jews were executed because of looting, Einsatz commando 5 further executed 74 Jews up to this time."
Witness, will you please comment on this part of the document?
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Heim, what page of the original is that on? What page of the German original, because the report is rather long.
MR. HOCHWALD:In the English it is on page 71 in the middle of the page, the fifth paragraph from the top.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, thank you. when you refer to a report, Dr. Heim, and then it has been located, please indicate the page of the original, because it does not always correspond with the mimeographed copy. Some times you may have a page and a half of the original report on just one page of the mimeographed copy.
DR. HEIM:Thank you, Your Honor, for helping me.
QWill you please comment on this passage in the document?
AThe unit of SK 4-A in Berdichew could have carried out these measures only upon the order of the competent army commander, but there is also a possibility that this instruction was given by the higher SS and police leader and that the staff was in Berdichew. I was not present myself during this event. It must heave happened during the advance.
QWitness, please look at document Book I of the Prosecution, page 122 of the German text. It is document Exhibit 23, document No. 3154.
MR. HOCHWALD:The document is on page 89 of the English, Your Honor. BY DR. HEIM:
QIt is situation report No. 80 of the 11 September 1941. I quote from about the middle of page 122 of the German text which is at the beginning of page 13 of the original. It is the third paragraph in the original I quote:
"In Korosten, according to reports received, numerous Jews who had previously fled had gathered again, constituting a source of continuous unrest.
"238 Jews who had been rounded up and driven to a special building by the Ukrainian militia, were shot.
"In Fastow, where the Secret Field police of the local command post and a Landesschuetzen Batallion had already liquidated about 39 snipers and 50 Jews, order could be fully restored only after Special Kommando 4-a had shot a former terrorist and all the whole Jewish inhabitants between the ages of 12, and 60, making a total of 262 heads.
"Therefore, the execution figure of SK A4 until the 24-8-1941, amounts to 7152 persons."
Witness, how do you explain this report just submitted?
AAs this report says, Jews were rounded up in Korosten by Ukranian militia, but the SK-4-A had nothing to do with these actions, because Ukrainian militia were not subordinate to the SK-4-A. Also the SK-4-A could not give orders to Ukrainian militia, and SK-4-A was also not mentioned as an executive unit. Fastow is 90 kilometers to the east of Zhitomir, to the southeast, and very near the combat area, it was an artillery zone around Kiev. In this territory only a Commander of the Army or a unit commander of the Army could have given orders. Whether Subkommando 4-A ever went into Fastow I personally do not know.
It says then, "With that the figures of executions by the SK-4-A amounts to 7152." The difference between this figure and the previous figure, 2531, cannot be understood, and does not conform with the facts. This description in the report shows that all figures in Korosten and Fastow, where the SK-4-A is not mentioned, were added to a total, an addition according to territory results, of figures of executions by the SK-4-A through the information service. It is very probable that from situation reports where events in the Ukrainian territory were mentioned, these figures were included in the figures of the nearest headquarters.
QWas the execution of the persons mentioned there ordered by you?
ANo, I have never been in Fastow and have not received any such order.
QWho gave the order for the executions then?
AI personally do not know. In Korosten it must have been that authority to whom the Ukrainian militia was subordinate. This might have been an Army unit or the Higher SS and Police Leader. As to the Fastow case, either the front can have given the order or the security division belonging to the AOK/6.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Heim, just for a point of information. Witness, where were you when Special commando 4-A was in Fastow?
DR. HEIM:Witness, do you understand the President's question?
THE WITNESS:Yes, where was I when the Sonderkomando 4-A was in Fastow.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
THE WITNESS:We had a subkommando to the south. I personally was in Shitomir in the orderly room.
THE PRESIDENT:And whom had you authorized to head the Kommando 4-A in Fastow while you were in Shitomir?
THE WITNESS:At the south territory there was a Subkommando South near Biala Zerkjew Wassilkow at the time.
THE PRESIDENT:Either I didn't get your answer or I didn't make my question clear enough. Whom had you authorized to direct Special Kommando 4-A when it was in Fastow and you weren't there, you were in Shitomir? To whom had you delegated your authority to command the unit when you were not there?
THE WITNESS:The subkommando leader of the commando South was Jantzen. About September he was ill in Zhitomir for sometime, and shortly before the kommando moved he came back to the kommando. At that time, as far as I remember, the kommando was subordinated to the GFP there, that is the Secret State Police, because there was no other leader at their disposal.
THE PRESIDENT:But you were normally the leader of this SK-4-A, were you not?
THE WITNESS:Yes, I was the chief of the entire command.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, that is right. Well, you weren't in Fastow when these events occurred, as you have told us, but who was in charge of the Kommando in Fastow? Being the leader, whom had you delegated to lead the Kommando?
THE WITNESS:I did not give any such order. I only heard about this event in this report, and the leader in September, Jantzen, was ill in Zhitomir for two weeks during that time.
THE PRESIDENT:Just a moment, I didn't say that you had ordered anybody. I am just asking whom you placed in command of Special Kommando 4-A during the time that these events occurred since you were not there.
THE WITNESS:In this lower territory there was a Subkommando South, and it was lead by the leader, Jantzen.
THE PRESIDENT:Well then, was it Jantzen who was in Fastow when this occurred?
THE WITNESS:Whether he was in Fastow I don't know,but he was in Biala Zerkjew. That is further southeast.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, if Special Kommando 4-A was in Fastow at the time indicated, then it was Jantzen who was in charge of it at that time. Well then, I take your answer to be that it was Jantzen.
THE WITNESS:Jantzen was in charge of the Southeast Subkommando, but whether this Subkommando went to Fastow, I only just read that in these documents, that it actually had been there.
THE PRESIDENT:You may proceed. BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, were you in charge of the Subkommando South, that is, couls you give orders to them and tell them the commitment?
ASubkommando South was subordinate to me in their commitment, but in their territory they were subordinate to the Army Commander in the territory. They were part of the division where they operated at the time.
QAt the time did you give orders for executions?
AI did not give orders for executions.
QI now refer to Document Book II-C of the Prosecution, on Page 32 of the German text. It is the document, Exhibit 73, Document NO-3151.
MR.HORLICH-HOCHWALD: Page 27 of the English, your Honor.
Q (Continuing) It is the situation report No. 86 of the 17th of September 1941. On Page 32 of the German text, Page 17 of the original text, ti says in the third paragraph, Page 17 of the original, continuation of the original, Paragraph 4 of Page 17 of the original, I quote: "that the Sonderkommando 4-A has exterminated 6584 Bolshevists, Jews and asocial elements." Witness, will you please comment on this?
AThe difference of 2531 with 6584 and also the figure 7152 as a total are incorrect.