At no time during my leadership of the Kommando did I send the Kommando VII-A or parts of it to such villages, and no such action at such a place was ever reported to me. Even now during my imprisonment I could not find these places on any map which was given to me. I could not find any place, Sadrudubs, or any place sounding similarly which is in my area. The same is true of the place Belowschtschina. I am sure that the event reported here did not take place in my area of commend and that no part of my kommando participated in this operation.
Q. Have you any other point of views which makes it appear impossible that this operation took place in your Jurisdictional area?
A. Yes, the already discussed document in Book II-B, Exhibit No. 60, of the 9th of October, 1941, on page 21 of the English and page 21 of the German, page 20 of the original. This shows that the Special Kommando 7a, as of the 28th of September, had carried out 1252 executions. This was the status subsequent to this partisan action. At this opportunity I would like to point out that at this time the neighboring Kommando 7b reports the executions of 1544 people. That is, 7a is listed with 1252 and 7b is listed with 1544 persons.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please, Dr. Mayer. There seems to be some confusion in my book. Page 21 does not carry the items which have been listed. What document number?
DR. MAYER: This is Document NO-3156, Exhibit No 60, operational report No. 108, and this is a compilation on the last page of the operational report.
THE PRESIDENT: What happened in my book is that page 20 was omitted and then 21 was misnumbered. However, I have a corrected book before me and you may proceed.
A. (Continuing) Yes. I would merely like to determine that this figure of 1252 is charged to Kommando 7a, the Sonderkommando, and 1554 executions are charged to 7b lying in its southern proximity.
I would like to compare this with Exhibit 63 in Book II-B of the 26th of October, 1941, Report No. 125. A comparison with this and that of the 26th of October shows that from the report of the 9th of October, which we have just discussed, the execution number of Kommando 7a increases from 1252 to 1344. Thus from the operational report of the 9th of October to that of the 26th of October an increase of 92 executions is determined for Kommando 7a. On the other hand, a comparison with the execution figures of 7b shows an increase of 278. In order to carry out this comparison be a conclusion: Since the 9th of October up to the period of this report, it is reported that the Kommando 7a had executed 63 Communists. If these Jews in Sadrudubs were to be included in this, no increase of only 92 people could ever be determined. This comparison proves that the man making out the report either at the Group or in Berlin did not include the 272 Jews in his report of 25 October of Kommando 7a. At least, it may be assumed that they were included under 7b, and this assumption becomes very probably since in no report after the 9th of October until the report of the 26th of October any executions are reported on the part of 7b. Therefore, the increase under 7b by 278 people is only comprehensible if the report about Sadrudubs refers to 7b. to 7b is to be found in the report of the 26th of October, Book II-B, Exhibit No. 63, Document NO-3403, Page 41 of the English, page 40 of the German, page 2 of the original. There it says, one day after the report about the Jews in Sadrudubs, that the Special Kommando 7b had secured 46,700 rubles in cash, and I quote, "which were found in possession of a number of Jews having been liquidated," no mention is made of 7a in reference to money which has been delivered from Jews.
in the area of 7b. On the other hand, a town Starudub, is mentioned in the reports of September and October as garrison of 7b. This is in the operational report No. 90 of the 21st of September and likewise in the operational Report No. 123 of the 24th of October. That is one day before the alleged action at Sadrudub. Both reports are in my document books in excerpts. The operational report No. 90 on the 5th page of the original, and I quote, "Special Kommando 7b, up to the 8th of September, had its headquarters in Gomel, and had several localities," - and here are some names and Starudub is mentioned here - "and had these occupied by its subkommandos." Then in the operational report of 24th of October, and I quote: "Sonderkommando 7b determined that in the vicinity of Starudub 102 partisans were found there." The city of Starudub is situated several hundred kilometers south of my garrisons in the district of Tschernikow. The fact that the village of Belowschtschina, according to an affidavit, according to an expert opinion to be submitted here, is to be found several kilometers southwest of Starudub might explain the fact, together with the other viewpoints mentioned, that the action reported in the operational report of the 25th of October about Sadrudub really refers to the town of Starudub, and the above mentioned action was actually carried out by Special Kommando 7b. The corruption of the names may be the result of a fault in the radio communications or is a typographical error. The number of letters is the same in both cases. At least I can say that my kommando 7a, at my time, was neither in Sadrudub nor in Starudub nor did it execute Jews or Jewesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, might we recess now?
The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.)
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. II, Case No. IX
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MAYER (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT STEIMER) Your Honor, may I proceed with my direct examination?
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Mayer.
(By Dr. Mayer) Witness, I want to show you the report of events of the 14th of November 1941. It is in Document Book II-B. It is Exhibit No. 59, Document No-2825. It is on page 12 of the English Document Book and on page 10 of the German Document Book. It is the Einsatz report and it says on the page next to the last page that Sonderkommando 7a, in the time of reporting, carried out 173 executions. Can you remember these executions? It is also not mentioned in the text what persons are shot and where. According to the period of reporting and according to the dates, it must mean the time between the 10th of October until the end of October. During this time, I was in the advanced Kommando of 7A marching towards Wyazma and Wyazma Utask, and marching towards Kalinin. In this subkommando no executions were carried out at that time. As far as actual executions were carried out, that can only have happened in the mentioned reporting period in Welikie Luki and in Welisch. These two kommandos moved in the direction of Smolensk at the end of October. Either they reported to the Group Staff there or they reported at a later date by teletype message.
I can certify that in October I made no reports. The actual facts which I know are that in Welisch, as well as in Welikie Luki, during the course of October, activity was increased and actions were carried out against partisans together with the Wehrmacht. As far as executions were carried out at all by my kommando either directly or in connection with the Wehrmacht, they refer to partisans and other resistance parts of movements. It is therefore a combination of all executions in the territories around Welikie Luki and Welisch, but I would like to point out that I cannot confirm the number of executions.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
this, for instance, points 3 and 5, these individual actions mentioned here do not refer to my kommando and have not been carried out by it. This can be proved in each case. and Jews, this refers to the shootings in Mogilew. Einsatzkommando 8 is mentioned in connection with Mogilew. That is on page 17 of this original document.
The following executions in Wyazma are reported to have been carried out by EK 9. Then in the action mentioned in Point 5, there again Mogilew is mentioned as the garrison for the Einsatzkommando 8. Then the following paragraph of Point 5 refers to the location of a garrison at Asmoni. This village Asmoni is again mentioned on page 17 of the original of this report, but it says Esmoni here with an "E", "Esmoni" and I quote, "It is 40 kilometres to the north west of Mogilew". Mogilew is, as I have already mentioned, the garrison of Einsatzkommando 8. The EK 8 is also charged with executions against Jews which are mentioned in this third paragraph. It is further mentioned in this report that Gorki is northeast of Mogilew. The next location, which is Mistislawl, is said to be 80 kilometres to the east of Mogilew. The further operations refer to Mogilew. From these locations it becomes quite evident that 7A did not participate in these operations and did not carry them out. December 1941. It is in Document Book II-B, Exhibit 62, Document NO2824 on page 30 of the English and 31 of the German. Did your kommando participate in these individual actions mentioned here? Naumann, who mentions the locations which are mentioned in this particular report and he made statements concerning these locations. He said that none of these villages were within the field of actions of Special Kommando 7A at that time. This is correct. Without much difficulty I could, using the names of villages, confirm and establish which kommando Court No. II, Case No. IX.
was in charge. I could find out by using the names of the locations which are mentioned in this document and if the Situation Report of 3 days later of the 22d of December is used, it is easy to establish this, which is on page 15 of the English Document Book III-B and on page 17 of the German. Apart from this remark, I can only repeat that my kommando had nothing to do with these executions which are mentioned in Document NO-2824, Exhibit No. 62 and in the Report of Events of the 19th of December, 1941. events, No, 154 in II-A, 162 in Volume III-B and l68 in Book III-A. No. 154 is Exhibit No. 51. It is Document No-3273. It is on 105 of the English Document book and 113 of the German. The Report 162 is Exhibit No. 122, Document NO-4784, on page 53 of the English Document Book and page 82 of the German Book, and Report 168 is Exhibit No. 107 and Document KO-4533 on page 45 of the English Book and 63 of the German Book. All these reports name you as the leader of Special Kommando 7A. They are of January and February, 1942, and do not carry any reports of Einsatzgruppe B. Please, will you comment on this briefly? 10th of December 1941, I went on leave, from which I should have returned on the 15th of January normally. During this leave, I asked for relief via the SS and Police Leader in Stuttgart, who was my immediate superior. The reasons I gave were that my teeth had to be treated. This request for relieve was not complied with, because I had to submit a certificate by a dentist. This I did. The long channel caused my prececessor to be prevented from arriving immediately and, therefore, automatically my name was mentioned as the leader of Kommando 7b. I should like to emphasize again that after my return from Russia to Stuttgart on the 20th of December, 1941 - that is, I arrived on the 20th of December, 1941 in Stuttgart - I did not return to my kommando. This was by permission of my superiors.
the Reich Security Main Office. In what position and how long were you employed in the Office 6 of the RSHA? was active in this office until the end of the war. I was in charge of Group 6b and from August 1944, apart from this activity, I took over a department Mil B -- that means Military Office B. That means the military office of the RSHA.
Q What were the assignments of Office 6? task to deal with political reporting in enemy occupied and neutral territories.
Q What do you mean "political, report", "political information service." ities of war importance of enemy, neutral, and occupied territories. This I did just like any political information service for any other state: to receive news on secret, political and other matters of war importance. One could describe this activity as political espionage.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
Q Witness, when was Office 6 in existence?
A I think since 1939. It had no tradition and no experience. There were no experienced people with any knowledge of foreign countries as collaborators and because of the war such assistants could not be found. There was a lack of understanding on the part of the Chiefs for the tasks of such an information service. Hitler refused to recognize our activity at times because he did not want to be irritated by the adversaries. Ribbentrop refused to recognize it because it was not under his leadership. special operations? Portugal.
Q How was your service organized? ordinated to me and in the countries themselves we maintained organizations who dealt with information services and people who were employed in these services. tried to change the Spanish foreign policy, a political and economical Spanish-English treaty was brought about. In this case the collaborators of the service succeeded in receiving secret information and through this they obtained the exact wording of the contract. utilized? situation in these countries and were passed to competent German authorities, and individual reports were immediately submitted to the authorities. German political refugees abroad, to watch them and to fight against them?
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
Mil, what was this?
Q What was this office? tion Service be created. This meant an organizational combination of the military espionage service which had been up to that moment under the OKW, which was called up to than Counter-Intelligence with the Political Information Service of Office 6. That is a cooperative Counter-Intelligence. Military espionage from this point on became the military office in the RSHA and was combined with the Office 6 as The German Secret Information Service. That is what it was called. Schellenberg who was the office chief of Office 6 took over this office Military, so that these two offices had a personnel union. In this development I became Department Chief in Department B of this military office and I remained at the same time Group Chief of 6 B.
Q What were your tasks as Chief of Mil B? leadership of the military espionage service against the Western Allies. Excluded from this field of activities was the so-called frontal enlightment, that is, Military Intelligence in the enemy operational territory. This was the task of another individual organization, while my department only dealt with territory behind the front lines. vice within your office? Service. According to your statements, you already dealt with these matters when you were in Stuttgart. How was that?
A I had always been very interested in foreign policy. There Court No. II, Case No. IX.
fore, it was obvious that I was very much attracted by foreign information service. Therefore, after war broke out and when my Stuttgart SD Department was officially joined to Office 6, I devoted myself to this task.
Q I am now thinking of the years 1939 to 1942. Did you, during that time have a personal conception and idea of foreign political problems? European disaster. I nver believed that it would ever come to war with Poland either. According to this, my attitude, after the beginning of the war with the aid of this foreign information, I tried to find ways and means to maintain peace and to have peace negotiations.
Q Did you actually concretely bring about such negotiations? I had through liaison men connections with English circles. I had established such connections and I reported about these to Berlin.
Q What was your aim? tact between one German and one English personality and it seemed to me it should be aimed at to bring about a political understanding between the Western powers. In 1940, after the Western Campaign, it was quite obvious that an understanding with England could be achieved, if it was brought about cleverly. By this modification, I mean the bringing about of a loyal peace treaty with France. In 1942, however, I hoped for a union on an Anti-Bolshevist basis.
Q Did these discussions actually take place? came about, because Hitler or Ribbentrop prohibited getting in touch with the enemy at that time. period of your activities in Office 6?
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
chief tried himself to go to find this particular way.
Q Did you discuss this attitude of yours with other authorities? dealing with France, I expressed this attitude. Also my office chief made us of the material which was brought in by me and the oral and written reports. still be able to work in this particular way, that is, to bring about able compromise? so far. First of all, the success of the invasion on the German part meant that there would be a two-frontal war which they could not possibly stand. Furthermore, the Western Allies with their success had a strongly fortified position. The possibility was given now to Germany, of course, to keep the Bolshevist Army from the German borders with sacrifices.
Q. What caused you to believe in a possibility of an understanding with the Western powers at that time?
A. From our work dealing with foreign news the increased tensions between Russia and England were well known. Also the facts that there were American circles who were reserved as far as the question of unconditional surrender was concerned ... from our work dealing with foreign countries. the tensions which became stronger between Russia and England was well known to us. Also the fact that there were circles in America who took a doubtful attitude towards unconditional surrender.
MR. FERENCZ: Your Honor, I don't want to impede the Defense in any way. However, of this is going to continue much longer this line of questioning, I would like to point out that what the defendant did to improve relations between England or France or the Western powers as against Russia has absolutely nothing to do with this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is in the nature correct, Mr. Ferencz, but the Defense has the right to submit whatever evidence it has, and whatever line of reasoning it cares to present, in an attempted exculpation of the charges brought against it, and if the defendant believes that by establishing what he was attempting to do to bring about peace, that this tends to fortify his denial that he had anything to do with executions, it would be relevant and the Court will permit it. The objection is over-ruled.
DR. MAYER: Thank you, your Honor.
Q. (By Dr. Mayer) Did you have contacts which could have led to negotiations?
A. Yes, but those negotiations never came about because the final victory of Germany became the bible of the German people, so that any remarks as to the actual position became senseless and any foreign political attitude and thought were encircled by the two mottoes of unconditional surrender of the Allies and the final victory on the other side... that was the official German motto. For a political information service regarding this particular position there was no way out, and nothing could be done.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, I have reached the end of my questioning within the direct examination of the witness. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Witness, you made one statement with regard to your attempts to bring about peace with England, and the phrase that we captured through the translation was that this peace could be achieved...this end could be achieved...if you went about the operation cleverly. Did you regard the attempt of Rudolf Hess as a clever movement? Would you put that within the category of the cleverness of program which you referred to?
A. I don't know the actual reasons for Hess's flight, but if this flight had an official or inofficial aim to start peace negotiations without any preparations, then, of course, I cannot regard this as a very reasonable attempt, the manner which it was done.
Q. Did you know anything of it before it took place?
A. No, I did not.
Q. What was your rank during the time that you were chief of Office VI in the RSHA?
A. In June 1944 I was promoted to Standartenfuehrer.
Q. What is the equivalent in the military field... what rank?
A. If a comparison is at all possible, it is the rank of a colonel.
Q. Yes, While you were making all these efforts to bring about peace with the Allies, was there any resentment on the part of Ribbentrop that you, only a colonel, would attempt to usurp the functions which undoubtedly he was very jealous of?
A. I was merely an information service activity which would show that there was a possibility of confidential negotiation, and this fact does not necessarily need an attitude, although in this particular case there was an attitude and it was passed on the authorities, not by myself but by my office chief.
Q. The Foreign Office, then, was entirely satisfied that you conduct these efforts?
A. No, it did not go via the Foreign Office from our own office, but our office chief passed it on to Himmler, as far as I know, and Himmler decided.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Any defense counsel desire to cross examine the witness? I understand you are finished with the direct examination, Dr. Mayer?
DR. MAYER: Yes, Your Honor. BY DR. SURHOLT (for the defendant Dr. Rasch):
Q. When did you join the Eastern assignment, witness?
A. As I have already said yesterday, it was in the first days of September. It was then that I arrived in Russia.
Q. Who was your Gruppe chief?
A. Brigadefuehrer Nebe was in charge then.
Q. How long was Nebe your Gruppe chief?
A. During November the position changed.
Q. And who took his place?
A. Naumann.
Q. Do your know whether, in the meantime, Dr. Rasch had been Gruppe chief or whether he was not Gruppe chief?
A. During the time when I was in Russia I never heard that Rasch was a leader of my Gruppe.
Q. As kommando leader of Gruppe B, therefore, you only knew that Nebe was in charge of the Gruppe, when you came and Naumann took his place later on?
A. Yes.
DR. SURHOLT: Thank you.
COURT II CASE IX BY DR. FRITZ (for the defendant Fendler):
Q. Since when do you know defendant Fendler?
A. Since the fall 1943.
Q. Where and under what conditions did you meet him?
A. Office VI was looking for a departmental chief, a Referent in my Gruppe, 6-b, and Fendler was assigned to Office VI, it was part of my own Gruppe, and he was subordinated to me directly within the Gruppe.
Q. You said in your direct examination, witness, I think, that the Gruppe dealt with countries of western and south western Europe.
A. Yes.
Q. And what countries did Fendler deal with?
A. Fendler was "Referent" for the sub-department 6-b-4 which dealt with Spain and Portugal.
Q. You have already explained generally in your direct examination the task of Office VI. I would like you to tell us now what special tasks were the tasks of a Referent, as Mr. Fendler was.
A. A Referent in a Gruppe had to obtain information ab out the country with which he was dealing. In the case, of Fendler, it was Spain and Portugal. He also had to have the necessary technical qualifications, and he had to get the technical information and other informational material, and he had to compile such material. The office material was then evaluated, and was passed on. As far as information which he received concerned the country he dealt with, -- in this case Spain and Portugal -- he had the responsibility as a Referent for a Spain report which he had to compile. If information was received concerning other countries, they were passed on to the responsible Referents of other offices. These reports were submitted to the Office Chief, the Gruppe COURT II CASE IX Chief, who passed them on to competent authorities or to the Reich agencies.
Q. And who signed these reports?
A. That depended entirely on the receiver of the report. It depended on by what agency it was received.
Q. What authority to sign did Fendler have?
A. He had the authority to sign all reports which went to his own office, or his subordinates. All reports to his chiefs and superiors had to be signed by the Gruppe chief or by the proper office chief.
Q. Did Office VI, or the defendant Fendler - apart from receiving information from foreign countries have also tasks dealing with active foreign policy?
A. No, no.
Q. Did Office VI have to deal with assignments of a political or propagandistic nature in the foreign organization of the NSDAP?
A. No.
Q. Did the defendant Fendler have anything to do with observation or supervision of persons or groups in foreign countries with the aim of persecuting them, either politically or by police?
A. No, that was not within his sphere of activity in the department, Fendler had nothing to do with it.
Q. Can you tell the Tribunal whether, in the subdepartment 6-b-4, there were only members of the SD or the NSDAP or the SS, or that they had to be members of the NSDAP?
A. No. Within the sub-department it was of ho significance, of no importance, whether anybody was a member of the Party of the SS for instance, there were emergency conscriptions into the office, civilian employees who, some of them, were not even members of the NSDAP; and, of course, many of them were not members of the SS. Qualifications for COURT II CASE IX the passing on of foreign information was the most important thing.
Some of them were members of the Wehrmacht, who had been detailed for such work.
Q. Was the defendant Fendler, while he was employed in Office VI, was he active in the Party or any one of the departments?
A. I know nothing about it. According to my knowledge he was fully employed in the office.
Q. Was defendant Fendler a member of the General SS?
A. No, he was a member of the SD. He was a member of the SD.
Q. Was he a member of the armed SS, the Waffen-SS?
A. That was only a formal matter. At the end of 1944 he joined the so-called "Training Institution" Konitz, but he remained in the Office VI, and he went on with the assignments of Office VI.
Q. Is it correct that the defendant Fendler received the order from you -- it was in 1944 -- to take part in establishing negotiations with the Western powers and technical requirements, and that he carried out these tasks?
A. It was contained in the program which I mentioned before, that Fendler worked on this task which had been given by the Office Chief, and in various cases he submitted reports which were to this effect.
Q. Do you remember what rank the defendant Fendler held when in 1943 he joined the Gruppe?
A. According to my memory he was Hauptsturmfuehrerbecause during the period he was employed there he became Hauptsturmfuehrer -- Regierungsassessor -- when he joined my office.
Q. Do you remember when Fendler was promoted to SS Sturmbannfuehrer?
A. I cannot say with certainly, but that was at the COURT II CASE IX end, shortly before the collapse.
Possibly in January 1945. I do not exclude the possibility that it was only in April 1945. It was at the end.
Q. It is supposed to have been in January 1945.
A. It is possible.
Q. It is possible?
A. Yes, it is possible.
Q. Did the Referent for 6-b-4, and there also Fendler, did he have any executive power?
A. No. There were no executive tasks contained in the foreign service, and therefore Fendler did not hold such an assignment.
Q. I have two conclusive questions concerning the personaltiy of the defendant Fendler. Do you know him as a brutal, and fanatic personality?
A. No, Fendler was not brutal, and he was not fanatical.
Q. Did he have tendencies to disregard authority?
A. No, Fendler was an independent personality who always did his duty in office VI.
DR. FRITZ: Thank you. Your Honor, I have no further questions. BY DR. VOGEL (for defendant von Radetzky):
Q. Witness, if I remember correctly, you were, from the middle of August 1942 until the middle of January 1943... you were active in SK 4-a.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. What were the assignments of the defendant von Radetzky in your Kommando?
A. When I took over the kommando he was liaison officer with the Second Army, and it was also his task to maintain contact with the Hungarian Army.
Q. Is it known to you that von Radetzky, before your Court II Case IX arrival to the SD 4-a, was the deputy of the kommando chief?
A. No, that is not known to me. And I don't think it is very likely... because at that time there was a Sturmbannfuehrer and Regierungsrat, Government Councillor, in the kommando who, if there had been such a thing as a deputy, he would have been the deputy.
Q. Is it known to you that the defendant Radetzky attempted to be relieved from his activities and his assignment in the kommando?
A. He discussed the question of his release, or the question of his attitude and assignment in the kommando, with me. At this time he attempted to join a combat unit. Shortly after my return to Berlin in the year 1943, Radetzky visited me, and he told me that he wanted to try at Office I to be relieved from this war emergency assignment.
DR. VOGEL: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Defense counsel desiring to cross examine may do so now. the Prosecution may be prepared to take up the cross examination after the Tribunal reconvenes at one forty-five.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours) (The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 6 November 1947)