THE PRESIDENT: If that is so, won't we then run into many complications as to the meaning of this term, because the Tribunal has been led to believe, and, with the Tribunal the rest of the world, that Hitler's word was law in Germany. Therefore, if he used the term "SD" in any particular way, wouldn't that of itself then make his meaning official?
DR ASCHENAUER: No, Your Honor. This is not a matter of the general mis-use, it just occurs in one particular decree in a sentence which was used here.
THE PRESIDENT: It would appear to me that from what we understand of Hitler's power, that if he called the SD a "PQ" that then it become "PQ" from that moment on.
DR ASCHENAUER: I don't think I have understood what Your Honor meant.
THE PRESIDENT: Whatever Hitler said was law, and if he used the term "SD" in any way opposed to your definition of "SD", Hitler's definition would be the law, would it not?
MR ASCHENAUER: No, Your Honor. That I quoted it here is one certain decree, which is erroneous, a mistake which has been made once, and all the other decrees which are being offered to the Tribunal, and submitted to them, who that what is said in this one sentence is a mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, it was for purpose of clarification that I had asked it. (interruption) Will you please repeat Dr. Aschenauer, it seems that it got into the wrong channel.
DR ASCHENAUER: The error is based on the fact that the term "SD" had the following meanings:
A. It is the term for a special news service organization which collected, evaluated, and submitted reports to the appropriate authorities of the State and of the Party. This news organization which did not have any executive police powers either before or during the war, exercised its functions within the SS, that is, within the Party;
its members were employees of the Party, and were paid by the latter, just as in general, the entire budget was met not by the State but by the Party, that is, the Reich Treasurer. If, therefore, the SD is referred to as an organization with a special assignment, that is an organization with certain tasks, only the above-mentioned news organization, with its clearly delineated duties, its installations and its personnel carrying out this task can and should be meant. Any other duty, or the assumption of a function is a false implication.
B. All wearers of the SS uniform with the SD marking on their left jacket sleeve were also characterized as "SD". From the beginning of the war, the SS uniform with the SD marking was worn by almost all of the members of the Secret State Police (Gestapo) including the Border Police, Criminal Investigation police, and especially all members of the Stapo and Kripe on combat assignment, were SS uniforms with the SD insignia. It is, therefore, easily understandable that everybody considered all men wearing this uniform to be "SD". Another result was that this term was not only applied to all those wearing those uniforms with the SD insignia but also to the organizations to which these men belonged. These were the SD offices in the actual sense of the word and the offices of the State Police and Criminal Police. For the sake of convenience and the desire for simplification and abbreviation, all of them were now called "SD". Thus the Wehrmacht, when dealing in enemy country with "commanders of the Security Police and of the SD" and with "Commanding Officers of the Security Police and of the SD"--that is what these agencies were officially called --, referred to them briefly merely as the "SD" only, for all members of these organizations were the SD insignia. Thus the French or the Norwegians referred briefly to these organizations and their personnel, all of whom were the SD insignia, as SD only, and usually they meant the State or Criminal Police. Actually, how could he know that the "Commander of the Security Police and of the SD" was an organizational term that could be traced back to the "Chief of the Security Police and SD," that even in these organizations there existed not always an SD news service set-up, or that in such organizations there were actually three completely independent and separate organizations included:
1. A news organization of the Party or of the SS, that is the SD in the real meaning of the word, as the organization with a special news service function.
2. Two authorities of the State Executive, that is of the Police (Stapo and Kripe), which in their special duties and activities, stood on an equal feeting completely independent one of the other, and were merely held together by purely organizational ties and by the fact that the same individual held, a lending position in both. (In this connection, see enclosed sketch.) mutually shared uniform (SD) finally went so far that even the Fuehrer in his "Commando Order" of 18 October 1942, ordered that the arrested commando troops be given over to the "SD" even though, in this instance, beyond all doubt, he meant the police executive, the State Police. It would not have occurred to any office in the Wehrmacht or the German Police to deliver members of an enemy commando, if they were arrested in the Reich, to an SD sector, for everyone know that this was exclusively the concern of the State Police. Kripe were this uniform and this SD insignia, even though they had nothing to do with the actual SD news service itself, as far as their duties were concerned? The answer to this requires a brief description of the development.
The "SD" as a news service originated in 1932, when HIMMLER commissioned HEYDRICH, a former naval officer, with the establishment of a news service, in order to combine uniformly the local "political information service" (P.I.) which had here and there arisen due to political necessity. This P. I. had the task of gathering information about the other political parties, their plans, and aims, in order to be able to utilize it in the struggle against the other parties.
include the gathering of information about all opponents of National Socialism, their organizations and their activities. The actual hour of birth of the SD, however, was in 1934 when a few old National Socialists who came from all circles of the movement and were thus clearly not recruited from the ranks of the SS alone, recognized the following to be true: The old parties of all shades of opinion, together or banned by the State. Any additional activity by these organizations is illegal and is therefore to be dealt with by the police, and the police is therefore authorized to fight, together with the Information Service, against such illegal opponents. This in itself proves that from the very beginning the SD (Security Service) was not at any time given such executive powers which rested exclusively with the police organs of the State. (Even at that time the SD was mainly engaged in the research and study of ideological contrasts and their effects on National Socialism.) Furthermore, they relized that A. Gradually, ever since 1933, all public criticism in parliaments, press and radio had been abolished. B. There was a growing tendency to misuse the Fuehrer principle and to push through orders, permitting no criticism. C. There existed the common tendency always to stress to higher authorities only the positive aspect of one's own field of activities, but to conceal in a shamefaced manner all unfavorable developments, mistaken measures, danger points, etc. only a completely distorted picture of the development and situation in the individual vital spheres (Lebensgebieten) (Law, administration, education, economy, etc.) They could no longer have a clear perception of the resulting reaction among the public and professional circles concerned. From this they concluded that an authoritarian state, by its every nature, needed an organization which would be willing and capable of presenting to responsible central agencies an objective and undisguised picture of the general position and developments without having any administrative responsibility itself.
In 1934/1935, this task was assumed by the SD with out explicit orders to that effect from any party or government authority, therefore, illegally, (For the authorization and legitimation of the SD as sole permissible news service of the NSDAP covered only the collection and transmission of news relating to counterreforms, their efforts and aims.) This explains why in 1934/1935 this part of the SD at the SD Main Office in Berlin consisted of a mere handful of men. Easter, 1935, for example, it consisted of a man who also worked as legal and administrative expert, 4 or 5 younger jurists, who had not finished their professional training and only worked part-time at the SD in addition to their other work, and 3 or 4 assistants. plete lack of agencies in the country and the necessity to build up this news service for vital spheres in a more or less illegal manner, because every reference to it caused sharp protests by the Party and above all by government authorities against this type of work. It was regarded by all these people as an inadmissible encroachment upon their own jurisdiction. Thus, for example, until 1936, the time when Ohlendorf entered the SD, the entire field of economy had hardly been dealt with. Only after that were systematic efforts made to win suitable specialists who were able to handle the individual vital spheres (Lebensgebietsarbeit) in an expert manner. At this juncture, it may already be said that from this work in purely vital spheres done by the Zentralabteilung II/2 the Amt III was subsequently developed under OHLENDORF, this is today considered the SD in the proper sense. "Chief of the German Police" with the official designation "Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police at the Reich Ministry of the Interior" in the process of another governmental reform and the centralization of the police which had hitherto been under the direction of the Laender.
Under him were Daluege as "Chief of Police and Heydrich as "Chief of the Security Police" Thereby, Heydrich simultaneously held a post in the administration of the SD as news service of the Party and of the entire German Security Police. This two-fold function explains the subsequent title of "Chief of the Security Police and SD" from which derives the designation "Commander" (or in command) (Befehlshaber) bzw. Kommandeure) of the Security Police and the SD in the occupied territories. Whereas until 1936 probably only a few members of the police, mainly the State Police, belonged to the SS, partly to the SD and partly to the General SS Himmler, from 1936 on, endeavored to have the SS take over the whole police organization. Thus from 1936 to 1939 many members of the police force who were eligible for the SS, were taken over into the SS, starting with the State Police and Criminal Police. Heydrich brought it about that the transferred members of the Stapo and Kripe began to wear SS uniforms. They were the SD insignia on the left sleeve, although they were never in any way connected with the SD as news service and as organization for a special task but remained, as hitherto, members of the state executive. Neither common service nor esprit de corps tied them to the SD. The uniform clothing of the Stapo and the SD, the distribution of which was started at that time, gave the uninitiated the first cause to designate on bloc as SS, members of two organizations of totally different fields of activitywork of a news service for vital spheres and executive work of the Security Police - merely becuase of their uniform outer appearance that is to say the SD uniform with the SD insignia. This misleading collective name led to the habit, of calling SD men not only the members of both organizations but of designating the offices and field of activity of both institutions simply as "SD". In fact, 90 percent of the people wearing SD uniforms had nothing to do with the actual work of the SD news organization. On the other hand, the SD of the RFSS, purely as news service, was not connected with the state executive (State Police and Criminal Police), either by subject matter or by its duties.
In spite of this fact, it was also called SD in common usage and especially also during the war in official announcements, decrees and orders (see Hitler's commande order). (Besides, in the NS-State there were numerous such 'personal unions' (one person being the holder of two or more jobs) as for instance in the person of Goering, the Minister President of Prussia, Reich Minister for Air, Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, Reich Chief for Hunting, etc. Nobody would dream of it to call all this one organization on account of the 'Personalunion'.) produced. There we see two completely different organizational and actual spheres of office - one of them the Party, the other the State. But the men working in these two completely independent and different set-ups are wearing the same uniform: The SS-uniform with SD. These were the first decisive causes for the above-mentioned complete confusion. the Party news service and the State Police were, on account of wearing the same uniform, mistakenly looked upon as one uniform entity, whereas from the very beginning they also showed very relevant actual differences among each other. These differences were the cause that already in 1937/38 some spheres of work Were completely taken away from the SD (II/i) and were handed over to the Secret State Police Office, namely Communism and Marxism. The 1938 decree concerning the division of functions (Funktiens-Trennungs-Erlass) already made it quite clear that the SD had nothing whatsoever to do with the comprehensive intelligence Service in enemy territory. These differences were ultimately settled when, urged by the State Police in 1938, another reorganization was effected, the result of which was the establishment of the "Reichssicherheitshauptant" (Reich Main Security Office.) Thus it was ultimately made clear that the dealing with the enemy in its entirety as far as intelligence service and actions resulting from it were concerned, belonged to the competence of the Secret State Police, that is to say, Amt IV of the RSHA.
This reorganization terminated the former Zentralabteilung II/1 (Central department) (Enemy research) ("Gegnerforschung") in the framework of the SD as a news service organization, and from that time onwards the SD's exclusive sphere of work was that of a mere news service organization, exclusively occupying itself with "Lebensgebietsarbeit" (matters concerning vital spheres). The former Zentralabteilung II/2 (Lebensgebiete) became the AMT III of the RSHA, and its employees were branded as members of a criminal organization in the IMT verdict. The SD, however, which organization was declared to be a criminal one, is according to its development the leading Zentralabteilung II/2 (Lebensgebiete), which at no time has had any contacts whatsoever with the tasks and the activities of the State Police (Stapo).
As from September 1939 the following set-up was given:
The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office) (RSHA) consists of 7 - seven - Aemter:
Amt I: Organization and Personnel Amt II:
Administration and Economy Amt III:
SD - Home Front (Lebensgebiete) Amt IV:
Secret State Police Amt V: Criminal Amt VI:
SD-Ausland (Foreign News Service) Amt VII:
Scientific Research problems of the Sipe (Stapo and Kripe) (State Police and Criminal Police) and of the SD in one organization. As far as their objectives are concerned they remain separated in the Amt, as for instance all the personnel problems of the SD (Amt II, VI and VII) Were handled in Referat I A 4 by men of the SD, of the former SD-Main Office, that means employees of the Party. They are exclusively concerned with SD, that is Party personal data, which have nothing to do with the problems concerning civil servants (Stapo and Kripe).It is the same in AMT II.
The administration of the budget funds is handled completely separately in Amt II. And this by necessity, for the administration has to concern itself with;
A. The budget funds of the State (Stapo and Kripe)
B. The budget funds of the Party (SD). Here completely different directives are followed, for not only the salaries and wages were entirely different, but so were also the whole of the accounting system of the Party and of the state. its tasks, AMT III was a hundred percent identical with the former Zentralabteilung II/2 (Lebensgebiete) of the SD-Main Office. Therefore, it is exclusively a Party office, its men are employees of the Party, they receive Party wages, have no civil service rights and duties, are exclusively subordinate to Party orders, and for this reason only they cannot have any State executive powers. If individual men, as will be commented on later, were detached for executive tasks, then they were used as individual persons. They worked by order of the State (Stapo and Kripe) and not as SD and in pursuance of its tasks: to be the Party news service without any executive functions.
AMT IV takes ever the tasks of the Secret State Police. Therefore, its special tasks are exclusively those of the State Police as an executive agency of the State. One might say that Amt IV is identical with the Secret State Police Office. Reich Criminal Office, which is also a purely State executive organism.
AMT VI (Foreign News Service) takes over the tasks of the former Zentralabteilung III/2 (Foreign News Service) therefore it is also a more SD (Party) office, its members are Party employees and do not possess any executive powers.
AMT VII (Scientific Research) is also a mere SD (Party) office without any executive powers and without any regional agencies. It did not have any real predecessor in the SD-Main Office. Its task is philosophical historical scientific research in the sphere of "Weltanschaung" which is laid down in a series of publications. This task too, did no longer exist during the war, so that it really only constituted a library and archives office. was a clear and unequivocal separation of mere news service tasks (Amt II, VI and VII) on the one hand, and of the State Executive (Amt IV and V), so that at the beginning of the war there is no longer any overlapping of competencies. Verdict that the SD after 1939 were an auxiliary organization of the Government's Executive Branch. The only factors which these different offices had in common with each other were three:
A. The same uniform.
B. The same chief (HIMMLER AND HEYDRICH).
C. The merely technical junction effected by the organizational structure of the RSHAL, which, however, only exists in the main office, because regionally, the Stapo offices, themselves entirely self-contained and independent from each other on the one and, on the other hand the SD sections continued to exist. The Security Police Inspectorates and the SD Inspectorates are offices with no executive duties but only with supervising and organizational tasks without any departmental competence and power of command. The Stapo office received its directives for its work exclusively from Amt. IV of RSHA, the SD sector exclusively from Amt III and VI of RSHA.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, I think this might be a convenient time to take the morning recess. Before we actually recess, let me indicate to the defense counsel that Mr. Wartenberg, the interrogator, who took most of the statements of the defendants, will be available this afternoon for cross-examination on the part of defense counsel with regard to the manner of taking of the statements.
Of course, this is an opportunity which you may avail yourselves of, if you desire. You don't need to cross-examine if you have nothing to examine him about, but in view of the fact that Mr. Wartenberg will ver soon be departing for the United States, it is necessary if you intend to raise any questions at all about the manner in which the statements were taken, that you raise these questions now, so this afternoon when we reconvene after the noon recess, Mr Wartenberg will take the stand, and he will be available to all defense counsel for any questions which they desire to put to him. We will now recess for fifteen minutes.
(recess)
THE MARSHAL: Take your seats, please.
DR. ASCHENAUER: In the occupied territories, however, the merely technical junction was created in a manner corresponding to the RSHA, Consequently there exists at the headquarters of the Regional Commander of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the offices I-VI corresponding to those of the RSHA, and that is one of the reasons which have led to misconceptions concerning the SD. But here too nothing has changed in regard to the departmental duties of the various offices. It has to be added that office VII had branch offices neither in occupied territories nor within the Reich. And not in all occupied territories did Amt III have branch offices in operation. differently organized. The usual organizational structure of the Security Police and SD cannot be compared with them. They are not government offices which constitute branch agencies for offices III, IV, V, and VI, but militant units whose organizational structure is evolved out of their special task, which they are to execute within the executive powers of the commander-in-chief of Army groups and armies. on operational duties and subject to military law. Force, the Stapo, the Kripo (Criminal Investigation Police), the SD, of emergency inductees and volunteers from conquered territories. They are organized for the commissioner of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD at the headquarters of the officer commanding the organizations behind the lines. Their activities change with the requirements of the situation in the zone of operations and are, as a rule, therefore, not those of Offices I, II, III, IV, V, or VI.
All these problems will be clarified by hearing Dr. Spengler as witness. These problems form the basis for the question: What was Ohlendorf's position to Himmler and Heydrich the leaders of the SS? During the presentation of evidence, it will be revealed that Ohlendorfs work was in direct contrast to that of Himmler, Bormann and Ley.
Ohlendorf caused the following: dence pointing out, for example, that "the small fry gets caught, but the big fish get away," and, incidentally, attention was called to the interference of the Party into judicial matters. A further report criticized the overlapping of the system of fines which the economic associations Wintochaftsverbaende could impose and the procedure before the regular criminal courts, which had caused an intolerable discrepancy in the severity of penalties inflicted. further attacks on schools and school teachers were prohibited by Goebbels, that the importance of scientists was officially adknowledged, that interference with school life by the H.J. as discontinued, the H.J. activities reduced, the school children excused from collections of all kinds, etc. of motion pictures and succeeded in supporting the role of the motion pictures against the will of Goebbels. The seventh Kulturkammer which already had been proclaimed by Ley was stopped by appropriate SD reports. In contradiction to the political policy of coordination (Gleichschaltung), private association were sponsored. In long reports, Amman's publishing and press policies were criticized and thus a number of publishing firms and newspapers were saved from closing down or from being transferred to the Eher Publishing firm. political publications. On the other hand, the publication of good classical novels and worthwhile new novels was aided. cluded from the measures for waging total war, although a decision to that effect had already been reached. The evidence presented was so convincing that the Party Chancellery changed their opinion and, satisfied by the documentary and statistical evidence, brought forth by the SD exerted its influence for the continuation of work at the universities.
zation with reports supported by evidence. five Gaues.
These facts correspond with the description of the "SD" in the "C.I. Handbook Germany," published by the "Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Counter Intelligence Sub-division." It reads here under number IV, "The German Intelligence Service," as follows:
"Amt III, with its regional offices, is the Party Intelligence Service inside Germany. To this end, it maintains networks of agents in all walks of German life.... who are drawn from all classes and professions. The information supplied by these agents is made up into Lageberichte (Situation reports) which are sent up to RSHA by the regional offices. These reports are extremely frank, and contain a complete and unbiased picture of German opinion and morale." of Ohlendorf. The picture of a man will arise which, in purpose, intent and actual work stood in opposition to the terrible events in the East. vice since 1938, gets into the terrible situation, the effects of which are visible today, through the announcement of the mobilization. Before his assignment in Russia, he had a war assignment of the Reich Group Commerce. After he had refused twice this war assignment was cancelled upon order from Heydrich. Ohlendorf was drafted for the Reich Fuehrer SS. This fact is also proven by the Indictment, No. 3196, page 5 of the original. Ohlendorf now clearly belonged to a military, hierarchic organiza tion.
Ohlendorf did not agree with the execution order. The assembled leaders of the Einsatzgruppen protested unanimously against Streckenbach who announced the Fuehrer order in the name of Himmler and Heydrich. Streckenbach agreed with the opinion expressed through that protest, but he declared that in a similar cases in Poland he had already tried everything in order to have the order not executed.
Himmler supposedly refused flatly. At the beginning of October 1941, Ohlendorf approached Himmler at Nicolajew, with regard to the execution order, although the latter in a speech before the leaders and men of the Einsatzgruppe and of the Einsatzkommandos called together, had again repeated the strict order of the Fuehrer. Ohlendorf in speaking to the Reich Fuehrer SS emphasized the inhuman burden. He did not even receive an answer. He could not make Himmler revoke the order. There was no possibility for him to prevent the practical execution of the order, which was his endeavor. There is no possibility for him to evade the order. He is in an unheard-of conflict of duties. Ohlendorf has no possibility to make any appeal, since any attempt to get to Hitler personally always had to be made via Heydrich and Himmler, Since it is Bormann who is behind the order, any attempt to surpass Himmler and Heydrich would have failed at the latest when it got to Bormann. Bormann's actual role in that unequaled European tragedy, the story of who he was, will be recorded by some future historian. If one assumed any other possibility for Ohlendorf to gain influence, one would forget, that he was only a Standartenfuehrer, without any political powers, i.e. without any position in the Party based on political powers. He knows neither Hitler nor Bormann. No Reichsleiter or Gauleiter or any other politically influential personalities are his acquaintances, let alone on his side. All he could do was to interpret the order in as limited a way as he could possibly do and to try to execute it as humanely as possible under the given circumstances, contrary to the interpretation of the indictment not only in the interest of his men but first of all in the interest of the victims, since the protection of the men against brutalization is a protection of the victims against brutalized men.
Ohlendorf's entire life shows that in spite of all setbacks and threats his fight was not only directed against the tyranny of Nazi leaders within the Reich, but that immediately after his return from the Einsatz he starts fighting against the exponents of extermination and colonial power politics in the East, especially against Koch, Globotschnik and Einsatzgruppenfuehrer, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Thomas. Ohlendorf continues in this fight, even though Himmler treatens him not only with liquidation of his office in case he should continue with this kind of reporting, but also threatens to arrest him. In that moment it becomes evident that, as soon as there is no purely military relationship where no resistance is possible, Ohlendorf makes use of the slightest opportunity in order to actively intervene against the policies of power and extermination. by the defense. The tragedy of Ohlendorf's life will become clear to every man. taking part in the session this afternoon and tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: In order that Dr. Aschenauer may have an opportunity to prepare the defense of the defendant Ohlendorf, Ohlendorf will be excused from attendance upon the trial for the rest of the day and for all of tomorrow.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Your're very welcome.
DR. SCHWARZ: (Attorney for the Defendant Joost)
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Just before you begin, I presume you would want to leave, Dr. Aschenauer; you would like to leave the Court now and you would like to have the defendant Ohlendorf available from this moment?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: "Will the defendant Ohlendorf be escorted from the courtroom so that he will be available to his counsel. Just a moment please, Dr. Schwarz.
Dr. Aschenauer, may I suggest to you that if you wish to put any questions to the interrogator, Mr. Wartenburg, that Mr. Wartenburg will be available this afternoon; and, any time you care to come in, we will make him available to you so that you may not lose any time in getting back to your client.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I have no questions to address to Mr. Wartenburg.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Schwarz, you may proceed.
DR. SCHWARZ: If Court please, -A and in violation of the provisions of Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council of 20 December 1945, committed the following:
1. Crimes against humanity by participating in the murder of 2. War crimes by atrocities or assault on body, life or property 3. With having been a member after 1 September 1939 of an orga litary Tribunal and by par.
1, Article II of the Law No. 10 prove the following points in answer to the charge of having committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, both of which, since they are essentially based on the same facts, will be treated under figure 1 as follows:
1. a) Jost was appointed Chief of Einsatzgruppe A by command on 29 March 1942.
His personal dislike of this order and the of the authoritative effect of this order.
As far as this effectively binding orders.
The problem of "order and ne such excluding guilt", need not be discussed at this point, ing this resp.
has already made a statement to that effect.
Montgomery's views on the nature of the concept "command".
the following (Excerpt from The Times, London, of 27 July 1946): "It must be clearly established that the army is a its discipline.
The army would fail the nation if it were them with three principles:
3. It is the duty of the soldier to obey all orders given questions."
b) When Jost entered upon his service, he looked at the tasks a military point of view.
For Einsatzgruppe A was subordi nated primarily to the Chief of the Army Group North.
Its Nort.
Lituania, Latvia, Estionia, and White Ruthenia did regions.
In these regions, which were under civilian ad at the time of Jost's entry upon his appointment.
These The Prosecution submitted an essay on basic conditions within the SS, the SD, the Gestapo, the Reich Security Main Office, and the Einsatzgruppen, dated 29 September 1947, which assumed, especially with respect to the enclosed photostatic copies of the drawings, the presence of certain actual conditions, which, at the time of JOST's entry upon his appointment, were already obsolete.