A. No, your Honor, I must say that this possibility did not exist. Take four or five thousand people......if two or three thousand of these were not Communists and the others constituted a danger........this is an estimate, I cannot look into the people's minds; and with a handful of the Crimea the Army Commander-in-Chief told me before Christmas already this must be carried out, I do not see a possibility of doing such a thing.
Q. Did you ever excuse one Jew just because there may have been some doubt as to whether he was a participant in Communism or not?
A. No, your Honor, because the order excluded such a thing. I could not decide on this any more since the Supreme Commander had given this order. This was beyond my rights.
Q. Don't you think that it would have helped your inner feelings if you had said, "Now, I am going to excuse one Jew just so I will know in my heart that I did not carry out this inhumane order to its utmost. Did that ever occur to you? I am going to excuse one Jew, one miserable Jew, so that then I can have on my conscience that I at least, in some way, I tried not to carry out this inhumane order to its merciless extent." Did that ever occur to you?
A. Your Honor, I do not know whether this would have changed my situation and my distress; but I agree I had been given this task, and I carried it out as I considered it to be my duty and as I thought I could not evade it in a military manner.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, I am sorry I interrupted your examination.
Will you please continue? BY DR. MAYER:
Q. Witness, even now.......are you still convinced that Hitler's order was only given in order to secure the territory, and not to exterminate people?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief I can answer, even now, only yes. In my Einsatz it was never mentioned that the Jews were to be exterminated, that a plan existed to exterminate all the Jews; but I remember very well that during that time in particular it was discussed very often that the aim existed that the Jews be given a national home......the name, Madagascar, even came down to the Crimea, and here in Nuernberg in the prison I learned the confirmation that a plan for a national home was seriously considered at the time. Added to it is the fact for me that I heard here that the order by Adolf Hitler should be a final solution, that is, to kill all Jews, according to what has been determined in the IMT, was given in April and May 1942; in any case, the affidavit by Wisliszeny, a co-worker of Eichmann, I read here.......according to which the order which he thinks he has seen in writing bears the date of April or May 1942. That is what I remember, your Honor, and therefore I am convinced, even now, that this order given in May or June 1941 was not connected with this so-called final solution which was found one year later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, I am a little bit confused about these dates. Once he said May 1942, then he says June 1941. Would you try to get a more......
THE WITNESS: May I explain this, your Honor, May and June the order by Adolf Hitler must have been made out.
THE PRESIDENT: Please give us the year, now, that is what we are talking about.
There is a confusion about the years. Now, May and June 1941. Is that right?
THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon, your Honor, I forgot to mention the year. In May or June 1941 the order by Adolf Hitler came out that the Jews be shot at the Eastern front. The reason given was that they constituted a great danger to the security of the Rear Army, that this measure was necessary in order to secure the Rear Army territory. What I heard and read here is the statement by Wisliszeny, during the IMT..........as far as I remember he stated under oath that the order for the final solution was given one year later, April-May 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: That is very clear. Thank you very much. BY DR. MAYER:
Q. DR. Braune, when did you go to Kommando 11-b in Odessa?
A. On 2 or 3 November, I think, I am sure of this..... I travelled to Odessa from Nikolajew where the Einsatzgruppe was stationed and where I stayed the first ten or fourteen days in order to gather information and to look after Minister Lie.
Q. After arriving in Odessa, were you put in a charge of the Kommando immediately?
A. No. I remained there for one week first, where my predecessor was in charge of the Kommando. I think I took over the Kommando on 10 November 1941.
DR. KOESSL: The defendant Schulz, your Honor.....
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Schulz will be excused for a few minutes. BY DR. MAYER:
Q. Witness, in your statement of 8 July 1947.....it is in Document Book III-D, Document 4234, page 54 of the English, page 94 of the German.
.....please explain.......that you were given your assignment in October 1941. The Prosecution draws the conclusion from this you were Kommando Chief of 11-b already in October 1941. Is that correct?
A. That I received the order in October 1941 is right. The conclusion from this that I had taken over already in October, is wrong. If I had Known that this statement would be used against me in a trial I would have attached importance to its clarification; and at the place where it says, I quote:
"I travelled to Odessa"........I would have added the date there, but Mr. Wartenberg told me at the time that I would be examined as a witness, and not as a defendant, and therefore I did not attach very much importance to this minor matter.
Q. When did you move to the Crimea?
A. That must have been after 20 November.
Q. In Odessa, did you carry out the execution of the Jews living there?
A. No. In Odessa I did not carry out the execution of Jews. The Rumanian Army, an officer of the Commander of Odessa, approached me and asked that this be carried out. But already before I took the Kommando.........I meant to say it already before I came to Odessa.......the Rumanians had the sovereign right in that territory, and also in Odessa, and the Einsatzgruppe had given directions that the transactions be concluded and that they should prepare to move on. I pointed out to this Rumanian officer that they had Rumanian sovereign rights, and therefore rejected his request that the execution of Jews should be carried out in Odessa by me.
Q. Were the Rumanians satisfied with that attitude?
A. No; the following day, or the day after the next, another officer approached me......I believe it was a major or a lieutenant colonel. He repeated this request, and also pointed out, or at least maintained, that it was the task of the Einsatzkommando, and they knew that, and threatened to make a complaint through diplomatic channels or through his war commander to Berlin. I still rejected, in spite of this, but in order to calm him down I told him that I shall turn to my superior officer in Nikolajew although there was no doubt in my mind that the decision would be. I did that. Herr Ohlendorf gave me the instructions which I had expected.........to continue to refuse; and I informed the Rumanians of this, as the decision of my superior office, and then nothing further happened.
Q. How many Jews were concerned in this case?
A. Odessa was a very large city. I believe in peacetime there were between five hundred or six hundred thousand inhabitants there. I think I can remember that about one hundred thousand Jews lived in Odessa in peacetime. Of course, a great number had escaped from there, but tens of thousands must still have been there.
Q. When did you arrive in the Crimea?
A. That must have been in the lest days of November. I arrived with only a few vehicles, as the first one there. I remember exactly. It was terrible weather. And the greater number of my vehicles had actually gotten stuck in the mud.
Q. When did the last vehicles of your detachment arrive?
A. I think that took two weeks.
Q After your arrival in the Grimea, where were you stationed? Einsatzgruppe Chief, Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf. Simferopol? the first days of November, that is, for weeks, a sub-kommando of the Kommando 10-a was in Simferopol. by Herr Ohlendorf until after a few weeks -- I don't know the exact date any longer -- they were sent back to Kommando 10-a. arrival? first of all saw to it that the vehicles which had gotten stuck were partly repaired; some of them were pulled away; and thus the kommando was gathered together again. Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf? There it was fixed where the sub-kommandos were to be assigned and and which territory was to fall within my competency. such sub-kommandos? Karasubasar, Aluschta and Eupatoria. Apart from the sub-kommando which already existed in Simferopol. when did you make them move? before the first few days of December.
other kommandos or sub-kommandos there, or had they already been active there? explain it -- on the basis of documents I am convinced that Kommando 10-b during their advance to Feodosia were active in Karasubasar as well, but I am not sure of this. since when other kommandos or sub-kommandos had been active before yours in your later Einsatz territory. Please look at Document Book I, page 34 of the German, page 30 of the English text. It is Document No. No-4134, Exhibit 7. Apart from that, Document Book II_D, page 11 of the German and page 12 of the English, Document No. NO_3159, Exhibit 85. Also Document Book II_C, page 59-60 of the German, and page 54 of the English. It is Document No. NO_2832, Exhibit No. 79. And finally, Document Book II_A, page 108 of the German, page 101 of the English. It is Document No. 2822, Exhibit 50. Please explain to me, on the basis of these documents, from when onwards your kommando was assigned in the Crimea, and was active there, and in how far other kommands had previously been active - namely, the kommandos 10-a, 10-b and 11-a, in your area of your later competency. NO-4134, Exhibit 7.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, this is page 30 of the English text.
A (by the witness, continuing) This is page 4 of the original, your Honor. There it says, under Einsatzkommando 11-a, on 28 October, Majhtschka, with Advance Kommando, south of Perekop.... your Honor, may I show on the map where Perekop is?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please do.
WITNESS: (continuing) Perekop is here. Therefore sub-kommando was to the south, while advancing south.
Q (By Dr. Mayer) On that occasion I would like to ask you to show the Tribunal the situation of Karasubasar, Aluschtka and Eupatoria, which will clarify the entire situation.
A (by the witness) It is not simply on this small scale, but Simferopol, it would be about here, at the lower end or the letter "M". Karasubasar was to the east Of it. Half way to Feodosia, which was about here. Karasubasar was about here, on letter "A". Eupatoria was west of Simferopol, on the coast about here; and Aluschta was on the other side of the Jala Mountains, on the south coast, about here, southeast of Simferopol.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
WITNESS (continuing): If I may repeat, it is shown here that on the 28th October a sub-kommando of 11-a was already south of Perekop.
I now refer to the next Volume, that is, II_D, page 11 of the German text -
DR. MAYER: Page 12 of the English, y ur Honor.
WITNESS: NO_3159. Exhibit 85. It is a Situation Report of the report of events, No. 129, Of 5 November, with the locations as can be shown on page 1. There on the top it says: "Location and Communications. As of 5 November." And here on page 4 of the original it can be seen that. "Sonderkommando 10-a, Taganrog, Advance Kommando to the north of Simferopol. "That is this sub-kommandoo your Honor, which in my opinion from the beginning of November had already been active in Simferopol. It can also be shown, 11-a, also an Advanced Kommandoo already in Simferopol... Therefore one sub-kommando of 11-a must have been active in Simferopol before a sub-kommand of 10-a. It can also be seen that 11-b, on 5 November, was still in Odessa, a time when I was not yet in charge of the kommado.
DR. MAKER: Page 54 of the English, your Honor) A (witness continuing) Document 2832, Exhibit 79.
Here on page 3 of the original it can he seen, "Sonderkommando 10-b, Feodosia, Advance Kommando in Kertsch," sub-kommando in Alushta, at the place where later on my sub-kommando went to.
On the next page, Einsatzkommando 11_a, Jalta, sub_kommando before Sevastaopol and Bachtschisaraj and Eupatoria. That is a location where later on one of my sub_kommandos also went to. Here under 11_b, my kommando is listed enroute for the first time as of 19 November. This cannot be quite correct, however, but I explain it to myself like this, your Honor, that I believe that the day when the departure should have taken place originally, I had already reported to the Gruppe that we were going to move; but during the night there was a severe frost, as a surprise, and a great number or cars froze, and cylinders burst etc., so that we had to remain another two or three days, if not more, until we finally were able to depart. That is how I explain to myself that this report came about. It cannot be right because I explain that my kommando, on the 28th of November, for the first time were reported in Simferopol. On 26 November they were reported to be en route.
And the last one, II_a, page 108 of the German-
DR. MAYER: Page 101 of the English text, your Honor, WITNESS (continuing) It is NO_2822, Exhibit 50.
There it says on Page 1 of the original in the Situation Report No. 135, that is the one I just mentioned before, there it is mentioned that on 19 November, 1941 the stations were not changed. Here too in Eupatoria and Alutschka subkommandos of 10b and 11a, my commando, still en route. And finally I have certified excerpts by my defense counsel from the reports of events 138 to 144. Unfortunately, we were not able, your Honor, to get them because these things were only found a few days ago.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, may I interpolate here? These excerpts from the reports of events of the prosecution, I shall introduce them in my Document Book I. My Document Book I may have been received by the Tribunal already. Document Book II will follow within the next few days.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, shall we take our recess now? The Tribunal will be in recess fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribu*el is again in session.
DR. FICHT: Dr Ficht for the defendant Biberstein. Your Honor, I ask that the defendant Biberstein be excused from the afternoon session since on advice of doctors he is supposed to lie down because of his heart condition.
THE PRESIDENT: We will not only excuse him for this afternoon, but at any time and for whatever period the doctor and his counsel believe he should be absent from the courtroom, I trust you will inform the Tribunal. The defendant Biberstein will be excused from attendance in court this afternoon.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, before the recess, the witness was discussing those documents which he mentioned in order to show which Einsatzcommandos were already active in the Crimea in his future district before he got there. On the basis of excerpts from the operational reports which I have in my Document Book and which I shall submit as evidence, I shall ask the witness to mention the dates, especially when his own subcommandos became active in the Crimea, when they first became active. ing: The Operational Report 138 of 26 November 1941 reports my Commando XI-B still enroute to Simferopol. The next operational Report no. 139 of 28 November has the typewritten note, still enroute to Simferopol, sofar as my Commando is concerned, but here the two words "marching towards" are crossed out in the original, which would mean just Simferopol. That means the Commando would have had to be there. Whether this penciled correction, which I don't know by whom it was made, or the original text corresponds to the truth, I can not say today after six years. Here at the same time subcommandos of mine are first mentioned in Alustchka, Karasubasar; furthermore, it says Juschon and this Juschon is also situated on the isthmus near Perikop. May I emphasize the fact that no subcommando of mine was ever there, but Jaschon was the last place where we spent the night,and there most of my vehicles had remained and were gradually brought forward later.
That is how I explain the mention of Juschon in this report. The next Operational Report No. 141 of 3 December 1941 still reports the Commando XI-A, that is not my Commando with a subcommando in Eupatoria where later one of my subcommandos came to be stationed, and my commando is again reported in Simferopol in this report with subcommandos in Alustchka, Karasubasar and again Juschon. That is, the forces in Juschon had still not been brought forward. The report of 8 December reports these same garrisons unchanged. That is, still no subcommando of mine is reported as being in Eupatoria, but it is not until the Operational Report No. 144 of 10th December, that is two days later, that a subcommando of mine is first mentioned in Eupatoria. I am through.
Q Before you, was another subcommando active at Karasubasar? but I assume that 10-B during the advance on Feodosia briefly was active in Karasubasar. mandos?
A I didn't have to give any specific orders to the subcommando leaders, outside of telling them where their garrisons were, and telling them generally about their missions, for the missions had been set up from the beginning, and in Odessa I came into this situation when I took over the commando. and Krimchak executions with which you have been charged, and, first of all, sofar as the figures mentioned are concerned. About the executions in Simferopol on the order of the Army I shall speak later, Your Honor. Witness, will you please look at the following documents: In Document Book II-D, page 26 of the German, page 21 of the English text; Document NO-2828, Exhibit No. 86. Furthermore, in volume II-C, pages 61 and 64 of the German, pages 55 and 58 of the English text.
This is Document No. 2832, Exhibit No. 79, and, finally, in Document Book III-D, page 36 of the German, and page 18 of the English, Document No. NO-4538, Exhibit No. 153?
A (continuing) This is NO-2828, Exhibit No. 86. Here it says on page 11 of the original about Jews, the total number of Jews is about 40,000, approximately one-forth of whom lived in Simferopol. It is an Operational Report of 12 December. In my opinion these figures can only represent the original number of Jews in the Crimea in time of peace, and, here, this does not include Sebastopol, which was then still occupied by the Russians, and, that, therefore, we had no way of getting any material. I remember how we got these figures, and I remember also that this original figure of about 10,000 in Simferopol was no longer there when we got to the city; a considerable number had fled, sofar as I remember it was more than half, and, as one document shows, they fled because rumors had been spread in the Crimea, which reported about the fate which awaited the Jews. Therefore, at considerable number from the entire Crimes,and carefully from Simferopol, had fled to the harbor cities, that is Sebastopol, Kertch, Feodosia and Jalta, in order to get away by ship. How large this flight was in the East can be seen in Document Book II-C, German page 61, which is NO-2832, Exhibit No. 79. There it says for the town of Ghernikov for 23 October 1941, that is about at the same time, that of about 10,000 Jews no more than 260 were left. Three pages further in the same volume, this is Document NO-2832, page 23 of the original, it says, and I quote:"Of the original 1,000 Jews in Dniepropatrovs, about 70,000 escaped before the German troops entered the town."
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through "1,000". Should it have been "100,000"?
THE WITNESS: Yes, of 100,000, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
THE WITNESS: That this flight was very considerable in the beginning is shown in Volume III-D, German page 36 and English page 18. This is Document NO 4538, Exhibit No. 153. Here it says, and I quote: This is a report of 25 August 1941, that is considerably earlier. In Kishenev before the war there were about 60 to 80,000 Jews, and a great number of these fled, when the Russians withdrew. when the town was occupied there were approximately 4,000 Jews left. Even if the escapes from Simferopol were not as strong as shown in these three documents, still I remember very exactly that a considerable number had fled, more than half so for as I remember. The number quoted before of about 10,000 could only be the figure before the war.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, at this time may I make a statement which I consider necessary. It is not the intention of the defense, to prevent all misunderstandings, to try to bargain with figures here. on the other hand, however, it seems to me necessary to exonerate the defendant who confesses to the carrying out of the orders, from what he had not done and what he therefore cannot take responsibility for otherwise, the Tribunal may get the impression that it would have been all the same to my client whether he had to take more or less lives on his conscience. Therefore, I have to discuss these tiresome matters to this extent. I ask that you consider this and pardon me for it.
THE PRESIDENT: The defense counsel always has the right, privilege and duty to present his case in such a way as he deems best for his client, and, we will say, Dr Meyer, that up to this point there is nothing you have done which would lack of intelligence, and any lack of consideration in the way you have presented your case. BY DR MAYER:
Q Witness, please look at operational Report No. 150, 2 January 1942. It is also in Volume II-D, page 33 of the German, page 28 of the English.
It is Document NO-2834, Exhibit No. 87. Furthermore, I ask you --
A May I interrupt a minute. I had to look for the volume, and could not get the pages.
Q Also look at Operational Report No. 157, of 19 January 1942, which is available here in a photostat, and, finally the Operational Report No. 149, of 22 December 1941, and also in photostat. It is in Volume III-B pegs 24 of the German, and NO, 2833, Exhibit No. 114, which is only here in an excerpt, and, please read the brief passages into the record, and comment on these documents? is Document NO-2834, Exhibit No. 87, on page 20 of the original, page 7 of the excerpt. There it says, on page 28 of the English, Simferopol, Eupatoria, Alutska, Kertsch, Feodosia and Karasubasar and other districts of Western Crimea have been cleaned of Jews. From 16th November through the 15 December 1941, 17,645 Jews, 2,504 Krimchaks, 324 Gypsies, and 212 Communists and Partisans have bean shot. The Prosecution has charged me with these figures, by claiming that Kertsch and Fedosia belonged to my Commando. By means of documents, I shall prove later that this is not the case. I assume that the Prosecution made a mistake here.
tially part of Commando XI-A. So much for the area. Sofar as time is concerned, I have just show by the Operational Reports When my commando Came to the Crimea; when the subcommandos ware activated, and may I call your attention to the fact that in Alutska and Karasubasar only at the beginning of December, and in Eupatoria, only from 10th December, subcommandos of mine were present. That is even from the point of view of the time I can not be Charged with these events, because they refers to the period of 16 November to 15 of December, whereas my commando and my subcommandos were in any case active in the second part of this period; that during this period other subcommandos carried on Jewish executions in my later area I can show by means of Operational Report No. 149 of 22 December 1941. This is Document No 2833. From it on page 9 it says and I quote from the photostatic copy: "Einsatzgruppe-D garrison at Simferopol, activity of the special commando XI-A." On the next pages this activity is described, and on page 14 it says under the paragraph "Jews": "After the appointment of a Jewish Council of elders and the registration of the Jews, whose number amounts to 750, their concentration was carried through on 21 November 1941 in one area." This is the proof that three weeks before my subcommando, the subcommando XI-A had collected the Jews in Eupatoria, and that meant practically their executions only a few days later, for the concentration was only carried out when it was known that the executions would follow within a few days.
Now may I say something about the figures 17,645 and 2,504? that is altogether about 20,000, Even though this figure does not fully concern me as for as location and time are concerned, and even though it cannot be seen exactly to what extent I am charged with these figures, still I consider it my duty to point out that even these figures cannot be correct. 1942. This is NO-3338. This is two weeks after the one which mentioned the figures in Volume II-D and here it says, I quote, "The resettlement of the Jews, Krimshaks, and Gypsies can be seen as almost a complete liquidation, almost without exception -- "I beg your pardon, I just see that I took the wrong quotation. It must be on the preceding page and it says on page 6 of the photostat, When in the beginning of December, the preparations for the resettlement -- "and it can be seen from the context that this refers to the entire Einsatz area of the Crimea -"the resettlement of the 12,000 to 13,000 Jews, Krimchaks, and Gypsies has been started." Here two figures are opposed to each other. On the one hand it is reported that in the beginning of December in Einsatz area of the Crimea the execution of the Jews, Gypsies and Krimchaks had been prepared and that these amounted to from 12,000 to 13,000 and in the report which wasmade out two weeks before,about 21,000, that it, to 7,000-8,000 more, are reported as being executed there. I cannot resolve the contradictions. I merely consider it duty to point them out and to express my serious doubts about the figures, 17,000 and so forth. Operation Report 170, Volume II-D, page 51 of the German, page 47 of the English text. This is Document NO-3339, Exhibit 93. of the excerpt, that is page 47 of the English, it says, in the last paragraph: "In Simferopol, from the 9th of January to the 13th of February, more than 300 Jews were arrested and executed.
The number of persons executed in Simferopol increased, therefore, to almost 10,000 Jews, about 300 more than the numbers of Jews registered," I already said, I cannot mention any other specific figure opposed to this 10,000, because I do not know any specific figure. I can only assure you again that this figure cannot be correct for the reasons mentioned before. How it came to be calculated I cannot say. Whether it is a typographical error or whether a mistake was made during transmission by the Einsatzgruppe or in Berlin, I do not know. Perhaps I may mention one example, in which mistakes came to be made in figures: December 1941 from 700 to 300 people were executed in Simferopol. The prosecution in its charges against me has mentioned 7,000 to 8,000. I assume that this is a mistake also. May I just point out that it is possible that wrong figures can be obtained. with which you are charged?
Q How did these executions come about? officer of the 11th Army came to see HerrOhlendorf and told him that the Army demanded the carrying out of e executions before Christmas.
Army told this to Herr Ohlendorf? present too.
Q How did you conduct yourself in the face of this Army order? would be impossible to carry out these executions before Christmas. strength of your unit.
but all told, including drivers, interpreters, auxiliary forces, etc. In Simferopol, outside of an administrative officer and two aides on my staff I had no other people, outside of an officer who took care of the SD reports temporarily for two months and at times I had a non-com who helped me in the handling of partisan questions which had become so extensive that I could not handle them myself. Everything else was assigned to the sub-kommandos, that is, the sub-kommando Simferopol, including the guard personnel and drivers who were necessary. Certainly it was not more than 25 to 30 men strong and the other sub-kommandos also were about the same strength. Enpatoria was a little stronger than Karasubasar and Aluschta. I know that in the sub-kommando in Simferopol there were about three or four,trained police and interrogation officials. With these forces it waspractically impossible for me to carry out the required executions in Simferopol. were too weak to carry out the execution which was demanded by the Army? his agreement I went to see the G-2 of the Army, Colonel Hauch and described the situation to him.
Q What was the result? number o trucks with drivers, to furnish the gasoline, and a certain number, I don't remember how many, of field police, all of whom were placed at the disposal to help in this execution.
Q Another question, Witness. Isn't it a mistake on your part when you say that Col. Hauch wasthe G-2 of the Army?
A I beg your pardon. I made a mistake. Colonel Hauch was the Chief Quartermaster of the Army.
Q Therefore, he was the 20A?
