this, he merely made his inspection, left, and then the detail moved on to Eastern Russia--Western Russia? was when the inspection in Dueben took place, the units which had since been set up were standing in an open place and the unit officers, those who had the same rank as I had, were standing immediately in front of their units. We, therefore, stood there before the chief came, then marched past him and we personally had no opportunity to talk to him, but the higher officer, who then accompanied the personal staff of the inspecting officer, had an opportunity to talk to him, and I saw them talking.
Q Well, you saw them talking, but you didn't hear what they were talking about?
A No. I say I cannot pass a judgment from my level. these protesting officers never brought it to the attention of Heydrich?
Q Well, just a minute. You are convinced of what? I ask you now, do you know of your own personal knowledge whether these other officers spoke to Heydrich about the fuehrerorder before you actually moved into Russia--of your own personal knowledge?
Q Now, please answer that question. Do you, or do you not know of your own personal knowledge, whether they spoke to Heydrich about the fuehrerorder and the possibility of its fulfillment?
PRESIDENT: Very well. Proceed, Doctor.
THE WITNESS: Well, in this connection, may I add that before the units he made a speech in which he again pointed out the task which was to be carried out. This convinced us that this order could not be altered and, therefore, was an order about which Heydrich could not decide either, but that it was a fuehrerorder which had come from the supreme head of the state.
BY MR. HOFFMANN:
Q. Witness, let us go back to yourself. I would like to first ask you what was your own attitude toward the order when you received it?
A. This order and the general situation upset me very much. For me personally there were two facts, which shocked me particularly. The first fact was that a war with Russia should break out at all. This fact to which our attention had been drawn upset the ideas which I had of a war and of a possible conclusion of the war. In my profession I had no opportunity to take an interest in higher politics and conducting war. I had only imagined a war with certain limits and I now faced the fact that the war was being expanded, the consequences of which were unimaginable.
had heard officially. Particularly with regard to Russia the press and other official statements did not mention anything, so that the fact of the war surprised me all the more. Also a war with the Bolshevist opponent would be a difficult one and was also bound to entail cruelty and atrocities. The order itself I considered impossible and I could not imagine if and how it could be carried out.
Q. Witness, what did you object to in this order? Did your upbringing not agree with it or your inner attitude? What effect did this order have on your feelings?
A. When attitude is the result of upbringing, it concerned both, but in the end it was my conscience.
Q. How did you think you could get out of this difficulty?
A. In those days I could not imagine that at all. I could only wait and see how things would develop. Apart from that we had been told that I with my Einsatzkommando 12, as part of the Einsatzgruppe D, was assigned to the Caucasus Mountains. The Army Group to which the Einsatzgruppe was attached had not yet been set up. It was still in the southeast territory. There were still thousands of kilometers which had to be fought for first, before we could over reach the Caucasus Mountains, and when this would be and should I ever reach the Caucasus Mountains, these were questions for me which remained unanswered and to which I could not find a reply. Perhaps I myself would never have occasion to carry out this order and such a situation might never arise for me. Perhaps by then things might occur which might make it unnecessary to carry it out.
Q. What happened actually? If I remember rightly, you were appointed to be in charge to Einsatzkommando 12?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was your Einsatzkommando?
A. As I have already stated, when we came to Dueben, - incidentally the enlisted men were gathered there and they vehicles, they were all in a large parking lot--after the order had been announced in Pretsch, the units were divided and I was told that one unit was Einsatzkommando 12, of which I was to be in charge.
Q. How strong was this Einsatzkommando?
A. The Einsatzkommando had about 130 to 140 men.
Q. What was their equipment?
A. I would first like to add here that this was the strength when it was set up. Later on, of course, some changes took place because of losses and other circumstances. The kommandos were fully motorized units. With vehicles as the offices in the Reich had sent them. They were not special Army vehicles, but common vehicles as you use in the city.
Q. And, witness, what were the weapons you had?
A. The weapons were nothing special either. The men of the Regular Police and the Reserve had carbines and the men of the Waffen SS they had one or two machine guns. Apart from that they only had pistols. In all in my unit there were perhaps at the most six to eight submachine guns, and no heavy weapons.
Q. Were the members of your Einsatzkommando 12 volunteers, or were they forced to join?
A. No one was a volunteer. They had all been drafted and ordered to go there. The members of the Security Police had been drafted by Regional Offices of the State Police and the Criminal Police, sometimes also by SD offices.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you don't mean, witness, that every member of your detachment was drafted into the SS, do you?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your statement they were under compulsion is not entirely correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Were you drafted? Did you join the SS voluntarily?
THE WITNESS: I only belonged to the SS, Special Formation SD and because of my position I had the same rank as an officer but for the actual assignment not one was a volunteer and the members of the Regular P Police, perhaps, were only drafted a few months earlier, and until that time they had carried out their jobs as tailors or business men or whatever they were.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what you mean is that the order to move into Russia was a military order and therefore you were acting under the compulsion of the military order, but you don't mean that each and everyone in your Einsatzkommando or in the Einsatzkommando was drafted into the SS, because you know that there were many who were volunteers.
THE WITNESS: It is definitely right, yes, absolutely, but I talked about matters generally, in as far as the actual assignment was concerned. For the actual assignment nobody could volunteer. The men from the Regular Police were age groups which the Army did not require, who had been released for police jobs. They had been drafted, at least, and the Main Office of the Regular Police had assigned then to the Security Police. The Waffen SS men had been drafted by a Police company in Berlin and the members of the Security Police originated. as I already said, mostly from the Regional Police Offices. who had been released because member of small offices had been dissolved and therefore the men were available.
Q. Witness, did you notice that when the members of Einsatzkommando 12 were selected only special directives were observed or was everything mixed up that is, were there all kinds of people at all ages?
A. Yes, they were all kinds of people, and I am convinced that often there were mere coincidences that these men came to the Einsatz assignment.
Q. How was the attitude of these men with regard to this assignment?
A. First of all, my recollection is not quite clear, whether even before leaving Pretzsch every individual officer and man know about this Fuehrer Order and had been told about it. In this connection, it was not yet necessary. First of all we had to advance, in order to reach the area to which we were assigned.
Q. When did Einsatzkommando 12 leave Dueben?
A. While the other Einsatzkommando moved on already the day after Heydrich had made the inspection, Einsatzkommando D, as far as I remember it remained for about another week in Dueben and as I thought, because they had been assigned to the Caucasus Mountains and the assignment for the Caucasus any way was not yet necessary. The day of departure, as far as I remember, was fixed for the 28th or 29th of June, 1941.
Q. Please describe to the Tribunal the route after the 28th or 29th of June until you came to your permanent station.
A. In a closed column, the Einsatzkommando moved from Dueben via Bohemia. In two days they reached the Austrian Hungarian border. On the third day, the Hungarian territory was crossed and the city of Chesburg in Siebenbuergen was reached. As far as I remember, already one or two kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe were branched off. These two kommandos, or this one, marched over the mountains into Roumanian territory The Einsatzgruppe staff and the other kommandos made their first station in Piatraneamt, which was a barracks camp. The Group Staff remained there for some time, perhaps ten, perhaps 14 days. I can't say exactly, and then the Einsatzgruppe Staff and the other kommandos, except for Kommando 12 marched into Roumanian territory.
Q. Where did your kommandos stay?
A. I said already that Einsatzkommando 12 remained at Piatraneamt.
Q. How long did you stay there.
A. Kommando 12 remained stationed until the end of July 1941, partly in Piatraneamt, partly near Jassy, in the original Rumanian territory.
Q. When did your Einsatzkommando move to Russia and where to?
A. While the Einsatzgruppe staff and the other commandos had already advanced Pruth and Jassy, following the fighting units, the connection between them and Einsatzkommando 12 had become very loose. Therefore, Einsatzkommando 12 followed into the Russian territory and the first location they reached was Olschanka on the other side of the Knjestr River. Olschanka at that time was the headquarters of the Group Staff.
AA few days later, perhaps a week later, I don't know quite exactly, the group staff and together with them the Einsatzkommando 12 moved their garrison to Charnomin. Charnomin was not a village it was an old castle in the side buildings of which the Einsatzkommando and Kommando 12 were quartered. that time? August, was kept there as reserve, but about two weeks previously, the Einsatzkommando chief gave orders and instructions to detachments of Kommando 12 and to me personally, too. the kommando? August, that two platoons of Einsatzkommando 12, two platoons consisting of 10 to 15 men, were to help to bring in the harvest and to help the Army do this.
This was a mission of the Army of the socalled economic kommando, for short, in German, W.i.k.o. The job consisted of working together with units of the Army who were available for this purpose and to in collecting the crop which had became overripe in this territory and to organize the harvesting. These platsoon were therefore assigned certain territory or some localities where they had to carry out these measures. If I understood you correctly, at the order of Ohlendorf this subcommando left? you visit the commandos as well which had been detailed. of course I wanted to have a look at the work out there, and I don't know exactly, whether I made one or two trips to those distant areas in order to have a look at the work.
Q You say "work of the commando." Do you mean to say mass executions, or what are you referring to by work of the commando? in the harvest and to help the Army to do this, and not to carry out the Fuehrer order.
Q Why not? under the reasons of the Wehrmacht, a very specialized mission. This that time, because of an agreement or because of some request made by the Army, there existed a directive that the Jews in the flat country should be exempted from the registration, which had been ordered by the Hitler orders. Because of these special considerations the Army did not want these measures to be carried out yet.
Q How could you prove that this existed? I was not subordinated to a special unit of the Army yet, but this was an instruction which I expressly received from the Einsatzgruppen chief in this connection.
Q The Einsatzgruppen chief was? the harvest, did you hear of any special occurences there? events reported to me. I could convince myself, that the harvest measures were being carried out as it could be expected.
Q How about shootings? Did any shootings take place during these actions? BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Let's have the date, Dr. Hoffmann, please, of this particular activity. haps, I am not quite certain, until about the 23rd or 25th of August, 1941. bringing in the harvest? men of my commando under my responsibility.
Q Did you yourself participate in the harvesting? of the commando, of the rest of the commando in Chanomin, but I cannot quite say whether once or twice I travelled to the district where my two platoons, were working. I believe only once, on another occasion, I had an economic mission to travel somewhere else.
Q Were your men all farmers?
Q What did they know about harvesting? measures had to be taken, and, as happens so often, something had to be done in a matter which, although one does not really understand the matter, but that was not what was needed, whether one understood. agriculture or not here. dorf told you, "Now, you go ahead and harvest this wheat." What would you do? Would you know what to do?
DR. HOFFMANN: May I say something just briefly?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you a farmer, Dr. Hoffmann?
DR. HOFFMANN: No, I am not. Witness. may I add another question to the question of the President? By "bringing in the harvest", did you mean that you people themselves filled the hay wagon or that they cut the horn, or what do you understand by bringing in the harvest in this connection?
THE WITNESS: I have already expressed myself to the effect, the organization of bringing in the harvest. They did not operate the machines themselves and cut the wheat, but to see to it that the harvesting was done by the people in the rural districts. And may I say two sentences here to describe the situation which we found in this fertile part of the Ukraine?
DR. HOFFMANN: Witness, one question. Your people did not work. themselves, they merely supervised?
THE WITNESS: Yes, they gave instructions. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Did they know enough about agriculture to give instructions? It takes a smarter man to give the instructions than to do the work.
A Your Honor, I quite understand you. I was not able to say my two sentences yet. They were not to give expert instructions here, but merely to give some intiative orders, to make the population in the country carry out the work to their expert knowledge and according to their expert knowledge and according to their old experience, but the following was necessary for this. The population in Bolshevist Russia was only used to do something when ordered, not on their own initiative and not as necessity arose. But since the administration of the districts did notexist any more, no district administration gave any instructions that the collective farms so-and-so collect their harvest tomorrow, and since no order came, they just did not do anything. ratively--the organization for bringing in the harvest was there but someone had merely to see that the machine was put into motion and supervise its operation. That is what you did?
A Yes. Also, there was the special task of overcoming the difficulties which arose owing to the fact that fighting had been going on in these areas -- in particular, the Red Army, in order to prevent the bringing in of the harvest in as far as they could, had destroyed all the machinery, or destroyed parts of it, and now it was the task to manage it so that one machine which would work, could be built out of several parts that the seythes, which were brought by airplane from the Reich in tens of thousands, be distributed to the various localities, so That the population, inasfar as they did not have machines, could at least bring in the harvest as far as possible with these primitive means.
Q (By Dr. Hoffmann) Now, witness, concerning the charges which are raised against you, I ask you again -During such time, did any shooting take place, or did you hear of any? place in the village of Bobchinski. The troop officer of one platoon, who was in charge of the locality of Babchinski there -- reported a shooting to me when he reported back to the headquarters in Chanomin.
DR. HOFFMANN: Very well. Just as you wish, Dr. Hoffmann. It would be well if you always -- if you recall it -- give the date of the particular episode which is being discussed -- approximately.
Q (By DR. Hoffmann) What was the date, approximately?
A I cannot say exactly. I said it must have been in this time -- that is during the time between the 10th and 23rd of August 1941.
Q When did the platoon return -- on the 23rd? platoon reported back?
Q Is this in the document which I already mentioned? assignments?
A Yes, I, personally, did. The Einsatzgruppen chief gave me the order to go to Jampol, and, through negotiations with the German commander, or with the Roumanian agencies or the Roumanian officer, to achieve that a larger number of Roumanian Jews be brought back to their district, who, some time before, through the Roumanian troops, had been moved out of Roumanian across the Dnestr River into the German rear army territory.
Q When was this? 20th of August.
Q And you obeyed this order -- you obeyed it? it necessary in order to carry this out, and one or two other vehicles came along, and some officers, and some more men -perhaps three or four men -- or perhaps a second car -perhaps two cars, aside from mine -- I am not quite sure now. I then travelled the long distance to Jampol. I returned, because I had already passed Jampol once, when travelling from Orchanka and Chanomin -- the distance, I think, was about 80 or perhaps 100 kilometers.
tell us precisely how many of you there were when you travelled to Jampol, and how you were equipped, if you can remember.
AAt least two officers. Also an interpreter, and five or six men.
Q And what equipment did you have?
A I probably had my automatic rifle with me. The men had carbines, or pistols.
Q Why did you carry your automatic rifle? Was there any particular reason?
A No, certainly not. But instructions had been given that no vehicle should travel alone -- and may I say that all this time in Russia I never travelled without my automatic pistol, whether I travelled to the hospital, or whether I went anywhere else.
Q Why? Why -- was it dangerous? Why did you have to carry an automatic pistol? as much, but later on one noticed it much more, and it became more and more necessary -- and, may I say that in the winter it became necessary to sleep with one's clothes on and to have the automatic pistol next to the bed. Jampol when you arrived there. I found out that a second bridge had been built since, which was just about to be completed. Then I travelled on the road which led from Jampol toward Mogilew. Just outside the town cooking.
I did not see any German soldiers and members of the security police guarding it.
They moved about freely, order was in that situation.
What were you to do?
Not to shoot them. But the order from the Einsatzgruppen
Q We have not come to that yet, witness. When you order meant?
Why importance was attached to it?
Roumanian Jews. I had heard that in Mogilew a number of resisted.
I think I even heard that they had tried to Jews to return.
In any case -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Hoffmann, this episode will be of it first.
Now, these Jews were in a camp. Is that right?
DR. HOFFMANN: No. Not a closed camp, but they were just in an open field.
That is how I understand the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: In his affidavit he said, "There was in Jampol a camp of I should say, three thousand Jews." Is that right, witness? Were they in some sort of a camp?
THE WITNESS: No, your Honor, this expression is rather unfortunate. There are camps, and there are camps! I already said they were not guarded. I did not see any German soldiers, nor members of the security police guarding it, but they were free and just camping there.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it was ca camp?
THE WITNESS: No, they were camping there.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they were camping, it is a camp, isn't it. If you camp, you camp -- then it becomes a camp. I think this would be a good place for us to camp for fifteen minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MAYER: Dr. Mayer for the defendant Steimle. Your Honor, I ask that the defendant Steimle be excused this coming Monday from that session in order to prepare the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Steimle will be excused from attendance in court next Monday all day so he may work with his attorney in the preparation of the document book.
DR. MAYER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Hoffman, we were talking about camps before we decamped, and we would like to get this situation so then we can understand the unfolding of the narrative. Now, we understand there were three-thousand Jews in Jampol, is that right?
DR. HOFFMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And they remained in a meadow?
DR. HOFFMAN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, the number three-thousand I mentioned as a quick estimate, and I had to give it here during my examination which was after I had driven here for half a day and a whole night, and half an hour stay here, when I was immediately interrogated here.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but we will go into that later. what I want to do now is to get a rough idea of what this episode is about.
THE WITNESS: Everything else is correct, but the estimate of three-thousand was too small. After I thought this over it must have been six to seven-thousand people.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There were six to seven thousand Jews in the group living together at least temporarily at a certain spot in Jampol, is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now were they under guard?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you received orders to do something with these Jews. Now what were the orders?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What were the orders, what you were to do with the Jews?
THE WITNESS: The order was as follows: These Jews who had been brought to Jampol from Mogilew, as I knew it, were to be lead across the bridge, and this was to be done by overcoming the Rumanian resistance which had been shown in Mogilew, and the retransfer had to be effected there, because there was the only bridge where this could be done.
THE PRESIDENT: What did this bridge span? Was it a river?
THE WITNESS: Yes, the bridge was over the Dnjestr River.
DR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, the Dnjestr River is missing on the map.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Then you were to take these Jews over the Dnjestr River to where?
THE WITNESS: Yes, merely into the Rumanian territory.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, all right, now generally we have an idea what it is about and you may develop it further, Dr. Hoffman. BY DR. HOFFMAN:
Q. Witness, first of all a question, do you think that a camp must always have a fence?
A. No.
Q. Thus, if there were six to seven thousand Jews camping, there was a camp also, and the President is correct?
A. The President is always correct, yes.
Q. Why were these Jews to be brought back into the Rumanian territory?
A. The last decisions, or better the preliminary thoughts I can not give you, because this was not my job, but, of course, it seems credible to me and understandable that in this situation it was not up to us to have a helpless population driven into our territory, which only had to cause us difficulties, because they were staying there and they could not be sheltered there, and didn't even belong to us, they were Rumanian citizens.
Q. But there was an order to shoot Jews?
A. Yes, certainly, but I would say that we had nothing to do with Rumanian citizens, and the Hitler Order could not extend to Rumanian citizens, and could not be valid in the Rumanian territory.
Q. And why did the Rumanians not want to take back their own citizens?
A. I can not explain that. I could not have insight into Rumanian affairs. It was certain that we had to get rid of the Jews in some manner or other, and, it was the simple way that one would drive them out of ones own territory and to leave them to the Germans.
THE PRESIDENT: And how did they get over there in the first place?
THE WITNESS: The way I heard about it, the Rumanians drove them out of their own old Rumanian territory, that is, Bessarabia, across the Dnjestr River, and after that they blocked off the bridge, and now they were at our charge.
DR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, maybe it would be helpful to the Tribunal if I submitted a map, which gives the territory in detail.
We have only one copy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would be very interesting to see it, Dr. Hoffmann. (Shows map at the Bench) You show it to him, and then you show it to us afterwards.
DR. HOFFMAN: Yes. (Shows map to the witness, thereafter Dr. Hoffman returns to the bench with the same map, where a discussion ensues outside the record).
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. BY DR. HOFFMAN:
Q. What did you do to see to it that the Jews be brought back to Rumanian territory?
A. I already said that I left Jampol and arrived at the large camping site, and I went right into the midst tive, or might speak for them. After some talking back and forth a coup of men came to see me. I asked them whether they came from Mogilew, and they said, yes. I told them that they would be brought across the bridge, and could go back to their homeland, but I can not as yet tell them exactly when. I hoped it would be the same day. They were very joyous about this.
Q. Did these Rumanian citizens want to go back there?
A. Absolutely. According to my impression it was the greatest desire to go back home.
Q. And how do you know that these were Rumanian Jews. Did you understand their language, or what was it?
A. They told me from where they came. I had an interto the German language, even in these areas, where I could make myself understood well enough.
Q. And now please describe for us briefly what you actually did?
A. We went to the bridge, and when I arrived there I found a German engineer bridge building company. I asked for their commanding officer. A technical master sergeant reported to me. I told him what my mission was. In the course of the conversation we established the fact we were somehow known to each other, and, when we went into the matter further we found out that he come from my hometown. He was a lawyer in Hallo, and his name is DR. Harsch. He knew me from my activity with my attorney, and from work in the courts. He promises to be of help to me. He told me that the other bridge would be possible within a few hours, and it would then be possible to take care of the west-East supply columns by transferring this traffic to the new bridge so that the other bridge would be at my disposal in order to bring the Rumanians back. Then we would have to set up second bridge command and the signs would have to be changed. He promised to take care of that. Then I went to the Rumanians and asked for their commanding officer. He was not present. It was of no use to speak to the Rumanian enlisted men. I told them that the traffic on this bridge would be re-routed today. They should occupy the other bridge and change the sign, but only when the German bridge commander would tell them to do so. All of this was taken care of. I agreed with the German bridge commander at about six or eight o'clock at night, safer as I remember, that the traffic would be re-routed to the new bridge, and then I had the camping Jews notified that they should stop preparing their meals, and should arrange their stuff and to place themselves in formation one hour after the traffic had been rerouted and they would be brought back across the bridge.