A. The next interruption began on 14 August. I fell off a horse and broke my left lower thigh. On 14 August I came to the Field Hospital No. 156 in Orel. I was there for about four or six days, and then I was to be taken to Warsaw in a train for wounded. At that tide, at least for a few days before the attack near Bolchoff had started, and the Field Hospital was "full-up". Then I went to my own quarters in Orel. I was lying there and the physician of the Field Hospital attended me. He visited me every two or three days, and apart from that I was also treated by the physician of the Unit Moelders.
Q How long was this interruption of your service with the Kommando? Government Councillor Dr. Allinger came who was to be put in charge of the Kommando. He remained for a few weeks in Orel but he was then transferred back to Einsatzgruppen B and the new Kommando chief SS_ Sturmbannfuehrer Wilhelm Bluhm was appointed. At this time I was to be retransferred which is noted in the documents here. mentioned, 4747, in Document Book III_B which the President already looked at during the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: How long was he disabled after August 14th?
Q How long had you been away? September. When I could walk with crutches, on 28 September 1943 when my retransfer had already been decided I went homo first.
Q Did you remain at home? I could only walk on crutches at the time. After five weeks when my leg had more or less been healed I was ordered to Russia again. I was detailed to Russia again upon special request by the supreme chief of the 2nd Armored Army Corps General Schmidt who had sent a report about Einsatzgruppen B to the Reich Security Main Office. This request of the General was supported by the chief of Einsatzgruppen B Brigadefuehrer Naumann.
Q How long did you then remain with the Kommando?
THE PRESIDENT: When did he return first?
Q And when did you take over the Kommando?
THE PRESIDENT: You went on 28 September 1942, is that correct?
AApproximately on the 8 September I went back. It took me seven days to get there and then I took over the Kommando.
tion until January 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: It came through that approximately September 8, undoubtedly November 8 is intended.
A Yes. I left home on 8 November and on the 15th I arrived or there abouts and on the next day, 16 November 1942. I took over the Kommando again. were they in agreement with your idea of what the work was going to consist of? the information service and intelligence work I knew from former assignments. Apart from that I had certain experiences which I had already at the beginning in the Russian territory during my Russian assignment made in connection with combating partisans. Already at that time a part of the roads could only be passed in convoys and only in daytime.
Q Did your expectations conform to conditions as they were?
A No I couldn't say that because Rausch informed me about the fact that this Fuehrer order was in existence.
Q What did Rausch tell you about the Fuehrer order?
THE PRESIDENT: When was this?
A That was when I arrived at Kommando VII_B in Bryansk. That was 18 or possibly 19 February 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: That's the first time you had heard of the Fuehrer order, February 1943? carrying out within the territory of sub-Kommando VII_B. in the evening. He was on a short service trip and in the evening we sat down in his own room and we discussed matters until midnight.
He first explained to me the marching route of the Kommando since it had left in June 1941 from Pretsch and Dueben. He also told me about the collaborations with the Wehrmacht and also he said, "Now, I am going to explain to you the hardest task which I had". And that was the Fuehrer order. I asked Bausch what Fuehrer order and Bausch said, "Of course, the Fuehrer order concerning the extermination of the Jews." Upon that I said, "What extermination of the Jews?" So Bausch said, "Were you not informed in Smolensk about that?" So I said "No, not a word was mentioned to me". Thereupon Bausch informed me about the Fuehrer order as he had informed the marching Kommando in June of the preceding year in Pretsch and Dueben or as the Fuehrer order had then been made known by Heydrich and Streckenbach. I requested Bausch to tell me whether this order had also been issued in writing. He said, "No, this order has not been written down." people concerned? Fuehrer order, the Jews would have to be eliminated for reasons of security. I asked him"what Jews" and he said, "All Jews". When I asked him "does that also concern women and children" he said "Yes, they also have to be eliminated".
Q What did he direct you to do or what did he give you as a tank? that the front had come to a stop near Orel as early as October, I think at the end of October 1941, and that the front line from that date on could not be moved forward. He told me that the Kommando for as long as five months had been stationed in Orel and Bryansk and had carried out the Fuehrer order concerning the elimination of the Jews. As far as I was concerned the order would become topical when Tula had been reached. The chief cities which by then were still occupied by the Russians were Suchinitschi and Mzensk.
main Russian part. They mention Mzensk which is east of Orel and Suchinitschi which is east of Bryansk. As far as your own territory was concerned which had already been in the hands of sub-Kommando VII-B for some time was this Fuehrer order to be carried out in this territory? concluded more or less in this particular territory. He said that towns were already free from Jews; that, however, probably in the far away places between the woods and swamps there would probably without any doubt be Jews, but that the Kommando was not string enough and not well manned enough to carry at operations in this territory which was over three hundred kilometers wide.
Q What was your reaction to this order then?
complete surprise to me and came out of the blue, I was horrified and I intended after the period of three weeks of my getting used to my work and when, Brigadefuehrer Naumann would arrive, I should have this order confirmed by Naumann. I did not only consdier this order very severe and serious for the people concerned but also for the men who had to carry out this order.
Q Didn't it occur to you to refuse to carry out this order, to object to it, and refuse the carrying out of it?
A That wasn't possible for me because as far as this territory was concerned it had already been carried out for five months. Naumann and what did he tell you?
A Yes. Brigadefuehrer Naumann arrived the 15 or 16 of March. It was a Saturday and he remained until Sunday noon and when he turned over the Kommando to me on this Sunday morning I asked him whether this order would have to be carried out in the form as told to me by Rausch and whether it was quite correct in this shape. Brigadefuehrer Naumann replied, "Yes, this order has been given in this particular form. I myself have very serious misgivings about it and I reject it psychologically but we have to carry it out." were chief of the Kommando to apprehend Jews and to execute them according by the Fuehrer order?
A No. When I took over Kommando VII_B there were no operations of any kind in order to seize Jews. which might possibly be in the territory concerned? confirmed, I could not detail this small unit of about 100 men into these partisan infested territories. I could not dispurse them there.
I depended on my own securing of supply routes, mainly the road BryanskKapatschew-Orel and the parallel railway line and in making partisan reconnaissance. Added to this in the southwest and south of Bryansk there was a forest and swamp area around Lokot. In this territory there were partisans numbering about 3,000 men strong.
Q How did the partisan warfare express itself in your territory? question because it is very decisive for conditions in the territory of the 2nd Armored Army, As I have already said that Lokot, south of Bryansk, could only be reached by an armoured train. The road Bryansk-Kapatschew-Orel and the railway line of the same route was in constant danger of partisan attacks. The same applied for the supply routes and the railway lines from Bryansk and Lokot to the frontal sector. In the territory in the north of Bryansk near Biat, Kowo, I put into this sketch, there also was partisan and sabotage not work here. The partisans even had an air base and they had regular aerial service. The losses through partisan warfare were very high. In the fall of 1942 shortly before I left at that time, for instance, the railway administration authorities Orel had lost 80% of their locomotives through blastings and sabotage acts. Each month hundreds of German soldiers and numerous Russian civilians were killed through partisan warfare. Even the trains with wounded and the supply trains were often blasted by mines. On the main road Bryansk_Orel according to statistics received by the Army.
THE PRESIDENT: How large was this partisan organization? territory?
A It was 6 to 7,000 men. We had groups of partisans.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There were 5 to 7,000 engaged in those activities which you have now described is that what you are saying?
THE PRESIDENT: How many men did you have? 100 men.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to try to tell us that you with 100 men were going to try to compete with 6 to 7,,000 armed forces who had an air drome and possessed of explosives and were organized and carried out what really amounted to organized warfare? the reconnaissance of the Partisans, a number of Wehrmacht units also took part, The 6 to 7,000 -
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that really became then a military operation?
THE PRESIDENT: The Wehrmacht wouldn't allow such a major situation as that to be solved only by your small group?
THE PRESIDENT: well then what you are doing at present is merely giving us a history of the situation of the area.
A Your Honor, I want to make clear the following things. One has to distinguish here between two different activities, First is partisan combating and the other is the reconnaissance,
THE PRESIDENT: That is enough that you indicate that there were vast partisan groups, in fact of such size and of such force that they engaged the attention of the Wehrmacht. Now, tell us what you did, what your Kommando did because if you go into the history of the whole partisan movement in Russia, it is entirely too vast to be related here in your own case. I would suggest, Dr. Koessl, that you would try to confine your questions to what his Kommando did. BY DR. KOESSL: Kommando in the whole of the Partisan warfare. Therefore, witness, tell us briefly about the tasks of your own Kommando.
two things were necessary. First was to actually fight the partisans which was mainly being dealt with by the Wehrmacht and the other thing was the Partisan reconnaissance which was mainly the task of my Kommando. I may point out, this is mentioned in a number of documents from which it becomes evident that the Kommando first of all dealt with reconnaissance of the partisan bands. documents. Please proceed witness.
so many units from the security sectors, for these tasks even temporarily in fact not enough to carry out a successful combat of partisan hands. The Wehrmacht was merely in the position, sometimes, only for a few days, anyway only temporarily, to put at our disposal a unit of the size of a regiments and to take from the front, and thus try and carry out an effective partisan warfare. I may refer here to a document which is contained in the document books here and which deals with the Operation Eisbaer, which is Polar Bear. That was a partisan operation in which I myself took part and which was conducted by the Wehrmacht, in January, 1943, briefly, how was it possible that you, with your lack of men and manpower, that you could do anything at all in the matter of the partisan warfare? O.D. That is the regualr service, Ordnungsdienst, the Ordnungsdienst, the regular service in the territory of the Einsatzgruppe B, as ordered by the Wehrmacht, was set up by ken from the Sonder commandos, selected men, who were then trained. They were Russian volunteers who had volunteered for police service. Added to this it was the task of the commandos to create a network of intelligence and agents who were in position to find out about all movements and changes in the partisan bands as far as possible, and as far as possible find out the directives issued by the partisans among themselves. It was by no means the task of the partisans to form closed units and to fight openly. It was rather the aim of the partisans to disperse into smallest units and carry out acts of sabotage and small attacks. actions. partisans then?
under greatest difficulties, to take men from fighting units, from the security units in these vast territories, even temporarily and to detail them for partisan combat units. a small nature against other small, movile units on the part of the partisans? tasks. There was first of all the espinonage and reconnaissance of small sabotage groups up to the actual warfare in which on both sides thousands of men confronted each other.
Q In what way did you take part yourself in partisan warfare? and when, in time, I received a perfect knowledge, not only of the manner of fighting of the partisans but also of the organization and of the territory, I participated in the assignments of the Wehrmacht with my own commando within the whole task of partisan warfare. I was in charge of the intellegence of armed and unarmed units with the aid of my agents and with my Russian police. Wehrmacht took extensive actions and more than one company participated? in command, I took part in seven large scale partisan operations of the Wehrmacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, you mentioned Russian police?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: They augmented your number to what extent so that what was the final total strength of your commando?
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, the Russian police, the so-called O.D. or regular service, was not an integral part of my commando, but it was Russian police which was merely being set up by us and it was trained by us.
THE PRESIDENT: Your commando always remained the same size?
THE WITNESS: Yes, it was equally strong at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the maximum number of men that you commanded?
THE WITNESS: Of my own commando only those one hundred men that I mentioned, and the Russian O.D. they had about four hundred and fifty men.
THE PRESIDENT: But you did not immediately command the O.D., did you?
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. We were in charge of this particular O.D. service. They were in a building which was attached to ours, and one of my officials, or at least I think two together with two interpreters were constantly in the central office of this Russian police.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you in effect had five hundred men under you?
THE WITNESS: Not quite this, because the Russian police had been assigned to other tasks by the Wehrmacht, tasks of the kind which in Germany are being handled by the constabulary, but I was authorized to detail men for the partisan reconnaissance of those O.D. I was authorized to employ them.
THE PRESIDENT: All I am trying to find out is whether these Russian police were under your command or not. If they were under your command, they necessarily increased the strength of your organization. If they were not under your command, they did not, How, the question is a very simple one. Did you have command over these Russian police so that they in effect became part of your organization, or did you not have such command over them?
THE WITNESS: No, this power of command was not mine, but exclusively the local commander or the city commander of the Wehrmacht had this power.
THE PRESIDENT: So that -
THE WITNESS: I only was in charge of the actual work to be done by order of the Wehrmacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so that your command strength always remained about one hundred?
THE WITNESS: Yes. The fluctuation was only a very slight one. Sometimes there were only eight-nine men, or even more, but approximately one hundred men.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Q (By Dr. Koessl) will you describe to us any extensive operations that you took part in?
A You mean partisan operations? part in?
A You mean partisan operations? part in? Shurinitschi, S_h_u_ It is at the east of Bryansk, and in the second part--.
DR. KOESSL: It is on the map. It is on the railroad running north east. It is on the other righthand corner. It is about 30 kilometers from Bryansk.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q (By Dr. Koessl) When did this take place? sent me to the Reich for getting further supplies between the 20th and 24th of April.
Q Were any partisans killed during such action?
A The G.F.B. in the actual fight in the towns only suffered two or three wounded, and two or three - two partisans were shot.
Q And what was the second undertaking? At thebeginning of June, 1942, together with two Wehrmacht companies, a colonel was in charge of this operation. It was in the territory of Trosna-Ploskoje.
That is to the south and southwest of Orel. southwest of Orel. I remember the event very clearly because the officer had this shooting carried out without interrogating these partisans.
Q And what was the third operation? by the counterintelligence group Witter, assisted hy twenty officers and men of my own commando and two companies of indigenous counterintelligence members who were Russian volunteers who were working under German leadership, and they were fighting against the partisans.
Q And what was the result? Werchopolie. That is in the vicinity of Bryansk. One officer....
DR. KOESSL: Your Honor, it is marked on the map at the east of Bryansk, about 30 kilometers to the east of Bryansk, on the map.
A (Continuing) One officer was killed and three men, or at least non-commissioned officers they were had stopped on mines in the partisan forest. The second operation in July - I don't remember whether it was in the middle or towards the end of July, 1943. That was an operation in collaboration with the fighting unit Fuchs and two squadrons of Russian cavalry who were also fighting on the German side in the sector Trojanowo-Michailowka. That was an operation which took about two or three days. There was not any result, success, which could be mentioned, I think two men were killed during this whole operation.
in the forests near the railroad line, Bryansk-Karatschew, and in this operation, the fortifications of the bonds were destroyed. A number of mines were unearthed, hut it was not possible to catch a single partisan. November shortly after my second return to Russia. That was in the sector of Bolchoff. That is immediately behind the front line. In this operation two battalions of the Wehrmacht had been combined from various units, fortified by another company, in order to comb out a territory infested by partisans, it was a thick forest. On our part seven or eight men were killed. There were about fifteen wounded, and the partisans suffered losses of about twenty-five killed and wounded, or at least the numbers I do not know because they did not fall in our hands, but on the evening of the third day we had to withdraw because the partisan bands had succeeded to cut us off in the back and therefore there was the danger that we would be encircled in the night. Polar Bear No. 1, 2, and 3. I was asked concerning this during my interrogation by Mr. Wartenberg, and I could give him minute details about this because I myself took part in this operation, which took place in January 1943, at 35 degrees below freezing point and it lasted ten days, Later on, after I had received the indictment, I could see from the documents that the Operation Eisbaer is contained in the reports in March '43 concerning the reports of the Eastern Occupied Territory. May I just finish this? The Operation Eisbaer was under the leadership of the Wehrmacht. Colonel Ruebsam was in charge of the operation. Among the German participants there were about 2500 men from various units of the Wehrmacht. The partisan bands who were chased into the forests and swamp territories there were about 3000 men, and here I may mention something which seems to me most characteristic, which is the fact, that this operation which took ten clays and in which 2200 German officers and men took part, did not bring into our hands one prisoner, one man or one dead member of this partisan group.
This becomes evident from the document which has been submitted to the Tribunal.
Q How many smaller operations did Commando 7-B carry out?
THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say that the Eisbaer Operation endured three days. Few you tell us of one phase of it lasting ten days.
THE WITNESS: No, that must have been a mix-up, The Operation Eisbaer had three phases, Eisbaer 1, Eisbaer 2, and Eisbaer 3. In each phase there was a new territory. It lasted from 15 January until the 24th or 25th of January. That is ten days.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
THE WITNESS: It is mentioned in the documents that I took part in it. I was in charge of the reconnaissance with 25 men of my commando. BY DR. KOESSL: How many lesser operations, reconnaissance operations, did the Sonderkommando 7b carry out during your time? because the partisan reconnaissance was almost a daily task, and it had currently to be dealt with. The partisans always changed their locations, and they sent out their sabotage and terror groups, which sometimes only consisted of three or four men, into the cities and everywhere. German 57, you have just mentioned the Operation Eisbaer. Why did you just mention this particular event and not the other operations?
tion by Mr. Wartenberg on the 21st of February of this year a list was shown to me, or at least it was read to me, which contained names for those various partisan operations. Mr. Wartenberg asked me to tell him about those operations in which I had taken part myself. When he read these names to me I said that the only operations in which I took part was 1, 2, 3 Eisbaer and that I had actually taken part in them.
Q Mr. Wartenberg said when he was heard on the witness stand on the 7th of October, it is in a German book on page 389. but I don't know the English page, he said that you stated that the Operation Eisbaer had taken place at various points, that it had taken from the middle of February to the middle of May, and that you then went on recreation leave, and after that you had spoken about executions. How, what did you tell Mr. Wartenberg at the time?
A In these explanations which Mr. Wartenberg made when he was in the witness stand, these statements contain a number of incorrectnesses. It was correct, however, that mention was made of the Operation Eisbaer which took place at various points, as Mr. Wartenberg quite rightly said. Although it wasn't my way of expressing it, but of course it must have taken place at various points, because if thousands of soldiers fight thousands of partisans these partisans do not stand still. That the operation, according to Mr. Wartenberg, according apparently to my statements, took from middle of February to May, of course, I did not say. I think I gave the exact dates; I gave the exact time which was from the 15th of January to the 24th of January, 1943, and a few days after that I was finally recalled.
Q Did you say that you went on recreation leave at that time?
A Then? No, I didnot say that I went on leave then. That is not correct. I told, him that I ceased to be in command immediately after that, that is at the end of January, and that Obersturmbannfuehrer Raabe had been appointed my successor and had already arrived at Orel in the meantime.
Q During this interrogation by Mr. Wartenberg, after you had made your statement concerning this operation Eisbaer, did you speak about the executions which were carried out afterwards?
A No. Again, unfortunately, this is incorrect. After I had made these statements concerning Eisbaer I did not speak about any executions of any kind, but what happened was this. At the beginning of my interrogation on the 21st of February of this year Mr. Wartenberg asked me "How many thousand Jews did you shoot?" I told him that this was not at all the case because in 1942 there were no antiJewish actions in my territory. Herr Wartenberg therefore asked me to give him a detailed description concerning my first execution which I had seen in Russia, and I told himiin detail, or at least as well as I remembered it, an execution which had taken place in Ordshonikidsegrad which is near Bryansk during the tine of my initial training. At that tine four to five partisans or members of sabotage groups
Q Just a moment, Witness, did this execution take place in Bryansk?
Q It was, therefore, not in Ordshonikidsegrad? turned over by the local commander of Ordshonikidsegrad to Bryansk. Ordshonikidsegrad and Bryansk are almost one town. It is about like Nurnberg and Furth.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Koessl, would you want to interrupt now for the noon recess?
DR. KOESSL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 10 December 1947.)
MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. STUEBINGER: Dr. Stuebinger for Braune. Your Honor, I ask that the defendant Braune be excused from tomorrow's session in order to prepare the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant,Braune, will be excused from tomorrow's session so that he may help in the preparation of the document book.
DR. STUEBINGER: Thank you.
DR. KRAUSE: Krause, as representative for Dr. Riediger, for the defendant Haensch. Your Honor, I have the same request for the defendant Haensch. I ask that he be excused from tomorrow's session, both morning and afternoon, and to direct that he be brought to Room 57 to discuss his defense.
PRESIDENT: For both the morning and afternoon?
DR. KRAUSE: Yes, Sir.
PRESIDENT: The defendant Haensch will be excused from attendance in court tomorrow and will be conducted to Room 57 where he nay confer with his counsel.
DR. STUBENHOLT: Stubenholt for Ohlendorf. Your Honor, I ask that the defendant Ohlendorf be excused from the session on Thursday and Friday, both days, in order to prepare further document books.
PRESIDENT: The defendant Ohlendorf will be excused from attendance in court on Thursday and Friday of this week in order to work on his document book.
DR. STUBENHOLT: Thank you.
DR. KOESSL: May I please continue?
PRESIDENT: Please do.
DR. KOESSL: The defendant Ohlendorf called my attention to the fact, Your Honor, that I did not use an expression quite correctly.
The official designation of the Einsatzgroups did not say "Einsatzgroups of the Security Police and SD" but the Einsatzgroups were named "Einsatzgroup A", Einsatzgroup B", "Einsatzgroup C", and "Einsatzgroup D" without the addition "Security Police and SD."
PRESIDENT: Very well.
DIRECT EXAMINATION ( Continued) BY DR. KOESSL: Mr. Wartenberg. Whad did you tell Mr. Wartenberg about the events during your presence at the Einsatzkommando 7B?
A The question Mr. Wartenberg asked was, "How many thousand of Jews did you have shot? " I told him that in 1942 when I took over the commando no Jewish actions took place any more but that, of course, here and there a Jew was shot if he was involved in partisan or sabotage acts. He told me then, "please describe to me the first execution which you saw while you were in Russia," thereupon, I described the execution which took place in Bryansk, and of February or beginning of March, during the time I became acquainted with the work in 1942. These were five or six saboteurs whom the army had captured near Ordshonikidsograd. These were saboteurs who had intended to smuggle poison into an army mess in order to poison a whole army unit. This execution took place during severely cold weather and there was snow, and this is what I described to him. At this occasion I was asked by Mr. Wartenberg whether the Einsatzkommando had taken valuables from the victims, and I explained to him that these valuables had been transferred to Einsatzgroup B or via Einsatzgroup B to an agency of the Reich, and that they had to be delivered to that agency.