How did your position in the SD develop further?
A. The picture in the SD was somewhat different that I had expected. The Chief of the SD had exaggerated to me insofar as the organization of the SD, which in reality did not exist. The whole central organization which I found consisted of about twent young people without any office help, without any registration, without any means at all. It was not a well organized apparatus at all. One did not even know what was wanted. One took up individual cases which in such an embryonic organization happened to come along. The natural interest of the Chief were practically the be-it-all of the SD. He was a political scientist and teacher, and thus the SD was first concerned with that field. Here I began to work in the field of economics, laid the basis for an information service in which information was gathered about economics in Germany, and I tried to find specialists who would be in a position to analyze the economic tendencies and to evaluate these tendencies. This work pleased, and around the turn of the year '36, '37, I became Chief of Staff of the SD inland, that is representative of the chief, with the special mission of transferring the system I had developed to the other fields. The basis for an all-encompassing information service was adopted and was organized along those lines. In 1936 we already find a picture, in a small scale, of the later Amt III of the Reich Main Security Office. The SD Central Department II/2 had three groups which encompassed the entire phases of the spheres of national life, Group I, culture, education and national culture; Group II, law and administration, the questions of Party and State, of the high school and of the student organizations; Group III, all departments of economics.
Q. In your work did you have any difficulty?
what was being developed here. The difficulties came from the culture. sphere and from the economic spheres. In the years 1936 and 1937 the development of the four-year plan and the success of the food ideologies as National Socialist policies had made strong influences within the middle class. Hundreds of thousands of plants were closed. I started to take a part in this development with the new SD. We did not only try to take a hand in these developments and to point out the catastrophic consequences, but we also took a hand personally by personal conferences and strengthening our information material so that in the closing down of these plants many difficulties arose. At the same time we tried to point out to Himmler the damaging effects of these measures. And now there was the first shart difference, because the Reich Food Association under Darre as head was the actual basis and support of Himmler's ideologies, and therefore he objected to my reports as being against Darre. The factual problems were not agreeable to him. Since we also took a hand in the cultural problems and objected against the retirement and recall of the old professors by the Party and called attention to the fact that the opportunistic young knights were certainly not fit to replace the wisdom of the old professors, Himmler called me on the carpet. For the first time he called me a pessimist and this clung to me all the time. Besides Himmler stated that the SD had no business in these questions, but that they were left up to the Party. In the year 1937 the Director of the SD, Professor Hoehn, was dismissed through the intervention of Streicher. After the director had been dismissed the mission of the SD was to be changed, and therefore those forces were removed who had so far determined the direction of this new line. Since I was not prepared to give up my ideas about the subject, I was myself dismissed, not dismissed, I was merely excluded from a policy-making position. I was merely restricted to the economic department. Since I no longer saw any chance for the development of the SD in this position and did not want to participate in any other measures I asked for dismissal.
Heydrich refused this, but after long negotiations I succeeded, in the spring of 1938 to get permission to leave the SD and to become an official in the Economic Administration. November, 1939, I became the top manager of this group. In this time I only worked in the SD sporadically, for after my dismissal the other defendant, Seibert, was my deputy in the economic group who now actually directed the task.
Q Why did you accept a position in the Reichs-Group Commerce? years, '36, '37 and '38 was that unemployment was not only overcome but by the four-year plan and the many tasks which had been created threatened about one million businesses of the middle class. We had taken up this question since in our opinion it was the mission of National Socialism to dissolve the collectivization but not by proletarizing the middle class and by dissolving independent plants to increase this collectivization. The attempt to prevent this -- I only found a chance to prevent this in this Reichs-Group Commerce, and thus I went to this Reichs-Group Handel, Reichs-Group Commerce, in order to pursue my aims further in practical politics which could no longer be pursued in a normal manner.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, this would be a convenient time to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken:)
THE MARSHAL. The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. ASCHENAUER (Attorney for Defendant Ohlendorf): Your Honor, before I proceed with questioning my witness, I would like to clarify a few mistakes which were made in the translation. A list of incorrect points becomes evident from the comparison between the English and German. Professor Hoehn and not in the SD.
Two - it was said : alleged national socialist policies in the Reichsnaehrstand..... "allegedly" was not translated. from SD itself was mentioned, - the dismissal from the Main Office was meant. The Main Office was left out. These three things were incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, your remarks, of course, will be incorporated into the record and we can assure you that the correct version will appear in the final transcript, because everything which is stated here in court is automatically recorded on a film and from that the transcript is eventually prepared.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Yes, thank you very much, Your Honor. large responsible task in the Reichsgroup Commerce (Handel) in September 1939 you became the leader of the office of the SD Inland in the Security Main Office? the State Police, because of the centralization of the political Police Forces by the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, had by then been extended so far that apart from the immediate fighting in the executive, they also took over the SD, the News Agency. and which had been legitimized by the Party, had, in the years 1936 and 1937, become smaller and smaller and in 1938 it had been separated from the State Police and SD and was finally dissolved.
to take up his old plans and form a State Protection Corps. He attempted to do everything in his power to establish this corps after the separation by the State Police and SD. He affiliated them into new organizations and turned them over to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. The Reich Security Main Office too was supposed to be just a staff for a State Security Corps, which he extended to such an extent later on, that even the inner administration was taken over into the the State Security Corps. The SS Police, the SD Interior Administration were supposed to be taken over into the State Security Corps and the SS was supposed to be responsible for all this. silent about his plans in front of the Party, because the Party had legitimized the SD as a news agency, because the SD was a Party establishment above the SS but it had never been prepared to admit such a task in front of the State and to have it legitimized by the Party. was the news agency which had been legitimized by the SD. Party. It was attempted not to give up the SD as a news agency, because the Party had developed its own news agency and would have had the possibility to require officially this news service for itself, because the Reichsfuehrer SS did not offer them this intelligence service for their purposes. service from the Party in order to amalgamate these intelligence services within the State Security Corps, but this never came about. The Reich Security Main Office, as an institution, until the collapse, had never been an official agency, but officially the Security Police.
that is, the State Police and the Criminal Police, were superior to the Reich Security Main Office which remained an official authority. This Main Office, Security Police, was not dissolved, although in the Reich Security Main Office and State Police formed the office for the Amt IV and the Criminal Police formed Office V. Also the SD Main Office did not remain as an official Party institution, although internally the administration in Office I and Office II were combined with the State organization. This Reich Security Main Office, therefore, was an interior administration set-up of the Reichsfuehrer SS for the purpose of the State Protection Corps, but it never became an official agency within the State or Party. Thus, through a decree, it had been forbidden to use the letterhead of the Reich Security Main Office for any external correspondence. party from extending its own news service to the intelligence service on the one hand in order to use the SD as a function itself; in order to be able to show a facade to the Party as the other news agency was dissolved, which had been handled by the adversary and as this did not exist any longer within the SD, it was only a small beginning of the Lebensgebiet (domestic) News Service, that is Central Department II/2. As the Reichsfuehrer SS did not intend to extend this domestic news service and to develop it, and, also, Heydrich did not intend to reorganize the SD as much as it would have been necessary, the solution of an external facade was sufficient. This was an emergency solution, insofar as the staff which had been in the SD up to the time in the fight in 1936, 1937, 1938, had been used up by the deputy of Heydrich in the Reich Security Main Office. Therefore, there was no person who on this new basis could establish bearable relations with the State Police, but, as the SD was not regarded as a really serious matter by Himmler as by Heydrich, I remained in my main capacity as the manager of the Reichsgroup Commerce and Trade and in NOV, 1939 I was authorized to become the main manager officially, i.e. to takeover the complete organization of about 900,000 members and to represent them officially for all agencies of the Reich.
I remained Honorary Manager of the SD and I only temporarily worked in the SD and I saw no possibility thus to create a different picture from the one I left in 1938.
of a special confidence on the part of Himmler or Heydrich, was it? was prepared to take this over, because there was no serious intention of extending this office. your work done, the work you just talked about? ties and all the setbacks and defeats which happened later on. The SD Inland, the only purpose. as from September 1939, of the SD within the Reich remained illegal. The Party had not approved of this formation of the SD and it was not prepared to approve of it. Himmler himself did not legitimize this SD. He was not prepared to cover it, and he let it and its men down whenever they were attacked by any side; he did not defend it. Thus it was not possible to follow the plan of the administration of the Office III-D, and, too, it was in the interest of the German people, and it was not possible, as far as office personnel went, so that it could really solve the task which was Large extensive. This became evident very soon, especially in my own person. Although in September 1939 I became the manager of Ant III, in the beginning of November we had the first big crisis. Heydrich sent me on official trips with Himmler, and disputes arose, the consequence of which was that in Warsaw he informed me, through his chief- adjutant Karl Wolff, that I should leave his services, that an agreement between us about the work was no longer possible.
Q What is the reason for this disagreement with Himmler? been able to treat the Jews in a manner which he wanted and that, he said, was the product of my education. Heydrich was very pleased by this crisis with the Reichsfuehrer because any possibility of my overshadowing his position had been prevented. He refused to let me have the organization, and he gave reasons to the Reichsfuehrer for abandoning the idea of my dismissal, During the year 1940 there were more disagreements, because the fact of the news service was protested from all sides.
Ley complained to Himmler about me and asked for my dismissal because of criticism by the SD News Service against the development of the DAF and its economic enterprises. Himmler himself criticized a number of reports because he said they are defeatist and pessimistic. They came back torn up. In the negotiations with me Heydrich realized that I was chief of the Reich Group Commerce and Trade and was declared essential as such - that means I was obligated to serve in the Reich Group Commerce and Trade during the war and that he had thus almost completely lost his power over me. Thus, in 1940, the crisis with Heydrich started again in a very acute form, he asked me on various occasions to join the army. This was prevented because, meanwhile, the chief of the Reich Group Commerce and Trade is a soldier, and apart from taking over the management, I also took over the military end of Reich Group Trade, therefore, he asked for my dismissal from the Reich Group Trade.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt, please. Witness, would you please indicate specifically just what were these differences between you and Himmler? Briefly, but specifically.
A (By the witness) The differences of opinion between Himmler and myself were differences of temperament and of politics. I now use his expression: I was the unbearable, humorless Prussian, an unsoldierly type, a defeatist, and intelligence monger.
THE PRESIDENT: Are we to understand that you mean by that, that you anticipated the defeat of Germany? many difficulties which might make the success of the war questionable
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
A (Continuing) What was most disagreeable to him was that in our administrative reports we wanted to bring about constitutional conditions under all circumstances.
We made it quite clear to him that if the order of the state was destroyed the war could not possibly be was. Now, I called Himmler a Bavarian because he called me a Prussian. He did not want orderly conditions. He was the representative of "Personalism". He tried to imitate Hitler in a small way. Hitler himself followed the type of policy so fatal to us, he had the habit of assigning tasks not to organizations but to individual persons, and if possible he assigned one and the same task to several individuals This was imitated by Himmler, although for him there was no reason whatsoever to fear that one of his functionaries would become too powerful, but he believed he could prevent his individual functionaries from becoming more powerful than Himmler himself. Practically the question of national culture dealt with in Case & Will be of interest to the Tribunal - these questions were handled by five different offices without making the conpetency for the individual tasks clear. When I suggested to Himmler to deal with these questions as an entity, this was, a further reason for his utterances which he made in Warsaw to the effect that I should be dismissed. Thus was his basic structure. He was a practical man; he was an opportunist of the day who was in no way prepared to deal with matters objectively and in an organized manner - rather, he liked to employ individual people day by day and to drop them again in the same manner. According to my opinion this Led had to destroy the whole order even in peacetime, and, of course, especially in as serious a war as Germany had to wage and that which separated me most from him was the willfulness of the individual decision not only in regard to the tasks he himself assigned but also in the legitimizing of people who were partly not qualified or so appointed that they could not exercise any leadership - it may even be that he appointed them perhaps for this reason - and on the other hand, by way of intervening in the continuous flow of events in an individual sphere, and thus nary very important matters were never brought to a satisfactory solution.
Expressed in one word, the difference between us was that I regarded politics objectively, and I wanted to make man the subject of politics While he regarded politics merely from a point of view of his own person and his tactical position, and he subordinated the facts to this tactical position.
If we judge the matter from the German point- of view, Himmler has not so much become a parasite of our own people for what he did, but for what he did not do. He had a power which has led to the terrible judgment of him and the SS, and in reality he did not exercise this power in Germany but he and his power were an empty shell, and in this we have the important element of his crime against humanity too, that through the police, through a unit like the SS, and later through his direction of the Ministry of the Interior, he would have had the power which would have enabled him to see the damage, and he would have had the possibility to remove this damage and to create a orderly conditions.
Q. Witness, you pointed out the difference between Himmler and yourself, How did it come about that in spite of this you returned to Berlin in June 1942, and took over Office III?
A. In June 1942, Heydrich was killed as a result of an attempt on his life. Himmler himself took over the leadership of the Reich Security Main Office with the clear intention of weakening it, because Heydrich was the only SS leader who had grown above his, Himmler's head. Technically, Heydrich was officially the Reich Protector and already on the official list of Reich authorities and ranked above Himmler. When Himmler was in charge of the Reich Security Main Office he weakened it in two important points. He took the economic authority from the Reich Security Main Office and transferred it to Pohl, the manager of the Economic Main Office, and he also took away the personnel authority of the RSHA and transferred it to the SS Personnel Main Office. Everyone who knows about offices and authorities knows what this weakening means. Himmler was not present at that time in Berlin, that is, the RSHA had no management, and no leadership. Thus he was forced to have the different offices working independently as the Office III, which, while I was in Russia, had no representative. I was, therefore, the only one of the management who, during his absence in Berlin, could direct the Office III. Furthermore, it was a tactical measure which, in my opinion, was to point up his weakening measure of the RSHA by taking away the Office Chief from the office and then instituting a person who had no authority, neither internally nor externally.
Q. What was the development of your relations with Himmler after this?
A. When I returned from Russia in July I was ordered to report to Himmler. In August he received me in his headquarters in a very friendly manner.
THE PRESIDENT: May we suspend just for a moment? There seems to be something wrong with the transmission here. We don't quite get all of it. I would like to speak to the interpreter here... BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q. We were just dealing with the question of the development of your relations with Himmler.
A. After my return from Russia I reported at the headquarters to report to Himmler about the situation of Office III. I was received in a very friendly manner, I was promoted to a Brigadefuehrer, and he told me that he planned to make me a Brigadier General of the Police. This friendly manner, of course, had its ulterior motives, because he went on with Heydrich's intentions by asking me to leave the Reich Group Trade and to become an official in the Reich Security Main Office. I explained to him that I had to ask him not to make me an official of the Reich Security Main Office, and not to make me a Brigadier General of the police, and why the Office III had remain an independent office under all circumstances, that is, it had to remain a party organization, and its members had to be party employees. I made it quite clear to him that the Party would never stand for a state organization taking over an information service in which the work of the Party would also be dealt with. I also made it clear to him that the SD could only tackle the task which he had talked about under the conditions that he would not give it the appearance of a police organization, because a police organization collected the most able experts of all departments, but these were not prepared to even give the impression that they were in any contact what so ever with the police.
Apart from that, through this connection between the state police and the SD, the most important task of the SD would be abandoned namely to be independent of any department, not to serve in any administrative or executive function, but to work without any individual responsibility and in no connection with other departments, but working completely independently because this, in itself, would justify the SD dealing with other subjects with its objective criticism, which, otherwise, would no longer be objective criticism and would be regarded as criticism of one department against another department. This, of course, led to a completely new disagreement. Himmler reproached me with very harsh words, and asked me to not try and teach him anything. He knew exactly what the purposes of the SS were, and what meaning the state protection corps had for him. I was dismissed in disgrace, and this was the second time in my activity of nine years in the SD that I had the chance to speak to Himmler himself. When Kaltenbrunner took over the office and became Himmler's successor in January 1943, Himmler spoke of the Office III and its chief with ironical words, and said they were the guards of the grail of National Socialism and of the SS who stood whining by the broken ideas and thought that now everything had been lost. Thus, we were publicly denounced as nuisances, pessimists, and defeatists. But it was only now that the actual crisis of the SD started because after Stalingrad conditions in Germany became more and more difficult. The more difficult these conditions in Germany became, the more critical, of course, became the reports of the SD, And now, Himmler was no longer prepared to approve of this activity on the part of the SD but, on the contrary, he used the complaints of his colleagues in the Reich Offices and pushed them on to the SD.
A. I'll give you a few examples. In the spring of 1943 Goebbels had tried through a theatrical attempt to gain the internal political power in Germany. It was the famous Sports Palace Speech, the declaration of a total war. Goebbels himself asked on that morning for a report of the SD on the effects of this declaration; and he got this report. In this report it was said that among the population of all Germany, in all districts, this declaration in the Sports Palace was disapproved of and disagreed with and that it was called a Punch and Judy show. This led to Goebbels' forbidding any spreading of these reports from all the Reich or part of the Reich. The reports from the Reich were these summaries of reports of all departments of the SD which were issued by us to all Reich departments and authorities and in the administrational practice of the Reich were the only source of information of the departments about difficulties of the remaining departments. With this the most important means of information of the SD was abolished and destroyed. that even Reichsminister Rammers and Goering, who, on pressure only, received these reports, were not in a position from their own reports which they received to overcome this defeatism. Gauleiter news service in the Party Chancellory had received these reports which I had issued against his power politics in Russia, He complained to the Reichsfuehrer SS, and the Reichsfuehrer SS wrote a letter to Kaltenbrunner in which he instructed him to dissolve the Office III and its subsidiary offices; to warn its chief; and to threaten him that if these unnecessary reports were not stopped, the SD, the news service, would be dissolved completely and the chief would be arrested. Bormann and Ley were the next people to take this direction. Ley immediately forbade the confidence men and the administrators of his office any collaboration with the SD. Because of the unjustified work of the SD, Bormann threatened to speak to the Fuehrer, which was to have the of effect that the Fuehrer would take the Chief of Office III where he belonged, and his people would be put to a more productive work.
also in 1944 forbade all Party authorities, all office chiefs in the offices down to the smallest menial clerk to have any activity within the Party. I mean the SD. This fight which Bormann put up remained in force until April 1945; and it was such a heavy fight that even Kaltenbrunner, who on the whole approved of my work, asked me urgently to stop the work on the Lebensgebiet (domestic) paper, or at least to camouflage the reports as reports of the adversary or sabotage reports. The reports of this kind regarding the leadership situation within the Reich which fell into the hands of the English showed the Allies that this manner of reporting was not given up in spite of all and in spite of the threats it was still possible to edit and issue the strongest reports about the leadership of the Reich, about the complete interior dissolution of leadership within the Reich, and about the collapse of the Luftwaffe and to submit them first by way of detour to the Fuehrer.
According to my knowlege that is the tragedy of the SD. These were the only reports which in the midst of the catastrophy were submitted to Hitler. I myself did not know Hitler personally nor did I over have the possibility of submitting a report to him or even of speaking to him.
Q. How did it come about that you were appointed into the Reich Economic Ministry?
A. My professional development was conditioned by my work in the Reich Group Commerce and Trade. This work gained importance and significance as it was meant for a group in the professional organization because the neighboring groups of the industries, the handicraft and banks and insurance companies and the transport groups did not have tasks which were handled by political people. They were not prepared to work in this very difficult sphere of the economical and armament ministries; and, as I entered this policy with political arguments, my own significance in economical policy was a much bigger one than can be understood from commerce and trade.
This was fortified by the fact that even in the economic ministry there were no political personalities who were prepared to discuss the differences with the Party, and the political person Speer, who was the confidence man of the Fuehrer. Thus in the years 1939 and 1940, from the Reich Group Commerce and Trade we were in charge of the economic, political situation; and we fought against all collectivistic and socialistic tendencies which were connected with the names Speer and Bormann.
Funk was in agreement with my activity. He especially approved of my work which I did in the face of the so-called self-responsibility of economy; that is, against the consequence that state authority as a state would vanish, and instead of the state economic leaders entered who took over the authority of the state, but at the same time they were competitors in competition with each other. Therefore, the possibility of corruption set in. But also it was one of the primary reasons for an economical loss of war because the competitor was no longer prepared to talk about its actual output to the competitor, and large masses of the people did not feel themselves confronted any longer with an objective state but with individual industrial beasts and monopolies. Therefore, the contrast between economy and the state became larger and larger. Funk approved of those reports of mine and therefore asked mo for my entry into the Reich Ministry of Economy. State in the Ministry of Economy. Himmler categorically refused my transfer into the Reich Ministry of Economy and for the very reason that caused Funk to ask for my transfer into the Reich Ministry of Economy. Himmler also recognized the significance of the economical development of the capitalism of monopoly as it had not been known until that date, But in a letter to mo he refused my own transfer into the Ministry of Economy, giving the reason that He did not want an 33 leader to be exposed in this economical fight against capitalism because this economical fight could not be waged within this whole world war.
After the Ministry of Economy collapsed in the summer of 1943, Funk again tried and through a tactful game succeeded in coming to a decision before Himmler; and Himmler now agreed.
Q. What was the effect of your last discussion with Himmler?
A. The relation with Himmler deteriorated even more; it had to deteriorate even more after this because my now duty in the Reich Ministry of Economy was added to the old crisis because what our predecessors had not been able to do now became our own task. We tried to force Pohl and his old Reich Economic Main Office to uncover the cards of the SS office; to play with open cards, as it were. We told him that we would not stand for the dissolution of this SS structure in Germany any more than we would in foreign countries. During the course of this discussion, together with Heider, the UnderSecretary of State in the Ministry of Economy, Himmler asked me to come to Berchtesgaden in the summer of 1944. He explained to us why this policy was not to be pursued by us in opposition to his economical activity. We refused any agreement; but he had already created conditions in Hungary by a deal with the Weiss-Konzern, securing the Weiss enterprise for the SS. As for us, the right was on our side in this case; and as normally he had nothing on us, he used the next occasion to begin a now correspondence of a very serious and criticizing, slanderous manner. The reason was the economical reform plan which I had drafted in the autumn of 1944. He intended in the economical field to establish an orderly administration. Himmler first agreed with that when Bormann objected because he was against any consideration on the part of the state and tried to prevent this; and furthermore he did not want a curtailment of the power and authority of the districts which he regarded as a measure against the Party.
Himmler now changed his opinion and agreed with Bormann. He disavowed my reform suggestions, which he said were academical reports, statements of an unnecessary intelligence.
But the end of our relations was of a different nature. In the last fortnight before the collapse I turned over my quarters in Flensburg and Ploen to Himmler. Only now did really serious discussions begin. Now he was more open to discussing matters with me. But even to say that these discussion were actually good discussions between Us-- only the end was more or less like the beginning because. at the end I tried to cause him not only to dissolve the Werwolf activities but also to dissolve the SS, and to go over and turn himself over to the Allies. In trying to cause him to do so, I put it t** that he alone could explain to the Allies the tasks which he had given to the SS in a responsible manner, and he would have to take this responsibility. He refused and escaped without saying goodbye.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I think this would he the right moment for a recess, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I should like to ask a question. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. What was the date of this discussion with Himmler when the witness recommended the dissolution of the SS and the going over to the Allies?
A. That was the 9th of May, your Honor, 1945.
Q. Well, it was all over then, wasn't it?
A. No, it was not all over in a manner of speaking because the Flensburg government was in power, and the Allies had agreed to this so-called Flensburg government. This government was actually in power until the23rd of July 1945. They were officially in charge of Germany; of course, only in the manner of a district council. In this time between the 9th and the 23rd of May there were government reshuffles, as it were. Only on that date Himmler left the government as Reich Minister and as the commander of the subsidiary army. He had been of the belief that via his officer Schellenberg the Allies might negotiate with him and he might be used as a confidence man within Europe. From these conversations with Schellenberg via Bernadotte, the chief of the Red Cross in Sweden, with Churchill and the British government, Himmler really believed in it, until the day of his escape, even until the day before his death. Even after he escaped he sent me ordinance reports every day by which manner he tried to find out whether Schellenberg had returned from Sweden or whether Field Marshal Montgomery had answered the letter which he had sent on the 9th of May.
Q. But whoa you say that on the 9th of May you were discussing whether you should go over to the Allies, it's like the mouse discussing whether he should go over to the cat. You'd already surrendered.
A. Yes, but as I just stated, this small district of the Flensburg government, as it were, with the locality Muerwik and Gluecksbuerg, had not surrendered, because at that place there were official negotiations between the Control Commission of the Allies with the government and the chief of government of the so-called German Reich.