general activity and a general situation report is given. That means naturally in reporting, the situation in the territory is discussed, and not only our own activities but also all the other happenings and events of the locality itself, quite independently of who created these situations.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, just as a matter of information, looking at this page about which you have been testifying and directing attention particularly to the phrase, "and the village was burned down", would you please explain just what military objective was being aimed at in destroying the village? Let's assume for the purposes of the question that there was a reason for liquidating those who were opposing your forces, that is to say the partisans. Just what was attained in the actual physical destruction of the buildings?
THE WITNESS: These villages which I talk about were at the foot of the Yaila Mountains. The Yaila Mountains fill the southern part of the Crimes near the coast. In the Yaila Mountains there were about 10,000 partisans at my time. Naturally, these partisans were not sufficiently supplied with food because the mountains and the south coast had already been territories where there were famines even during peace. Therefore, the villages, that is the north part, were natural reservoirs for food supplies for the southern part. That means these villages were the only bases or the only places where partisans could go, especially in winter. The reason for burning and destroying these villages were two-fold; one, at first the village that is talked about here was a hiding place for partisans, and thus a base, was to be destroyed for partisan activities; and secondly, after the Army had threatened, on verification, to burn down villages if the villages supported the partisans actively, in such a case when a village actually supported the partisans it was then to be a deterrent for the inhabitants of the village.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q I have Document Book II-a in front of me. It is Exhibit 54, Document No. 3235, page 139 of the German document book. It is an operation situation report of 23 March 1942, It is reported about shooting of mentally insane people. Even if it is not evident from the document how many mentally insane people were actually shot. Could you comment on this? place at a time at which I myself was not present in the Crimea, but I can assure the Tribunal that my Kommandos did not carry out shootings of mentally insane. I have forbidden this explicitly, and I repeated this again and again because the Army asked us on various occasions to carry out shootings of mentally insane people. It is for this reason that it is impossible that this report deals with actions carried out by one of my own Kommandos. Furthermore, I think this is a false report because the territory at the south of Karasubasar consisted mainly of woodlands and clay huts. There were no major villages and there was certainly no asylum for insane people.
Q.- Witness, I must remonstrate you here and that is from Document Book III-D, I want to put to you Exhibit 150, Document No. 604. I shall show you this document and I should like you to comment on it.
A.- This Document 604 is a report of the Sender Kommando 11a to the army. In the last paragraph it says, that Romanenko, on the 9 December 1941, for heriditary biological reasons, was executed, I do not remember this case in detail, but the reason probably was that - or at least this becomes evident from the document - that the Sonder Kommando 11a received a direct order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army that Romanenko should be punished as deterrant, if possible should be executed in public by hanging. The Kommando investigated this case, as becomes evident from the document, and did not find the reasons confirmed for this request by the commander-in-chief. It does not become evident from the report why the kommando, in spite of this, executed the order, especially as it gives the reason for heriditary biological reasons, I do not know whether I ever saw this report, but if I had seen it I would not have agreed with it, but I assume that he reported to the Commander-in-Chief immediately after the Commander-in-Chief had been put in charge of this kommando.
Q.- Witness, from the same document book I now turn to another document. Would you look on page 15. It is Exhibit 151, Document No, 631, I ask you on this document, why did you try to justify yourself with the Army; why did you have to justify yourself concerning the confiscations of watches and other valuables taken during the Jewish actions?
A.- I remember the incident very well which led to my writing this report to the Army, Some officers had complained to the Chief-of-Staff that I refused to turn over money to the town of Simferopol without a receipt. Furthermore, complaints had been received that I had failed to turn over as many watches as I should have done after the confiscations had taken place. The Army sent a remonstration to me and asked me where the valuables were.
As the Army, by their own position, had the authority to ask me for such an explanation of the facts, this is the answer to the complaints of the Army.
Q.- I should like you to keep the same document, that is III-D, and to look at Exhibit 152, which is on page 21 of the German. This is Document No. 4439. The Einsatzgruppen is charged that they had looted Jewish apartments and had taken away property which they put at the disposal of Ethic Germans.
A.- What is called looting here was the carrying out of the confiscation, - and utilization decrees - which I simultaneously had received from the Reich Security Main Office and the Army. The apartments as well as the furniture, were put at the disposal of people who had lost all their property and who could prove that or it was administered by the local commander in their respective localities of command and was put at the disposal of those people who were looking for apartments. Furthermore, apart from these two lines, this report, which contains about twenty pages, is an excellent explanation of the terror under which the German territories lived for twenty years, and which only proves what I said yesterday, that as a rule three male grown-up members of each family in the course of this time were taken from the family and their fate could not be established.
Q.- That is those who looked for accommodations were, therefore, Tartars, Ukrainians and Etnic Germans, witness during what period in the war were you Chief of Einsatzgruppe D?
A.- I was chief of the Einsatzgruppe D from June 1941 until June 1942, inclusive, However, from March 1942 to July 1942 there were considerable interruptions.
Q.- What was the nature of these interruptions?
A.- From the beginning of March until 26th April I was on leave in Berlin. At the end of April I had to go back to Berlin until the begin ning of May.
After the death of Heydrich on the 4th of June, 1942, I was called to Berlin, and I only returned in order to give over my office to my successor.
Q.- Did you, as the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, operate with the Einsatzgruppe and its units in Russia independently?
A.- No. My official office position was Plenipotentiary to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in the 11th Army. As such, for the tasks which I had to carry out within the Army, Einsatzkommandos had been subordinated to me as units with whom these tasks were to be carried out.
Q.- Will you explain to us the importance of this position in the Army and the activity of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos?
A.- I was given this assignment on the basis of an agreement between OKH and OKW (The Command of the Army and the Armed Forces) on the one hand and the Security Police and the SD on the other. This decree was known as the so-called Barbarossa decree. On the basis of this decree the institution of these mobile units had a two-fold significance within the framework of the Army units. On the one hand, special units were subordinated to the Army for tasks which they had so far carried out on their own authority and with their own units. On the other hand, Heydrich, Chief of the Police and the SD, the sole authority, to give immediate instructions to these Einsatzkommandos, and, also to receive the new reports direct with the reason and the purpose to prevent an expected collaboration of the adversaries in the Reich itself and in the occupied territories at the front. The essential thing was that these activities were carried by me and the Einsatzkommandos in the assigned territories and was within, the territory of the Army, this means that the task and activities of the Einsatzkommandos were under supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He held the executive power within his territory, and his power of attorney had been laid down in the Reichs Defense Law, as well as in a decree of the OKW, the high command of the Army, regarding the position of a commander-in-chief in the operational theatre.
of the Army were of primary importance and had to be complied with first. Therefore, it was necessary for the units to carry out all activities and tasks in a form which was in agreement with the intentions of the Army. That means the Army had either to agree or comment upon this, or, at least, show their agreement concerning the activities of the units within the framework of the tasks of the Army. By this term I mean that the activities of the Einsatzkommandos, Special Task Forces, were formed from the tasks of the army itself. That is, it had to attempt to fulfil the task which was meant for these special units within the framework of tasks of the army. It wasits duty to accept special tasks, which, according to the authority of the Barbarossa Decree could be asked for by the army.
Q This is the general framework. Was this factual and legal relation - to the army hirarchy and to the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzkommandos also defined individually by a decree? agreement I mentioned. It was left to the discretion of the Army to determine the operational theatre of the individual kommandos, the strength of the kommandos, and the period of activity of the kommandos. Furthermore, it also had been determined for operative necessities the regulations and decrees of the army had priority. What had not been determined, however, was the current competition of orders which might occur within the decrees of the Chief of SD and the Security Police and the Chief of the Army. It was often the case, that it was more or less left to the skill of the officers in charge of the respective agencies to find an objective solution in case of such competitive orders. For operative reasons, however, the highest instance always in the end had the right to make the final decision. Barbarossa Decree for your own position and your activities and the activities and the position of the Einsatzkommando?
tried from the very first day not to take notice of me at all as the Chief of the Einsatzgruppen and to treat the Einsatzkommandos as their own army Units. We were auxiliary units, of the TC/AO. This becomes evident also from another document. It is Document 584. It is in Document Book III-D, in which IC/AO gives us a picture of how in his own tasks of espionnage of armed band activities and the setting up of plans for combatting such bands, apart from the Field Constabulary and his own units, and also the SD, delivered news reports which he himself used for his own purposes.
Q What was your relationship to the Chief-of-Staff of the Army? nor the Chief of Staff really took notice of mo at all when I first reported to them. When therefore, on the strength of describing the actual situation. The Army made use of the Kommandos without my knowledge. I had a serious dispute with IC, the consequence of this was that I was called to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Woehler, and he received me with the words, if the collaboration between the Army and myself would not improve, he would ask for my dismissal in Berlin. I believe that this fact gives a good picture of my relationship with the Chief of Staff, For although the Chief of Staff was a colonel, and, I, as a Standartenfuehrer apparently was - colonel, also the actual position becomes evident which I had within the framework of the Army. By the Army I was considered an unit leader of just about 500 men. That equals a commander of a battalion and I was treated accordingly. I was not only ordered to see Oberst Woehler but even a major and IC Rank and, he avoided expressly to address me with naming my rank, a custom usually exercised in the army in order to show that he, even as major, was above a Standartenfuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say he was a colonel.
THE WITNESS: Who?
THE WITNESS: Who?
THE PRESIDENT: This officer with whom you were speaking.
THE WITNESS: The last one I mentioned was a Major. The IC with whom I had to deal immediately, and from whom the Einsatzgruppen received most of the orders, was a major.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Were you so under the control of the army that a recommendation from him for your dismissal would have had weight and effect in Berlin?
THE WITNESS: I didn't hear the question.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. I am sorry. Were you so under the command of the army that a recommendation from this officer to Berlin could have worked the dismissal which he threatened?
THE FITNESS: Immediately, yes. There is no doubt, because it was Himmler is interest as to this assignment to extend this first footing he had won for the territory of the army by means of a close collaboration with the army, and it is generally known that, as rule, not one officer of Himmler was ever covered by him when in the case of complaints the complainant was a person who was of importance to Himmler himself, and this was certainly the case of the Chief of the OKW, Keitel. What was your field of command? What was your power of decision? I repeat the question. Would you tell the Tribunal the content value of your position? What were you in command of? What was your power of decision and your authority? What was the territory of your authority? were at the utmost auxiliary organs of IC. The field of tasks which had been concretely established was to get a secure collaboration with the Security Service and the SD and to guarantee such collaboration with the army. That was the general framework of the order, and within the framework the order frequently discussed here -- to liquidate certain groups of people wasone concrete order, that had been issued, in order to achieve the goal of guaranteeing the security within this territory.
My authority consisted in safeguarding the communication lines of the army as well as the police security and in deciding whether or not the Einsatzgruppen should carry out such executions. It was outside my authority to stop the Einsatzkommandos from carrying out such executions, because this was the basic order which came from the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and which was not within the power of authority of the unit leaders. My authority only started in carrying out these orders, that is, when deciding in what manner these orders were to be carried out, which was determined within the task or security. The orders which were issued by the OKW currently in this connection prove that the competence and the possibility of securing and guaranteeing security in these territories was not fully used, but that these orders with their possibilities were never exploited by me. Furthermore, the fact that in winter 1941/1942 currently Kommandos were never exploited by me. Furthermore, the fact that in winter 1941/1942 currently Kommandos were taken away from my own units by the army and became subordinated to the combatting troops. This, as I say, proves perhaps best that I, with my own kommandose, was only a little wheel at the lower and of the machinery, which the Army units kept in the Russian territory. might be of interest here, for instance, in the assigning of combatting units?
A I think I have given an example for this just now. There is only to be added that, as I have already basically explained before, special tasks were transferred to me by the Army which I just had to carry out and I could determine the way in which they should be carried out, for instance, in espionnage of armed band activities or recruiting of Tartars, or, for instance, the harvesting or establishing of district administration, or whatever the case might be. My authority and power of ordering was not left to me at all; and only insofar as the army did not deal with it itself, for me it was only a way of carrying out these orders.
Q The concluding question concerning the Russian set of questions: How was your power of decision? What was your power of decisions concerning execution orders?
A I do not think I have to repeat this. As to the orders for execution, even if applying the harshest standard, I had no possibility whatever to overlook them.
DR. ASCHENAUER (ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT OHLENDORF): This ends the questions dealing with Russia. Perhaps this would be a good moment for a recess.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess for 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. ASCHENAUER: May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, indeed.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I now come to the final questions. Membership in the SS and the SD. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q: Witness, we heard yesterday that in 1926 for a few months, lists were made of the members of the SS. What was the position after 1926 until 1935?
A: From the time 1926 to 1936 I had n immediate contact nor any immediate connection with the SS. I was not a member of the SS, either.
Q: By joining the SD, did you become a member of the General SS -- the Allgemeine-SS?
A: No, I did not become a member of the Allgemeine-SS. That concerns everybody who joined the SS through the SD as an organization. For all persons wearing the uniform of the SS within the reach of Heydrich and Daluege, the Chief of Regular Police, were appointed for that very purpose in order to avoid that these members of the SS should become members of the General SS. They did not want the officials to be subordinated to the General SS as well and they did not want them to be subordinate to other chiefs in the SS. They way none of those who joined the SD became a member of the Allgemeine SS.
Q: Witness, you said yesterday that Himmler tried to form a State Security Corps. What was the development of this?
A: This idea of the Stats Security Corps remained nothing but a plan. Nothing has been achieved that way, which made this idea at all a reality. The State Police agencies and the SD agencies in the Central Offices, as well as in the Regional Offices for the Reich, remained independent of each other and they remained independent agencies.
This presumption that the so-called Inspector of the Security Police and the SD established this connection, is incorrect because he had no actual orders, but in general he was to deal with the personnel questions of the SS members. He had further tasks which were not within the field of activity of the Sparten. Heydrich had formed commands of the Security Police and the SD in Holland he had made an attempt - and my men, together with the men of theState Police, were organized into one organization. This individual incident was rectified by me after Heydrich's death, when I returned from Russia. This one example in Holland was a step which could be described as one step towards the State Security Corps. The solution of this unit in Holland was the last attempt of that kind, but the agencies of the Security Police and the SD remained independent with their various tasks which had nothing to do with each other.
Q: What did you consider the political situation of the SD to be; in how far was the SD Inland in opposition to the Nazi regime?
A: The way things stood in the Reich there were three possible courses one could take if one did not agree with the development after the seizure of power: emigration abroad, emigration within the Reich, and positive opposition. The first two ways of opposition meant nothing but a catastrophe. They wanted to bring about a collapse by force. The positive opposition held an evolutionary attitude towards history, because in every revolution values are lost which can never be replaced and history must be considered as a continuous course of events where brisk interruptions and the attempt to miss something out -- whether forward or backward it does not matter -- on the whole causes more damage than it does good.
The men who after 1935 built this SD and extended it, saw the faults of the Nazi development in the same manner as those who emigrated abroad or within the Reich, but they stood in the middle of the political development, remained independent, and had to remain hidden for many years; they assembled exports who were able to overlook the situation; they obtained knowledge in order to understand the situation thoroughly and now tried, with the damages they could show, to bring about the evolution against the misuse of National Socialism by National Socialists. They wanted to bring about the evolution in order to counteract the damage done. The possibility was given to us through Himmler's generous attitude on one occasion. It was known generally, that when joining the SS, he did not attach any importance to the fact whether the persons were members of the Party or not.
with the strange coincidence that about 80 per cent of these experts were not members of the Party, But, these people were in a position owing to the moral strength which they held throughout the years to attract the largest part of the German intelligentsia in as far as they proved active in their professions and beyond this they attracted masses of the population and these people, who agreed with us in the one aim to develop history in a positive manner and who wanted to help to stop the mistaken developments which occurred; those were the actual workers for our end. Those were the members throughout the entire Reich with whom we carried out this positive opposition against Naziism.
Q Witness, whom did you fight in particular through the SD?
Q Why these three in particular? value of the human being. Ley, because he interfered with the independent development of the social ideas and the private sphere of the human being and tried to do away with it; Goebbels, because he denied the independent mental development, the development of consciousness, and in that way, the inner freedom of the human being, and in questioning all absolute values he took these values from the modern Existentialism and embodied and expressed Nihilism. Bormann, because he eliminated the natural tension between the individual and the community to the disadvantage of the individual by trying to subordinate these individuals to certain masters within the Party. These three together attacked the value of the human being, the result of modern times.
Q How did SD Inland fight this power? opposed these tendencies and secondly, he denied in his reports the measures of these persons, in as far as they expressed their inner views in their measures. That way, in a great number of cases, the realization of these tendencies in their development, as I have noted, was hindered or eliminated altogether.
opposition as you described it to us? and did not want any executive power and were prepared to show their power only by making reports, whose form and contents were unobjectionable.
Q What aim did the SD have?
A The aim of the SD was: our entire reporting activity was measured in the same way all the time, what is the effects of certain activities upon the individual and how do individuals react to these activities and we tried to help to develop a way of living in which people could develop themselves as we saw them, namely, people who, in their aim to gain consciousness and inner freedom found a way of living and results in all spheres of life and who were suitable to support these human developments.
Q You used the words "inner freedom". What do you understand by the word "freedom."
A By "freedom" I mean the voluntary ties of the individual, the motives of his will and actions, the obvious will of God, in nature and history. existed and still exists, in particular the SD was considered a great power which was omniscient in a way. Will you please state your opinion on this. activity had to be camoflaged. My department was not called Economic Department but ST-4; it was supposed to mean Staff Department No. 4. In 1937 I was not in a position to make any report at all without gitting permission of Herr Kranefuss first who was the economic expert in the personal staff of the Reichfuehrer SS. In 1938 we made the first great report, the contents of it dealt with sabotage of the Railway Adminis tration and further extension of the G erman Communication network.
This report was read by Heydrich and put in the files, that is, it disappeared in the safe because this mighty SD was not in a position to inform even a third person that they were dealing with such questions. In 1939, after the war had started, we had the courage to reveal obvious damages in the beginning of the war by making reports on them and here chance assisted us because Goering saw these reports and took them and used them in the sessions of the Reich defense counsel meeting and used them as questions to the resort representatives. He now desired to be informed on that way without knowledge of the connection for the first and only time in the history of the SD he permitted that these reports were given out. In 1940 he confirmed them again, when a number of local leaders, Gauleiters, objected strongly to these reports. But this leagalizing did not last either and in spite of the importance of these reports the SD was only an illegitimate child which one did not like to see and wanted to hide as quickly as possible. As the development in 1942 and 1943 shows that we were allowed to make official reports to the outside world no longer, Goebbels prohibited it. The power we had until the end was the result of the personal influence of my individual experts using their knowledge in the fact of experts in the Resors who were interested in this knowledge, an actual power the SD never constituted. My personal relations I need not repeat in this connection. I explained it in detail yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any defense counsel who would like to question the witness? If so, and whatever order they desire, they will proceed with such questioning. BY DR. GAWLIK (counsel for Seibert): Q Witness, how long have you known Herr Seibert? A Since May 1936. Q In what manner did you meet Herr Seibert? A He was in the economic section of the SD which I joined at that time.
He was an expert there on questions of commerce and trade. Q Who was Gruppenleiter, Group Leader, of the Economic Group? A I was the group chief of the Group Economics. Q In how far was Herr Seibert your deputy? A In June 1938 Seibert became my deputy, when I left the SD as per orders from the main office.
He was my deputy until about 1944 Q For what tasks was Herr Seibert responsible? A Merely for within the economic sphere. Q Was Herr Seibert your deputy also in your capacity as Office Chief A There was no general deputy for office chief III but the four group Q Would you please inform the Tribunal which these four groups were. A III-A Law and Administration, Party and State; III-B Ethnic groups theatre and radio; III-D Economics starting with Agriculture, Trade, Q What was Seibert's last task before Russia was attacked?
A At the time he was my deputy in the economic group in the SD. Q When was Herr Seibert ordered to join Einsatz Gruppe D? A He was ordered to join the Einsatz Gruppe D when it was set up. Q I believe the word "ordered" should be translated as "drafted". He was drafted to join the SD and not ordered to join the SD.
When was Herr Seibert drafted to the Einsatz Gruppe D? A When the Einsatz Gruppe was formed.
Q Can you tell me the date? A June 1941. Q Did Herr Seibert volunteer to work for Einsatz Gruppe D? A No, at that time Seibert was in the Army and without his knowledge Q What tasks within Einsatz Gruppe D was Herr Seibert supposed to deal with?
A He was intended for the reporting section. Q And what was his title? A Leiter III, or Chief III. Q Will you please describe in detail the tasks of Leiter III within A He had the task to work on the news reports on the same subjects it.
For example, asfact which I have seen myself, to look into the NKWD had to be determined and similar things.
Apart from that he had to deal with all military tasks under me.
He continued in his connection with the Army; he inspected the Tartar companies villages; as protection against the partisans, he saw that they got Q Witness, in your reply you mentioned the word "Lebensbereiche", life's sphere.
A I hope you understand me because we talked about it all day yesterday.
Q Who determined the drafting of Herr Seibert to Einsatz Gruppe D and his tasks?
A At the suggestion of office I, the Chief of the Security Police and Q And who determined the tasks of Herr Seibert within the Einsatz Gruppe D? A I fixed the tasks of Seibert but he was assigned to the official Q Could you determine his position?
A No. that was fixed from Berlin. Q Could you change the position of Herr Seibert as Chief of Department III?
A In the long run, no. Q What was the reason that Seibert was drafted as Chief of Office III? A The reason was the previous knowledge he had gained on SD work, on economic group.
Apart from that, as I had meetings of all group other branches.
He was the most suitable one of my group leaders to Q In your staff was there an expert on executive questions? A When the Einsatz Gruppe was formed such an expert had been given to me.
After a considerable short time I asked for him to be relieved because he was not fully employed by me.
The Einsatz Gruppe itself had no executive tasks.
For that reason we did not heed to have an Q What title did this expert on executive questions have? A He was Chief of Office IV.