326, is wrong. following sentence in the document, "In Minsk, an action was carried out against a railroad terrorist group; 126 persons were arrested. The number of those arrested shows thedangerous strength of this terrorist - and Partisan group" .
Document No. 3876, Exh. 223 in Document Book 5-A gives exhaustive information of the participation of Jews in the Partisan, movement and illegal activities. of the document book, page 54/55 of the original report, which, as I have just found out, are not included in the English text, details are given on pages 87/88 of the document book, pages 57/59 of the original about the considerable strength of the Partisan groups - up to the strength of a battalion - in white Ruthenia and Minsk.
Page 57 of the original states:
"In Minsk the chief of a partisan recruitment agency, a Jew, was arrested. In a fresh campaign against the partisan movement in White Ruthenia it has been possible so far to arrest 163 people. Numberous pistols, hand grenades, machine guns, carbines and ammunition were seized. Investigations so far have disclosed the following: staff, composed of 10 departments, whose heads were all Bolshevist officers or army administrative officials. ROKOV, the Chief of the Soviet Partisan Movement of Ninsk, and numberous other leaders were arrested. The staff had set itself the task of poisoning the Commissar General, contaminating wells and water installations in Minsk and reconnoitring military objects. Several bacterial cultures were seized. The reconnoitring of military objects was already for advanced." partisan groups, which consists of 200 to 400 men. Furthermore it is stated:
"Side by side with the Partisan Department there is the Party in Minsk, which exercises a certain control. It was possible to arrest the organizer of the Party machine, the Grusinian Jew Mustafa (page 59 of original) LELIKURDGLY. The management of the Party was in the hands of a committee consisting of seven persons. An illegal group of 60 Ghetto Jews financed Party activities, procured weapons, and continued to reinforce the Partisan group. 60 to 80 Jews were sent from the ghetto to join the Partisans. Several receiving sets as well as bandaging materials and drugs were seized in the home of the Jew DELIKURDGLY. Furthermore a perfectly functioning printing shop was dismantled and 8 typewriters confiscated." ment Book 5-A than in the English Document Book 5-A and bears the report dated March 1942, reveals that both recruitment for the Partisan movement and the organization of the Party, which is hardly separate from the Partisan movement, were essentially in the hands of Jews, that strong group of Jews - 60 men - effected the financing and procured weapons, and that strong groups of 60 to 80 Jews were sent to the Partisans.
partisan-shootings on 9 May 1942. It proves that the actions of 9 May were necessary, justified, and therefore legal according to martial law. It may be assumed that the shootings of 9 May 1942 were the outcome of the events of March 1942, in that the partisans, including the Jews, who had been arrested in March 1942 and who had participated, received their punishment on 9 May 1942 after having been tried previously. part of the defendant JOST,insofar as any responsibility whatever for the shootings Of 9 may 1942 could possibly be ascribed to him. This holds good, if for no other reason, then because of the fact that the defendant gave no order, nor did he participate in any way in this case. The relevant orders, as the document shows, were on the contrary given direct by the Commissar General in charge of that domain, or by the Wehrmacht. This fact then clarifies the fundamental question of responsibility for incidents in areas under civilian administration. that HEYDRICH had given the respective commander a respite for the enactment of the action against the Jews in White Ruthenia until after the harvest had been brought in. (transer 22 Oct. 1947, German page 1158 English page 1151, direct examination JOST- transcript 20 January 1948, direct examination STREUCH - affidavit ZENNER, Document Book I STRAUCH. Minsk at the time, as he had indicated to the defendant on the occasion of the discussion in Riga on 31 march 1 April 1942. In view of the respite greats by HEYDRICH to STRAUCH, but postponing the Jewish executions until after the harvest had been brought in, there was no reason whatever for such executions in May 1942, insofar as they were not, as explained above, executions connected with partisan or other punishable activities.
This fact too, shows that the events of 9 May 1942 were not an actual anti-Jewish campaign. for events in White Ruthenia during the time from March until September 1942, as, according to HEYDRICH's declarations, events in White Ruthenia were no particular concern of his, and he was above all things not responsible for executive measures, as is proved by the above described incident.
1. The Prosecution is unable to bring a charge of, and much less to prove, one single execution in the entire domain of Einsatzgruppe A, namely Krasnowardeisk and Loknia, during the time from 29 March 1942 to roughly 2 September 1942, which was the defendant's term of office as chief of Einsatzgruppen A; nor has any other punishable action or deed been brought forward.
2. Concerning the events outside the domain of Einsatzgruppe A. i.e., in the Reich Commissariat Ostland, and the Main districts (Generalbezirke) it may be regarded as proved that the events dealt with in action reports 186, doc. NO-3236, exh. 109 and action report 195, exh. 56, doc. No. 3277, date from the time before the defendant took office.
The contents of Doc. USSR-41, exh. 101, are not proved, Punishable conduct of the defendant JOST in particular cannot be regarded as having been proved.
This leaves the events of action report No. 193, NO-3261, exh. 55, with 22 shootings on 7 April 1942 in Olita for active Communist Activity and contact with Partisan groups, and the shooting of 22 persons in Kauen, for proved Communist propaganda activities, and finally the shooting of 253 partisans in Minsk on 9 May 1942. of the size of Greater Germany.
white Ruthenia for.the following previously discussed, reasons:
the defendant's position as Commander of the Sipo and the specific restriction of his executive powers, through HEYDRICH, due to the vastness and complexity of the area and the consequences arising therefrom, but especially in view of the defendant's attitude regarding the enactment of the Fuehrer-order, which I shall discuss in detail. connection to the statements and argumentation of the co-defendant STRAUCH, as well as to those of the other co-defendants, inasfar as they relevent. that the charge against JOST cannot be upheld, then it will be shown even more clearly through the clarification of the subjective part of the facts and the description of the situation that would have arisen if the defendant had really acted as the Prosecution asserts, namely if he had enacted the issued orders in a formal and strict manner, that the defendant cannot be charged with any punishable offense.
The defendant's attitude toward the execution problem and HENNICKE whom he had in known previously, in Smolensk. The subject of the execution problem was brought up during the conversation, and the defendant stated unequivocally that he would never let himself be drawn into such things. The defendant's statements gave HENNICKE the impression that if need be, JOST would certainly act accordingly. message for the defendant was received, conferring on him the position of chief of Einsatzgruppe A, and BdS for the Ostland. The radio message greatly perturbed and depressed the defendant, who told HENNICKE that he would, not comply with this command without protest, but would contact HEYDRICH immediately to have it revoked.
HENNICKE had the impression that these remarks were in keeping with JOST's inner most attitude toward these matters, and that he wished to have no further dealings whatever with the Sipo and the SD. (Affidavit HENNICKE, JOST's examination). attitude toward the assignment, and his intentions to escape such an appointment. They are in conformity with his psychological make-up and character as described earlier.
The defendant's words were soon followed by action. but failed at first. However, he soon had an opportunity of speaking to Heydrich, as the latter arrived in Riga himself at the end of March 1942. The contents of his talk which the defendant had with him and especially his attempt to have his assignment and the Fuehrer-Order revoked, are explained in greater detail in Jost's statements in the witness box. ( Transcript of 21 October 1947, German page 1162/64, English page 1146/49). revocation of the assignment, he nevertheless achieved the restriction of his assignment, and tasks at least so far as duties and duration were concerned. On this occasion the defendant adopted the attitude which he had already previously explained to Hennicke, and he declares in particular that he was unable to carry out measures such as were here demanded of him. of a possible transfer, and that, at least for the moment he would receive no specific instructions for a continued execution of the Fuehrer-Order. In support of the above I refer to: ventures to speak to his local superior, the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln, about the Fuehrer Order.
In view of Jeckeln's personality, as revealed in various reports of events which were introduced in the proceedings, this was rather a critical undertaking. He had the advantage of being able to refer to his previous conference with Heydrich and to modify his attitude on the basis of that discussion. Yet his statements are not accepted favorably. But the defendant at least achieved the following: he did not receive any special instructions for executions. could in all fairness be expected to do. To do more than that, the defendant would have had to sacrifice his own life considering Jost's personality, the defendant must be given particularly high credit for his attitude. acquanit the commanders in Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia of his personal attitude and of the result of his conference with Heydrich in order to achieve that for the time being executions of Jews would no longer be carried out. (Transcript dated 22 October 1947, German page 1181, English page 1165 direct examination Jost.)
In that respect the defendant's testimony is also correborated by defendant Sandberger's statements. (Transcript dated 14 November 1947).
The result of the defendant's action is evident from the fact that during the following period no further executions were reported from the area in question, at least not during the time of the defendant's activity. This alone proved the credibility of the defendant's statement in the most unmistakeable manner. by an order of Heydrich to surrender Jews under 16 and over 32 years of age for special treatment, while the other age groups were to be made available for labor allocation. The defendant credibly described and proved why he could not - and consequently did not - transmit this order. (Transcript dated 22 October 1947, German age 1182, 1183, English page 1165/67. Direct examination Jost).
surprise by an order of Heydrich to surrender Jews under 16 and over 32 years of ago for special treatment, while the other age groups were to be made available for labor allocation. The defendant credibly described and proved why he could not - and consequently did not - transmit this order, ( Transcript dated 22 October 1947, German page 1162, 1183, English page 1165/ 67. Direct examination Jost). (Affidavits, Best Nyhoegen, and Jost.
Dr. Leibbrandt, the former department chief of the Ministry of the Interior who was present at Jost's conference with Rosenberg at a later date, is also in a position to report that the latter had told him at that time that he had expressed his disapproval of the execution of such impossible orders to Heydrich (Doc. Book Jost I, page 19).
In spite of the clear order and Heydrich's and Jeckeln's attitude which is known to him from the previous conference, Jost decides to visit Heydrich In Berlin. This proves the defendant's strong instinctive disapproval of these execution orders. It was a risk for him to report to his superior once more in connection with this question, even if he were to employ the most diplomatic means to achieve his aims. During the conference Jost was then also informed of his assignment for active duty in no uncertain terms etc.
( Affidavits Dest, and Jost.) The defendant was unable to achieve the cancellation of the order, where as he was assured of his recall, which he urgently desired.
However, owing to Heydrich's death shortly afterwards the recall was never effected. his conviction, for instance in Krasnowardeisk he prevented the liquidation of insane persons requested by some Army Headquarters. (Transcript dated 22 October 1947, German p. 1189, English p. 1172.
Direct examination Jost). This is corroborated by the statement of the former Major General of the Waffen-SS Klingemann (Doc. volume Jost I, page 49/51). when, at the end of July 1942, Reichskommissar Lohse revealed to him his desire to report to the Fuehrer that the Eastern territory had been freed of Jews. Also in this case the defendant refuses to cooperate in the execution of measures of this kind. (Transcript dated 22 October 1941.) with Lohse, came home, Major General Jedicke, commander of the regular police, was waiting for him there. He informed the latter of his conversation with the Reichskommissar. Jedicke commented: "Well, that takes courage: Congratulations. Did you also consider that this might cost your life?" (Affidavits Jost and Jedicke). to a viewpoint which he had once considered right, regardless of danger to his own person. the lives of thousands.
After Heydrich's death the defendant was unabating in his endeavors to get away from the activity he disliked. He repeatedly tried to contact Himmler and he finally succeeded during the last third of August 1942. By this alone he incurred a great risk since he had not been ordered to present himself to Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Schwarz, in the statement at the bottom of page 53, "later on the defendant was rewarded for his conduct which saved the lives of thousands. " To what do you refer? What happened later on?
DR. SCHWARZ: He was drafted to the Waffen-SS later on.
THE PRESIDENT: You say he was "rewarded."
DR. SCHWARZ: I am not getting the translation, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The statement says that "later on the defendant was rewarded for his conduct." Do you moon the word "rewarded" to suggest that his action was approved.
DR. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, I believe this is a mistranslation in the German text. It does not mean "reward," but it means "receipt," "receipt of the reward," "a receipt for receiving something. "
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Glancy -
MR. GLANCY: I think possibly it is used in an ironic sense, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it is used in an ironic sense then it makes sense. What is actually the German word, the literal translation of the German word?
INTERPRETER JUELICH: "Reward" is the correct translation of the original, but it may mean something different.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that in a cynical or saracastic sense, that he was paid for the rebellion by being demoted, is that what you mean?
DR. SCHWARZ: Certainly, Your Honor, it is sarcastic -- it means that in fact he was punished.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SCHWARZ: In connection with this personal visit, I refer to the defendant's description in the witness-box and to the relevant affidavits.
(Affidavits Best, Nyhoegen, Annemarie Jost.)
The defendant had to listen to harsh words, such as "I have to decide how I can make up for that (strict adherence to orders) and how I can teach you " or "Order are not to be discussed or talked about, orders are to be carried out ". That this conversation did not have any serious consequences for the defendant, at least for the moment, was probably due to the fact that Himmler took Jost's poor state of health into consideration.
Jost was at least able to obtain the approval for his recall from Riga and his transfer from the SD (Security Service ) to the ministry for the East. (Affidavit Best as above) (Affidavit Wohlgemuth, Doc. Book Jost I V).
The discussion with Rosenberg, "which took place in November 1942, ran along the same lines. At the time Jost was no longer concerned with affairs regarding Jews. He had no reason whatsoever to commit himself again in the same matter. He nevertheless took the opportunity at his first meeting with his superior, to state his personal views once again without thought of personal gains. On this occasion the defendant again opposed the execution of the pertinent orders. He tried to induce Rosenberg to prevent further executions of Jews. (Affidavit Dr. Leibbrandt, Doc. Book Jost I, page 19).
This also proves again that the Prosecution's opinion of the defendant is erroneous and untenable.
A few days after the call on Himmler the defendant's recall was actually effected. Thus his activity in the East came to an end.
The consequences and the result of the defendant's activity. different than the way the Prosecution tried to present it, For 5 months Jost was chief of an Einsatzgruppe and commander of the Sipo (Security Police) and of the SD in the East. During this time not a single person was reported dead from the entire territory of the Einsatzgruppe. Reports from the territory of the Reich Commissariate show that 2 partisans and Communist activists were shot. Within the entire territory neither a Kommissar nor a Gipsy was shot and not a single Jew was shot only because he was a Jew.
his predecessor Stahlecker. A comparison of the two results alone makes the indictment against Jost appear untenable. took up has duties, more than 40,000 Jews were living in the countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia; the same number of Jews were living when the defendant left his office as the report of events, submitted by the Prosecution, prove. Thus about 2600 Jews were at that time still living in Riga, 900 in Duenaburg, 300 in Libau, 4500 in Schaulen, 15 000 in Kaunas and 20 - 25 000 in Vilna. Had the defendant executed the Fuehrer and Heydrich orders, then no Jews would probably have been left at the time when he was recalled from his office.
The defendant's statement is also supported by the following fact: regarding the individual persons responsible for the persecutions of Jews in the Baltics and in White Ruthenia. (Doc. Book of the Prosecution III - A, doc. No. 3872, exh. 110, German page 17 - 20, English page 1012). that he had been given a few days in which to compile this list of names and that for this purpose various persons had been interrogated. The defendant Jost's name - who was the chief of the co-defendant Sandberger 5 months - does not appear in this document. That can only be ascribed to the fact that Sandberger could not link the name of the defendant Jost with persecutions of Jews in the Baltics and in White Ruthenia and was therefore unable to list it. There is no logical reason why Sandberger, who listed the names of a greater number of co-defendants like Ohlendorf, Strauch, Nosske, Rasch, should not have mentioned the defendant Jost, if according to his opinion and his knowledge, the latter had been responsible for the persecution of Jews in the territory in question.
the executions of the persecutions of Jews have been submitted while Jost held office. Furthermore Faulhaber's affidavit proved (Doc. Book Jost I, page 21/22) that at the time when Jost was in Riga - that is at the end of August 1942 - there were still about 25 000 Jews in Vilna alone. Various reports of events or situation reports also show, that the number of Jews in the area in question did not vary during the period from March to September 1942. Jost's responsibility for his area, therefore, is this, that he has not destroyed life but has saved the lives of many thousands on account of his attitude dictated by a strict sense of justice, his decent moral principles and his conscience. On no account can the defendant, therefore, be charged with being guilty either in the eyes of the law or even morally. In view of all those circumstances it would mean basing one's judgment on formal reasoning if one intended to charge the defendant with a crime against humanity or with a war crime. The defendant was not, as the Prosecution declared in its opening statement, "presumptious enough to decide the fate of human beings, their death being the intended manifestation of his power and of his contempt for them with which he was filled". The defendant did not exercise his power for carrying out evil, but good intentions. He did not allow himself to be guided by feelings of contempt, as is corroborated by the statements of all witnesses who made affidavits. Even if one assumed that one or the other incident had happened, which might justify the raising of the question of guilt, one really could not - if one were guided by reasonable considerations - make him responsible for them. One could have to take into account his proved fundamental attitude and the extent of the area subordinated to him, the bad transport and communication conditions in this area, the unclear situation with regard, to orders which was apt to load to action being taken by all kinds of departments, and all the other circumstances, which had already been mentioned previously.
Incidentally it may also be mentioned - in order to round off picture of the defendant's personality - that he had explained his views on the Jewish question to members of his headquarters on the occasion of a rollcall and had pointed out that even the person, the life and the property of a Jew enjoyed the protection of the law. Furthermore, one of the first steps he took was to express his objection to Heydrich with regard to a decree concerning the treatment by the Police of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians who were employed in the Reich, and to effect the cancellation of this decree despite the fact that this decree did not even concern the sphere of his authority. in Riga as on 1 May 1942 and recommended the same measure to be taken in Estonia as well. These incidents further emphasize the general attitude of the defendant towards members of other races and nations and even towards political opponents. to produce the witnesses Nyhoogen and Landgraf, who had the most extensive insight into these events. Nyhoogen is a prisoner-of-war in Russia, whilst Landgraf is missing.
VII. The consequences of the defendant's course of action affecting him personally. talks with HEYDRICH and HIMMLER did not, of course, remain without repercussions so far as he himself was concerned. The defendant now encountered many difficulties in his path. He had given up his past, without being immediately entrusted with other tasks. He stayed with his new office in the Ministry for the East without occupation for 13 months. He was in fact being passed over. His temporary assignment as chief of liaison with an army group, that is to quite an inferior post, accentuates the impossible situation into which the defendant had got himself. (Affidavits HILDEBRANDT, and REST) prevented JOST's employment even outside the SS and the Police. Although BERGER, Chief of the SS Main Office, tried to provide a post for the defendant in the public or civil sector, he was unsuccessful, as HIMMLER did not agree to this. (Affidavits BERGER and HILDEBRANDT) HIMMLER was not satisfied with having JOST "shelved"; on the contrary he ordered him to be drafted into the Waffen SS as a corporal - a truly degrading procedure. Accordingly JOST was then to be assigned immediately,to a front unit, without previous training and medical examination and inspite of his impaired state of health of which HIMMLER know. Even the General of the Waffen SS, BERGER, wasunable to do anything about by pointing out to HIMMLER that under these circumstances JOST's conscription would be equal to a "Himmelfahrtskommando" (suicide commando). As has been stated by BERGER, HIMMLER used to take such measures whenever any of his subordinates acted in any way contrary to his orders. (Affidavit BERGER). The final cause for HIMMLER's action end the renewed order given to BERGER to have JOST drafted immediately, may have been the defendant's refusal - of which HIMMLER had gained knowledge through HILDESBRANDT to be re-assigned to the Security Police. At that time HIMMLER had used the grossest invectives against JOST, when talking to HILDEBRANDT, and had declared "that now he would certainly bring him (JOST) to his senses". (Affidavit HILDEBRANDT). JOST's conscription was ordered to list until the end of the war.
It was made known as a warning to higher SS and police Headquarters by means of a circular - a heavy blow to the defendant who was now finally "done for", a victim of his uprightness. He had been deprived of his reputation and his honor. These facts have been corroborated by the witnesses THOMASHAUSEN, NYHOFGEN and EVERWIEN. (Affidavits THOMASHAUSEN, NYHOFGEN and EVERWIEN). with not being promoted and not receiving any decorations during the whole the war and not even during his assignment to the Eastern front. Eventually one went so far as to link up the defendant with the happenings on 20 July 1944. Probably at the instigation of the Chief of the Office IV of the Reich Security Main Office, MUELLER, with whom the defendant had been at variance right from the beginning, he was searched for and suspected of having concealed the Oberourgermeister Dr. GOERDELER in his apartment. (Affidavit HEINRICH) (Transcript dated 14 October 1947, cross examination OHLENDORF). the defendant suffered through his upright and honest conduct. The defendant could have saved himself all that, of he had complied with orders. He chose to take the difficult path, which his attitude and his conscience dictated to him. VIII. Count III of the Indictment. belonged to a criminal organization, i.e. Office VI of the Reich Security Main Office and the SS. In the IMT-Verdict the SD and consequently Office VI was declared a criminal organization, because it was maintained that Office VI was a counter-intelligence organization of the Gestapo.
Actually the Prosection does not contend that the defendant had himself committed a criminal act during the period from September 1939 to August 1941, when he belonged to the Office VI; the prosecutor too pointed out during the defendant's examination, that membership of Office VI was by no means an important point. The prosecutor declared. when questioned by the Presiding Judge as to whether he accused the defendant of a crime in connection with his activity at the Reich Security Main Office: "No, Your Honor, that is only an irrelevant point".
In this connection it must be pointed out that:
1) the Office VI was no counter intelligence organization of the Gestapo, but an intelligence service for the procurement of political and economic news from abroad,
2) the Office VI accordingly had no professional connection whatsoever with the Gestapo and had nothing to do with the facts with which the Gestapo was charged; and,
3) the defendant had not gained any knowledge of these facts during his term of office from 1939 until 1941. ments of the defendant in the witness box. tasks of the Office VI and the fact that this Office VI was no counter intelligence organization of the Gestapo, are confirmed by the following affidavits: VOLLHEIM, BEST, WANECK, FINKE, DAUFEIDT and OHLENDORF. libitum, show clearly the tasks of Office VI and the non-existence of any connection with Office IV. Proof has therefore been furnished that the tasks of this office were legally founded. Furthermore the prosecution and annihilation of the Jews, atrocities and murder in concentration camps, excesses in the administration of the occupied territories, the carrying into effect of the slave labor program, and the illtreatment and murder of prisoner-of-war, with which the IMT Verdict charged the Gestapo, happened at a time, which precluded the possibility of JOST's having gained any knowledge thereof while ha held a position with the Office VI.
who had either participated in the perpetration of a crime or had not severed his connection with the organization after having gained knowledge thereof. But at the same time the verdict says (page 104) that the members of the Security Police and the SD had no opportunity during the war, to exert any influence whatever on the type of their activity, In spite of this being established in the verdict, it remains for the Tribunal to examine what the defendant undertook to quit the service of the SD and what was the result of his endeavors. The defendant, in his evidence, has given a detailed description of his relationship with the Chief of the Security Police, HEYDRICH, and the Chief of Office IV, MUELLER; of how he had at first tried to protect Office VI from MUELLER's lust for power and to keep it away from tasks, which had nothing in common with its purpose and structure, and which he furthermore considered dangerous; and last but not least he has described how he endeavored to leave the SD when he considered it impossible for material, personal and political reasons to continue to cooperate with HEYDRICH and MUELLER respectively. These declarations by the defendant are absolutely confirmed by the following affidavits: The following list I shall not read into the record but would like to ask you to take note of it. relations of the defendant to his then chiefs HEYDRICH and MUELLER, of his conception of the tasks assigned to him, and above all of his attempts to leave the SD and of the fact that he actually left the SD on account of his attitude and his endeavors approximately in August 1941. Though it is true that no formal discharge took place, it is decisive that, through his subsequent transfer to the Ministry for the East in the Reich Security Main Office, he no longer performed any functions.
There, namely in the Ministry for the Fast, no use was made of JOST's services, and without any steps on his part and against his express wish, he was employed in Riga. employment for 7 months was by no means pleased with this new task, as might have been expect d after his long period of inactivity. Nor did he reach to HEYDRICH's obvious attempt at reconciliation but immediately asked HEYDRICH's again to reverse this assignment, and in any case to give it a time-limit. Thereby he stressed anew that under no circumstances was he willing to return to the sphere of activity of the Security Police and the SD. When HEYDRICH did not keep his promise of an early recall, he Went to see him again in Berlin on 22 May 1942, in order to effect his recall. HEYDRICH gave his promise, together with the unambiguous threat that he would have him drafted into the Waffen-SS after his recall.
Even after HEYDRICH's death, JOST's endeavors were continuously directed towards bringing about his recall, and after having tried many times in vain, he succeeded in seeing HIMMLER during the last part of August. The defendant related this discussion with HIMMLER in detail.
result of this discussion. In this case he had again succeeded in leaving this kind of work, even though it was not possible for him to leave the organization altogether during the war. Only after 13 months of inactivity was the defendant given an unimportant position as liaison officer of the ministry of the East with the army group at Nikolayev. When the position of commander of the Security Police was offered to him again in February 1944, he resolutely refused it, since he did not want to be subordinated again to HIMMLER's authority. JOST's refusal, which was made without considering his own person, was made known to HIMMLER and led to JOST's final drafting into the Waffen-SS. in 1941 as chief of office VI and in 1942 as chief of Einsatzgruppe A and Commander Ostland as also in 1944, in order to be able to leave the Security Police and SD, namely HIMMLER's field of activity. he maintained this attitude without regard for his own advantages. In practice it was impossible for him to achieve any more. He has proved that he tried everything that could be asked of him, and thereby succeeded in not performing any functions, at least after fall 1942, within the scope of the Security Police, SD, or SS, with the exception of his being drafted into the Waffen-SS. Taking this into consideration, he cannot be convicted for membership in a criminal organization. In this connection I wish to refer to the statement made by the British Chief Prosecutor in the verdict of the International Military Tribunal, namely that there was one way of leaving, namely via the forces. By his attitude towards HEYDRICH and HIMMLER' JOST provoked this course of events and accepted it.