The Balts set up their own Immigration Advisory Office which was staffed exclusively by Balts and served the sole interest of the resettled Balts, and there can hardly be any doubt about its character as a social, unpolitical enterprise. Once again we can observe the conduct of the defendant v. RADETZKY in a relatively free situation: he did not fawn upon the National Socialist Offices and also did not prove to be one of those National Socialist preachers who had been frustrated up to that point, but he helped and only helped, insofar as he could help at all, with his energies in the general confusion, and he was just as astonished as his Baltic compatriots when the Gauleiter of the NSDAP received the Baltic Germans with the friendly threat that he would soon exercise their domineering attitude and teach them National Socialism. In this external and internal distress into which v. RADETZKY and his compatriots had fallen as a result of National Socialism, he truly did not have the heart to acknowledge a particular belief in National Socialism or even to enter the SS.
I would like to repeat what I said in the beginning: The Balts came as refugees, who were looking for work and shelter; they had to adapt themselves and enter the Party and its affiliations if they wanted to profit by a moderate influence upon their fate: they could hardly criticize the recruiting of the Party, since they came from a foreign country. It would hardly be possible, therefore, to hold it against v. RADETZKY, if, in his hopeless situation and in the face of his existence which had again been shattered, he had joined the SS, hoping for a modest improvement in his situation. In spite of this, von RADETZKY came to the SS, however, under conditions which were for him just as unexpected and involuntary. He did not simply join through the system of pressure from above, he was forced into the SS.
It happened in this way: in the fall of 1939 the Baltic German Emigration Advisory Office in Poznan was taken over by the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans upon the order of HIMMLER as Reich Commissar; it would have been an exception and almost a miracle if this office had remained free from the general tendency of centralization. Had the Balts not offered any resistance, their organization would have been dissolved without opposition, and an increase of suffering, worry, and distress on the part of the resettlers would have been the certain result. Even though events might have taken the same course as previously, there was still from all outward appearances the "Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans Emigration Advisory Office -- Poznan," and even though the Baltic German employees, among them von RADETZKY, had remained the same as far as their personality and identity were concerned and their work remained unaltered in every way, they were still assigned to the SS. During his stay in Poznan HIMMLER personally took them into the SS on 12 and 13 December 1939 and appointed them at the same time SS-offieers. simultaneously when von RADETZKY was taken into the SS he was appointed SS-Untersturmfuehrer. had come to Germany as a Baltic German and foreigner, was taken into the SS as an Officer without any further investigation of his person and without his application. The witness KUBITZ, former Director with the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans, has explained in detail to us this event, which is certainly a singular one, (affidavit, dated 28 November 1947, Document Book RADETZKY II, page 54 ff., Document No. 14, Exhibit 4). He remarks as follows:
"I am able to testify as follows in this respect on the basis of my practical knowledge; von the SS; made no SS oath, paid no dues, was not SS duties.
The honorary officer was carried as a belong to an SS unit.
He exercised no power of literature.
To be sure, the Honorary SS--officer Main Office and not by an SS unit.
I also remember not as a regular SS-officer."
Resettlement of the Baltic Germans, with Headquarters in Riga, and subsequently Personnel Chief of the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans, in other words certainly also a competent witness, supplements this statement in his affidavit of 14 November 1947 (Doc. Bk. RADETZKY II, p. 57, Doc. No. 15, Exh. 5) when he states:
"After the first resettlement, there existed a Poznan in which v. RADETZKY worked; when this Honorary officers by the SS; among them was v.RADETZKY.
From my activity as Personnel Chief of SS; it was a written order which stated that SS Main Office.
Thus v. RADETZKY was in no in connection with this transfer."
the former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer LORENZ states:
"HIMMLER, during a visit to Poznan about the middle of December 1939, had shown extreme indignation at the existence of an independent representation of the Baltic Germans in the form of the Immigration Advisory Office. By HIMMLER's order it was made an annex of the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans. At this occasion the greater part of the personnel was taken over and put into uniform............
In this manner also v. RADETZKY was taken over by the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans and it was contemplated to give him as well as several other Baltic German employees, insignia of a senior rank. In February 1940 v. RADETZKY was ordered to report to Berlin and for the first time was issued the uniform of a second lieutenant. I wish to emphasize that this transfer came about without any request or action on the part of v. RADETZKY and that he was in no position to promote or counteract it." (Doc. Bk. RADETZKY III, p. 8 f. Doc. No. 35).
May it please the Tribunal. Behind the verdict of the IMT, which declares as criminal certain organizations and groups and thus finds their members guilty of criminal acts, stands the incontestable principle of the criminal code of all civilized nations which demands that only a person, who voluntary, knowingly and willingly commits an act, shall be treated as a criminal; therefore, the IMT excerpts those members of the SS from being declared criminal who were drafted into its ranks by the State in suchaa matter as to leave then no other choice, and those who did not commit such crimes.
The admission of the defendant v. RADETZKY was a purely passive act as far as he is concerned. I further quote from LORENZ' above-mentioned affidavit?
"HIMMLER issued his orders during his inspection and not as Reichsfuehrer-SS.
With regard to governmental authority.
In this capacity Immigration Advisory Office".v. RADETZKY, who was accepted not on political grounds but for reasons connected with the resettlement action, and particularly in order that he could be in uniform while officially dealing with the Russians, had as little choice as any other person who was drafted into the Waffen-SS for purely military purposes.
In due deliberation with reason and justice conscription for state duties cannot be charged one way on another today as a crime to those concerned. No further discussion is needed of the fact that the execution of the state treaties with the Baltic states and/or Russia concerning the resettlement of Baltic Germans represented a state matter. the part of the defendants not only on the claim that they participated in shootings; in some cases, and this includes the case of my client, the accountability is based on the assertion that the defendant in question had held a responsible position and therefore had authority to order executions, but also to prevent then.
Since the defendant in question had violated his legal and moral duty of preventing the execution of innocent people, he was, for his reason alone, responsible for what happened. The prosecution's argumentation in the case of the defendant v. RADETZKY is quite simple: v. RADETZKY at the time held the rank of SS-Captain and thus was next to the highest leader of the Kommando BLOBEL, therefore on account of his position alone he should be held fully responsible. This argumentation, however, is incorrect since the SS-rank in itself did not bestow on a person any authority within an Einsatzkomamando. The position within an Einsatzkommando, and thus the authority and responsibility, was not determined by the SS-rank but, as was and still is customary in civil service setup, of every state, by the orders from superior headquarters in the same Sector, in this case by orders from the Einsatzgruppe.
If the defendant v. RADETZKY would not have been admitted to the SS in December 1939 by order of Himmler in his capacity as Reich Commissar, he would have been drafted for the Einsatzgruppe no differently, in no other manner and in no other way but under the Emergency Service Decree. The fact that v. RADETZKY was transferred to or drafted into the Einsatzgruppe and/or the SK 4a not by the Personnel Main Office of the SS or by any other SS office, but that he was drafted under the Emergency Service Decree by the Oberbuergermeister of Poznan as the local Police Authority seems to me to be the decisive factor in the solution of this problem.
with very little talent for administration and organization and a very poorly developed scent if one were to assert that the responsible leaders of a Sonderkommando, which is scheduled to carry out assignments of the gravest nature in the East, were picked in such a manner. In order to illustrate how incorrect it is to confound SS-rank and power of command in the Einsatzkommando, I quote from the affidavit of the Amtschef (Chief of Office) of the RSHA Walter Schellenberg, of 4 Oct. 47 (Doc. Bk. Radetzky I, p. 24, Doc. No. 10, Exh. 10):
"In May 1941 many ethnic Germans from the Baltic Area were drafted for the SD (RSHA) under the Emergency Service Decree. These persons were assigned to Einsatzgruppen as interpreters and experts on the country in view of their knowledge of the Russian language. These persons so drafted under the Emergency Service Decree were so-called "persons wearing uniform", in other words, regardless of their previous membership in organizations they donned the SS-uniform. There were no specific rules concerning rank insignia, they Were issued quite indiscriminately in consideration of age and previous positions and ranks." to render service on the basis of their draft by the civil authority under the Emergency Service Decree, this situation in itself explains why there can be no talk of "authority" or "power of command" as far as these persons are concerned. The need to put them in uniform resulted from the nature of their assignment; they were employed by a mobile outfit in enemy territory.
identity between von Radetzky's rank in the SS and his position in SK 4a is also substantiated by the available personnel records of the defendant von Radetzky (NO-4711). In vain we look for an order by the SS Personnel Main Office or the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans decreeing von Radetzky's transfer to the RSHA or to the Einsatzgruppe C or to SK 4a, in vain we look for any other indication that usually can be found in a Personal File in connection with the transfer of an SS-Leader for duty in another office. Yet on the first page of his file card we find the following data: "Trained vocation: business man; at present Deputy Chief of Ethnic Immigrants; furthermore Employer: Immigration advisory Office for Ethnic Germans at Poznan; drafted on 19 May 1941 into a Sonderkommando of the Security Police."
In this connection I would like to explicitly establish the following: Emergency Servide Decree: a less involuntarily way of committing a person to render service cannot be conceived!
Yet another fact should receive attention: from a viewpoint of seniority von Radetzky never was the senior Leader next to the Commander; both at Blobel's time and otherwise von Radetzky was subordinate not only to the Commander but also to other SS-officers. This fact has been clearly substantiated by the defendant's statements on the witness stand as well as by the affidavits of members of the Einsatzgruppe and the Kommandos which were introduced. have nurtured a false ambition to ever have held the position which the Prosecution has ascribed to him. And even by way of the relatively neutral activity of objective reporting von Radetzky was not Chief of this Section but only Special Advisor as, here again, he also was subordinate to another SS-officer in addition to the Commander. It thus is impossible to uphold the assertion that von Radetzky was second-incommand of the Kommando next to Blobel, regardless from which viewpoint one may consider his position.
that he was a member of the SD Organization which was declared criminal. The question as to whether the defendant von Radetzky became a member of the SD be being drafted under the Emergency Service Decree to a Sonderkommando, must be answered in the negative already because the IMT judgment in discussing the membership in the SD expressly emphasizes that the Security Police and the SD were voluntary organizations. I wish in this connection to quote verbatim the respective passage of the judgment (page 104 of the Nymphenburger Edition 1946):
"The Security Police and the SD were voluntary organizations. It is true that many state and administration officials were transferred into the Security Police. The assertion that this transfer was a compulsory one results in nothing but that they had to accept the transfer or to withdraw, thereby possibly exposing themselves to official disgrace. During the war the members of the Security Police and the SD had no free choice with regard to their activity within this organization and the refusal to fill a certain position, especially in the service within the occupied territories, could have inflicted heavy punishments. There remains, however, the fact that all members of the Security Police and the SD voluntarily joined this organization under no duress other than the wish to retain their position as civil servants." drafted and made liable to do emergency service may, therefore, today not be regarded as a member of the SD or the RSHA according to the sense of this judgment. tion: It may be true that the defendant was made liable to emergency service, yet this cannot mean an exoneration for him, because (1) the Emergency Service Decree of 15 October 1938 does not form a sufficient legal foundation for the drafting into the Security Police and the SD (Cf. Affidavit of Dr. Hans Heinrich of 7 January 1948, Doc.
No. 5814, Doc. Book V C) and (2) the compulsion of a draft on the basis of the Emergency Service Decree nevertheless, was not so far reaching that upon certain efforts one could not have evaded it.
In this connection the following should be stated: Reich is not under discussion in this connection. It would be of no use to attempt to prove, for instance, to a former prisoner that his commitment to a concentration camp had no legal foundation. Incidentally, the argument of the non-existing legal foundation is also substantially incorrect. In his order Gazette of 20 July 1942 (Doc. Book IV Radetzky, Doc. No. 39) the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, on his own authority, confirmed and ordered the draft into the ranks of the Security Police and the SD on the basis of this Emergency Service Decree of 15 October 1938. The Chief of the administrative department and simultaneously the personnel officer of the NuernbergFuerth Police Headquarters in the years 1933 to 1945, Regierungsdirektor Dr. Alfons Holz, further confirmed on the basis of his practical experience of many years (Doc. Book Radetzky IV, Doc. No. 40) that it was the regular practice of the Nuernberg-Fuerth Police Headquarters to draft persons into the Gestapo and the SD as well as into the SS on the basis of the Emergency Service Decree. In addition, on the basis of his practical handling of the Emergency Service Decree for years, Dr. Holz declared as follows:
"I am acquainted with Article 1 of the Emergency Service Regulation of 15 October 1938, in which is stated in paragraph III that service on the basis of the Defense Law, in the Reich Labor Service , in the Border Customs Defense (Zollgrenzschutz), on the Police etc. always has priority over Emergency Service. This regulation is to be understood to the effect that service on the basis of the Defense Law, in the Reich Labor Service, in the Border Customs Defense, in the Police, etc. cannot be altered by an Emergency Service draft, and that persons who are clearly serving on the basis of the Defense Law, in the Reich Labor Service , in the Border Customs Defense, in the Police, etc.
can not be drafted to service on the basis of the Emergency Service regulation".
And he continues:
"It may not be concluded from that this an "indispensable" status based on the Defense Law could not have been altered by an Emergency Service draft. Rather, the procedure was such that an Emergency Service draft could overrule an "indispensable" status for a civil service, i.e. outside of the Defense Law, without any trouble. In practice this was handled in such a way that the man drafting for emergency service had to negotiate with the civilian office for which the "indispensable" status applied, for instance with the town administration."
Finally, Dr. Holz also made statements which are based on his practical experience of many years with regard to the question as to whether one could evade the Emergency Service Decree. He states that he does not know of one single case where somebody would have dared to make an attempt of evading the draft for emergency service. Everybody knew that such a behavior would have been interpreted as political unreliability or as sabotage and that his behavior would have caused state police interference with the customary consequences, such as commitment to a concentration camp. Finally, Dr. Holz declared that he did not experience a single case in his practice where a person liable to emergency service would have succeeded in evading the draft.
Thus it is evident: It is not very commendable to trap a defendant today by applying judicial theories based on the decrees and laws of the Third Reich. sequence of his career as civil servant or by being drafted into emergency service, had come into the mysterious sphere of the RSHA, Heydrich's threat applied to all of them, namely that the very attempt voluntarily to resign would mean concentration camp and physical extermination of the renegade.
a dozen times, ventured to get out of the liability for emergency service. First of all he asked his employer, the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans, to requisition him; Radunski in his affidavit of 14 November 1947 (Doc. Book Radetzky II, page 60, Doc. No. 15, Exh. 5) stated that von Radetzky's application for re-employment with with the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans was not processed by chief of staff Behrends because the latter shunned quarrels with the SD in personnel matters. At every change of commanders with Sonderkommando Ha, von Radetzky repeated his risky attempt, he troubled his Baltic friend von Freytag-Loeringhoven, who for a certain time was Ic of Army Group Center, to assist him in this dangerous game. He repeatedly informed first one person then the other, in Einsatzgruppe I, of his wishes, always hoping perhaps some time to contact the right man and to discover the right way. A gracious fate protected the defendant von Radetzky so that this, not only dangerous, but I may say, also naive playing with fire did not one day become a flame, consuming him. As regards his naivety, I must in this connection refresh your memory that von Radetzky told us how he sent two memoranda from Shitomir to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories , one concerning the treatment of the Jewish question, hoping thus to effect a change of the German policy in the East. One must have been a Baltic German of the mould of a Radetzky with so much ignorance about the actual conditions on the one hand and with so much faith in the good of human nature on the other, in order at all to get the idea of writing such a memorandum. Maybe this imperturbably decent and good character of the defendant von Radetzky is the reason why his desires were not taken amiss and why he was not treated in agreement with Heydrich's threat. With this confiding naivery he seriously and obstinately purused his goal and first of all succeeded in being granted leave from the middle of December 1941 until the middle of March 1942; and then h e was very fortunate in finally finding a man right in the center of the RSHA with whom he not only could speak openly but who even promised him his full support; this was defendant Schulz, at that time Personnel Officer in the RSHA, with whose assistance von Radetzky , after long, vain efforts, finally succeeded in being released from Eastern assignment (Einsatz). declares verbatim as follows (page 108 of the quoted edition):"The Tribunal declares the group of such members of the Gestapo and the SD to be criminal according to the sense of the statutes as held the positions enumerated in the previous section, as were members of the organizations or remained so, although they knew that these were being used for the performance of deeds which according to Article 6 of the statute have been declared to be criminal and such as being members of the organization personally participated in the perpetrated in the perpetration of such crimes."
amy be said in summarizing: (1) the defendant was not a member of the SD in the sense of this sentence, since he joined the service of the Einsatzgruppe and the RSHA on the basis of a civilian draft, the so-called Emergency Service obligation, and never in any way voluntarily; (2) he cannot be reproached for having stayed in the service since he made every effort that reasonably may be expected from him, considering the situation at that time, in order to escape this service, rendered involuntarily and reluctantly, and he did so immediately employing every opportunity offering itself regardless of possible consequences as we could see from his discussion with the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe Thomas. A third point speaks in favor of the defendant von Radetzky: Not only was he not a member of the SD, he also never participated in the perpetration of the crimes mentioned in the sentence of the IMT.
the individual responsibility of the defendant v. RADETZKY; (1) by ascribing to him a special position and authority in Sonderkommando 4a on the basis of his rank in the General SS, saying: this very authority makes the defendant appear guilty; (2) by presenting his mere belonging to Sonderkommando 4a as evidence for his criminal participation in executions; one could assume that it was impossible to have belonged to Sonderkommando 4a as an officer without being entangled with these things. the General SS are evidence for the authority and the sphere of responsibility of the defendant within Sonderkommando 4a; in addition, that his duties to begin with were adjusted to the purpose of his emergency service obligation. It is still necessary to discuss the further development of the activity of the defendant v. RADETZKY with Sonderkommando 4a in order to remove every doubt about the miscarriage of the argumentation of the Prosecution concerning the individual guilt of this defendant. cution expresses at the conclusion of its opening statement of 29 September 1947, saying that the defendants were under the obligation, if not by their conscience then by law, to refrain from such an activity. The story of the activity of the defendant v. RADETZKY is nothing but a successful attempt, attended by equal shares of good luck and ability, to stay out. Since he also regarded his activity as interpreter as dangerous-under no circumstances would he have to deal with interrogations - he merely restricted himself to reporting and thus gradually severed his connections with Sonderkommando 4a altogether, he became liaison officer to the army and in this practical manner achieved what was not possible for him in any other way. of Einsatzgruppe C, Karl HENNICKE, of 28 November 1947(Doc. Book I RADETZKY II, page 76, Doc.No. 20, Exh. 14) I quote his statement with regard to v. RADETZKY's activity as follows:
"In each of the Sonderkommandos, or Kommandos, the Secu which kept the person concerned fully occupied.
The official reports in some way or other.
For this purpose he had to sources of information of all kinds.
The reports were drafted (according to the department to which they went), mental head III.
The drafting of reports which prepared charge of department IV of the Kommando concerned.
As far matters were prepared by their own officials."
clusively with execution; but the duties of the Special Adviser IV and/or the Chief IV in the Staff of Einsatzgruppe C comprised all police and similar measures. There was a separate to Special Adviser in the Staff of Einsatzgruppe C for executive matters.
In Sokal where v. RADETZKY for the first time learned of the Fuehrer order, he made sure once more in a discussion with his Commander, BLOBEL, about his special task which concerned reporting for the SD and registration of documents, and he received the assurance that he would be given no such assignment as the other officer of the Kommando since he did not have the necessary qualifications, that is police training, v. RADETZKY also were rank insignia different from those of the other leaders of equal rank, who were exercising police functions; this, possibly, was only a formality, yet in the Wehrmacht this was definite proof as to the kind and scope of the authority and duties of the wearer of the uniform; also the amount and manner of payment assured v. RADETZKY that he was not regular T/O officer in the Sk4a but only a civilian drafted under the Emergency Service Law, even though he held the rank of (Captain) in the General SS. While v. RADETZKY had to be satisfied with a daily allowance of RM 1.20,a Captain of the SD of the Secret State Police, who to all outward appearance was of equal rank, received exactly ten times the amount.
In connection with his job of reporting, the defendant v. RADETZKY came into increasingly close contact with the headquarters of the 6th Army, be it on the distributing or the receiving end, for their duty, too consisted of reporting and thus their interests ran parallel to those of v. RADETZKY.
Here he saw for himself an opportunity to escape the narrowmindedness of the Kommando after his initial attempt to resign had failed. He worked his way intentionally toward the position of a Liaison officer since only in this way could he escape the constant danger of being drafted for executive work. Thus he succeeded in becoming detached from the Kommando as early as one month after the invasion of Russia.
He was sent on temporary duty with the G-II of the A03 (Army High Command Section 3) of the 6th Army, a Major LULEY, whose affidavit of 7 October 1947 can be found on p. 42 of my Doc. Bk. 1 (Exh. 15, Doc. No. 11); LULEY reports that from - August 1941 until the middle of December 1941 v. RADETZKY maintained constant local contact with him and that after he took leave of absence at that time for several months he resumed his functions on his return from furlough. Through his well-informed reports on the situation in agriculture, commerce, and industry von RADETZKY had attracted above all the attention of the economic secitons of the Army and now as Liaison officer with the Army had a special opportunity of reporting from a central point, and it was here that he found one of the few places where, in an indirect manner and a form unique under the prevailing circumstances, he was able to point out the effects of the Fuehrer order. In his closer entourage at that time was also the Liaison Official of the Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Councillor of Legation von SCHUBERT, whose affidavit of 1 November 1947 can be found on page 72 of my Doc.Bk.II (Exh. 17, Doc. No. R 19). Von SCHUBERT, also had to file reports, in his case with the Reich Ministry for foreign Affairs, and they dealt with the morale of the Soviet Army on the basis of the material arriving at G-II from prisoner of war statements, furthermore with the morale of the population in the occupied territory, the supply situation of the population, cultural affairs, such as re-ortanization of the school system, and with the re-organization of the self-administration of the population. Von SCHUBERT received many an idea for his reports from Von RADETZKY, who also gave him hints with regard to offices and persons who would give him further enlightenment.
Von RADETZKY, in this connection, proved to be an outstanding expert while revealing at the same time that he was a most severe critic and opponent of the official German policy toward the East. gical report of the further official assignments and the career of the defendant, Von RADETZKY. With the help of affidavits from many witnesses I have been able to demonstrate without any gap whatsoever von RADETZKY's activity during the period from June 1941 until the beginning of 1944 and beyond, and in such a manner that for any given part of this period there are always several statements available. I therefore, need not carry on this presentation since the Tribunal can easily gain from the perusual of my document books a precise picture without any further argumentation on my part; this picture clearly and distinctly shows the following:
Von RADETZKY, who in June 1941 was drafted as a "person rendering emergency service without an employment contract" in an assignment as interpreter and expert on the country with Sk4a and who at once was used, in addition, as Special Advisor III for reports to the SD, soon, that is as of August 1941, was given the assignment as Liaison Officer with the Army and he exercised these functions at various Army headquarters until he resigned from Sk4a, and even thereafter. He could not be drafted for executive tasks in the Sk4a since he formally held only a rank in the SS; since he had had no training in police work, in other words since helacked technical qualifications, he could not at all be utilized in this field and he actually was not utilized in the security police work of which the so-called executive matters formed a part. For this reason, i.e. the fact that he was not a full-time and technically trained police officer, Von RADETZKY wielded no power of command in the Sk4a, and, therefore, never could become a Chief of the Kommando or of a Vorkommando or Sup-Kommando nor could he ever become deputy to such a Leader, and he never did.
with the army and in maintaining himself in this office "since he was able to move about in military circles and possessed the necessary poise" to quote the fitting remarks which the witness BENDT made in his affidavit of 21 January 1948, Doc. Bk. RADETZKY IV, Doc. No. 36, but also certainly because, from a technical point of view he was a stranger within the Sk4a and could not be given an other assignment. Logical thinking will lead yet to the following conclusion:
1) If v. RADETZKY constantly was Liaison Officer with the Army, then he must have been geographically separated from his Kommando; one would have to expect the existence of special circumstances if one were to assume that he participated all the same in executions; there was for him all the less reason for this since his capacity and time were efficiently made use of at another place, i.e. within his assignment as Liaison Officer, not to speak of his additional time-consuming task of reporter within the scope of duties of Department III. Furthermore; As Liaison Officer with the Army he was under constant observation and could be watched better than if he would have trudged along within the unit of the Sk4a; all the more elucidating and valuable are the unanimous statements by the witnesses to the effect that Von RADETZKY never had anything to do with executions and even less ever was Deputy of the Chief of the Kommando. And thirdly; if Von RADETZKY exercised either as Chief of a Sub-kommando or as Acting Commander of the Sonderkommando or in any other way security police functions within the scope of activities of the Sonderkommando - a situation that, as we know, never materialized - then why was he kept on as Liaison Officer to the Army? One certainly could have assigned him a position of greater responsibility and with better prospects in the Security Police Service, as the witness BENDT, who certainly is an expert in such questions, correctly pointed out. There is yet another question to which one cannot find a sensible answer; why should it have been just Von RADETZKY who was used in executive matters as long as there was a sufficient number of technically trained officers available? Neither in his personality, nor in his training nor in reports of events or similar documents, nor in testimonies do we find an answer to these questions.
One thing, though, is clear and obvious; the defendant Von RADETZKY was only belatedly included among the defendants of this trial on the basis of the affidavit of 6 June 1947 of his former Commander BLOBEL (Doc. NO. 3824, Doc. Bk. I of the Prosecution, Exh. 31) who states therein that among other things W. v. RADETZKY took charge of Sonderkommando 4 a during his absence and that under his direction, too, a number of mass executions took place. witness-stand, to their full extent if concerns Von RADETZKY (Transcript of 29 Oct. 47, p. 1660 ff. German,1622 English.
DR. RATZ: I shall interpolate here that I am skipping the remaining part of this paragraph and I shall continue with the next paragraph. KRAEGE who states in his affidavit he had been (Doc.Bk. III C, No-4765 Exh. 137, p. 30 Engl. p. 47 German) under the impression that v. RADETZKY was Chief of the Verkommando LUCK. Yet with this witness the prosecution experienced no less a mishap than with the witness BLOBEL; before this high Tribunal he termed his "Impression" of the past incorrect and made most valuable and positive statements in defense of Von RADETZKY, which can be summarized that Von RADETZKY at the time in question was engaged in the registration of enemy documents and in reporting, not however in executions. (Examination KRAEGE of 17 Dec. 1947, p. 4319/20, 4322/23 Engl. p. 4403, 4408/9 Germ). established three new theses: 1) the alleged responsibility of Von RADETZKY for the compulsory evacuation of the Poles, an accusation lying absolutely outside the framework of the indictment and which was already repudiated by my previous statements; the alleged illegal drafting of Von RADETZKY into the Sonderkommando on the basis of the Emergency Service Decree.
I have also repudiated this argument previously; 3) the recommendation for promotion by the Reich Security Main Office of 15 October 1942, NO-4771 X, concerning v. RADETZKY in which the following sentence appears: "During the advance in the Summer of 1942 SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer v. RADETZKY was entrusted with the direction of a Telilkommando". I would like to make a brief statement as far as this recommendation of promotion is concerned. First of all I would like to use this document in favor of the defendant. The Reich Security Main Office requests the SS-Personnel Main Office to promote SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer v. RADETZKY. If v. RADETZKY was not under the jurisdiction of the Reich Security main Office, as is unequivocally shown by this request for promotion, then v. RADETZKY was not an officer either in the Security Police or the SD; even in October 1942 he was "a person rendering emergency service without an employment contract", who had received a rank in the Allgemeine SS, as was stated previously, and not by virtue of some position within the sphere of activities of the RSHA. In further consideration of the alleged incrimination of v. RADETZKY by this document I would like to quote the prosecution witness. Albert HARTL, who in his affidavit of 6 January 1948 (Doc. Bk. RADETZKY III, Doc. No. 32) states In this connection:
"I made the acquaintance of v. RADETZKY in Kharkow in the Spring of 1942.
Neither at the time I met him nor later during the Summer RADETZKY was a Teilkommando Leader.
At the time I met him he was also later.
If a Teilkommando v. RADTZKY had existed, I would existence of such a Teilkommando v. RADTZKY during my work with the BDS.
At the time I learned about all the Teilkommandos. If there had been a Teilkommando v. RADETZKY I would remember it with near-certainty."