In this connection I must say the following: initiate him into these matters, because, as I have described, he came to an area in which there were no more Jews. Of course, his superiors in the RSHA, Heydrich and Streckenbach and also Thomas, the Chief of Einsatzgruppe C, had exact information about these natters. Therefore, they consciously avoided brining up the subject before him. It can even be assumed that the defendant was ordered to this part of the Eastern front because here he could gain the front-line experience which Himmler required of every member of the RSHA, without coming into contact with things of which he was supposed to know nothing, considering his future activity as special adviser in disciplinary matters. of Jews which had taken place earlier. The last execution of this sort, i.e. the one in Artemowsk, had occurred, not as the prosecution says, a few days before the defendant took over the leadership of the Kommando, but a number of weeks prior to this. In this connection may I refer to the statements I made in the first part of my final plea. Minutes or other written documents were no longer available, therefore, since it was forbidden to keep them. Moreover, may I once again remind you that the staff of SK IV b was not located in Artemowsk, but only a Teilkommando was stationed there. The defendant only visited the latter, lasting perhaps one and a half hours at a time, for purposes of inspection. On these occasions only current matters were discussed. At any rate, neither the predecessor of the defendant, Braune nor the non of the Kommando over uttered a word about the fact that there had been shootings of Jews by SK IV b. resumed his activities as RSHA special adviser for disciplinary matters, the situation was the same as before. The reports of events or, as they were not sent to department I, and their contents were otherwise kept strictly secret.
The practical effects of the handling of the racial problem was a matter concerning which the little man on the street knew much more than the officials in the RSHA who were not directly connected defendant knew nothing of the persecution of Jews also explain why he did not know anything about the Fuehrer order, which was supposed to have been the basis for these measures. He did not need to be familiar with this order in order to perform his tasks as Fuehrer of SK IV b, since at his time it no longer had any significance in the Kommando areas.
Knowledge of such an order, however, would have had nothing less than a tragic effect for the activities of the defendant as RSHA special adviser for disciplinary matters.
III. The question of the defendant's participation in criminal also had he personal connection of any sort with crimes against humanity and war crimes, neither as a perpetrator nor as a participant. the defendant constantly conducted himself as can only be expected of a humane and just man. As Kommandofuehrer in the East, he saw to it that no one was persecuted without cause and that the civilian population of the occupied territory was spared unnecessary oppression. The affidavit of Hans Steinwede, of 22 December 1947, to cite only this one example, proves how he was regarded as a special advisor for disciplinary matters. Steinwede's error with regard to the defendant's authority in department I of the RSHA has been corrected by the affidavit submitted by the codefendant, Erwin Schulz, of 12 January 1948. an assistant judge, an assessor, of the Gestapo in Berlin, and he had him punished because he had maltreated a Jew. Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark is of particular significance in this connection. Of course, these activities have nothing further to do with his membership in the SD, but they demonstrate the over-all personal conduct of the defendant with penetrating distinctness. There the defendant intervened in every possible way for a compromise between the interests of the German Wehrmacht and the concerns of the Danish civilian population, including the American and English citizens interned in Denmark, and in numerous cases where there were indications of undue severity, he interceded in a helpful manner, in direct and shart contrast to the German police.
I will not go into the multitude of details here, but will refer to the affidavits of Friedrich Stalmann, of 4 November and 4 December 1947, and of Werner Best, of 31 October and 26 December 1947. praisal of the character of the defendant. The same applies to the affidavits of Elizabeth Charlotte Ebbinghaus, of 23 October 1947, Frau Lisa Krueger-Martius, of 29 September and 2 November 1947, of Frau MariaKrueger-Martius, of 16 October 1947, of Frau Erika Coulon, of 24 November 1947, and of Frau Charlotte Harmstaedt, of 21 October 1947. I would also like to call the attention of the court to these.
C. Closing comment to Part II. not guilty on count III of the indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now be in recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30 o'clock, and tomorrow's session will take place in Courtroom No. 1.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1948, at 0930 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
PRESIDENT: Some time ago'several weeks ago the Tribunal discussed with counsel of both sides the order of presentation of the final pleas or summations. Several of defense counsel were of the impression that they were entitled to the final word. We indicated at the time, and we repeat today that the order of the presentation is not of paramount importance. After all, it is the substance of the speech and not the order in which it is heard which determines just how much it helps to elucidate the issued involved. In Anglo-American procedure the prosecution invariably terminates the argument because the prosecution has the burden of proof. We decided that the prosecution would make the final speech in this case, not so much because of the burden it must sustain, but because of the physical and mechanical difficulties with which it was confronted and which were more numerous than those which confronted defense counsel. Nonetheless, although the prosecution will have the final speech in this case, defense counsel will still be allowed an opportunity to make further remarks. In keeping with the policy which has been demonstrated rather repetitiously throughout this trial and which perhaps sometimes it has been demonstrated we fear to the annoyance of the prosecution, we allow the defense every possible latitude in the presentation of arguments or of evidence which they believe are of importance in the defense. Thus, after the prosecution will have completed its final speech this morning, such of defense counsel who believe that they should reply to what is new in the prosecution's final utterance will be permitted to make those extemporaneous remarks. We will insist that these extemporaneous remarks be addressed only to what is new in the argument presented by prosecution counsel and not merely be a duplicate of some argument which has already been made by defense counsel in final statement or summation already delivered.
We will now hear from the prosecution.
GENERAL TAYLOR: May it please the Tribunal. dence in support of the indictment which has been brought against these defendants. On 30 September, 136 days ago, the prosecution rested its ease. In view of the nature of the crimes charged here, and the conclusive documentary proof in support thereof, the desperate nonsense which has been chattered during the twenty-one intervening weeks may jar the ear but it can hardly surprise the mind. week for each defendant the prosecution sees not the slightest necessity for or benefit from a tedious rehearsal of the details of the record. We are filing briefs summarizing the evidence against each individual defendant. In this oral statement, we will confine ourselves to the very few general matters raised by the defense which warrant a few words. briefly what the prosecution's evidence showed with respect to the organized program of murder of which these men are the chief surviving executors. It is only too well known that anti-semitism was a cardinal point of Nazi ideology. Throughout the early years of the Third Reich, the Jews of Germany were subjected to ever more severe restrictions, persecutions, and barbarities, and by 1939 life in Germany was all but intolerable for them. The war presented Himmler and Heydrich with what, to them, was a golden opportunity to carry these doctrines to their logical and terrible conclusion--the extermination of all Jews in Germany and in the countries overrun by the Wehrmacht. But practical problems soon cropped up. No one, at least for centuries, had ever tried to eradicate an entire antional and racial group, and it rapidly became apparent that such a project was.....
PRESIDENT: General Taylor, I suggest that you speak a little more slowly for the benefit of the interpreter.
GENERAL TAYLOR: ...an ambitious undertaking which required time and money and manpower and planning! With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the project was put on a really systematic footing. the most part, the approximately 3,000 members of the four so-called "Einsatzgruppen" of the SS, whose leading members are indicted here. The members of these units were carefully instructed as to their mission by Heydrich himself. Their general task was to insure the "political security" of the conquered territories in Russia, and as part of this function they were directed to exterminate all Jews, Gypsies, government officials, Communist party leaders, and other so-called "undesirable elements" in their assigned territories. With the support of the Army leaders, this program was faithfully carried out, and resulted in the murder of at least a million Jews and other human beings during the first two years of the Russian campaign. The defendants have not seriously endeavored to controvert these facts, which conclusively prove the crimes of genocide and the other war crimes and crimes against humanity charged in the indictment. Nor, with a few exceptions as to precise dates -- for the most part insignificant -- have the defendants attempted to contradict the clear proof that they commanded or were otherwise connected the Einsatzgruppen as charged in the indictment. All of the foregoing is clearly established by the documents introduced by the prosecution, consisting chiefly of the defendants' own reports of their activities. escape the damning effect of the conclusive proof afforded by their own records? Only a few of them have been so utterly foolish as to deny that they knew that the Einsatzgruppen had been directed to kill Jews and government officials as described above, or that such executions indeed took place, and in the face of the proof, such a defense is, preposterous.
These defendants who were in charge of these units at the outset of the Russian campaign received instructions which were terribly clear. Those who came in later learned about it from their superiors and predecessors. Mass executions of Jews by the Einsatzgruppen took place in all sectors of the Russian front. We may well believe that the members of the Einsatzgruppen were brutalized by what they did and what they saw being done around them, but they did not become so blase as to carry out these mass executions without even talking about it among themselves. The subject matter of this proceeding is horrible, but it is hardly boring. And furthermore, quite apart from the inherent incredibility of this defense, it is easy to see why very few of the defendants have ventured to put it forth. Most of the defendants have relied upon the so-called defense of "superior orders", and if no order was given to kill Jews and others, or if such an order was not perfectly well-known to all the members of the Einsatzgruppen, then of course the defense that these executions were committed under the compulsion of such an order can not be made. In any event, the very idea that the defendants did not know of both the order and of the executions is so ridiculous that we have already dignified it overmuch.
various times during the trial which deserve some comment. Some of the defendants have sought refuge in the contention that they as individuals did not take an active or direct part in the actual executions, but were primarily concerned with administrative matters or other phases of the operations of the Einsatzgruppen. Other defendants claim that the units under their command did not carry out the order for the killing of Jews and Gypsies and Government Officials, and other undesirables. With respect to reports showing that their units did in fact execute large numbers of people, the excuse is given that the victims were either proven criminals or were all executed by way of reprisal in the course of the anti-partisan warfare being waged behind the front in Russia. And the third point - made by numerous defendants - is that they acted under the compulsion of "superior orders". we will, shortly, make a few observations on what effect, if any, a few of the defendants - most notably the defendant Ohlendorf - have advanced as a defense the very motives which led them to commit these murders; they have bluntly taken the position that under the circumstances which confronted them, the killing of all Jews - even Jewish children - was a necessary and proper part of warfare. This sinister doctrine we will deal with in conclusion. available, conclusive, and susceptible of very brief statement. We do not propose now to examine the evidence, or the application of these arguments, with respect to each of the individual defendants; that has been done in the written briefs which we have filed or are filing with the Tribunal, we have no desire to protract the trial on this, its last day, by laboring the obvious or burdening the transcript with a detailed refutation of flimsy and desperate contentions.
What we may call the defense of "lack of direct participation" has been made by two distinct groups of defendants.
Some of them - for example, Jost and Naumann, and Blobel - were the commanders or deputy commanders of the Einsatzgruppen or their subordinate units the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos, with slightly greater plausibility. Thus the argument has also been put forth by the lower ranking defendants - such as Ruehl, Schubert and Graf - who were officers and staff members, but not in command of these units. participate directly , the elementary principle must be borne in mind that, neither under Control Council Law no. 10 nor under any known system of criminal law, is guilt for murder confined to the man who pulls the trigger or buries the corpse. In line with recognized principles common to all civilized legal systems, paragraph 2 of article II of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies a number of types of connection with crime which are sufficient to establish guilt. Thus, not only are principals guilty but also accessories, those who take a consenting part in the commission of crime or are connected with plans or enterprises involved in its commission, those who order or abet crime, and those who belong to an organization or group engaged in the commission of crime. These provisions embody no harsh or novel principles of criminal responsibility, and a moment's reflection on their meaning will indicate how inadequate is the defense which we are now considering. matters which they affirm establish that their responsibility is, in fact, deeper than that of some of the other defendants. It is, of course, highly probable that these defendants did not, at least very often, participate personally in executions. And it would indeed be strange had they done so. Not even a regimental or battalion commander in battle spends much of his time personally shooting a gun -- it is his task to organize and direct the shooting by the men who serve under him.
And when these defendants tell us that they were chiefly engaged in "administrative work" this means only that they were engaged in the general management and direction of the work of the Einsatz units which they commanded. The "administrative work" which these top leaders and their immediate staffs performed at times - as in the case of Jost -- included such interesting tasks as the ordering of additional gas vans to be utilized for mass exterminations. But such items like that one are colorful rather than necessary to establish guilt. We are not aware that General Yamashita, with his own hand, took the life of anyone in the Phillipines, and surely General Anton Dostler did not serve as a member of the firing squad which shot down the fifteen American commandos who had been taken prisoner in Italy. waking hours to the extermination of Jews. The Einsatzgruppen had a general mission of which these executions were a very important part, but they did have some other things to do. We are quite prepared to believe that the defendants spent some of their time writing general reports to the RSHA and to the military intelligence officers, and that they at times scrutinized captured documents, in pursuit of what the defendant Six was plased to call "cultural objectives". Often, as the defendant Klingelhoefer conceded, the purpose of the documentary research was to identify intended victims of Einsatz executions. But, in any event, these circumstances are no more important than the conceded fact that the defendants had to take time out to eat and sleep in order to carry on. So far from being a defense or even a circumstance in mitigation, the fact that defendants like Naumann did not personally shoot a great many people, but rather devoted themselves to directing the overall operations of the Einsatzgruppen, only serves to establish their deeper responsibility for the crimes of the men under their command. such as Radetzky and Ruehl, and Schubert and Graf. It is a little different, but not much.
Even though these men were not in command, they can not escape the fact that they were members of Einsatz units whose express mission, well known to all the members, was to carry out a large scale program of murder. Any member who assisted in enabling these units to function, knowing what was afoot, is guilty of the crimes committed by the unit. The cook in the galley of a pirate ship does not escape the yardarm merely because he himself does not brandish a cutlass. The man who stands at the door of a bank and scans the environs may appear to be the most peaceable of citizens, but if his purpose is to warn his robber confederates inside the bank of the approach of the police, his guilt is clear enough. And if we assume, for the purposes of argument, that the defendants such as Schubert and Graf have succeeded in establishing that their role was an auxiliary one, they are still in no better position than the cook or the robbers watchman. group of defendants - including Schulz, Blobel, Sandberger, Steimle, Haensch and Nosske -- have claimed that they did not carry out the order. And they say that executions reported by units under their command are justified on the basis that the victims were in all cases partisans, or that they were executed in reprisal for attacks by partisans, or were proven criminals. their contention is palpably false even at first glance. Blobel, for example, was in command of Sonderkommando 4 a of Einsatzgruppe C when his unit entered the Russian city of Kiev. This ancient city had not seen such carnage since its destruction by the Monguls centuries before. As the records show, Blobel's unit killed 35,000 people in Kiev in two days, and 60,000 over the course of six months. Schulz's Einsatzkommando 5 killed 12,000 people during the six weeks of his command . Sandberger's Einsatzkommando I A of Einsatzgruppe A killed 14,500 people, including according to one report, 1,158 "Jews and Communists" at one fell swoop.
And even as to the other defendants whose recorded murders do not run to five figures, nevertheless the number of executions reported is still more than ample - particularly in view of the established pattern and purpose of Einsatzgruppen activities -- to compel the inference that these executions were certainly not all undertaken solely against partisans or by way of reprisal. the situation of the defendants is not much the better for our charity. In thus exculpating themselves under Count One of the Indictment, they have simultaneously inculpated themselves under Count Two, which charges atrocities and offenses against the laws of war, including the murder and ill-treatment of the civilian population of occupied countries. As a most eminent authority on international law has pointed out, "a war crime does not cease to be such for the reason that it is committed under the guise of reprisals". extreme as reprisals, which can be taken only when an unlawful act of warfare has first been committed by the other side. Counter-action can only be taken as a last resort, and the sole purpose of reprisals is to discourage the continuance of unlawful acts of warfare by the enemy. Reprisals may never exceed the degree of violence of the acts which they seek to stop, or the degree reasonably necessary to accomplish this purpose. by the Einsatz units never conformed with the requirements laid down by the laws of war. So far from being measures of retaliation for unlawful acts of warfare by the Russians, they were carefully planned in advance long before Germany launched the attach which began the war. Furthermore, nothing is more clearly established by the laws of war than that no surrendered combatant - whether he is a partisan, spy, or guerrilla - and no civilian may be executed without the benefit of a court-martial or military court trial to determine his guilt.
This was well known to each defendant and is written in the pay book of every German soldier. The defendants have not even pretended that this requirement was fulfilled. If we had applied to these defendants the kind of law which they administered prior to the executions they carried out, this trial would have ended the day before it began.
In arguing that the victims of the Einsatz executions were "partisans" the defendants become enmeshed in a hopeless mase of contradictions and confusions. If their own records show that the victims were Jews, they reply that all Jews were partisans. If the records show the executions of partisans, the they are asked how they knew that the victims were partisans, they reply that they must have been partisans because they had been ascertained to be Jews. This, of course, is flatly contradictory to the argument advanced by Jodl, the defendant before the IMT, who assured us that "there were enxt to no Jews among the partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatic, steelhard Russian fighters, mostly white Russians."1 "cultural research", but the Judicial process, however summary, was not part of the activity of the Einsatzgruppen. As the defendant Klingelhoefer finally admitted on cross-examination, "whether or not the Jews had violated any order, whether they left or stayed in the ghetto, and whether or not they contacted the partisans, they were all killed".2 And the defendant Blume admitted that interrogations were not held in order to determine guilt or innocence, but to obtain information, and that the interrogation was always followed by the death of the subject.3 Having noted these admissions which, revealing as they are, serve merely to confirm what is abundantly clear from the documentary proof, we may turn to 1. IMT mimeographed transcript, p. 11075. See also the admission to the JODL's counsel, Vol.
IV, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 487. 2. Tr. p. 3939 3. Record p. 3756 the third general proposition which a number of the defendants have urged on the Tribunal.
That is the defense of command did carry out mass executions of Jews, gypsies, and political officials, but seek to escape the burden of guilt by pleading that they carried out these executions under the compulsion of superior orders. To this group belong Ohlendorf, Naumann, Blume, Braune, and Ott. It should be noted at the very outset that the putting forward of this plea of superior orders cuts the ground from under the defenses which we have just been considering, If, as Ohlendorf and these other defendants tell us, Hitler did order the Einsatz units to execute all Jews and political officials, and if, in obedience to Hitler's order, such executions were carried out, then there is less than nothing left of defenses such as lack of knowledge, or that the victims of the executions were all partisans. And in fact, the documents make it clear beyond the slightest doubt where the truth lies -- the order for the mass executions of Jews and political officials was given, and it was carried out and there remains for consideration only the question whether the fact that these defendants acted pursuant to an order shall be held to better their position before this Tribunal in any way. to the effect of superior orders on criminal responsibility are by now well established Normally, a subordinate is entitled to assume that orders issued to him by his superiors are lawful and do not require him to commit crimes in execution thereof; and we cannot hold the subordinates responsible to make careful inquiry or elaborate research into the background of the order to make sure that it is in fact lawful. But this general presumption for the benefit of subordinates has no application where, on its face, the order is palpably criminal. These principles have been concisely set forth in the decision of the German Supreme Court at Leipzig in the so-called Llandovery Castle Case (1921): I will quote from that opinion:
"...It is certainly to be urged in favour of the military count upon its legality.
But no such confidence can be doubt whatever against the law.
This happens only in rare and exceptional cases.
But this case was precise ly one of them.
For in the present instance, it was per breach of law.
As naval officers by profession, they were people.
They well know that this was the case here." The language of this decision is precisely applicable to the present case; here also we are dealing with even more obviously criminal orders to kill "defenseless people" on the sole ground that they were Jews, gypsies, or government or party officials. And, in any event, the scope and affect to be allowed the plea of "superior orders" are expressly set forth in Control Council Law No. 10, which is governing on this Tribunal and which states: 1 "The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order ed in mitigation."
So we are left, with this question of mitigation. In dealing with this matter, the prosecution believes that there are at least three matters which deserve primary consideration. The first is--what was the attitude of the defendants towards the criminal order and the criminal acts which it required? Obviously, if the defendants were in sympathy with or merely indifferent to the criminal character of the order, its existence can be allowed, no mitigating effect. If, and only if, the Tribunal is satisfied as to any defendant that he was opposed to and revolted by the character of the criminal order, then two other matters warrant consideration. First -- how well equipped, by rank and education, was the accused to resist the compulsory impact of the order? And secondly, how 1. Control Council Law No. 10, Article II, paragrapy 4 (b). This pro deep was the criminalnature of the order?
For by this we can, to some extent, measure the gravity of the obligation to resist it. defendants made any showing whatever which would establish a claim to mitigation. These defendants are not German peasants or artisans drafted into the Wehrmacht. They are not uneducated juveniles. They are lawyers, teachers, artists, and a former clergyman. They are, in short, men of education, who were in full possession of their faculties and who fully understood the grave and sinister significance of the program they embarked upon. They were part of the hard core of the SS. They did not give mere lip service to Himmler's atrocious racial doctrines; they were chosen for this terrible assignment because they were thought to be men of sufficient ruthlessness to carry them out. They are handpicked fanatics; Every one of them was an officer of the SS, and among those indicted here are six SS Generals, five Colonels, six Lieutenant Colonels, four Majors, and only three junior officers. They are not unhappy victims, unwillingly pushed into crime by the tyranny of the Third Reich; these men, above all others, themselves, spread the Nazi doctrine with fire and sword. of the crime which is charged here. We are not concerned with the conduct of soldiers in the heat and excitement of battle. These crimes were not committed as a result of snap judgments in serious emergencies. These crimes were committed in execution of deliberate plans laid months earlier. And the crime itself is of staggering enormity -- the annihilation of entire racial and national groups -- such as Jews and gypsies -and all leading government and party officials. Questions of guilt or innocence of the victims played absolutely no part; this was massacre for its own sake and the intended victims numbered in the millions. This case therefore, falls well within the conclusion reached by the IMT in passing judgment on Keitel and Jodl. Keitel and Jodl too, had advanced the same argument; in disposing of it, the IMT said, in the case of Keitel:
"There is nothing in mitigation. Superior orders, even justification."
and, in the case of Jodl2, the IMT said:
"His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of "superior or ders", prohibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a de fense.
There is nothing in mitigation. Participation his excuse for commission of these crimes."
the sake of formal completeness, that this defense has no application under Count Three of the indictment, which charges all the defendants with membership in organizations (the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo) declared criminal by the IMT. Under well established principles, the defendants must be convicted under Count Three on the basis of a showing that they were in fact members of any of these organizations after September 1939, and that they knew that the organizations were being utilized for the commission of acts declared criminal by the London Agreement and Charter. The defendants were all officers in the SS -- most of them high ranking -- and all of them joined the SS years before the time, during the latter part of the war, when compulsory recruiting for the Waffen SS began. The close association of all of the defendants with one of the most horrible crimes of the SS upon which great stress was laid by the IMT in rendering the declaration of criminality, needs no further emphasis here. few of the defendants, and most notably by the defendant Ohlendorf, that the massacres of the Einsatzgruppen were, under the circumstances, defensible and necessary. I have used, the expression "point of view" advisedly, 1. Vol I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 391 2. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals. p. 325 for this argument is not, properly speaking, a defense against the charges stated in the indictment; rather it is an attack upon the binding character of the laws of war and international law.
Its logical conclusion is that the laws of war are not laws at all, and are not judicially enforcible. The argument runs about as follows:
(a) It was not unlawful for the Third Reich to attack Russia Government;(b) The Germans expected that, in repelling the attack, the Russians would not comply with the laws of war;(c) Therefore, it was lawful for the Germans to plan to vio ever extent might be necessary in order to achieve victory;(d) Among the Russians, those groups who could be expected sies, and political and party officials;(e) Therefore, it was lawful for the Germans to plan to ex their own military and political security;(f) Furthermore, in modern total warfare the laws of war are not and can not be observed;(g) The heavy bombing raids carried out by the allies during (h) Finally, therefore, the defendants can not be held criminThis, I believe, is an accurate statement of the arguments which the defendant Ohlendorf put forth during his testimony.
And, after all the incredible gabbling we have heard about cultural pursuits and scientific research, it is a relief to be given a direct and stark rejoinder of this kind.
This is exactly what a fanatical pseudo-intellectual SS man might well believe. Thus, when Ohlendorf was asked on the witness stand to explain why the civilized world regarded the Einsatzgruppen massacres with abhorence, he replied:1 I quote from the test:
must shoot individual persons. I believe that the time will Ohlendorf's theses is, of course, equally relevant to the other cases which are being or have been tried at Nurnberg and, indeed to all war crimes trials everywhere.
And Ohlendorf is not the sole exponent of the thesis that Allied bombing constitutes a complete and satisfactory defense to all the crimes charged in these indictments. Thus, counsel for the defendant Burkart in the Flick case, by way of defending his client against the charge of participation in the slave labor program, asked2 in his closing argument:
their wives and children, through air attacks? 1. Tr. p. 520 2. Final plea for Burkart, p. 176, in United States v. Flick, Case No. 5 And counsel for the defendant List in Case No. 7, dealing with the charge that his client had executed thousands of hostages in violation of the laws of war, observed: