(The hearing reconvened at 1120 hours.)
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE DIXON:The defendant WILLY SEIBERT.
SS-Colonel Willi Seibert graduated from the University of Goettingen in 1932 as a graduate economist. He served in the Army from 1932 until 1935 when he entered the SD as an expert in economics. In 1939 he became Chief of Group III D, Economics, in the RSHA and, as such, Deputy to defendant Ohlendorf. He continued in this capacity until transferred to service with Einsatzgruppe D in May 1941.
The defendant Ohlendorf, in his affidavit made on April 2, 1947, declared:
"The former Standartenfuehrer Willi Seibert was my Chief III.
Since he was the senior officer from point of service after me, he was entrusted by me with the duties of a deputy during my absence.
One of his tasks was the composition of all reports which went to the higher headquarters, to the Reich Main Security Office, Berlin, and to the 11th Army.
In rare cases only, if very important reports had to be written, I dictated them myself and later informed Seibert of the contents as a routine (customary) matter.
Seibert had full access to all the secret files; including those which were designated as Top Secret.
In cases where reports bear my signature these can just as well have been written by Seibert as by me.
Reports which are signed by Seibert were, as a rule, written by him during my absence from the Einsatzgruppe.
Seibert was acquainted with all the duties and problems within the framework of Einsatzgruppe D. Only two people could have had complete knowledge of the number of executions which took place, namely, Seibert and myself."
In an affidavit dated February 4, 1947, which has already been cited and quoted from, the defendant Seibert stated that the radio reports on the activities of Einsatzgruppe D were known only to Ohlendorf, Seibert and the telegraphist. Further, that Seibert accompanied Ohlendorf on journeys of inspection.
On the witness stand both Ohlendorf and Schubert modified their original statements as to Seibert's activities with the Einsatzgruppe and endeavored to delimit his functions to those of Chief of Office III. This modification could well have stemmed from a desire to help a co-defendant, rather than because of a mistaken statement in the first instance. One could err in the general summing up of another's activities, but it is difficult to comprehend how one in the normal possession of faculties of memory and reflection could ascribe the accomplishment of a very specific act to another if, in fact, it had not occurred. Thus, in his affidavit of April 2, 1947, Ohlendorf stated: "The only people whom I generally assigned to inspections were, except for Schubert, Willi Seibert and Hans Gabel." Here we have a very definite type of work.
Schubert, in his affidavit of February 24, 1947, very specifically declared that Willy Seibert was Ohlendorf's deputy, and that Ohlendorf or Seibert had assigned him to supervise and inspect an execution which involved some 700 people. Schubert could scarcely have credited Seibert with this type of executive authority, unless he was aware ho possessed it. One Karl Jonas declared by affidavit that Seibert was deputy to Ohlendorf.
In his own affidavit Seibert declared that, although he was not Ohlendorf's deputy generally for Einsatzgruppe D, he did represent his chief "in all matters which a Chief III has to work out". And then he explained that "as senior officer on the staff of the Einsatzgruppe" he "took over all tasks within the Group whenever Ohlendorf was absent from the Group".
Although the defendant attempted to testifying confine his activities to those falling within the normal scope of Office III, he did state that he made inspections of Tartar companies, that he engaged in combat actions against partisans and that he did make reports on executions.
These assignments obviously do not fall within the duties of a Chief of Office III, as Office III was described by Seibert.
Ohlendorf testified that Standartenfuehrer Setzen had been originally appointed by Heydrich as chief of the Department IV in his Einsatzgruppe. Under the plan of organization, Setzen would thus become Ohlendorf's deputy in executive functions of the Einsatzgruppe. However, Ohlendorf did not use Setzen for this purpose. He assigned him to the leadership of a subkommando, and the evidence is entirely convincing that he used Seibert for functions which would otherwise have been performed by Setzen. Seibert had been Ohlendorf's deputy in Office III of the RSHA since 1939. It would be quite natural for Ohlendorf to want Seibert, who had been his deputy in Berlin, to continue in a similar capacity in the field. And it is significant that they both returned at about the same time to the RSHA in Berlin and Seibert once more took up his duties as deputy to Ohlendorf in Office III.
The prosecution submitted two documents in the nature of reports signed by Seibert as acting commander for Ohlendorf during the latter's absence. These reports show conclusively that Seibert was reporting upon the general activities of the Einsatzgruppen, which included executions, planning for operations, and negotiations with Army officials, and in one of the documents Seibert is revealed requesting a conference with the chief of Staff of the Army. A report (Register No. 1118/42) dated April 16, 1942, carried the phrase "The Crimea is freed of Jews". Seibert knew the full significance of that phrase.
He was questioned about it on the witness stand:
"Q. When you signed the report which contained a reference to the settlement of the Jewish problem, you were aware that the settlement of the Jewish problem meant the execution of Jews?
A. That did not have to be the case, Your Honor, because in the country Jews were not executed, or at least during the first time; they were assigned to labor, and then they were collected for such purpose and, of course, Jews were also executed.
Q. Eventually they were executed?
A. Yes, that is probably the case.....
Q. And when you signed the report which contained the phrase, 'The Crimea is freed of Jews', you knew what had happened to the Jews?
A. Yes, I knew that."
Seibert admitted having witnessed two executions and stated that he did not exclude the possibility that Jews were among the executees. He also knew that Jews and Communist functionaries were shot without investigation:
Q. So you know that of your own knowledge that people were sentenced to be shot without any investigation or trial?
A. Yes, I had to assume that from the Fuehrer-Order."
Seibert admits that he passed on to the commanders of Einsatzgruppe D any orders from Army Headquarters which should arrive during Ohlendorf's absence.
The Tribunal finds that Seibert was in fact, if not in name, Ohlendorf's deputy in the Einsatzgruppe D. It finds further that he was thoroughly aware of the activities of Einsatzgruppe D and participated as a principal as well as an accessory in its operations which violated International Law, and fall within the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10.
The Tribunal finds from all the evidence in the case that the defendant is guilty under Counts I and II in the Indictment.
The Tribunal also finds that the defendant was a member of the criminal organization SS and SD under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and, therefore, is guilty under count III of the Indictment.
PRESIDENT:The defendant, Eugen Steimle.
SS-Colonel Steimle studied history, Germanic languages and French at the Universities of Tuebingen and Berlin. In May 1935 he qualified as instructor of secondary schools, and in March 1936 he passed the examination as Studienassessor. In April 1936 he entered the security service and on 1 September 1936 was appointed leader of the SD Regional Headquarters in Stuttgart.
From September 7 to December 10, 1941, Steimle was chief of Sonderkommando 7a of Einsatzgruppe B. During this time his unit executed 500 people:
Report No. 92;
Report No.108;
Report No.125;
Report No.133, From August 1942 to January 1943 the defendant was chief of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, which unit also participated in liquidating operations.
It is the contention of the defendant that all executions ordered by him were in the nature of punitive actions falling under established offenses against the laws of war, such as sabotage, looting, and partisan activity. It is evident that this defendant, like the defendant Blobel, has a distorted view of what constitutes established offenses when he states, as he does in his pre-trial affidavit, that under his leadership his kommando executed even "persons suspected of being partisans".
Defense Counsel in his trial brief complains that the Prosecution did not submit any evidence to contest the defendant's assertion that every exeuction of partisans was preceded by a thorough examination on the basis of a regular procedure. The defendant himself gave one highly illuminative demonstration on his idea of regular procedure. He was asked what he would do to a man he came upon lecutring on Communism, and he replied that, after taking a look at him:
"If I was under the impression that he would put his theoretical conviction into deed in that case I would have him shot."
Another example of his idea of justice arose out of his voluntary narrative of an episode involving the shooting of three girls who, according to the defendant, were about to form a partisan group. He explained that the case of these throe girls was investigated for eight days. Whether such an investigation actually took place or not can only depend on the credibility of the defendant himself. In this respect it must be remarked that, if his concern for the girls' civil rigts rose no higher than his regard for their spiritual comfort, the victims could not have had much of a chance to defend themselves. Steimle himself commanded the firing squad, and he was asked if the girls were afforded any religious assistance before the shots were fired. He replied that, since they were Communists, they could not have had a religious conviction. Then the question was put to him as to what he would have done in the event they were religious. His reply was:
"If the wish had been uttered I can imagine that this would have been done.
I, myself, wouldn't have bothered."
The defendant undertook to deny responsibility for various executions performed by his two units by stating that the alleged investigations were conducted by his subordinates. His admission, however, that he reviewed investigations and ordered death sentences makes him co-responsible with the persons in charge of the examinations. A superior may not delegate authority to a subordinate and then plead non-involvement for what the subordinate does.
Especially, when the superior reserves the right of supervision, as Steimle testified he did.
The Tribunal is satisfied from the evidence in the case that the defendant understood his responsibility in this regard but failed to meet it.
The Tribunal further finds that the credible evidence in the case does not support any conclusion that all Jews admittedly executed under Steimle's orders were accorded a trial and judicial process guaranteed by the rules of war and International Law.
The defendant then claims that no Jews were executed by either of his sub-kommandos while he was chief. In his pretrial affidavit he stated:
"From talk by members of the Kommando, I know that SS-Stnadartenfuehrer Dr. Blume, my predecessor in this Kommando in White Ruthenia, carried out shooting of Jews besides fighting against partisans."
And "I know that my predecessors, SS-Standart enfuehrer Blobel and SS-Stnadartenfuehrer Weinmann carried out shootings of Jews and other atrocities, mainly during the march through the Ukraine."
It is incredible that, although the two kommandos involved were engaged in the execution of Jews prior to Steimle's arrival, they should suddenly cease performing their principal function while the Fuehrer-Order was still in force.
The defendants other statement that there were no more Jews in his territory is discredited by Report No. 108:
"The Sonderkommando 7a executed a local, leading Bolshevist official and 21 Jewish plunderers and terrorists in Gorodnie.
In Klinzy 83 Jewish terror ists and 3 leading party officials were likewise liquidated.
At a further checking up 3 Communist officials, 1 Politruk (political commissar at the front) and 82 Jewish terrorists were dealt with, according to orders."
(Emphasis supplied)
The defendant stated that, when he took over the command of Order.
He added that he was opposed to it and thus, by failing to shoot Jews, he exculpated himself from any responsibility under that order. But, neither the Fuehrer-Order nor the Indictment in this case is limited to the extermination of Jews. The ruthless killing of members of the civiliam population other than Jews is also murder. Nonetheless the Tribunal is convinced that the Einsatz units under Steimle's leadership and authority killed Jews on racial grounds and also killed Jews on supposed offenses without affording them the trial called for under the Rules of War and International Law. It is also clear that Steimle did not attempt to prevent Foltis, his subordinate, from killing Jews under the Fuehrer-Order. The Tribunal finds from all the evidence in the case that Steimle authorized and approved of killings in violation of law and is guilty of murder.
From all the evidence in the case, the Tribunal finds the defendant guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment.
The Tribunal also finds that the defendant was a member of the criminal organizations SS and SD under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and, therefore, is guilty under Count III of the Indictment. JUDGE SPEIGHT: The Defendant Ernst Biberstein.
Ernst Emil Biberstein was originally named Szymanowsky. This striking change in name was no more extraordinary than the change in his profession. From clergyman in the Lutheran Protestant church in Kating, Schleswig-Holstein, he went to a chiefship in the Gestapo in Oppeln, Germany, in the meantime having renounced the church and his ecclesiastical garb. In August 1935 he entered the Reich Ministry for Church Affairs and in May 1936 was promoted to Oberregierungsrat in the State service. He served in the Wehrmacht from March 10, 1940, until October 20, 1940, when he became Chief of Gestapo at Oppeln. In the meantime, he had become SS-Sturmbannfuehrer and as such went to Russia as Chief of Sonderkommando 6 under Einsatzgruppe C. He served in this capacity from September 1942 until June 1943.
On June 25, 1947, at Eselheide, Germany, Biberstein declared in a sworn statement that his kommando during the time he was its chief killed from 2000 to 3000 people. In Nuremberg he twice repeated these figures under oath. At the trial he sought to repudiate the total, saying that the interrogator, on the three different occasions, had insisted that he name a figure and that a discrepancy of one thousand more or ess did not matter. It was then put to him that allowing for a margin of one thousand he had still admitted to from one to two thousand killings. He refused, however, at the trial, to name any figure.
Although he repudiated the totals, he did not attempt to deny that he had witnessed two executions, the precise details of which he had described in his three pre-trial declarations. In his affidavit of July 2, 1947, he related:
"I personally superintended an execution in Rostow which was performed by means of a gas truck.
The persons destined for death -- after their money and valuables (sometimes the clothes also) had been taken from them -- were loaded into the gas truck which hold between 50 and 60 people.
The truck was then driven to a place outside the town where members of my kommando had already dug a mass grave.
I have seen myself the unloading of the dead bodies, their faces were in no way distorted, death came to these people without any outward signs of spasms.
There was no psysician present at unloading to certify that the people were really dead."
................
"I have also witnessed an execution carried out with firearms.
The persons to be exe cuted had to kneel down on the edge of a grave and members of my kommando shot them in the back of the neck with an automatic pistol.
The persons thus killed mostly dropped straight into the pit.
I had no special expert for these shots in the neck.
No physician was present either at this form of execution."
At the trial he explained that he witnessed those executions only because the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe wished him to experience the sensation of watching an execution so that he might know how he would feel about a spectacle of that kind.
"Q. You didn't know that before you witnessed the execution that you would have a feeling of revulsion against the execution.
You didn't feel that before you actually witnessed the execution?
A.Of course not, Your Honor, for, before, I had never seen an execution.
Q.So you had to see an execution in order to know that it offended against your sentiments?
A.Yes, I had to see what kind of an effect this would have on me."
The defendant denied having executed any Jews and in substantiation of this assertion he advanced various explanations:
(1) that Thomas, the Einsatzgruppe chief, was aware of his religious background and therefore wished to spare him his feelings;
(2) that there were no Jews in his territory anyway; (3) that he did not know of the Fuehrer-Order.
The defendant carried this third incredible proposal to the point where he declared that althought he had led an einsatzkommando in Russia for 9 months, he did not learn of the FuehrerOrder until he reached Nuremberg. In fact he states that the very first time the Order ever came to his attention was when it was talked about in the court room and its contents shocked him considerably.
Many of the defendants in seeking to justify killings have pronounced the word "investigation" with a certain self-assurance which proclaimed that so long as they "investigated" a man before shooting him they had fulfilled every requirement of the law and could face the world with an untroubled conscience. But an investigation can, of course, be useless unless proof of innocence of crime releases the detainee. Investigating a man and concluding he is a Jew or Communist functionary or suspected franctireur gives no warrant in law or in morals to shoot him. Biberstein claims that all executees of his kommando were given a proper investigation and killed only in accordance with law. Can this statement be believed? In testing Biberstein's credibility he was questioned regarding his work as a Gestapo Chief.
His answers to the questions put to him shed some light on the extent to which Biberstein can be believed in his wholesale denials:
"Q. Suppose that you learned that in the town of Oppeln there was, let us say, a Hans Smith, who made a declaration to the effect that he hoped that Germany would lose the war because it was an unjust war that she was waging, what would you do?
A. I would have asked the man to come to me and would have told him to hold on to his own views and keep them to himself and just would have warned him."
.....................
"Q. You are on your way home one evening from the office and someone comes up to you and tells you that he overheard Hans Smith inveigh against the German Army, the German Government, Hitler and the whole National Socialist regime.
......
what would you do?
A. Nobody would have done this, I don't think.
Q. Well, let us suppose someone did. Peculiar things happen.
A. I would have told him, 'Don't talk about it.
Keep it to yourself, keep it quiet'."
...................
"Q. Well, let's go a little further. This man who stops you on your way home, says 'By the way, I just found out that there is a plot on here to kill Hitler.
I heard the men talking about this; I know the house in which they gather; I saw some bombs being taken into the house and I want you to know about this, Herr Biberstein.
' What would you do?
A. I would have told him, 'Go to Official So-andSo and report it to him'.Q. And you would have done nothing?
A. Why what could I have done? I didn't.
know what to do. I had no police directives."
In a further denial that he ordered executions Biberstein said that a pastor has the task "to help souls but never to judge". Biberstein was no longer a pastor, professionally, spiritually or intellectually. He had already denounced his church and his religion and when asked why he did not offer religious comfort to those who were about to be killed under his orders and in his presence, he said that he could not cast "pearls before swine".But despite his never swerving determination to avoid an incriminating answer, truth in an unguarded moment emerged and Biberstein confessed to murder from the witness stand.
He steadfastly had maintained that every exeuction had been preceded by an investigation. As chief of the kommando which conducted the executions, his was the responsibility to be certain that these investigations revealed guilt. However if conceivably he could -- although in law and in fact he could not but even if arguendo he could be excused from responsibility for the death of those who were executed outside his presence, he could not escape responsibility for the death of those killed before his eyes.
With regard to the two executions which he witnessed (one by gas van and the other by shooting), he testified that the first involved some 50 people and the second about 15. He was questioned as to whether investigations had been made to determine guilt or innocence of these 65 executees. He replied:
"I did not see the files of these 65 cases.
I only know that men of the kommando had received, orders ever since the time of my predecessor to investigate the cases."
The interrogation continued:
"Q. You do not know of your own knowledge that those cases were investigated?
These 65 deaths?
A. I did not see it.
Q. No. So, therefore, you permitted 65 people to go to their deaths without knowing yourself whether they were guilty or not?
A. I said that I only made spot checks.
Q. Did you make any spot checks in these 65?
A. Not among these 65.
Q. Then we come back to the conclusion that you permitted 65 people to go to their death without even a spot check?
A. Without living made a spot check, yes."
It is, therefore, evident that in this instance alone Biberstein is guilty of murder in ordering the death of 65 persons and supervising their very executions without evidence of guilt.
The Tribunal finds from all the evidence in the case that Sonderkommando 6, during the time that Biberstein was its chief accomplished mass murder. It finds further that as its chief, Biberstein was responsible for these murders.
The Tribunal finds from the entire record that the defendant is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment.
It finds further that he was a member of the criminal organizations SS, SD, and Gestapo under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and, therefore, is guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
WERNER BRAUNE Judge Dixon; The Defendant Werner Braune SS-Colonel Werner Braune received his law degree at the University of Jena in July 1932 and in 1933 was awarded the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science.
He joined the SS in November 1934. In 1940 he became chief of the Gestapo in Wesermuende. In October 1941 he was assigned to Einsatzkomando 11b. As chief of this unit Braune knew of the Fuehrer-Order and exected it to the hilt. Hi defense is the general one of Superior Orders which avails Braune no more than it does anyone also who executes a criminal order with the zeal that Braune brought to the Fuehrer-Order. Various reports implicate Braune and his kommando in the sordid business of illegal killings.
The Tribunal has already spoken of the Christmas massacre of Simferopol. Braune was the kommando leader in charge of this operation. He has admitted responsibility for this murder in unequivocal language:
"It took place under my responsibility.
Once I was at the place of execution with Mr.Ohlendorf and there we con vinced ourselves that the execution took place according to the directives laid down by Ohlendorf at the beginning of the assignment.
I personally was there several times more and I supervised.
...
Furthermore, my sub-kommando leader Sturmbannfuehrer Schulz was always pres ent, the company commander of the police company and, I think, another Captain."
The Fuehrer-Order did not offer reasons or ask for explanations. Like a guillotine blade in its descent it did not stop to inquire into cause and premise. Nonetheless, the question was put to Braune as to why the Army, which apparently had immediately ordered this execution, was so anxious that the slaughter be accomplished before Christmas. Braune enlightened the Tribunal and simultaneously horrified humanity for all time as follows:
"The Fuehrer-Order was there, and now the Army said 'We want it finished be fore Christmas'. I wasn't able at the time to find out all the reasons.
May be the reasons were strategic reasons, military reasons, which caused the Army to issue that order.
Maybe they were territorial Questions.
Maybe they were questions of food.
The Army, at that time, was afraid that hundreds of thousands of people might have to starve to death during that winter be cause of the food situation.
..."
There were also executions after Christmas. Einsatz-Order, dated January 12, 1942, speaks of an operation destined -
"....to apprehend unreliable elements (partisans, saboteurs, possibly enemy troops, parachutists in civilian clothes, Jews, leading Communists, etc.)
." Braune admitted that he took an active part in this operation. He was asked what happened to the Jews who fell into the dragnet which he had spread, and Braune replied:
"If there were any Jews, Mr. Prosecutor, they were shot, just as the other Jews."
The question was then put if the Jews were given a trial, and the defendant replied:
"Mr. Proseuctor, I believe that it has been made adequately clear here that under the order which has been issued there was no scope to hold trials of Jews."
Document NOKW-584, describing the executions mentioned in that document carried this significant item:
"SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Braune gave orders on the place of execution for the carrying out of the shooting."
Although Braune deniews that he actually gave the order to fire he does admit that he marched with the condemned men to the place of execution.
Speaking of the Ewpatoria action the defendant explained that he was convinced that "the whole lot of them had engaged in illegal activities", but he admitted that there was the possibility, theoretically, as he described, that among these 1,184 executees "There were some people who had not participated in murdering the German soldiers or who had not participated in sniping activities."
The Tribunal finds from all the evidence in the case that the defendant is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment.
The Tribunal also finds that the defendant was a member of the criminal organizations SS, SD and Gestapo under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT:The Defendant WALTER HAENSCH - - - - - - -SS-Lieutenant Colonel Walter Haensch studied law at the Leipzig University, trained as Referendar in various cities and passed his final State Law Examination in December 1934.
He took a position with the town administration of Doebeln in February 1935 and in the Fall of that year entered the SD. In the early part of 1942 Haensch was assigned to Sonderkommando 4b as its leader. It is the contention of the Prosecution that his authority over this unit began on January 16, 1942. The defendant asserts on the contrary that although it is true he was ordered to this post in January, he did not arrive at the site of the kommando until March 15, 1942.
In support of this asserted delayed inauguration of his einsatz service, the defendant presented evidence to show that he was in Berlin on February 7, 1942, for some dental work, that, on February 20, 1942, he opened up a bank account, on February 21, 1942, he posed for some pictures and on another date attended a birthday party, all in Berlin.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
A great deal of time was devoted at the trial to the presentation of evidence both for and against the alibi contended for by the defendant. The question of alibi, however, remains moot, in view of the fact that even if the Tribunal assumed that the defendant did not arrive in Russia until March 15, 1942, the date asserted by him as the beginning of his active service with the Sonderkommando, this assumption would not exculpate him. The record proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Sonderkommando 4b, under the leadership of the defendant Haensch, was active in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, even subsequent to March 15, 1942.
On April 3, 1943, Sonderkommando 4b arrested 50 hostages and killed one-half of them. The identification of Haensch's unit in this mass execution is established by the following:
(1) Report No. 188, dated April 1, 1942 shows that Sonderkommando 4b had an active unit operating in Zhitomir.
(2) Report No. 189, dated April 3, 1942 states:
"Locations and communications as re ported in Situation Report 188, dated 1 April 1942, remain unchanged."
This proves that Sonderkommando 4b was still at Zhitomir so that it was bound to be the unit responsible for the incident described in the report as follows:
"Zhitomir -- 50 hostages from Gayssen and vicinity were arrested in the course of the investigation and half of them were shot."
(3) Report No. 190, dated April 8, 1942 confirms the responsibility of Sonderkommando 4b for the events of April 3 by declaring that units of Sonderkommando 4b were still stationed at Zhitomir.
Report No. 189 above indicated, carries also another item under "Einsatzgruppe C":
"From 28 March up to and inclusive 31 March a total of 434 persons were subjected to 'special measures' (executed). The figures breaks down as follows:
33 political officials 48 saboteurs and plunderers 253 Jews and 1 insane."
This item quoted not to conclusively prove that Sonderkommando 4b was responsible for the 434 executions, but for the purpose of demonstrating that Einsatzgruppe C (and, therefore, its integral units, including Sonderkommand 4b) was at the time actively engaged in the carrying out of the extermination program.
Haensch was involved in still further executions following March 15. Report No. 6, dated Juno 5, 1942 shows that Sonderkommando 4b, under the leadership of Maonsch, was located at Gorlovka. The same report carries this item:
"Several large-scale actions against partisansa and Communists were carried out in the district of the Gorlovka in late April -- early May 1942. 727 out of1,038 persons arrested were given special treatment Among them there were 461 partisans, mentors of destruction battalions, saboteurs, looters and some Communist activists and NKVD agents."
The conclusion is inescapable that Hanesch's organization is responsible for the various executions mentioned herein.
The defendant endeavored at the trial testifyingly to absent himself from Gorlovka at the time of the executions, but his evidence in this respect was vacillating and entirely inconclusive. He admitted that officials under his command participated in the action. Whether he personally was present in the actual physical arresting and shooting of the victims is of no consequence legally. A high ranking officer who plans an operation or participates in the planning and has control over officers taking part in the movement certainly cannot escape responsibility for the action by absenting himself the day of execution of the plan. Haensch was not only responsible for the sonderkommando during the operation, but he admits having been informed on the results thereof.
It is urged by Defense Counsel in behalf of Haensch that:
"In addition, nothing happened during the course of these operations which could be regarded as a crime. The containing of partisans, members of the Destruction Battalions, saboteurs, and looters is an action permissible accord ing to International Law.
I believe I do not have to touch upon this matter further.
The report also shows that those persons apprehended were not killed indiscriminately but that only some 75 percent were actually effected by the so-called 'special treatment'.In other words, the cases were all in vestigated."
The report clearly states that the actions were taken against partisans and Communists. Membership in any political party is not a capital offense according to the Rules of War and International Law. And executions for membership in a general political party can only be murder. It is asserted that all the cases were investigated. The report says nothing about investigations and, in any event, there is no evidence in the record that the investigations, if held, conformed to the accepted trial requirements, recognized by the Rules of War and International Law insofar as they appertain to civilians. Whatever defense exists to the charges contained in this item depends on the defendant's word. Can he be believed?
He asserted that during the entire time he served in Russia he never heard of the execution of Jews as Jews. Only three or four weeks prior to his alleged assumption of command over Sonderkommando 4b, the kommando killed, 1,224 Jews. He professed to know nothing about this massacre. He was asked:
"You have now stated that you have no reason to doubt the correctness of these reports.
Therefore, if 1,224 Jews were shot by your organization before you took over, does it not seem strange to you that in all the time that you were with the very men who conducted those executions, that not a word was ever said about so extraordinary a phenomenon as the execution of 1,224 human beings because they were Jews?"
His only reply was that no one talked about these killings or any killings at all, and that he did not learn that Jews were executed for racial reasons until he arrived in Nuremberg five years later!
The witness stated that before he took over command of Sonderkomnando 4b he was told by Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo and Thomas, Chief of Einsatzgruppe C, that the executive activities of Sonderkommando 4b were to remain unchanged. He was asked whether he carried out these directives of Mueller and Thomas and he replied in the affirmative.
Report No. 24, dated July 16, 1941, discloses the killing of 180 Jews and the burning of Jewish homes by Sonderkommando 4b. Report No. 88, dated September 19, 1941, spoke of the execution of 435 Jews as well as 28 saboteurs and 55 officials and agents of the NKWD. Report No. 94, d dated September 25, 1941, contained an item on the execution of 290 Jews. Report No. 111, dated October 12, 1941, declared that 125 Jews had been liquidated. Report No. 132, dated November 12, 1941, reported 161 Jews killed. Report No. 135, dated November 19, 1941, repotted 562 Jews liquidated. Report No. 143, dated December 8, 1941, described the killing of not only 137 Jews, but also 592 "mentally deficients". Report No. 173, dated February 25, 1942, revealed the killing of 649 political officials and 139 Jews. Report No. 177, dated March 6, 1942, chronicled the execution of 1,224 Jews.
If, as Haensch stated, he continued to carry out the executive policy of Sonderkommando 4b as it existed prior to his arrival in Russia, and the above enumeration indicates quite clearly what that policy was, this can only mean that he continued with the execution of the FuehrerOrder. The Tribunal rejects completely the defendant's statement that he did not know of the execution of Jews. In the face of what appears in the record the Tribunal also refuses to accept as fact the statement of the defendant that he was only personally aware of four executions involving in all sixty deaths.
On July 21, 1947 he wrote out by hand a 25-page statement on his einsatz service. Over eight pages (which is over one-third of the entire statement) were devoted to a discussion on executions and his, the defendant's manner of conducting then. On page 22 he said: