Here, too, I can only say that I have never given such a report, and that I would not have given such an order. Quite apart from the fact that on the 23rd of September I handed over my command to my successor. I only mention it because this mentions a plan, and if a plan had proceded this action, I would doubtlessly have known about it. I may ask that Dr. Rasch be interrogated about this during his examination. I can say nothing about Uman.
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
Q. Witness, the Prosecution charges you in a number of other documents with having participated in executions. These are the documents which are contained in Document Book II-C, Exhibit No. 72, Document No. 2850, that is the Operational Report 132 of the 12th of November 1941. Then, in the same Document Book, Document No. 2832, Exhibit 79, that is the Operational Report 135 of the 19th of November 1941; and in the same book, Document No. 2827, Exhibit 74, that is Operational Report 143 of the 8th of December 1941. What do you have to say about these documents?
A. They all were made out after my time, and, of course, I cannot say anything about them. It may be of interest to look at Exhibit 72 in Document Book II-C, Document No. 2832, that is Operational Report 132, on page 19 of the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Operational Report No. 132? Here it is listed as 135.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: 132, your Honor. 132, 135 and 143.
Witness: It might be useful to mention Operational Report 132, even though this is after my time and have nothing to say about it. I mention it only to underling the incorrectness and inexactitude of the report and to show that Einsatzkommandos are charged with things with which they had nothing to do. In Operational Report 132, on page 19 of the original-
DR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: 135 of the English document book, your Honor.
WITNESS: It says that Einsatzkommando 5 executed, from the 28th of September to the 4th of October, so and so many functionaries in Kriwoi-rog; and in the time of the 28th September until the 4th of October it killed so and so many functionaries in Dnepopetrowsk.
book, Exhibit 79, Document 2832, page 57 of the German. There it says, on page 22 of the original-
DR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: Page 57 of the English, your Honor.
WITNESS: (continuing)... that "Einsatzkommando 5 is busy in the district of the Dnjeprbogen (bend of the Dnjepr) since the 6th of October 1941. Apart from extensive rural districts the following towns, all of a definitely industrial character and densely populated", namely, Dnjepropetrowsk, etc. This shows that Einsatzkommando 5 was not at all active in this area but that this was the area of Einsatzkommando 6. I mention this merely to underline the unreliability of the reports. Otherwise, I have nothing to say about the other documents because they are after my time. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. May I make a concluding question. According to the indictment, letters "U", "V" and "W" - the witness as leader of Einsatzkommando 5 is charged with having participated in executions which took place from the 20th of October 1941 to the 24th of January 1942.
Witness, were you in Russia during this time at all?
A. About the 28th or 29th of September 1941 I returned to Berlin from Russia, and after that time I never returned to Russia.
Q. And at what time did you officially hand over the command of Einsatzkommando 5?
A. I handed over my command just when Kiev was captured. That is why I mention the dates from the document, in order to emphasize that at the latest, one or two days after Kiev was taken, I turned over my command to Obersturmbannfuehrer Mayer.
Q. Were you ever in Kiev?
A. NO; from Skwira I went by way of Berditschew back to Berlin.
Q. In your Einsatzkommando 5, did you ever order measures against Gypsies or so-called racially inferior people?
A. No, I don't know such an order at all.
Q. Was there a gas van in Einsatzkommando 5?
A. No, not during my time.
Q. Do you know of any mistreatment of prisoners of war and of civilian populations?
A. They are unknown to me. They would have been severely punished by me, for the detachment commanders -I told the detachment commanders, and at every other fitting opportunity, not to commit any indecensies or mistreatment, and to conduct themselves decently and cleanly at all times.
Q. Did your Commando carry out any destruction of personal property?
A. No, I don't know of any single case where such a destruction was carried out.
Q. The prosecution charges that valuables were taken from the victims or from the people to be executed. What do you know about this?
A. In my Einsatzkommando this was not the case. Such valuables were given to the relatives of the victims. If such relatives were not present these valuables were handed over to Einsatzgruppe as per order. How the Einsatzgruppe disposed of them, I don't know. I can merely remember that some cash of insignificant value was handed over to the Einsatzgruppe. Valuables were not present at all.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, this concludes the examination of the witness in the Russian assignment. After this I want to come back to his activity in the Office I of the R SHA.
And then, in conclusion, to his activity in Salzburg as the local police chief. I believe that I shall conclude the direct examination after a short While, but I consider this a proper time for a recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Before we recess: Mr. Hochwald, these two localities mentioned by Dr. Durchholz -- Salzburg and Berlin -- insofar as the offices of the RSHA are concerned -- do they come within the purview of the charges in the indictment?
DR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: Certainly not as far as the activity of the defendant in Berlin is concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Is he charged with any crime committed in Berlin or Salzburg?
DR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: No, he is not, sir. This question would only be relevant as to a decision on Count No. 3.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, Is that your purpose, Dr. Durchholz?
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. The Tribunal will be in recess until one forty-five.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: The Tribunal please, inasmuch as the witness has finished his testimony concerning Counts One and Two of the Indictment, and of what the witness is going to say now, can only have a certain relevency as to Count Three of the Indictment, the Prosecutiln is willing to concede that in the RSHA after his return from Russia. and in his position asinspector of the SIPO and SD in Salzburg, the witness did not commit any act and did not reveive any knowledge which would have made him guilty on Count Three in the Indictment, that in order to save time and to make the trial expedient.
THE PRESIDENT: We gather from what you say then, that whatever the defendant is charged with in the Indictment, has or has not been answered by the testimony up to this point, and that anything further which might be said would shed no more light on Count Three.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are willing to concede that regardless of what he might say in connection with his activity in Berlin, and in Salzburg, it would not incriminate him under Count Three.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: We want to submit that, when he says now, and I do expect he will say so, that he did nothing incriminating in the period after returning from Russia and in Salzburg and Berlin, so we will submit to this statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Count Three is rather a broad Count. Insofar asthe defendant would testify to what happened following his return to Berlin, the Tribunal understands that the Prosecution does not charge him with participating in any criminality after that time.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: That is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Therefore, efforts on that point would be irrelevent.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: Yes, that is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: But if the witness might want to explain what he did in Berlin before in order to expulgate himself from the charge under Count Three, then that would be relevant.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: That is what we understand, but the witness has already testified, and the testimony of the witness from now on should come at the time after ids return to Berlin, in the beginning of November 1941, until the end of the war, and what I want to express to the Tribunal is that we see the liability of the witness under Count Three any time previous, first, let's state the date as 1 November 1941-
THE PRESIDENT: Until the termination of his activity in Russia.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: That is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Durchlolz; what have you to say to this?
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, the defendant is charged under Count Three because he was amember of the SS after 1 September 1939, and remained a member of the SS after that date. The IMT had determined, that a defendant is guilty if he remained a member of this organization which has been declared criminal after that date and asto his direct examination the witness has given detailed statements that he does not want to identify himself with the crimes committed by this organization, He showed the reasons which were decisive for him to act in the manner as he did, and he wants now to prove the reasons why he remained in this organization, that is, only to be mitigating, and insofar as any crimes were ordered, after his assignment in Russia, to avoid such crimes. For that reason it is important for the defense that he may prove his personal attitude as to individual events, and his position later. Of particular importance seems to be the attitude he adopted in Salzburg later, and may I say that the witness in Salzburg received the well known Air Force Order, according to which the parachutists of the enemy who had jumped, without interference from the police, should be lynched by the excited population.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Durchholz, now that you understand the position of the Prosecution, you may proceed with your examination of the defendant, keeping in mind it is not necessary to respond to any charge along the lines mentioned by Mr. Hochwald. You may examine him, but perhaps you may do it a little more briefly than you had intended orginally, because of the concession made by the Prosecution.
DR. DURCHHOLD: Very well. I shall try to make the questions as brief as possible, but I consider it necessary to give an overall picture of the personality of the witness. I therefore ask that I may address the questions as I had intended to.
THE PRESIDENT : You may proceed.
BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. Witness, after returning from Russia, you were in command of the Officers Training School of the Security Police again, were you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Before your assignment to Russia, and after your assignment in Russia, you tried through directives you gave to the participants to show them how to conduct themselves asfuture police leaders. May I ask you very briefly, with a few brief words to explain the attitude which you asked the participants to take?
A. I shall try to be as brief aspossible. First of all I'll answer the question whether this has no connection and no relevency. Owing to my experiences in Russia I felt it to be my duty to train the young officers at the Officers Training School very carefully. As a basic idea I always told them that they had to be an example, becuase a living. example is the best education. I pointed out to them the difference between the ideas of being a leader and being a superior. First of all I used the phrase, "Master Race," the slogan "Master Race" and gave them two explanations, which in German sounds so very similar, and yet they are so entirely different, namely, the socalled "Master Race" or "Master man," and the socalled"Masterly man", or the "domineering man"? I compared these ideas to other ideas as well, which in my opinion were often misused drastically, the ideas of strictness on the one hand and, brutality on the other hand, and at the same time the difference between weakness and kindness.
Many people can not see any difference between them. Finally, I also got the concept of selection, which particularly within the SS was a very important word. I clearly said that within the Security Police we were further from representing a selection, and we had to try everything possible through energy and hard work, and by giving our best to become better, but that we could only consider ourselves to be a selection when, using fair self-criticion, we could say that the least one amongst us was as good as the best amongst an average man. I particularly emphasized that it was of importance to be humane and chivalrous.
Q. You then became chief of Gruppe-I-A in the Reich Security Main Office, were you not? While there did you have anything to do with the executive there?
A. No, the Group-I-A was that group within Office-I which dealt with personnel questions. They were subdivided into six referatedepartments. If I may tell you about the departments of the Referate and what they dealt with: Department -I dealt with general official measures, distinctions, terms, and employing personnel in occupied territory.
Department 2 dealt with personnel files of State police. Department 3 with personnel filesof the criminal police. Department 4, the personnel files of the SD. Department 5 SS matters. Here, in all the departments of the Security Police all matters of promotions were dealt with; from here it went to personnel Main Office, which decided promotions. The RSHA were not entitled to promote anyone on their own authority with the SS. They also had no authority to regulate the reasons for promotions. They were strictly laid down, and had to be followed according to the proscribed measures. Department 6 which later came to Office-II, dealt with and looked after the relatives of people who had fallen in battle, and the casualties. Then there was a department for organization which merely dealt with organizational affairs of the inner construction,
Q. Then you became chief of Office-I. Please tell us in one sentence what Office-I meant?
A. Office-I dealt with personnel matters. Previously they had been connected with Office-II. When Streckenbach went to the WaffenSS, those two offices were separated completely. Office-I then had four departments: Group I-A which I have just mentioned, personnel; Group I-B, training and education, about which I have already talked, and---
THE PRESIDENT: Your attorney said to answer in one sentence. Now you were to give us a brief outline of the office. It might be interesting but to go into any long detail discussion of all the movements and mechinationsof the Office is scarcely necessary.
BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. Another question, witness. Did you have any close connection with Himmler?
A. No, I had no connection with Himmler, except during four lectures, when sofar as I remember he was in Hamburg, and one in Koenigsberg, once in Berlin, and once in Salzburg, when he talked to the counter intellegence.
Apart from that I had no connections with Himmler. During these lectures, I did not have any close contact with Himmler. I never went to him with discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear his Posen speech in October 1943?
A. No, Your Honor. Sofar as I wasinformed, only the group of leaders, that is, people above the rank of group leaders participated in those meetings. I myself wasnever in Posen. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. Now I'll talk about your last activity in Salzburg. Where and what was your task when you went to Salzburg? March 1944 I was relieved from my job as Office Chief, and sent to Salzburg as commander of the Security Police. It was not of any importance that I held a rank of Chief of the Security Police only as an honorary rank, because actually I was nothing but an inspector. My intention to use this position to give orders was refused to me by Berlin at the time. If I had the title of Commander of the Security Police, this was only because with that title I wason equal basis with the office chiefs, while the title "inspector" would have meant down grading. I started to work in Salzburg on 1 May 1944. At the same time I was in the section North of the Drau as representative of the Higher Police and SS Leader Obergruppenfuehrer Rossler, who was handling a special task in Laibach, and there dealt with the anti-band actions south of the Drau River, and he was quite independent in his power as commander. His representative in this field was SS-Brigadefuehrer General Hahn. My position as such remained the same asit had been in Hamburg.
Q. Now in the Salzburg special events occurred about which, in your official position, you had to explain what your attitude was. What were they?
A. Apart from the constant events which also made some impression four big events are of most important ones. On 20 July 1944, the socalled Air Force Order, "Fliegerbefehl", which had become known as"Augen zu erlass", taking over the POW Department from the Reichfuehrer--SS, and finally the actual capitualtion, from that, if I am asked to state my opinion about these events now that I have to be brief, I can only mention the fact that I managed in Salzburg to deal with the events on 20 July in such a manner that they took place without any great interference on the part of the population. In comradely cooperation with the commanding general in Salzburg I could solve these problems, and no arrests were carried out, and no measures were taken and no persons were involved. About the same time a top secret order, the air force order wasgiven, which had become known under the name of ' 'Augen/zu/Befehl'. I was instructed myself to make this order known in the agencies in the proper manner. Apart from that I didn't agree with.
I considered these announcements a great danger, the results might have been dangerous, and for that reason I put it into the safe and didn't announce it.
Q. Will you please state what the contents of this order were?
were?
A Yes. Actually it had become known incorrectly, and that is what I wanted to explain. I did announce this order later because it was talked about, and it was said that this order contained something, that all parachutists were to be shot. I then announced this order because I had to prove to the commanders that the shooting of parachutists was not at all mentioned in this order, but that merely the police had been instructed not to take a part if the population lynched parachutists who came down. The police was not to interfere with this. That was one reason why I did not announce this order. I could never understand that the police, who should look after order and security, should permit injustice.
In Salzburg too, no difficulties arose. Parachutists who came down were handed over to the Wehrmacht officers. In one case one airman was saved out of the River Salzach by the police.
About August 1944 Reichfuehrer Himmler became chief of the POW's and the Higher SS and Police Leaders became higher commanders of the POW's within intelligence service. Since the Higher SS and Police Leader was absent from Salzburg, on my own authority, although I was not competent to do this, I took responsibility for the POW department. In very many cases I could help POW's. Most of all in spite of some officers, during heavy air attack I gave them opportunity to go into air-raid shelters and saw to it in every way that even under the most difficult conditions Red Cross parcels were sent to them, and saw to it carefully that the Geneva Contention was kept to in the strictest manner. I believe I will be able to conclude the subject because I just heard now an affidavit has arrived from the officers concerned who confirm this. I can add only that in spite of the great difficulties which occurred during the last moments of the tragedy in Salzburg, and also in the Alps Mountains no POW and no foreign workerswas done any harm. When they were given over on the day of the capitulation it Was done in the best of order without any occurrences or incidents, and Salzburg itself could also be handed over in the proper manner.
helped that Salzburg surrendered without a fight and asked the Wehrmacht and the Party officers to let Salzburg surrencer without a fight? every city was considered a fortress. The refusal to obey such orders would be dealt with by a court martial, and mostly very severe punishments were conferred. According to this Salzburg started to work on their defense. During the first discussion with the Reich Defense Commissar I managed to convince the Gauleiter and Defense Commissar of the fact that there was no sense in doing this because this city was of no military importance and it could not help operations to defend such a city at all. Since the Commanding General Ringel also followed my suggestions and the Regierungspraesident also supported my views, the Reich Defense Commissar tried to ask the higher offices whether they could avoid defending the City of Salzburg and declare Salzburg an open city, also because of the man hospitals in Salzburg at the time. At another stage I managed, with the support of the Regierungspraesident, Dr. Lauer, to convince the Reich Defense Commissar as well that the blocked region in front of Salzburg no longer should exist not to give the approaching opponent the impression that Salzburg was to be defended. We also succeeded to stop people from preparing to blow up bridges so that Salzburg as a city remained intact. The third point was merely the Alps fortress behind Salzburg, and which as such was not really a fortress at all. I did not succeed because the old 'Fuehrer decree still existed, that this Alf fortress was to be defended, and General Kesselring wanted to have this defense carried out. In this Alp fortress all authorities in Salzburg were informed in a proper manner to resist the approaching American Army, or rather to hand over the city and to surrender it in good order, which actually happened then.
and order and particularly took care of it that the 20,000 POW's which were in the Alp fortress were well looked after, and that the foreign workers were treated in a proper manner. On the day of the capitulation, without even one incident, the entire territory of Salzburg, without any signs of lack of organization, could be surrendered. Army authorities. Where was this?
A This was on the Zell Am See Lake on the day of capitulation. That is 8 May, 1945.
Q And why did you do this? the twenty-five years when I worked in the police, and the orders I had given there, I wanted to be present where my men were, whom I had led throughout this time. In the hour of the capitulation it was decisive whether I remained faithful to the basic principles which I had expressed and announced. One of these principles was in the hour of danger the leader should always be with hismen. That is why I surrendered.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, I have therewith concluded the direct examination of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness is now available for cross-examination on the part of defense counsel. BY DR. LUMMERT (for Defendant Blume): of 1941 did you come from the east and return to Berlin? because I was in Berlin one or two days before my wife's birthday. That is the 27th or 28th of August, 1941. time, of the RSHA? 28th or 29th.
at the time as well? Please answer yesor no.
Q Did he talk to you?
Q Was the Defendant Blume already in Berlin at the time?
Q What did Streckenbach tell you about Blume at the time?
A It was in accord with my own statements. When I saw Streckenbach at the time and described to him the conscience troubles of the men and also told him about my own state of mind he told me that it was the same with Blume, Blume already had been recalled because he was too soft, too humane.
Q Did Streckenbach's statement show that Blume had already returned to Berlin?
Q According to Streckenbach's statement did you understand that the Defendant Blume had tried to avoid this order for shooting as far as possible? Streckenbach explained to me that Blume was in the same state of mind as myself.
DR. LUMMERT: Thank you. I have no further questions. BY DR. GICK (For the defendant Strauch):
Q Witness, in Document Book III-A for "Apple", Exhibit 106, Document 2966, German Page 34, I am afraid I don't know the English page, there Strauch since February '42 is described as Commander of the Sipo and the SD in White Ruthenia. May I submit this document to you? Actually he is only mentioned as representative in the documents in March '42. Only on the 22nd of March, 1942, did he start his service. According to your general knowledge about the conditions in the personnel office, how does this difference in the statements in the personnel files conform with the statements in other documents concerning actual taking over of the power of command? I want to put it: from an office chief upwards was very complicated. within the official dhannels of the central office. The personnel chief did not have power of authority over the personnel entirely. When office chiefs were appointed, the Chief of the Security police had first to be asked about it. When this discussion was completed, according to his instructions, the draft was made out. It looked about as follows: At the top right there was, the date; "Berlin" -- The day wasleft open -- and the month and the year. When this order was ready the special offices also had to sign it that means that it had to be sent on to the Offices III, IV and V, so that they could eventually make an objection against the person because possibly this might concern their field of activity as a commander.
There a few days elapsed until the circulation was finally concluded in the adjutant's office of the Chief of the Security Police: it might have taken up to three weeks. Then the paper was submitted to the chief for signature, and this signature was only given after a time e.g. in cases of absence. Even there sometimes it was possible that it had to be left there for two or three weeks. This happened repeatedly, and the day of the actual signature was then given and filled in on the empty space on the top. But since many of the offices had already approved it previously, the signature of the chief could not be doubted, it happened that an order was given through teletype so that in such cases between the actual day of duty and the date of the document there were considerable differences of time. given about the middle of March and reached Defendant Strauch, about that date, and only then Strauch started to work there?
A I cannot state my opinion on Strauch's personal case, but I think there is a possibility according to what I have said previously.
Q Then a second question. Do you know from your activity with the RSHA that Strauch in White Ruthenia almost entirely worked on armed investigation of partisans, so that he wasofficially reproached that his own work as to security police information service thus was neglected?
A Yes, that is right. I know that Strauch, whether with or against his will I, cannot decide off hand, of course, had nearly got into a position of dependence towards Gruppenfuehrer von Dem Bach who took him particularly under his wing in order to use him for partisan combatting. For that reason he himself therefor was forced, particularly as his chief in the Higher Police and SS official in his district to deal with him very closely in the partisan combatting. So he was reproached for being more active in that field than in the sphere of the security police.
DR. GICK:Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. SURHOLT: (For Defendant Dr. Rasch): The defense of Dr. Rasch asks to reserve the right to address questions to Defendant Schulz also at a later date. As reason I give the following. The defense does not know about the facts the witness just stated. My defendant himself is not present. I an, of course, not in a position on my own authority to put questions here extemporaneously.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Surholt, were you present during the examination of the Defendant Schulz? Were you present during the examination of the present defendant?
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, except for ten minutes, I believe.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are familiar with what he has testified to.
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, I know that.
THE PRESIDENT: And you have had contact with your client right along, have you not?
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, I talked to him on Saturday, Saturday afternoon, but the witness has stated a lot today as well.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I am leading up to, that the only part o this witness's testimony which has not now been related or related to your client is that which he testified to this morning.
DR. SURHOLT: That is not correct, because it is impossible to talk to Rasch for a long time. After about half an hour or an hour he is exhausted. Apart from that, the technical possibilities of having discussions with him are very difficult. Rasch is together in one room with several others in hospital, and it is obvious that I have to wait very long until he is taken to another room, and that is very difficult altogether, in order to discuss matters with him at all. Apart from that his mental state at the moment is such that one cannot say that his mind, is working actively now. HE makes many incorrect statements, the incorrectness of which is found later. His memory is not working so that it is very difficult to help him to understand the way the proceedings are going.
Apart from that, quite honestly, I am not in a position, -- let us say, when a defendant like Defendant Schulz is in the witness box and for two days and making statements continuously -- to remember all that, even when I make short notes, and to remember everything that might be of importance to my client, because this defendant as subordinate to Rasch and has stated a great deal concerning my client.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Surholt, what you have just stated how is not a valid excuse.