Apart from that I had no connections with Himmler. During these lectures, I did not have any close contact with Himmler. I never went to him with discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear his Posen speech in October 1943?
A. No, Your Honor. Sofar as I wasinformed, only the group of leaders, that is, people above the rank of group leaders participated in those meetings. I myself wasnever in Posen. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. Now I'll talk about your last activity in Salzburg. Where and what was your task when you went to Salzburg? March 1944 I was relieved from my job as Office Chief, and sent to Salzburg as commander of the Security Police. It was not of any importance that I held a rank of Chief of the Security Police only as an honorary rank, because actually I was nothing but an inspector. My intention to use this position to give orders was refused to me by Berlin at the time. If I had the title of Commander of the Security Police, this was only because with that title I wason equal basis with the office chiefs, while the title "inspector" would have meant down grading. I started to work in Salzburg on 1 May 1944. At the same time I was in the section North of the Drau as representative of the Higher Police and SS Leader Obergruppenfuehrer Rossler, who was handling a special task in Laibach, and there dealt with the anti-band actions south of the Drau River, and he was quite independent in his power as commander. His representative in this field was SS-Brigadefuehrer General Hahn. My position as such remained the same asit had been in Hamburg.
Q. Now in the Salzburg special events occurred about which, in your official position, you had to explain what your attitude was. What were they?
A. Apart from the constant events which also made some impression four big events are of most important ones. On 20 July 1944, the socalled Air Force Order, "Fliegerbefehl", which had become known as"Augen zu erlass", taking over the POW Department from the Reichfuehrer--SS, and finally the actual capitualtion, from that, if I am asked to state my opinion about these events now that I have to be brief, I can only mention the fact that I managed in Salzburg to deal with the events on 20 July in such a manner that they took place without any great interference on the part of the population. In comradely cooperation with the commanding general in Salzburg I could solve these problems, and no arrests were carried out, and no measures were taken and no persons were involved. About the same time a top secret order, the air force order wasgiven, which had become known under the name of ' 'Augen/zu/Befehl'. I was instructed myself to make this order known in the agencies in the proper manner. Apart from that I didn't agree with.
I considered these announcements a great danger, the results might have been dangerous, and for that reason I put it into the safe and didn't announce it.
Q. Will you please state what the contents of this order were?
were?
A Yes. Actually it had become known incorrectly, and that is what I wanted to explain. I did announce this order later because it was talked about, and it was said that this order contained something, that all parachutists were to be shot. I then announced this order because I had to prove to the commanders that the shooting of parachutists was not at all mentioned in this order, but that merely the police had been instructed not to take a part if the population lynched parachutists who came down. The police was not to interfere with this. That was one reason why I did not announce this order. I could never understand that the police, who should look after order and security, should permit injustice.
In Salzburg too, no difficulties arose. Parachutists who came down were handed over to the Wehrmacht officers. In one case one airman was saved out of the River Salzach by the police.
About August 1944 Reichfuehrer Himmler became chief of the POW's and the Higher SS and Police Leaders became higher commanders of the POW's within intelligence service. Since the Higher SS and Police Leader was absent from Salzburg, on my own authority, although I was not competent to do this, I took responsibility for the POW department. In very many cases I could help POW's. Most of all in spite of some officers, during heavy air attack I gave them opportunity to go into air-raid shelters and saw to it in every way that even under the most difficult conditions Red Cross parcels were sent to them, and saw to it carefully that the Geneva Contention was kept to in the strictest manner. I believe I will be able to conclude the subject because I just heard now an affidavit has arrived from the officers concerned who confirm this. I can add only that in spite of the great difficulties which occurred during the last moments of the tragedy in Salzburg, and also in the Alps Mountains no POW and no foreign workerswas done any harm. When they were given over on the day of the capitulation it Was done in the best of order without any occurrences or incidents, and Salzburg itself could also be handed over in the proper manner.
helped that Salzburg surrendered without a fight and asked the Wehrmacht and the Party officers to let Salzburg surrencer without a fight? every city was considered a fortress. The refusal to obey such orders would be dealt with by a court martial, and mostly very severe punishments were conferred. According to this Salzburg started to work on their defense. During the first discussion with the Reich Defense Commissar I managed to convince the Gauleiter and Defense Commissar of the fact that there was no sense in doing this because this city was of no military importance and it could not help operations to defend such a city at all. Since the Commanding General Ringel also followed my suggestions and the Regierungspraesident also supported my views, the Reich Defense Commissar tried to ask the higher offices whether they could avoid defending the City of Salzburg and declare Salzburg an open city, also because of the man hospitals in Salzburg at the time. At another stage I managed, with the support of the Regierungspraesident, Dr. Lauer, to convince the Reich Defense Commissar as well that the blocked region in front of Salzburg no longer should exist not to give the approaching opponent the impression that Salzburg was to be defended. We also succeeded to stop people from preparing to blow up bridges so that Salzburg as a city remained intact. The third point was merely the Alps fortress behind Salzburg, and which as such was not really a fortress at all. I did not succeed because the old 'Fuehrer decree still existed, that this Alf fortress was to be defended, and General Kesselring wanted to have this defense carried out. In this Alp fortress all authorities in Salzburg were informed in a proper manner to resist the approaching American Army, or rather to hand over the city and to surrender it in good order, which actually happened then.
and order and particularly took care of it that the 20,000 POW's which were in the Alp fortress were well looked after, and that the foreign workers were treated in a proper manner. On the day of the capitulation, without even one incident, the entire territory of Salzburg, without any signs of lack of organization, could be surrendered. Army authorities. Where was this?
A This was on the Zell Am See Lake on the day of capitulation. That is 8 May, 1945.
Q And why did you do this? the twenty-five years when I worked in the police, and the orders I had given there, I wanted to be present where my men were, whom I had led throughout this time. In the hour of the capitulation it was decisive whether I remained faithful to the basic principles which I had expressed and announced. One of these principles was in the hour of danger the leader should always be with hismen. That is why I surrendered.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, I have therewith concluded the direct examination of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness is now available for cross-examination on the part of defense counsel. BY DR. LUMMERT (for Defendant Blume): of 1941 did you come from the east and return to Berlin? because I was in Berlin one or two days before my wife's birthday. That is the 27th or 28th of August, 1941. time, of the RSHA? 28th or 29th.
at the time as well? Please answer yesor no.
Q Did he talk to you?
Q Was the Defendant Blume already in Berlin at the time?
Q What did Streckenbach tell you about Blume at the time?
A It was in accord with my own statements. When I saw Streckenbach at the time and described to him the conscience troubles of the men and also told him about my own state of mind he told me that it was the same with Blume, Blume already had been recalled because he was too soft, too humane.
Q Did Streckenbach's statement show that Blume had already returned to Berlin?
Q According to Streckenbach's statement did you understand that the Defendant Blume had tried to avoid this order for shooting as far as possible? Streckenbach explained to me that Blume was in the same state of mind as myself.
DR. LUMMERT: Thank you. I have no further questions. BY DR. GICK (For the defendant Strauch):
Q Witness, in Document Book III-A for "Apple", Exhibit 106, Document 2966, German Page 34, I am afraid I don't know the English page, there Strauch since February '42 is described as Commander of the Sipo and the SD in White Ruthenia. May I submit this document to you? Actually he is only mentioned as representative in the documents in March '42. Only on the 22nd of March, 1942, did he start his service. According to your general knowledge about the conditions in the personnel office, how does this difference in the statements in the personnel files conform with the statements in other documents concerning actual taking over of the power of command? I want to put it: from an office chief upwards was very complicated. within the official dhannels of the central office. The personnel chief did not have power of authority over the personnel entirely. When office chiefs were appointed, the Chief of the Security police had first to be asked about it. When this discussion was completed, according to his instructions, the draft was made out. It looked about as follows: At the top right there was, the date; "Berlin" -- The day wasleft open -- and the month and the year. When this order was ready the special offices also had to sign it that means that it had to be sent on to the Offices III, IV and V, so that they could eventually make an objection against the person because possibly this might concern their field of activity as a commander.
There a few days elapsed until the circulation was finally concluded in the adjutant's office of the Chief of the Security Police: it might have taken up to three weeks. Then the paper was submitted to the chief for signature, and this signature was only given after a time e.g. in cases of absence. Even there sometimes it was possible that it had to be left there for two or three weeks. This happened repeatedly, and the day of the actual signature was then given and filled in on the empty space on the top. But since many of the offices had already approved it previously, the signature of the chief could not be doubted, it happened that an order was given through teletype so that in such cases between the actual day of duty and the date of the document there were considerable differences of time. given about the middle of March and reached Defendant Strauch, about that date, and only then Strauch started to work there?
A I cannot state my opinion on Strauch's personal case, but I think there is a possibility according to what I have said previously.
Q Then a second question. Do you know from your activity with the RSHA that Strauch in White Ruthenia almost entirely worked on armed investigation of partisans, so that he wasofficially reproached that his own work as to security police information service thus was neglected?
A Yes, that is right. I know that Strauch, whether with or against his will I, cannot decide off hand, of course, had nearly got into a position of dependence towards Gruppenfuehrer von Dem Bach who took him particularly under his wing in order to use him for partisan combatting. For that reason he himself therefor was forced, particularly as his chief in the Higher Police and SS official in his district to deal with him very closely in the partisan combatting. So he was reproached for being more active in that field than in the sphere of the security police.
DR. GICK:Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. SURHOLT: (For Defendant Dr. Rasch): The defense of Dr. Rasch asks to reserve the right to address questions to Defendant Schulz also at a later date. As reason I give the following. The defense does not know about the facts the witness just stated. My defendant himself is not present. I an, of course, not in a position on my own authority to put questions here extemporaneously.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Surholt, were you present during the examination of the Defendant Schulz? Were you present during the examination of the present defendant?
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, except for ten minutes, I believe.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are familiar with what he has testified to.
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, I know that.
THE PRESIDENT: And you have had contact with your client right along, have you not?
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, I talked to him on Saturday, Saturday afternoon, but the witness has stated a lot today as well.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I am leading up to, that the only part o this witness's testimony which has not now been related or related to your client is that which he testified to this morning.
DR. SURHOLT: That is not correct, because it is impossible to talk to Rasch for a long time. After about half an hour or an hour he is exhausted. Apart from that, the technical possibilities of having discussions with him are very difficult. Rasch is together in one room with several others in hospital, and it is obvious that I have to wait very long until he is taken to another room, and that is very difficult altogether, in order to discuss matters with him at all. Apart from that his mental state at the moment is such that one cannot say that his mind, is working actively now. HE makes many incorrect statements, the incorrectness of which is found later. His memory is not working so that it is very difficult to help him to understand the way the proceedings are going.
Apart from that, quite honestly, I am not in a position, -- let us say, when a defendant like Defendant Schulz is in the witness box and for two days and making statements continuously -- to remember all that, even when I make short notes, and to remember everything that might be of importance to my client, because this defendant as subordinate to Rasch and has stated a great deal concerning my client.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Surholt, what you have just stated how is not a valid excuse.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Surholt, what you have stated in the latter part of your statement is not a valid excuse because every Defense Counsel is confronted with the same situation. He listens to the witness and then he must immediately stop to the podium and begin to examine, and he must make notes as best he can. That is a lawyer's job; that is what I had to do when I was practicing law. But what you have stated with regard to the condition of your client is another matter, and certainly we give full weight to what you have said to the Tribunal so that we will permit you to do one of two things. You may, if you wish cross-examine the witness in such fields as you now feel you are sufficiently familiar with and have already talked over with your client, reserving the remainder of your cross-examination to a later day; or you may, if you wish, decline to cross-examine now and at a later date cross-examine the witness Schulz completely at one time.
DR. SURHOLT: I would prefer that.
THE PRESIDENT: You would prefer the latter?
DR. SURHOLT: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That right will be reserved to you then.
DR. SURHOLT: Your Honor, may I address another word to the Court? I know and agree to the way you understand the duties of a Defense Counsel, but there is a great difference that after each session I cannot talk to my client about the testimony of a witness and I cannot discuss with him anything a witness may have said and ask my client to clarify it.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason we made the ruling we did. Mr. Hochwald, do you have anything to say about this?
MR. HORLICH-HOCHWALD: If Your Honors please, if the Defense will question at a later date the Defendant Schulz concerning his connection with Rasch and so on may the right be reserved to the Prosecution to cross-examine Schulz on such questions which may arise out of this, later?
THE PRESIDENT: That right naturally follows, Mr. Hochwald, will be reserved to the Prosecution.
Any other Defense counsel ready? BY DR. HOFFMANN: (Counsel for Defendant Nosske) Q.- Witness, you were personnel expert in the RSHA?
A.- Yes.
Q.- In that position you had to know about all institutions in the RSHA, did you not? Not the way they worked, perhaps, but about the fact of their existence?
A.- Yes.
Q.- I would now like to ask you: Was there a top staff in the organization of the Einsatzgruppen?
A.- I have never heard of that expression.
Q.- Was there a Staff Command of Security Police and SD?
A.- I have never heard that description either.
Q.- And now only one more question to you. Could you tell me your views about the way in which orders were passed on? That is, the Hitler Decree, and the official channels through which it was sent to the various agencies of the Einsatzkommandos?
A.- Yes, I believe that this official channel is very clear. First of all, it must have come from the Fuehrer himself. For the Police in its entirety it must have come via Himmler;from Himmler it must have gone via the Main Office Chiefs, that is at least by the Chief of the Main office of the Police, the Regular Police, because such men had been put at their disposal. And for the Security Office, via the Chief of the Security Police-- that is Heydrich-- then it must have been handed down in such a manner that the Einsatzgruppen were informed by the Einsatzgruppen chiefs and the Einsatzkommando leaders were informed by the Einsatzgruppen chiefs.
BY DR. MAYER (Counsel for defendant Steimle):
Q.- Witness, as a former Gruppen chief for personnel questions in the RSHA, do you know anything about the way Steimle was transferred to Office VI?
A.- The Chief of Office VI, Schellenberg, dealt with Steimle's transfer and tried to achieve it for some time. I remember that at the time I tried very hard to get Steimle to Office VI because Schellenberg at the time was just setting up his office, and Himmler bothered him very much in this, and almost daily either he or his experts were in my office in order to try to get some personnel. I therefore tried to bring Steimle there as well, particularly as Steimle himself would have liked to go there. If I remember correctly, basically his office chief, Ohlendorf had approved this.
Q.- And why did you not succeed in this?
A.O Steimle's transfer for Office VI was put aside by Streckenbach temporarily. What detailed reasons were decisive for this, I do not know However, they may have consisted in the fact that between the two office chiefs there was not very much close cooperation.
I want to add something. Schellenberg's requests for personnel at the time went to such an extent that they could not have been confirmed.
Q.- In any case, Streckenbach refused, isn't that right?
A.- Yes.
Q.- Did you know whether Schellbenback tried to have Steimle transferred to Office VI at such a time when Steimle was already in command of a Kommando in Russia?
A.- Yes, I also remember that. The Russian Campaign was decisive for Schllenberg to call me up at my office and to inquire about the position regarding Steimle. On that occasion he told me "If Steimle goes to Russia now I surely won't have a chance of getting him to my office for a long time to come." For that same reason, if I remember cor rectly, that same day I tried again and asked Streckenbach to give us Steimle.
Streckenbach told me then that Steimle, after he had finished in Russia, would be sent to Office VI, Q.- How did you manage to get Steimle to Office VI after all -- and earlier than Streckenbach had intended this to happen?
A.- I think Streckenbach did not have anything to do with that because, if I remember correctly, shortly after I took over Office I, Steimle was sent to Office VI.
Q.- When did this happen?
A.- I took over Office 1 on 1 February 1943.
Q.- And soon after you transferred -
A.- I cannot remember all the details but I know that it was very soon after, because Schellenberg would not let go.
Q.- Thank you, BY DR.FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fendler):
Q.- Witness, since when have you known the defendant Fendler?
A.- I met Fendler when I got the order, in the spring of 1943, to take an Einsatzkommando in Oppelm. In this Einsatzkommando Fendler was assigned to me as an SD expert.
Q.- What jobs did he have at the time when he was SD expert in the Kommando?
A.- The tasks of the Einsatzkommanders at the time were such that as long as the army itself was mobile they looked after the locations, housings, and saw to it that a proper office was set up. was Fendler's task to make these preparations for a final office.
Q.- Was the manner in which this SD Office, was set up and founded the same as in the agencies in the Reich?
A.- I think I can say that they were exactly the same.
Q.- Do I understand you correctly to gag that Defendant Fendler at the time, even when Czechoslovakia was occupied, was not active in the executive staff?
A.- He had nothing to do with the executive staff. The executive tasks were dealt with by a Criminal Commissar.
Q.- In the year 1940 Fendler became a candidate for the so-called Executive Service (Leitender Dienst). Will you please inform the Tribunal what was considered to be the Executive Service?And candidate for Executive service?
A.- This position was set up as a result of the shortage of personnel owing to the war. Since all available personnel were put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht and the command offices and since the police and the Wehrmacht themselves who legally had the duty of handing on men stopped to transfer men, the Security Police was in an emergency state, to supply their own candidates for leaders and chiefs. For that reason, a great number of men were chosen whose abilities were above the averabe. Their character had to be good enough for this, as well. After they were selected these men were put together in special training courses, and had to study law at one of the universities. When they completed this law course and had trained with the administrative offices, such as the County Councillor, the Government President, and so forth, these men then passed their final State examination before the Main Testing Commissioner, in Berlin. They became assessors and started their careers in the Executive Service. Throughout this training they were called Candidates in the Executive Service.
Q.- They studied law like any other students at a German university?
A.- They had to matriculate and graduate from the university; they had to satisfactorily complete all the terms; they had to take part in lectures; they had to participate in seminars, and do every bit of it.
Q.- During that time, did they cease to work in their official capacity?
A.- During the time of the course, they were excused from their offices which they held, because they had been taken from all departments and during this time they belonged to Office I, and Office I looked after them.
Q.- When Fendler was a candidate for the Executive Staff just like the other candidates, in the summer of 1941, was he sent to Pretsch, on the Elbe River, and from there ordered to go to an Einsatzkommando, or did he volunteer to do this?
A.- The candidates for training for this Executive Staff, at the order of the Chief of the Security Police, in May 1941, owing to the lack of leaders at the time, were all given jobs and ordered to go to Pretsch. This was a military order and therefore nobody could volunteer, of course.
Q.- Were these candidates informed in Berlin as to the purpose of their job?
A.- No, they were not informed about this, and nobody could have done this because there was nobody who knew it himself.
Q.- Did the candidates have the opportunity to object to going to Pretsch?
A.- First of all, one could not object because that would have been military disobedience; and, secondly, there was no reason for it.
Q.- Were the candidates informed about all this in Pretsch, what tasks the Einsatzkommandos had and what their job were to be in the East?
A.- I cannot state in detail about this because I don't know about any such order, but I don't think so because if these candidates of the Executive Staff were given more detailed information this information would have reached the leaders in my command as well and they would have told me about it.
Q.- Did you meet Fendler in Russia during the assignment?
A.- No.
Q.- Do you know who was the Commander of Einsatzkommando IV-B?
A.- The Commander of Einsatzkommando IV-B was Oberregierungsrat Hermann. I know him very well personally because he was in charge of this training course and had also been at the officers' candidate school.
Q.- Can you tell me any more details about the attitude of Hermann in his office?
A.- Hermann was the typical German civil servant; very conscientious correct down to the last detail, sometimes even correct to such an extent that one could consider him pedantic.
Q.- Defendant Fendler states that Hermann, from the beginning of the assignment until September 1941, never was on leave and never left the Kommando for any other reason either. Do you know anything about this?
A.- I know this for the same reasons as I have said before. Hermann was in charge of the training course, this training course for the candidates of the Executive Staff, and I expected him to return to Berlin. When I returned to Berlin Hermann had not yet arrived, but he arrived a few days later so that I know that during the Russian Campaign he was not in Berlin.
Q.- How long did Fendler belong to the Executive Staff, and when did he complete his training?
A.- He belonged to one of the first selective training courses? If I remember correctly, it must have been in 1940. And he also was one of the first to pass the final examination. That was in the fall of 1943.
Q.- That should have been in August. Is that possible?
A.- Yes, that is quite possible.
Q.- Where was Fendler transferred to after that?
A.- When they finished their studies and when they had passed their assessor's examination, the candidates for the Executive Staff were sent back to the different departments of the Security Police, and according to the request and their ability they were trained in several branches. At the time, Fendler, was sent to Office VI.
Q.- What did they deal with there?
A.- Foreign Defense.
Q.- could a member of the SD or a candidate for the Executive Staff during the war leave the SD?
A.- Of course that was not possible because, according to orders, it had been prohibited. Heydrich considered any such request, tantamount to desertion.
Q.- Are you able to give your private opinion and your official opinion of the defendant Fendler?
A.- So many people passed through the Officers' Training School that I do not remember every one in detail, of course, and cannot judge them. But I think I can state briefly that Herr Fendler if he had not been perfect, officially; if his character had not been good, he would hat have been able to remain in the training course. I think that is the general judgment I can give.
DR. FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fendler): I have no further questions, Your Honor. During the examination of Schulz it was pointed out to me that the Interpreter once interpreted Executive Service rather than Leading Service. Might the word not be translated as Leading Service -- rather than Executive Service? The Prosecution pointed it out to me that that is the correct translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hochwald, do you agree that this correction is in order?
MR. HORLICH-HOCHWALD: I do think that the translation "Executive Service" for Leitender Dienst is much better an explanation than Leading Executive.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. Aschenauer (Attorney for the Defendant Ohlendorf):
Q: Witness, do I take it from the answer to one of the counsel's questions about the channel of the Fuehrer order and about the execution of certain people in Russia that you claim that in all cases it first went to the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe and then later to the Einsatzkommando leaders and not as it has been stated previously in Pretsch, to all Einsatzgruppen chiefs and to all Einsatzkommando chiefs?
A: I answered the question of Dr. Hoffmann the way I understood it. He asked me what thenormal channel was. I didn't know the say it was presented in Pretsch because I wasn't there. If the Deputy of the Chief of the Security Police presented this order before the Einsatzgruppe Chiefs and the Einsatzkommando chiefs, in such a case a repeated order to the Einsatzkommando leaders would be unnecessary.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Thank you. I have no further question.
DR. MAYER (Attorney for the Defendant Steimle): Your Honor, I ask that the Defendant Steimle be excused from court tomorrow, Tuesday and the next day, Wednesday, so that we can prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Steimle will be excused from attendance in court tomorrow, which is Tuesday, and Friday so that he may prepare his defense.
DR. MAYER: Wednesday, Your Honor, not Friday.
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry. Tuesday and Wednesday.
DR. MAYER: Thank you.
DR. HOFFMANN (Attorney for the Defendant Nosske): Your Honor, would you permit me another question to the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: We always permit you another question, Dr. Hoffmann.
BY DR. HOFFMANN (For Defendant Nosske):
Q: Witness, may I ask you, you were the leader of an Einsatzkommando?
A: Yes.
Q: To whom did you feel responsible about the order which you received, to the Fuehrer himself or to your Einsatzgruppe Chief?
A: First of all to my Einsatzgruppe Chief.
Q: And why?
A: That was my next superior to whom I had to report.
Q: Only to report?
A: Yes, I also got my directives from him and I have also said that I received my orders from my Einsatzgruppe Chief personally. The first one received in Lemberg, and the second one in Shitomir.
DR. HOFFMANN: Thank you. BY DR. KLINERT (Attorney for the Defendant Seibert):
Q: Witness, I have a few questions. In Document Book III-D, German text. page 83, Document No-2969, Exhibit 162 -- do you have this document? On the promotion sheet of Seibert among the experts of Amt I SS Brigadier General Schulz is mentioned. Are you SSBrigadier General Schulz?
A: Yes. Then I was Group Chief I-A.
Q: Do you make any claims about the correctness and completeness of these orders, or are there mistakes possible?
A: Yes, mistakes are possible.
Q: How are these mistakes to be explained?
A: Unfortunately, and I have regretted this several times, there are mistakes in filing. That is first of all because the various agencies did not keep their records up to date. Often it was the fault of the person himself, when he forgot to inform us about any changes which were important, but which did not seem important to him.