Q. What was the general attitude when the tasks of the unit were announced?
A. At first there was general silence. The speech was finished. We went into the different rooms. There little circles formed and in general the task was considered a necessary security measure while the News Agency and Information Service and the fighting of armed resistance of the forces mentioned were main items. No one could exactly picture what the task was which Streckenbach had explained in a few brief words. He had explained a great deal more about the soldierly behavior of the men of the Security Police, Who, together with the Wehrmacht Would march cut to the front. That was his main concern.
Q. what picture did you have, Herr Blobel,at the time, about your future task?
A. My personal opinion of this task was based on the fact, to be part of the Wehrmacht in a military commitment as a Security Police especially to secure the troops, and if these Einsatzgruppen were committed there had to be reasons which indicated danger. As opponents, there was the enemy counter Intelligence with all its branches, which we did not know as yet, but which had to be known by the Military counter-intelligence.
Q. At that time, could i you imagine at all that the security tasks given to you would conflict with general moral laws?
A. About the extent of the tasks of the Security Police, I could not imagine anything. I did not know the Eastern Territory until then. The generally valid laws of morals and law I considered to be our directives. Apart from that I imagined the Security Police tasks to be the same as I had seen in the work of the Security Police in The Reich, as I remembered during the franc fireurs partisans time from 1914 to 1918 during the first World War.
Q. At the time would you have had the possibility to leave your commitment("Einsatz") and resign?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I had been drafted under war law, to this particular task. A refusla would have caused a court-martial.
Q. Do you know any case that when the orders were given in Pretsch Schmiedeberg a leader asked that he be transferred?
A. I did not hear of any such case. I did not hear of that kind of thing.
Q. What would have been the consequences according to the laws at the time if one had refused to obey the order which had been given?
A. From that moment onwards, the man would have been given to the SS and Police court to be examined and the punishment inflicted by the police court was much stricter than that of the Army Courts-martial. The sentence was death for disloyalty.
Q. How was the task distributed in Pretsch?
A. The Einsatzgruppen A,B, C, D were formed.
Q. To which Einsatzgruppen were you appointed?
A. Einsatzgruppen B; after a few days it was altered into Einsatzgruppe C.
Q. Who was the chief of your Einsatzgruppe?
A. Dr. Rasche.
Q. How was the subdivision in Einsatzgruppe C which had previously been Einsatzgruppe B?
A. Einsatzgruppe C was subdivided into Sonderkommando 4a, Sonderkommando 4b, Einsatzkommando 5 and Einsatzkommando 6.
Q. Was there a difference between the Sonderkommandos and the Einsatzkommando concerning tasks ?
A. The Sonderkommandos were units subordinated directly to a Army unit, in particular officials of the STAPO and the KRIPO as interrogating officers, so to say as, a Secret Field Police and extension officers for the political secotr. The Einsatzkommandos on the other hand were directly subordinated to the Einsatzgruppen.
Q. I refer to the document submitted in Ohlendorf's cross-examination by the Prosecution , NOKW -256, Exhibit 174. It is the draft for an order the commitment of the Sonderkommandos and the Einsatzgruppen and it says on page 4 of the German copy: "The Sonderkommandos of the Security Polce (SD) carry out their tasks on h their responsibility." Witness, is this draft not in contradiction with the way it was carried out according to which the Sonderkommandos were subordinated to the Army?
A. Not at all. This document is a draft order, which obviously had nothing to do with the later Barbarossa Decree.
The fact is, in any case, that the Sonderkommandos immediately subordinate to an Army unit, as can be shown by my other explanations.
Q. Was there a difference between the Sonderkommandos and the Einsatzkommandos concerning the number of men?
A. The Sonderkommandos in contrast to theEinsatzkommandos were much smaller concerning the number of their men, approximately in a rate of one to four, at least of one to four.
Q. How strong was the SK 4A and how far was it set up? What were the subdivisions?
A. Sonderkommando 4a consisted of a commando Leader, 7 leaders, 45 subleaders, men, drivers, kitchen personnel, altogether a total of 1 7 45.
Q. Who were the leaders of your Kommando?
A. The leaders in the SK 4a were Criminal Officers and leaders from the SD: Jantzen, Hanf, Haefner, Karlson and Dr. Funk were candidates for the leading staff. Drafted as war emergencies and appointed as interpreters were Von Radetsky and Mueller.
Q. Were they commanded for a special purpose?
A. The drafting to the Einsatzgruppe was considered a military commitment.
Q. For Now long did your appointment last?
A. The time of the committment meant for a definite period of time, which, however was not fixed according to which the course was to be carried on.
Q. When did the SK 4a leave Pretsch and where did it go to next?
Court2A Case 9
A. Gruppe C, that is, the previous Gruppe B, as well as SK 4-a, marched in the surly morning hours of 23 June 1941 from Pretsch via Liegnitz and Gleiwitz, to Cracow.
Q. What orders did you get there?
A. On the 25th of June 1941, in Cracow, I received the order to march SK 4a to the AOK 6 headquarters, and that I should report to the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, General Field Marshal Von Reichenau.
Q. Witness, please describe further events, particularly the occurrence when you reported to the AOK-6.
A. The SK 4-a marched via Sandormirsz, Samos (?) to the headquarters to the AOK 6 near the river Bug . On the 26th of June 1941 together with the leader , I reported to the Commander-in-Chief , General Field marshal Von Reichenau, in the afternoon. The Field Marshal ordered me to a discussion. Also the following people were oredered to take part: The Chief of Staff, the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Department 1-C; a colonel, Major Palzow, officer in the Department C; and another major of the staff, Altogether, the Field Marshal and five officers and myself, and a leader of mine. The Field Marshal who was walking about in the park in his bathing suit turned to me with the following words: "Please excuse my dress. I have just returned from the front. I expected you already for three days , together with your commando." I told the Field Marshal that three days ago we had set off. The Field marshal said, "I am glad you are here there is your Commando stationed , - and how many men do you have," I told him how many ,1:7:45, the Commando was still approaching.
Q. Please describe the discussion with Field Marshal von Reichenau.
A. It follows now the discussion, with almost verbal extractions: "The Field marshal: Herr Major Palzow, please give me the map and the order which concerns the Commando." The Field Marshal to the officers of the staff:" Gentlemen, please hold the map. About the position:
We are here, we are there, and there." And the Field Marshal pointed out on the map the position of the front." And according to the reports received by the divisions in these areas," -- and he indicated these places on the map," armed civilians have been met who have done us a lot of harm." And he said to 1-C, "Please, Colonel submit today's report." Then he continued: "According to the situation, the Commando will be sub-divided into three sub-divisions, and subordinated to the commanders in chief of the Division. The army order, please." Herr Major Palzow, who had the order in his hand, showed a page in the text to the Field Marshal, The entire order consisted of about ten to twelve pages. The contents of the order were: announcing the individual units , out of which the army was set up, and also troop units which had been ordered to the combat area of the Sixth Army. The next paragraph dealt with the commitment of the Commando of the Security Police, and their tasks . I heard there about the same assignment of tasks , how they were announced by Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach at Pretsch. The contents were approximately as follows: PKH. A file number. Top Secret matter. Date, July .1941. And the contents were approximately ...: "Since it is to be expected that the advance of the units is hindered by the many political groups of the opponent, the commanders in their territory are given detachments of the Security Police of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The task of these commandos deals with the Security Police activity concerning political opponents and the absolute elimination of all elements and Jews, insofar as they endanger the security of the units. The commandos will give instructions as required to the units subordinate to them, " Then some more followed, which I don't remember exactly. I told the Field Marshal that the Commando, according to the commitment order Barbarossa -- this order which had been handed to me by Dr. Rasch in Cracow -- that the Commando, of the Rear Army territory with view to marching routine - was subordinate to him. The Field Marshal give the order that concerning the technicalities of the actual marching and the supplies, and concerning the task it be directly and immediately subordinateto AOK 6, and should only be used in the fighting area.
The Chief of Staff received the order to inform the Commander of the Rear Army territory, and also the Division Commanders about the commitment of Commando 4-a. The Chief of Staff ordered the 1-C to carry out such an order at once. A copy of this order was received by the Commando the following day. The contents of this order was approximately the following: "AOK 6, Department C, the SD 4-a, of the Security Police of the Reichsfuehrer SS, are subordinate to AOK 6 , Department C with regard to factual concern with the task to carry out Security Police measures on political events endangering the security of the troops. The Commando is to be supported in every respect. " And then the stamp of the AOK 6, and the signature. Another copy of this order was given to the leaders of the later Teilkommandos - subcommandos. The Field Marshal instructed all officers of the staff who were present to support the commando in every respect. I was given the order to advance the Commando as quickly as possibly. Maps were handed out; march routes were fixed; news service and reports from the Division were discussed. The Field Marshal gave orders current personal reporting to him or the chief of staff, or rather, to 1-C. A permanent liaison officer was appointed, and the utilization of material which had been captured by 1-C and the Ukrainian Special department which was attached.
Commander-in-Chief of AOK-6? the 1-C of the AOK 6 with the duty to report to Field Marshal von Reichenau and to supply a permanent liaison officer, as to the marching route, and the supplies, it was attached to AOK-6, it was ordered to be in the fighting area.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I believe this is a suitable moment to introduce the document Blobel No. 1, as Exhibit No. 1. This is the first document in Document Book Blobel No. 1. It is a plan with the title: "Division and Subordination of Sonderkommando 4-a on the 28th of June 1941." yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, it concerns the first photostatic plan in the book. It is called, "Division and Subordination of Sonderkommando 4-a on the 28th of June 1941."
Q (By Dr. Heim) Witness, please explain to the Tribunal, briefly, the sketch made by you. dotted lines show the relation concerning the information service among the units. In the middle of the sketch you see AOK 6, to which Staff Department C under Field Marshal von Reichenau belonged. As the plan shows, this Department C was a Special Ukrainian Department. This special department was connected with the former Ukrainian Colonel Brisancz, and exchanged news and information with him. Brisancz himself was in the military counter-intelligence. On the right side of Department C you see the liaison officer of Sonderkommando 4-a, put in who was attached to Department C of AOK 6.
THE PRESIDENT: May I say to the interpreter that the designation on the chart, in English, is "Section C". I presume that when you are say ing Department C you are referring to the same block which is here indicated as Section C. And if that be true I would suggest the use of Section C to avoid any confusion when the record is read and compared with the chart.
INTERPRETER: Thank you, your Honor. BY DR. HEIM
A The full lines indicate about the Section 1-C. The orders were sent immediately to the offices of SK 4a; also direct to the Teilkommandos of SK 4a with the divisions, In the latter case, the orders were sent through 1-C of AOK 6 to the competent 1-C -
THE PRESIDENT: Does any one know what the equivalent in the English language is of 1-C? What the equivalent would be in the American Army?
MR. WALTON: Your Honor, please, that would be the G-2, or Intelligence -- Chief of intelligence.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Very well. Thank you very much, Mr. Walton. BY DR. HEIM: the competent 1-C of the Intelligence Section of the Army unit, and from there to the Teilkommando. Information, but not orders, were sent from the Teilkommando to the office in the same manner. Or through courier. As the dotted line indicates, between the Teilkommandos and SK 4-a and the orderly room. In the upper part of the chart the subordination of AOK under the Army Group South is shown. Between the Army Group and AOK 6, the Higher SS and Police leader with his staff acted as intermediary. As the line of the Higher SS and Police Leader to Einsatzgruppe C shows, the Higher SS and Police Leader had the right to give instructions to the Chief of Einsatzgruppe C. Between Einsatzgruppe C and SK 4a there is a full line missing because orders by the Einsatzgruppe C were sent via the liaison officer with AOK 6 to SK 4a, to the orderly room. The SK 4a, therefore, was subordinate immediately to the AOK 6, and also to Einsatzgruppe C. On the way, orders were given via AOK 6. An immediate connection with Einsatzgruppe C existed temporarily between the Ukrainian interpreters inasfar as they could meet within movements of the units about.
This is indicated by the dotted line between the interpreter unit of Einsatzgruppe C and the interpreters of SK 4-a, The interpreter of Einsatzgruppe C were mostly Ukrainian emigrants -- politically it belonged to Colonel Brisancz and had been connected with him during the war 1914-1918. by Field Marshal Von Reichenau? breaking unit. Also, personnel was appointed for the orderly room. This can be seen in the chart discussed just now.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, may I point out that the three Teilkommandos are entered at the bottom of the sketch, and on the same level the safebreaking division. Below the little sections, the strength of the individual commands are mentioned.
Q (By Dr. Heim) What tasks did the Teilkommandos have?
A The Teilkommandos: Security Police work -- that is, finding and seizing of the opponent's document material, interrogations of persons, filing of documents concerning certain events were part of the security task. Also, participation in the carrying out of executions. were to be carried out by the Teilkommandos?
A No, I was not entitled to this. The Commander-in-Chief did decide about this. Or rather, the Commander of the Army unit in whose territory the Teilkommandos were committed.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Heim, may we suspend now?
DR. HEIM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed. BY DR. HEIM: sub commandos. How high was the strength of a Teilkommando normally? command.
Q That would have been twenty? commissioned men and officials and two to three drivers. On the Chart I have just described you can see this strength regulation.
Q What was the task of the Constant Liaison Officer in the AOK/6?
A The Constant Liaison Officer had to transmit the orders of AOK/6 to the Teilkommandos and had to transmit also reports of the Teilkommandos to AOk/6 via I/C. He also had to inform the orderly room and the office about reports with regard to changes of the location of the Teilkommandos, and on measures issued and directives issued by the Supreme Commander. The location reports of the Teilkommandos were sent to Group C via the AOK/6 by radio, and during the first period they did net arrive because the group had a different code key which was not known to us. troop?
A We didn't have any radio installation.
Q where were you, Witness, usually, where were you yourself? SK-4-A, in the registrar's office. to the SK-4-A itself? the I/C commanders of the division and were in constant exchange of news with the units which were part of the division. There they received direct orders from the AOK/6, and these orders were channeled through the SK-4-A according to the situation.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. Dr. Heim, the reference to a division, is that to an Army division?
Q (By Dr. Heim) Witness, the Bench would like to know whether the reference to a division actually refers to a division of the Army? security division in the territory itself.
Q Was this division under the Armed forces command?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q (By Dr. Heim) Was there any connection between the Teilkommandos and the remainders of SK-4-A?
A Namely the remainder of the SK-4-A consisted of the registrar's office and the food supply office. As long as the Teilkommandos were in the direct vicinity of the remainder of the SK-4-A, that is the orderly room, they had a possibility to contact them by courier, but there was no radio or other means of communication at the disposal of the command. The Teilkommandos via the I/C of the AOK/6 and further on via the I/C of the division could be contacted. During the advance, there was no possibility at all of a contact with the orderly room because of the distances. Also the bad roads hampered these communications considerably. The battle area had a part in it and also the actual situation of the fighting itself. as the situation arose?
A The Teilkommandos were formed as the situation arose. They were not a permanent unit. The changes made in the distribution are shown by the charts after all, and during my testimony I will refer to them again. the SK-4-A, taking especially into consideration your own personal position? In what area of the AOK/6 did the SK-4-A exert its activities?
A In the battle area of the A OK/6.
Q Well, what do you call the battle area? forty Km large which extends to the backward area, but once in a while that would go further in the rear even.
Q What activities did the SK-4-A normally exercise in this area? as well by the Army as by the civilian agencies. Furthermore the checking of elements by which the troop had suffered damage while they were advancing, either snipers or saboteurs or attacks by civilians, and so on and so forth, or by persons not belonging to the uniformed battle units. Furthermore, it was a task of the SK-4-A to make use of the record documents as far as Security Police measures were concerned, and in this connection the SK-4-A had also the duty of sorting out the documents, the documents first of all which pertained directly to military matters, that is within the scope of the AOK/6, and such documents as were to be transferred to the RSHA. Furthermore the SK-4-A was in charge of investigation and search for persons which had made the troops suffer damage, and furthermore they had to search for political activists, saboteurs and suspected elements who had taken part in activities against the troops. Search was also carried out on the part of search lists, and these search lists given to the SK were in line with those used by the killed troops when they reached into Germany. The SK-4 had to search for the persons. The further task of the SK-4 was to interrogate these persons, to establish the facts, and on that occasion the Production of the files and the drawing up of the files was done by the interrogators. Q Witness, what was the Security Police task? That was the Security Police Task of SK-4-A, but I want the properly speaking SD tasks, for instance, reporting on the occupied areas and so on and so forth.
A Yes, that was connected with it. That was the task of the interpreters of the chiefs of Subkrumandos.
rather deal with the Security Police tasks of the SK's. A while ago you stated that it was a task of the SK-4-A to interrogate persons. What happened, with these persons once they had been interrogated, that is usually? Kommandanturs or of units of the Armed Forces. Once they had been interrogated, the files and documents were submitted to the AOK/6. During the first period I did that personally most of the time, that is, I submitted them to the Supreme Commander, personally. The other files which had been drawn up at the divisional quarters were brought to the Army Commander by the competent command chief who was responsible and had proper Police training, and he submitted it either to the Supreme Commander or to the I/C in charge. In cases of which I personally know, the Supreme Commander, on the strength of the Fuehrer order, ordered the executions when the files were submitted and when he saw that there had been violation of international law and of the customs of war established beyond doubt in these files. you make any suggestions to him concerning executions?
A No, I wasn't even in a position to do so because I didn't have the proper police and legal training. Therefore, I didn't interfere in the interrogations either, because I never dealt with things like that. files to the Supreme Commander in AOK/6? established in the files they were immediately released, but that happened already with the units before the files were even submitted to the AOK/6. these crimes where it was not found out they were not guilty?
A The OAOK/6 ordered the execution of all such persons for which the files established that they had violated the customs of war and the international legal prescriptions.
Q Who actually carried out these executions? the Army units involved, on the strength of the order issued by the Supreme Commander of the AOK/6. issued by the Supreme Commander? orderly room of the SK-4-A, and from these files I gathered knowledge concerning their contents, in as far as it was in German and I could read it. In the cases where larger circles of persons were involved there were names, lists in the files, with so-called final reports. These lists were attached to the files. out by the AOK/6? of files submitted to him, discussed the matters with the legal officer of the AOK/6, checked them and then made his own decision. In the divisional headquarters the SK leader had to submit the files to the I-C officer, and this I-C of the divisional headquarters discussed them again with the I-C of the AOK/6. the AOK/6? of the armed forces or that they had done sniper activities or other atrocities, furthermore, persons convicted of espionage or sabotage, also civilians who, contrary to the directives, were in the possession of arms, and also for participation in and abetting of such violations. For all these activities public posters had to be posted up by the AOK Commander, by which the population was informed that these crimes were liable of capital punishment.
Q Didn't you have any misgivings at the time that these orders ordering executions were contrary to the international law and that carrying them out you could make yourself punishable? law, especially as the Russian adversary did not consider himself bound to the customs of war and to the international law. Furthermore, these shootings were not coarried out in any arbitrary manner. On the contrary, in line with the international law in force at that time, every case was individually checked and only on the strength of this examination the decisions were made. Even today I am of the opinion that this procedure was quite in line with international law. AOK/6 concerning the carrying out of the executions as ordered? discipline for the executions, which could only be carried out in a military court martial manner. He ordered that a shooting command was to be formed, that there should be two rifles always for every person to be executed, that the command should be conducted in accordance with military rules. That pistols or a shot in the neck be used as the Russians did, was prohibited in the most severe manner in accordance with the regulations dealt out by the Supreme Command. The details of the execution were fixed by the Supreme Commander, and instead of the five rifles per person as was ordered by a military commander for the execution of a German convicted it was lowered to two rifles per person only. carry them out in exactly the same way as they had been issued by the Supreme commander?
mentioned. Reichenau towards the tasks of the Security Police as you have just referred to them? and more specifically by the reports given to him by the I-C and the special detachment of Ukrainians, was very well informed concerning all the developments and concerning the activities of political groups, sabotage units and attacks against the troop, enemy propaganda, and in the interests of the security of the troops the Supreme Commander, of course, made it a very strong point to eliminate these circles and to prevent these incidents. At all times Von Reichenau stressed the most intense persecution and immediately carried out the punishments publicly posted up for such crimes. With regards to that the Supreme Commander in his daily orders had informed all the officers and soldiers of regulations of conduct of a very positive nature. One of these orders was so stringent that I still remember it. The wording was, "To all officers of my staff and to all officers and enlisted men under my command: I prohibit for all officers and soldiers not members of a commando carrying out these orders that they stand around as spectators and loiterers" - and this word (loiterers ' was so stringent "when the commando carry out their difficult tasks and thus prevent them from doing them properly". The wording went on to say that even every officer that loitered around the executions as a spectator would be put in that category.
4a? to be directed? investigation either directly or via the I-C files which were kept and contained the whole command, were submitted to him by the sub-commands via the I-C of the division to I-C of AOK6. The local reports of the sub-commander had to be sent to Group C and in regular intervals a report on the activity of the Kommando had to be given also. Furthermore, the enemy espionage material had to be secured for AOK 6. The connection with Group C was only possible via Army radioo because we had no radio installations of our own. Furthermore, the Supreme Commander requested reports concerning the condition of the territories in the Ukrainian area. In the same way, such reports were made for Group C. Every commander had to make a report also on the situation.
Q Who in your command had been appointed for this reporting? and also the SKD Sub-Kommando leaders. SD 4a done? situation in their area and also about the exploitation of documents they had captured; enemy documents which were meant for the RSHA and requested by this office were transferred to Group C via the orderly room. Reports on the activities were collected by the Liaison commander in the AOK 6. according to the report of the headquarters of the OAK 6.
sub-kommando, the safe blasting command, was ordered to go to Luck. on page 79 of the German text. There we have Document No-2938, and it is Exhibit 44 of the prosecution.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: On Page 76 you can follow it in the English. 1,854 by the SK 4a. Witness, is this list correct?
A The documents can lead into a misunderstanding. The figures are wrong.
Q And how far are the figures wrong? forces and of the police took a considerable part in the executions.
Q What sub-kommando was ordered to Sokol? a sub-kommand under the command of Hanf. The strength was one leader and six men and three drivers.
Q On whose request was the assignment made?
Q What persons were involved when the measures were carried out? by the armed forces as snipers, as participants in attacks against the armed forces, persons, who at the very beginning of the assignment had formed guerilla groups.
Q Who had ordered the executions referred to in the document?
Q Did you direct all these executions yourself? 30 each. The others were carried out by units of the armed forces and by the Ukrainian local Security Detachment in the Sokol area. As our personnel strength was very low, the SK 4a, that is, the sub-commands attached to it, as a rule would not have been in a position to carry all these executions in so short a time, as they are listed in this report.
In the Sokal area, 6 or 7 localities were involved in these executions. did the Commander in Chief decide to issue these orders? day in the Sokal area by snipers and attacks in the dark. The bodies were mutilated in a most horrible way. I personally even saw that five German soldiers, shot in the back, had their backs slit on an iron gate and one morning they were found like that. From further reports, I also remember that Pro-German Ukrainians were killed by terror groups by being put alive into boiling water and when the German troops marched in a few hours later, they found these people partly living. Those were a few occurrences picked out of the many reports which we received at Sokol.
Q Were you morally depressed in some way by these occurrences? these occurrences because the most primitive people only did such things and, therefore, I considered the measures for the punishment of these criminals completely justified.
Q What kommando was dispatched to Luck?
AA sub-kommando of which Dr. Funk and Jantzen were in charge was dispatched to Luck, six men, and three drivers, and also the safe blasting command, in charge of which was von Radetsky.
Q On whose orders was this distribution made? Chief of the OAK 6. Luck? put on the march to Luck, and also the safe blasting command.