THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT:Proceed. BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, before the recess we had stopped at the part commands, sub commandos. How high was the strength of a Teilkommando normally?
A ATeilkommando should have reached the strength of half the usual command.
QThat would have been twenty?
AIn reality, however, there were one or two leaders, six noncommissioned men and officials and two to three drivers. On the Chart I have just described you can see this strength regulation.
QWhat was the task of the Constant Liaison Officer in the AOK/6?
AThe Constant Liaison Officer had to transmit the orders of AOK/6 to the Teilkommandos and had to transmit also reports of the Teilkommandos to AOk/6 via I/C. He also had to inform the orderly room and the office about reports with regard to changes of the location of the Teilkommandos, and on measures issued and directives issued by the Supreme Commander. The location reports of the Teilkommandos were sent to Group C via the AOK/6 by radio, and during the first period they did net arrive because the group had a different code key which was not known to us.
QWhy had the SK-4-A not an independent radio connection with the troop?
AWe didn't have any radio installation.
Q where were you, Witness, usually, where were you yourself?
AUsually I was with the SK-4-A, that is with the remaineder of the SK-4-A, in the registrar's office.
QHow was the positionof the individual sub-commands of the SK-4-A to the SK-4-A itself?
AThe Teilkommandos in their field of tasks had been attacked to the I/C commanders of the division and were in constant exchange of news with the units which were part of the division. There they received direct orders from the AOK/6, and these orders were channeled through the SK-4-A according to the situation.
THE PRESIDENT:Pardon me. Dr. Heim, the reference to a division, is that to an Army division?
Q (By Dr. Heim) Witness, the Bench would like to know whether the reference to a division actually refers to a division of the Army?
AYes, I am referring to an Army division in the front line or a security division in the territory itself.
QWas this division under the Armed forces command?
AYes, it was a division under the Armed forces command.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well.
Q (By Dr. Heim) Was there any connection between the Teilkommandos and the remainders of SK-4-A?
ANamely the remainder of the SK-4-A consisted of the registrar's office and the food supply office. As long as the Teilkommandos were in the direct vicinity of the remainder of the SK-4-A, that is the orderly room, they had a possibility to contact them by courier, but there was no radio or other means of communication at the disposal of the command. The Teilkommandos via the I/C of the AOK/6 and further on via the I/C of the division could be contacted. During the advance, there was no possibility at all of a contact with the orderly room because of the distances. Also the bad roads hampered these communications considerably. The battle area had a part in it and also the actual situation of the fighting itself.
QWere the Teilkommandos a permanent unit or were they only formed as the situation arose?
AThe Teilkommandos were formed as the situation arose. They were not a permanent unit. The changes made in the distribution are shown by the charts after all, and during my testimony I will refer to them again.
QWitness, will you please describe the average normal activity of the SK-4-A, taking especially into consideration your own personal position? In what area of the AOK/6 did the SK-4-A exert its activities?
AIn the battle area of the AOK/6.
QWell, what do you call the battle area?
AThe battle area seen from the front line is a range of thirty to forty Km large which extends to the backward area, but once in a while that would go further in the rear even.
QWhat activities did the SK-4-A normally exercise in this area?
AFirst of all seizure of the documents of the Bolshevist agencies, as well by the Army as by the civilian agencies. Furthermore the checking of elements by which the troop had suffered damage while they were advancing, either snipers or saboteurs or attacks by civilians, and so on and so forth, or by persons not belonging to the uniformed battle units. Furthermore, it was a task of the SK-4-A to make use of the record documents as far as Security Police measures were concerned, and in this connection the SK-4-A had also the duty of sorting out the documents, the documents first of all which pertained directly to military matters, that is within the scope of the AOK/6, and such documents as were to be transferred to the RSHA. Furthermore the SK-4-A was in charge of investigation and search for persons which had made the troops suffer damage, and furthermore they had to search for political activists, saboteurs and suspected elements who had taken part in activities against the troops. Search was also carried out on the part of search lists, and these search lists given to the SK were in line with those used by the killed troops when they reached into Germany. The SK-4 had to search for the persons. The further task of the SK-4 was to interrogate these persons, to establish the facts, and on that occasion the Production of the files and the drawing up of the files was done by the interrogators. Q Witness, what was the Security Police task? That was the Security Police Task of SK-4-A, but I want the properly speaking SD tasks, for instance, reporting on the occupied areas and so on and so forth.
AYes, that was connected with it. That was the task of the interpreters of the chiefs of Subkrumandos.
QWitness, that was not so much your task, and that is why we would rather deal with the Security Police tasks of the SK's. A while ago you stated that it was a task of the SK-4-A to interrogate persons. What happened, with these persons once they had been interrogated, that is usually?
AMost of the time, these persons were in the custody of the local Kommandanturs or of units of the Armed Forces. Once they had been interrogated, the files and documents were submitted to the AOK/6. During the first period I did that personally most of the time, that is, I submitted them to the Supreme Commander, personally. The other files which had been drawn up at the divisional quarters were brought to the Army Commander by the competent command chief who was responsible and had proper Police training, and he submitted it either to the Supreme Commander or to the I/C in charge. In cases of which I personally know, the Supreme Commander, on the strength of the Fuehrer order, ordered the executions when the files were submitted and when he saw that there had been violation of international law and of the customs of war established beyond doubt in these files.
QWhen these files were submitted to the Supreme Commander, did you make any suggestions to him concerning executions?
ANo, I wasn't even in a position to do so because I didn't have the proper police and legal training. Therefore, I didn't interfere in the interrogations either, because I never dealt with things like that.
QNow, what happened to persons concerning whom you submitted the files to the Supreme Commander in AOK/6?
AInsofar as these persons were not connected with the crimes established in the files they were immediately released, but that happened already with the units before the files were even submitted to the AOK/6.
QWhat happened to the persons where they were connected with these crimes where it was not found out they were not guilty?
AThe OAOK/6 ordered the execution of all such persons for which the files established that they had violated the customs of war and the international legal prescriptions.
QWho actually carried out these executions?
AThe executions were carried out by members of the SK-4-A and by the Army units involved, on the strength of the order issued by the Supreme Commander of the AOK/6.
QDid you know what facts ware at the base of the order for execution issued by the Supreme Commander?
ADuring the first period of the assignment we had files in the orderly room of the SK-4-A, and from these files I gathered knowledge concerning their contents, in as far as it was in German and I could read it. In the cases where larger circles of persons were involved there were names, lists in the files, with so-called final reports. These lists were attached to the files.
QDo you remember any details concerning the checking procedure carried out by the AOK/6?
AI know that in Sokal the Supreme Commander himself, on the strength of files submitted to him, discussed the matters with the legal officer of the AOK/6, checked them and then made his own decision. In the divisional headquarters the SK leader had to submit the files to the I-C officer, and this I-C of the divisional headquarters discussed them again with the I-C of the AOK/6.
QCan you tell me what persons in general were shot on the orders of the AOK/6?
A Civilians of whom it had been proved that they had attacked members of the armed forces or that they had done sniper activities or other atrocities, furthermore, persons convicted of espionage or sabotage, also civilians who, contrary to the directives, were in the possession of arms, and also for participation in and abetting of such violations. For all these activities public posters had to be posted up by the AOK Commander, by which the population was informed that these crimes were liable of capital punishment.
QDidn't you have any misgivings at the time that these orders ordering executions were contrary to the international law and that carrying them out you could make yourself punishable?
ANo, I considered that a mere measure of punishment admissible under law, especially as the Russian adversary did not consider himself bound to the customs of war and to the international law. Furthermore, these shootings were not coarried out in any arbitrary manner. On the contrary, in line with the international law in force at that time, every case was individually checked and only on the strength of this examination the decisions were made. Even today I am of the opinion that this procedure was quite in line with international law.
QDid you receive special directives from the Supreme Commander of AOK/6 concerning the carrying out of the executions as ordered?
AThe Supreme Commander during each talk stressed the strongest discipline for the executions, which could only be carried out in a military court martial manner. He ordered that a shooting command was to be formed, that there should be two rifles always for every person to be executed, that the command should be conducted in accordance with military rules. That pistols or a shot in the neck be used as the Russians did, was prohibited in the most severe manner in accordance with the regulations dealt out by the Supreme Command. The details of the execution were fixed by the Supreme Commander, and instead of the five rifles per person as was ordered by a military commander for the execution of a German convicted it was lowered to two rifles per person only.
QThese directives, did you carry them out or did the commanders carry them out in exactly the same way as they had been issued by the Supreme commander?
AThey were carried out as they had been ordered and as I have just mentioned.
QWhat can you personally tell us concerning the attitude of Von Reichenau towards the tasks of the Security Police as you have just referred to them?
AThe field Marshal, by the reports of the units under his command and more specifically by the reports given to him by the I-C and the special detachment of Ukrainians, was very well informed concerning all the developments and concerning the activities of political groups, sabotage units and attacks against the troop, enemy propaganda, and in the interests of the security of the troops the Supreme Commander, of course, made it a very strong point to eliminate these circles and to prevent these incidents. At all times Von Reichenau stressed the most intense persecution and immediately carried out the punishments publicly posted up for such crimes. With regards to that the Supreme Commander in his daily orders had informed all the officers and soldiers of regulations of conduct of a very positive nature. One of these orders was so stringent that I still remember it. The wording was, "To all officers of my staff and to all officers and enlisted men under my command: I prohibit for all officers and soldiers not members of a commando carrying out these orders that they stand around as spectators and loiterers" - and this word (loiterers ' was so stringent "when the commando carry out their difficult tasks and thus prevent them from doing them properly". The wording went on to say that even every officer that loitered around the executions as a spectator would be put in that category.
QDid you have to make reports concerning the activity of the SK 4a?
AYes.
QWhat was the contents of these reports and where did they have to be directed?
AThe Supreme Commander had to receive reports concerning the investigation either directly or via the I-C files which were kept and contained the whole command, were submitted to him by the sub-commands via the I-C of the division to I-C of AOK6. The local reports of the sub-commander had to be sent to Group C and in regular intervals a report on the activity of the Kommando had to be given also. Furthermore, the enemy espionage material had to be secured for AOK 6. The connection with Group C was only possible via Army radioo because we had no radio installations of our own. Furthermore, the Supreme Commander requested reports concerning the condition of the territories in the Ukrainian area. In the same way, such reports were made for Group C. Every commander had to make a report also on the situation.
QWho in your command had been appointed for this reporting?
AThe reports were made by the interpreters, Radetzky and Mueller and also the SKD Sub-Kommando leaders.
QHow was the reporting for the individual sub-kommandos of the SD 4a done?
AThe chiefs of the sub-kommandos had to report about the situation in their area and also about the exploitation of documents they had captured; enemy documents which were meant for the RSHA and requested by this office were transferred to Group C via the orderly room. Reports on the activities were collected by the Liaison commander in the AOK 6.
QHow did the assignment of the various sub-kommandos come about according to the report of the headquarters of the OAK 6.
ATwo sub-kommandos were assigned to the Sokal area and one sub-kommando, the safe blasting command, was ordered to go to Luck.
QI am referring now to Document Book II-a of the Prosecution on page 79 of the German text. There we have Document No-2938, and it is Exhibit 44 of the prosecution.
MR.HORLICK-HOCHWALD: On Page 76 you can follow it in the English.
QIn this document reference is made to the scooting of a total of 1,854 by the SK 4a. Witness, is this list correct?
AThe documents can lead into a misunderstanding. The figures are wrong.
QAnd how far are the figures wrong?
AThe document stresses specifically that units of the armed forces and of the police took a considerable part in the executions.
QWhat sub-kommando was ordered to Sokol?
AA sub-kommando commanded by Carlsen was ordered to Sokol and a sub-kommand under the command of Hanf. The strength was one leader and six men and three drivers.
QOn whose request was the assignment made?
AOn the orders of the Sonderkommando commander of the OAK 6.
QWhat persons were involved when the measures were carried out?
AThose were persons who in their majority had been arrested by the armed forces as snipers, as participants in attacks against the armed forces, persons, who at the very beginning of the assignment had formed guerilla groups.
QWho had ordered the executions referred to in the document?
AThose executions had been ordered by the AOK 6.
QDid you direct all these executions yourself?
ANoo for instance, in Sokol, there were two executions of about 30 each. The others were carried out by units of the armed forces and by the Ukrainian local Security Detachment in the Sokol area. As our personnel strength was very low, the SK 4a, that is, the sub-commands attached to it, as a rule would not have been in a position to carry all these executions in so short a time, as they are listed in this report.
In the Sokal area, 6 or 7 localities were involved in these executions.
QOn the strength of what occurrences according to your knowledge, did the Commander in Chief decide to issue these orders?
ADuring that period the armed forces had 10 to 15 deaths per day in the Sokal area by snipers and attacks in the dark. The bodies were mutilated in a most horrible way. I personally even saw that five German soldiers, shot in the back, had their backs slit on an iron gate and one morning they were found like that. From further reports, I also remember that Pro-German Ukrainians were killed by terror groups by being put alive into boiling water and when the German troops marched in a few hours later, they found these people partly living. Those were a few occurrences picked out of the many reports which we received at Sokol.
QWere you morally depressed in some way by these occurrences?
AI only had a disgust for such enemies when I heard about these occurrences because the most primitive people only did such things and, therefore, I considered the measures for the punishment of these criminals completely justified.
QWhat kommando was dispatched to Luck?
AA sub-kommando of which Dr. Funk and Jantzen were in charge was dispatched to Luck, six men, and three drivers, and also the safe blasting command, in charge of which was von Radetsky.
QOn whose orders was this distribution made?
AThese measures were taken on the orders of the Commander in Chief of the OAK 6.
QAt what time were these sub-kommandos assigned to Sokal and Luck?
AThat was the 28th of June, 1941, when the sub-Kommando was put on the march to Luck, and also the safe blasting command.
QDuring that period where was the remainder of the command, SK 4a and what was the strength of this remainder?
AThe remainder of the command, namely, myself and the interpreter, Mueller, and 7 men in the orderly room remained in Sokal.
QWas another command of the SK 4a active in Hracow?
AHracow was part of the area of the sub-command in the Sokal area.
QWhat was the situation, more specifically, about the retaliation measures referred to in the document we have mentioned, namely, the shooting of 1,160, plus 300, plus 20 Jews in Luck?
AAccording to the reports, knowledge of which I received later on-
THE PRESIDENT:What page?
MR.HORLICK-HOCHWALD: Page 81, second paragraph from the top.
A (Continued) According to the reports we had received later, atrocities had been committed while German troops marched
QWitness, will you please start again with your answer?
AAccording to the reports which came to my knowledge at a later stage, atrocities of the Russians had been found out when the German troops marched into Luck. Four German pilots had been split up alive with oxygen welding machines. 2,000 Ukrainians, about 2,000, had been shot in the jails, and a few of then were still alive. A retaliation measure was ordered by the Commander in Chief of the OAK 6, Field Marshal von Reichenau; under the leaders of the Higher SS and Police Leaders or by a plenipotentiary of that Higher SS and Police Leader, it was carried out.
QDid you attend the carrying out of the retaliation measures ordered by the Commander in Chief?
ANo.
QWere you competent and responsible for the carrying out of such a measure?
ANo.
QYou did your part that the Security Police and the Armed Forces be called in?
ANoo not even that.
QOn whose directive was this measure carried out then?
AOn the directives of the Commander in Chief of the AOK 6, in agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln.
QWhen did you have knowledge of these developments for the first time?
AIn August, 1941, the beginning of August. I should say.
QNow what was you next aim on the march?
AOur next aim on the march was Luck.
QWhen did you reach Luck.
AOn the same day; that was the 7th or 8th of July, 1941. It must have been one of those two days.
QThe retaliation measures which had been ordered and which I have just mentioned, were they already carried out when you arrived at Luck?
ANo.
QDid you aim in Luck?
ANo.
QWhy not?
AI had fallen ill alrady in Sokal and when we arrived at Luck I was in bed with a high fever. A staff physician ordered that I be transferred to the hospital during the same night, because I was suspected of having contracted typhoid fever and a nervous breakdown. I was transported to Lublin and put in quarantine.
QHow long were you in quarantine in Lublin in the hospital there?
AThe whole month of July, 1941.
QWitness, when did you come back to the command?
AThe beginning of August, 1941.
QWhere was the SK 4a during that period?
AAt Shitomir.
QWho was in charge of the SK 4a in your absence?
AThe Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer in charge of the SK 4a and who was Liaison Commander with the Higher SS and Police Leaders and for the Group C. He had been assigned and he was with the Higher SS and Police Leaders at Luck. The Group C had Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Baier, who had been sent to the SK.
QWhen you returned to SK 4a, did that cause any changes, and, if soo what kind of changes?
AThe orderly room of the SK 4a had orders to remain at the location of the Einsatzgruppe C. The official exchange of orders with the AOK 6 was taken over by the Group Staff. Radetzky personally remained in contact with the Department Economy of the AOK 6 for reasons of reporting. The Liaison Commander Haefner received the assignment to report on negotitations with regard to the Ukrainian question. to remain in contact with the AOK 6 or with the 29th Army Group, which was under the command of the AOK 6. The sub-kommandos were attached to the front line divisions toward the north and towards the southeast; the orderly room remained at Shitomir.
QIn what did the fact that the Einsatzgruppe C and SK 4a had the same location result?
AA direct contact of the orderly room of the SK 4a to the AOK 6 did not exist any longer, because the Group C wanted to avoid a duplication at the same location and, therefore, they had prohibited all direct contact of the SK 4a with the AOK 6. Einsatzgruppe C from that moment onward was responsible to the AOK 6 for the affairs of the SK 4a.
QWhat other changes could you tell us, apart from that?
A 28 to 30 sub-commanders and enlisted men of the SIPO and two detachments of the Waffen SS, 55 to 60 men with three leaders of the Waffen SS had been ordered to the Kommando.
QWhat task and duties did the Schutzpolizei have, the Security Police, which had been attached to this Kommando?
AIn the south eastern are, the Security Policy was attached to the Sub-Kommando South for Security Police Tasks and guerilla fighting.
QTo whom was the Waffen SS attached?
AThe Waffen SS in the northwestern area was assigned near the sub-Kommando North.
QWhat task did the Waffen SS have when they were commanded to join the SK 4a?
AThe Waffen SS had been ordered to join the SK 4a, for technical and military task and especially for guerilla combatting.
QUnder whose orders were they?
AIn the vicinity of the Northern Sub-Kommandoo they were committed by the responsible Army commander for the Guerilla Warfare. The Waffen SS in its command was independent, also, as far as administration and food supplies were concerned.
QAs the leader of the SK 4a, could you issue orders to the Security Police or the Waffen SS that had been attached to this group?
ANot to the Waffen SS, because they were commanded by the responsible tetachment commander of the armed forces in their assignment. As far as personnel was concerned, the Waffen SS was also independent. The Security Police had been submitted to the orders of the sub-kommando leader and they were not independent units.
QThese command conditions, did they make necessary a reorganization of SK 4a and did they result in such a reorganization?
AYes, now the SK 4a consisted of two sub-kommandos.
QOn whose initiative was that carried out?
AThe AOK 6 had made the request via the Group Staff C.
QAt what period and how did these reorganizations take place?
AAt the beginning of August, 1941, the sub-kommandos when they marched to the front line areas received orders from the armed forces and the same applied to the Security Police and Waffen SS.
QWhere were the two sub-kommandos committed when the SK 4a had its location in Shitomir?
AOne sub-kommando was assigned northeast of Shitomir in the region east of Radomiszl and Malyn. The same applied to the Waffen SS, a little more northeast in the same area. The other sub-kommando was assigned southeast of Shitomir in the region Wassilkow Byala Zerkjew, together with the Security Police.
DR. HEIM:Your Honor, now I should submit Document No. 2 and have the witness comment about it, and, therefore, I dare to suggest to the Tribunal that maybe we should start our recess now.
THE PRESIDENT:The suggestion is welcomed and the Tribunal will recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours)
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
DR.HEIM (for the defendant Blobel): With the permission of the Tribunal I will continue with the questioning of the defendant Blobel. We stopped talking about August 1941, and I take the liberty, Your Honors, in this connection to submit the Document Blobel No. 2 as Exhibit No. 2. It is the second photostatic copy in Document Book 1 for the defendant Blobel, and it is headed, "Division and Subordination in Sonderkommando 4-A at the end of August 1941." BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, please describe, following this plan which you have in front of you, the division and subordination of SK-4-A at the end of August 1941.
AIn the left upper corner of the chart the Higher SS and Police leader is mentioned. From his a channel of commend exists to the Ukrainian Battalion and the police regiments, and an exchange of information with the AOK 6. And finally, a channel of command of Einsatzgruppe C. Subordinate to AOK 6 was the Section C, which was at the same level, concerning orders, as Einsatzgruppe C. Between Section C of the AOK 6 and Einsatzgruppe C, there was an information service and also a channel of command. The SK 4-A, as the line from Einsatzgruppe C to SK 4-A shows, received the instructions and orders immediately from Einsatzgruppe C whereby the channel of command was between the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe C and the Chief of the SK 4-a. As the chart also shows, the two sub-kommandos of the Security Police were in the area of the territory of the Army Commander, and also the Waffen-SS. Immediately subordinate to the AOK 6 were the security divisions with the Ukrainian militia in the army units, the local commandants throughout the territory, together with the Ukrainian security units which were attached to them. On the left side of the chart it shows that the orderly room consisted of three officers, six *CO's and privates, one cook and helper, and also one or two interpreters.
QIn what manner was the commitment carried out for the territories mentioned?
AThe sub-commandos were subordinate to the Army units for that territory. In the south it was the 29th Army Corps; in the north, a front - or a security division. The sub-kommandos had to discuss, screen, interrogate, make out documents, and to carry out executive measures, together with the Army, or units with whom they worked. At the same time, the sub-kommandos helped with the combating of partisans, together with the army, the local commanders, and Ukrainian militia in the Army units.
QAt whose order?
AAt the order of the AOK 6 alone, or the AOK 6 with the Higher SS and Police Leader; over the Gruppe C or through G-2 of the AOK 6, via G-2 of the Division.
QWhich units took part?
AThe Army units took part, including the Ukrainian militia in the Army units, and the units under the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln. There were police regiments of the regular police and battalions of the Ukrainian militia, who were subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
QYou just mentioned the name of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and said his name was Jeckeln. Can you give us a characteristic of Jeckeln?
A The Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln carried out a totalitarian way of using his power, which extended down to the Security Police, and, beyond that, to the local commanders. Jeckeln did not allow any contradiction. His manner was inconsideration of others; given orders should only be reported when they had actually been executed.... His instructions were supported through the SS and Police Court of which he was the presiding judge.
QWere the Ukrainian militia units the same as the Army units?
ANo; there were Ukrainian security units with the local commandanturas; secondly, Ukrainian militia units within the Army - that is, with the Security Division of the Army. And Ukrainian militia units who were subordinate and attached to the Police Department of the Higher SS and police leader.
QI refer to Document Book of the Prosecution II-C, on page 18 of the German text, which is the Document Exhibit No.71, Document NO2952.
DR. HOCHWALD:Page 16 of the English Document Book, Your Honor. BY DR. HEIM:
(continuing) It says there, I quote: "In Shitomir itself, Gruppenstab and Vorauskommando 4-A in cooperation have up to date shot, all in all, approximately 400 Jews, Communists and informants for the NKWD. Thus, Einsatzkommando 4-A has carried out 2531 executions."
Witness, will you please comment on these reports?
AI was not present during this event. It happened when I was absent, at the time I was at the hospital in Lublin. In this connection, however, I want to point out that this report is not correct, and that there is a discrepancy in it. In the Situation Report No. 37 of 29 July 1941, Document No. 2952, Exhibit 71, the execution of 400 persons in Shitomir is mentioned, by the SK 4-A. In the Operation Report No. 47, of 9 August 1941, Document 2947, Exhibit 82, from the Book II-C - there it also says that in Shitomir 400 people were executed.
DR. HOCHWALD:Page 66, Your Honors. BY THE WITNESS:
(continuing) Therefore, in the Situation Report two weeks later the same figure is mentioned.
DR. HEIM: Your Honors, may I state where you can find the two documents the witness just mentioned? The Document NO-2952, Exhibit 71,is contained in Document Book II-C of the Prosecution, on page 18 of the German text. The Document 2947, Exhibit 82, is contained in Document Book II-C, on page 72 of the German text.
DR. HOCHWALD:The first document, Your Honors, is on page 16 of the English; and the second one is on page 66. BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, how can you explain the total figure mentioned there, of 2531 executions?
AThe figure 2531 is an addition of those figures in the documents in Document Book II-C, 2934 Exhibit 78; Document Book II-A, 2936, Exhibit 44; Document Book II-C, 2952, Exhibit 71. Adding up the figures in the documents, results in the figure 2494, while the document says 2952. Exhibit 71 mentions the figure 2531 as a total of those figures. But in the figures mentioned last, shootings by the Army, the Police, the Ukrainian Units, and SK 4-A are all put together and reported here.
QPlease give a short description of the situation in the Ukrainian territory as it developed after the German Army had occupied it.
AIn the Ukrainian territory after the occupation, several movements in the population could be felt. Some were in favor of the Germans, and some strongly disapproved of the Germans. The armed civilian resistance was carried out by civilian agents of the Russian NKWD who organized it and carried out by them. Civilian snipers, partisans, spies, agents, saboteurs of traffic, railroads and streets, of communications and army property, could be found. Russian agents formed resistance groups against the German army. Partisans and guerrilla bands were active. Excesses took place, murders and arson were committed, they tried also to destroy the harvest and the machines. The Russians helped these partisans and guerrillas and suddenly a great number of people moved from the east to the west. Parachutists acted as agents.
QWhat results came about owing to this situation,concerning the division of this territory from a military point of view?
AThe territories where these destructions and the disturbances of the security of the units had taken place, were large territories. From the front to the rear they were divided in several sectors: the fighting area which varied had a depth of 20 to 40 kilometers and more; the rear area where the new .fighting units and the supply units moved; then came the Rear Army territory, and then followed the operational territory. All together from the front up to the rear it extended over 300 to 500 kilometers.