The following event happened. The sub-commando had moved to MalynMacarow, further to the East, in the middle of August - and they had left four people in Radomyszl who kept pigs - which was their so-called fat store - and one day the SS and Police Leader came with his staff, and he established that there were four members of the SK left there, and he ordered them to carry out this action and at the same time he confiscated a few pigs. The report of this officer went to the Higher SS and Police Leader, and he gave them to Meier, and Meier had to ask us about this. And eight or ten days later he made an inquiry into the matter and on that occasion Meier told me that an action had taken place, and three people of yours were used in this action. That is how I found out about this action, but the leader of the sub-commandos did not know anything about it at the time. They only learned later, when - preparing their march to Kiev - they wanted to fetch their sausages and their ham and these were gone.
QWho carried out the action, generally?
AIt was carried out according to the reports by Meier, by police regiments of the Higher SS and police leader of the Ukrainian umilitia and a number of men of the SK 4-a, that is, the Part Special Commando North who were stationed at the time in Radomyszl.
QDo you think it possible that this action was reported about by the sub-commando independently?
AThe sub-commando did not report about it independently, but when I met the leaders again in Kiev I heard about it because they were very much embittered that the supply had been taken awry. An independent report on the part of the sub-commando was never issued.
QWhat would have been your attitude as the leader of SK 4-a if such an "operational report" had been received by you?
AIf the leader of a commando had reported to me about the fact that 1107 men had been executed, I would have asked him: with your 15 men only? He certainly would appeared to be a liar.
QI now come back to the document we have talked about.
THE PRESIDENT:It is not clear to me, Dr. Heim, just what this last exchange was. I understand you asked him - what would he have done if the writer of the report had told him that 1107 Jews had been executed... Was that the question you put to him?
DR. HEIM:Your Honor, I asked him: What would you have done as leader of SK 4-a, and what would you have said, if your sub-commando leader had reported to you to the effect that the sub-commando had carried out shootings of 1107 people?
THE PRESIDENT:Yes; and his reply was that he would have called this man a liar. Yes. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWitness, why would you have celled him a liar? Did you know what the facts were? Did you know how many were killed?
ANo.
QThen how could you call him a liar if you did not know how many were killed?
AIf a leader reports to me about 1107 shootings, of which I did not know, I would have asked him .. Where did you got this report from... Who ordered it to you... And I would have said it is impossible that 1107 people were shot in one day by 15 people.
QThen the reason you would have called him a liar is that you would know that 1107 people could not have been shot in the period of time indicated, is that right?
AThat is correct.
QYou would know that as an expert?
AYes; according to the order, executive measures issued by the Higher commander, this would have been impossible, that he would have shot 1107 people in one day with 15 people.
THE PRESIDENT:Proceed.
DR. HEIM:I now come back to the document discussed last, which is Document Book II-A of the Prosecution, on page 93, I think it is, page 86 of the English. It is Document NO-3149, Exhibit 46, on page 8 of the original document. It says in the last but one paragraph, the last sentence, that is, the original document, page 8, last paragraph, last sentence.
DR. HOCHWALD:Your Honors, on page 89, third paragraph from the top.
THE PRESIDENT:That is the page we were already on.
DR. HOCHWALD:That is the next page, the sentence following the quotation by Dr. Heim.
THE PRESIDENT:I see.
DR. HEIM:I quote: "Thereby the Sonder-kommando has taken care of a total of 11,328 Jews till 6 September 1941."
BY DR. HEIM:
QWitness, can you comment on this total figure which is mentioned in that report?
AThe figure mentioned in this situation report cannot be correct. In the proceding document, II_C, Document 3151, Exhibit 73 of the Prosecution, page 32 of the German Book, it says that on the 17th of September that SK 4-a carried out executions of 6,548 people. According to the Operational Situation Report 88, Document 3149, of the 19th of September 1941, according to this report, as I say, the Special Commando 4-a until the 6th of September 1941 executed 11,328 people. This comparison shows very clearly the incorrectness of the Operational Situation Reports, which contradictseach other if we regard then closely.
QThis rapid increase of the numbers -- how can you explain it? The discrepancy between these two reports?
AThe Operational Situation Report of 11 September 1941 shows a total figure of 7,152 on the 24th of August 1941. The Operational Situation Report of the 17th of September 1941, Document 3151, reports the number 6,584 on this day. The Operational Situation Report of the 19th of September 1941 mentions a total figure of 11,328 on the 6th of September 1941. The figure 11,328 on 6 September 1941 is in no logical connection to the figure 6,584 In the report of the 17th of September 1941... just as little as 11,328 to 7,152 of the 24th of August 1941. Experience tells me that Hofmann as a reporter got a supply of reports from the Army authorities via Sturmbannfuehrer Heier, which he used these figures in his own reports. Apart from these documents, the situation reports of the sub-kommandos were at his disposal, the reports of the commanders of the subcommandos, in which the activities of all units stationed in the territory were reported about. The text of the reports which went to Berlin was in the hands of Hofmann. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q In writing up this report did Hofmann contact Meier with regard to the events of September 6th in Radomyszl?
AMeier was in the office of the Higher Police and SS Leader in Berdichew and sent current reports to Gruppe C because that was his assignment. It was his duty, in fret, to maintain the connection between the Gruppe C leader and the Gruppe, and he currently reported to Hofmann about these general happenings.
QWhere did Hofmann get the figure of 1107 Jews executed on September 6th?
AWhether Hofmann established this figure, I cannot say. The additionamust have been made in Berlin. Hofmann will have reported for the territory, saying that in his particular tine so and so many executions were carried out. Under this particular unit the EK 5, the SK 4-b, or SK 4-a, and in my opinion these were added as being within the territory.
QHow many men were operating in the sub-kommando in Radomyszl on September 6, 1941? How many men were in that sub-commando?
AThis sub-commando, as I have already stated, had left these four men -
QHow many?
A Four men.... four men.....
QI understood you to say 15.
ANo; the entire sub-commando had only 15 State police and SD men of the SK 4-a.
Q When you commented on the impossibility of the 1107 Jews being executed in one day, you said that 15 men could not do it. So there were 15 men in the operation?
AThat's correct. The Kommando was operated by four men in Radomyszl and the others were in the front line division in MalynMacarow. There was a distance between these units of 40 or 50 kilometers. That was the only independent Kommando which they had, which the officer of the Higher Police and SS leader had found somewhere.
QBut when you said that if ome one reported to you that he had executed 1107 persons, you said you would have called him a liar because 15 men could not have executed that many. That is what I understood you to say.
AYes, I meant the entire unit as it was subordinated to this one leader.
QBut 15 men could not have executed that many in one day?
ANo.
QHow much time is required for an execution?
AYour Honor, the regulations concerning executions issued by the Supreme Commander was, two rifles to one person, one firing squad; and if I now think about it, for a short while, and as I experienced myself in Sokal when twice approximately 30 men were shot. The whole duration of the leading in of the prisoners - it takes about 10 minutes.
If I then work it out mathematically, it means that in an hour six squads are active, and if I think about the firing duration, I begin to think that it is impossible that this could be carried out
QWell, I don't see where it is so incredible. Suppose that 1107 men were taken by trucks cut into the woods, or into a field.... that would only require one operation. You have them out there. Then they are lined up. You say there are 15 men in the shooting party, and two rifles to a person.... that would give you on the average of 71/2 per shooting... In order to work this out without too much complication, we will say seven to a shooting. With 100 shootings you would have disposed of 700 people, wouldn't you?
AYes, that is correct.
QYes. All right. And now, how much tine is required to lead out seven men and to shoot them down? That certainly wouldn't take more then four or five minutes, at most, would it?
AThat would take ten minutes, certainly... to line up, to lead in, and line up the prisoners. To make the firing squad ready, to put down rifles, to take them up.... the carrying away of the corpses to the graves, and the leading in of the further seven men.
QWell, ten minutes to an execution, seven on each execution, in all, would be 42.
ASix tines seven is forty-two.
QWell ten minutes to an execution of seven and the executions in an hour would be 42?
ASix times seven is 42.
QSo that according to what you have told us, if they worked all day, this was in the month of September, when you had plenty of day light, you would have 15 or 16 hours of daylight, and if they were operating continuously 700 or 800 could have been killed in one day.
AYour Honor, no kommando can stand up to this. If a kommando works perhaps an hour it is enough and it cannot be put to shooting people all of the time, that is too much.
QWell then how many could have been executed in one day normally? What number would you have regarede as not being subject to criticism or as being an exaggeration?
AAs I have said, as it was carried out in Sokol there were thirty men and each shooting took about an hour, and afterwards their nerves were in a very bad state and you could not have used these people again the same day, one would have had to put up many more kommandos if you wish 1100 people to be shot in one day, that is impossible, incredible.
QWell if a man had reported, let us say, 400 had been shot in on day, you wouldn't have called him a liar, would you?
ANo, one wouldn't do that. I knew my men.
QWell would you say 200, would 200 deaths place him within the category of a credible or veracious person?
AYour Honor, it would have been questionable if 200 people are concerned, you must have a unit with a special guards and a special unit which has no other assignment than shooting and for the guarding of corpses of 200 people, there must be other guards, there must be other units.
QDid you say "guarding the corpses?"
AWell if 200 people are being shot, the people had to be kept somewhere, they had to be guarded.
QWhy did you have to guard the corpses?
ANot the corpses, I mean the living.
QOh, I understood you to say you had to guard the corpses. Very well, proceed Dr. Heim. BY DR. HEIM:
QIn the document last mentioned, the execution of 11328 Jews are mentioned, are these executions mainly Jews, if that report is correct at all?
AThere were never any special execution laws or figures concerning Jews.
QI refer to book 2-C of the Prosecution, on page 69 of the German text, as the document Exhibit 81, document 3146, in the English document book it is on page 62. It is operational situation report No. 94 of the 25 September 1941, on page 69 of the German copy, page 14 of the original, approximately at the beginning of the page 14 of the original copy, under No. I, it says and I quote:
"The group staff is still at Nowa Ukrainka. After the fall of Kiev, headquarters will be shifted to that place. Sonderkommanda 4a is still in Shitomir; Teilkommandos at Radomysihl and Bialacerkiew. Other Kommandos are deployed in the area of Malin-Macharow, Korosten and east of Wassilkow."
MR. HOCHWHALD:Your Honors, it is on p ge 64 of the English document book in the middle of the page. There is the Roman numeral I - Locations. BY DR. HEIM:
I continue quoting:
"On the basis of an agreement with the Army High Command it is guaranteed that a Vorauskommando of Eisatzkommando 4a and of the Group staff will march into Kiev with the advance guard after the fall of the town."
And on the next page, it is page 15 of the original, it is the last paragraph and it says:
"Sonderkommando 4a has now surpassed the number of 15,000 executions."
Witness, the reported total number increases within a few days to over 15,000.
Did this Sonderkommanda 4a carry out any further assignments in that section there?
ASpecial Commando 4a did not carry out any further tasks during these few days. According to my knowledge document 3149 of 19 September 1941 mentioned the number, 11328, document 3146, however of the 25 September mentions the number over 15,000. These two figures show a difference of 3672 people. Assignments of these measures in the period mentioned were not carried out and were not participated in by any of the SK 4a.
QThe stations and garrisons mentioned in the document Ex. 81 with regard to SK 4A are they correct?
AAt the time when the march to Kiev was planned, the Northern subcommando was at Makarow, the Southern subcommando was in a sector near Wassilkow with troops in Kopastow. That was in the vicinity of Wassickow. The orderly room remained in Shitomir until October 1941. The subcommando 4a was not stationed in Korosten, but the interrogators had carried out interrogations on the orders of the higher SS and police leaders. The locations Korosten and Radomyszl are not correct, for this period.
QYour Honor, if I understood correctly, there was a mis-translation which just occurred. The witness said the orderly room of SK 4a remained until the march of 17 September 1941 in Shitomir. I think the word October was mentioned.
Witness, as becomes evident from the document 3146, Exhibit 81, SK 4a had sent an advance commando to Kiev, who gave the order to send the mentioned advance Kommandos of the SK 4A to Kiev?
AGroup C had come to an agreement with the AOK 6 to move to Kiev and I received an order from the group because only special units which were agreed upon beforehand were allowed to enter Kiev.
QWill you give us further details about the march towards Kiev?
AThe Northern subcommando had received an order to march in the direction northeast to Macharow with its special advance units.
The south commando, however, was ordered to march together with the advance commando Haefner and together with the 29th Army Corps to Kiev, from the territory around Wassilkow. The orderly room of the SK 4a with the 8 or 10 men who were left there with the kitchen machinery and the vehicle repair shops and with the Ukrainian personnel marched on the 17 September 1941 in the direction of Kiev from Shitomir, on a detour road in the north. The garrison of the AOK 6 was given the opporutnity to contact the staff officers of the army group again, and on the same day Paltawa has been taken by German troops.
QWhen did you reach Kiev yourself?
AAfter lengthy marching, advance marching through the territory, I reached ths suburb of Kiev and I met the Commander Haefner and on the 24 of September 1941 I reached Kiev itself .
QWhen did the individual subkommandos of the SK A4 reach Kiev?
AThe advance Kommando had reached Kiev on the 20th of September, that is about 8 or 10 men under Haefner, also the South subkommando under Jantzen, the North Kommando, and the Waffen SS from the Northern territory reached Kiev on the 25 September.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Heim, do you think we might suspend at this point?
DR. HEIM:Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will be in recess - do you have something, Dr. Ficht?
DR. FICHT:For the Defendant Biberstein:
I would like to ask that the Defendant Biberstein be excused from tomorrow afternoon's session because he has to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT:The defendant Biberstein will be excused from attendance in Court tomorrow afternoon.
The Tribunal will be in recess until tomorrow at nine-thirty.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 29 October 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Otto Ohlendorf, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 29 October 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Musmanno.
presiding.
THE MARSHAL:The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. A.
Military Tribunal No. II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT:Just before you begin, Dr. Heim, I would like to make a short announcement. On Friday afternoon the Tribunal will recess at three instead of four-thirty. In order to make up that hour's time, We may run a little later this afternoon. We may go as far as five o'clock this afternoon and five o'clock tomorrow afternoon, and then on Friday at three o'clock we will terminate for the week, so that the attorneys can make whatever plans they desire.
Then the Tribunal might make another announcement with regard to trial briefs. At the end of the trial, of course, each counsel will address the Tribunal in behalf of his client. In addition to that, if he wishes, he may beforehand prepare and submit to the court what we call a trial brief, a brief on the law and on the facts.
The prosecution, we understand, will submit briefs on some of the defendants in order to analyze the various documents. It may be impossible in the course of an examination or cross-examination or in a final summation speech to refer to all of the documents in a way that would be entirely satisfactory to the attorney and his client, so that you are advised that, if you wish, the Tribunal does not request, but, if you wish, you may prepare a brief on the documents and on the law involved in a particular case which you are handling. That, of course, applies to the prosecution also.
DR.HEIM (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BLOBEL): Your Honor, I permit meself to ask a question of the Tribunal. I think as far as I am concerned and, as far as my colleagues are concerned, it would be an advantage-
THE INTERPRETER:The switch here is out of order. I cannot hear the original.
(The sound system was repaired.
DR. HEIM:Your Honor, after what the Tribunal has stated, I would like to ask a question. This is important for my colleagues as well. and it would be to their advantage to know today what period of time is allotted for this closing speech, because this time and the knowledge of this time would be important to us, because we could then tell to what extent and how long we should submit a closing brief to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:Let me say very clearly that there are two items. one the closing speech, which is delivered orally and which, or course, is also written, but which is delivered physically by spoken words to the Tribunal, when all the testimony is in. That is a normal procedure and happens in every trial.
Now in addition to that, if an attorney feels that he may not, within the time alloted to him, in the final speech, cover all angles of the case legally and factually, he may, in addition, prepare a brief in which he can point out various arguments legally and factually. These briefs should be prepared currently and one should not await preparation until the end of the trial. I would suggest that each attorney who believes he will prepare a brief, should start on it immediately upon the conclusion of his case, because he knows what he has presented and, of course, he knows what the prosecution has presented. The same things is true of the prosecution.
It may be, and it probably is true that the prosecution will not have time to go into all the documents in cross-examination. It may not even be necessary, but in preparing a brief and then every reference which the prosecution feels is necessary in order to establish the case may be made in that brief. Is that clear?
DR. HEIM:Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:We only add that the Tribunal does not insist upon it that you prepare these briefs, but, if you do prepare them we shall be glad to have them.
DR. HEIM:Thank your, Your Honor. With the permission of the Tribunal I continue my direct examination of the Defendant Blobel, as a witness in his own defense.
PAUL BLOBEL __Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION __ Continued BY DR. HEIM (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BLOBEL):
QYesterday afternoon we stopped with the arrival of special Kommando 4a in Kiew. Witness, you said that various Kommandos of Special Kommando 4a arrived in Kiew on the 20th of November, 1941. with the mission of establishing themselves in Kiew, and then on the 24th of September you arrived yourself in Kiew and on the next day the two sub-kommandos arrived there too. In this connection, I would like to refer to Document Book I, page 149 of the German, page 415 of the English text. This is Document NO-3140, Exhibit 30. In the English text on page 118, in the German text on page 150, it says, literally, at the beginning of page 9 of the original, about the middle of the page in both books-
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD:On page 118 in Document Book I, in the middle, the heading is Kiew, "I, Kief."
QI quote: "A Vorkommando of the Sonderkommando 4a led by Obersturmfuehrers Haefner and Janssen, 50 men strong, arrived on 19 September 1941 with the fighting troops in Kiew. The Main Kommando of the Sonderkommando 4a reached Kiew on 25 September 1941 after Standartenfuehrer Blobel had already been in Kiew on 21 and 22 September. The Vorkommando of the Gruppen staff, Hauptmann of the Schutzpolizei Krumme, Obersturmfuehrer Braun arrived in Kiew on 21 September 1941. The Gruppen staff followed on 25 September 1941."
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Heim, you supplied the name which is absent in the English copy after "Standartenfuehrer". Which name did you read?
DR. HEIM:Your Honor. I beg your pardon.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD:On page 115 of the document book it shows that the name is Blobel. Is that what Your Honors wanted to know?
THE PRESIDENT:That is right. Thank you very much.
Q (By Dr. Heim) Witness, is this description of the RSHA correct just as I have read it?
AThe dates are not correct. Haefner and Janssen, as I have already mentioned, with 17 men and drivers, as well as with 28 men of the regular police arrived in Kiew after the day it was captured that is on the 20th of September. I personally arrived in Kiew on the 24th of September, one day before the Northern Kommando arrived. The Group Staff was already in Kiew when I arrived there.
QWitness, if I understood you correctly, then this situation report is not correct, as far as the date of your arrival in Kiew is concerned?
ANo, it was not the 21st and the 22nd of September. It was the 24th of September, 1941.
QWitness, will you please pause between my question and your answer until the translation has come through. Please describe briefly your first impressions about the conditions in Kiew.
AGroups and columns came into the city or passed the city by on their way to the front. Explosions to k place at various places. The inner city was in flames. Troops and units were quartered there. The roads were cleared of barricades by the troops. The part of the city which had been burned was evacuated by the population, who went to sleep in parks, and many buildings had been evacuated by the fleeing population.
QWhen did the main Kommando of Special Kommando 4a reach Kiew?
AThe Kommando designated "Main Kommando" was the northern subcommando with the Waffen-SS. This Kommando arrived on the 25th of September, 1947, in Kiew.
QWhere did Einsatzgruppe C take up headquarters?
AThrough a Kommandoo Einsatzgruppe C had requisitioned a building for its headquarters.
QWhere was the orderly room of Special Kommando 4a?
AThe orderly room, together with the sub-kommando, took up space in a building nearby.
QWhat was the attitude of the population towards the German.
AThe reception of the German troops was generally very friendly. The Ukrainian population greeted the German troops with obvious pleasure. :
QWhat was the situation which Special Kommando 4a found in Kiew?
AWhen the Dommando arrived, the fire had spread in the city. Wehrmacht units went through the city and blew up the streets, but the fire spread to the other parts and did not stop. The entire city was a sea of flames and thick clouds of smoke covered the city.
QWhat order came about as a result of this fire?
AIn the night of the 25 of September and the 26th of September, 1941, all billets, those which were situated in the center of the city had to be evacuated. The Special Kommando 4a moved to a stadium on the Dnjepr River. All units which were not needed in Kiew had to evacuate the city.
QDid this order also apply to the Group Staff?
AYes, the Group Staff, also evacuated the city, since the building had been heavily damaged by explosions.
QDid any Waffen-SS and Regular Police units remain subordinate to Special Kommando 4a?
AOn the 26th of September, the Waffen-SS was dismissed to their original units. The Regular Police joined the Group Staff in its guard duties.
QDid sub-kommandos of the Special Kommando 4a remain in Kiew?
ANoo the remainder of the southern sub-Kommando under the leadership of Untersturmfuehrer Mueller, up to then an interpreter, was ordered to report to Poltava at the front.
It consisted of a leader and 12 to 15 non-comissioned officers and men.
QWas there a change in the personnel within your Kommando at that time?
AYes, the leaders of the executive units. Hanf, Tausen, Haefner, Janssen, upon order of the Group, had to return to Berlin, to continue their studies. Dr. Funk had already left the Kommando in Shitomir.
QWhere did the rest of Special Kommando 4a stay?
AThe rest of Special Kommando 4a, the orderly room and the northern sub-kommando were billeted near the group which now occupied the main building of the NKVD, which it had confiscated.
QWhat was the health condition of the members of this Kommando?
AA great part of the men had become sick of wolhynian fever and had been taken to the hospital. I personally had been wounded on the
QHow strong was SK 4a at that time?
AIt contained about two-thirds of its original strength in addition to about 1,745 men.
THE PRESIDENT:Just a moment. The witness apparently uses some technical expression which can very logically be interpreted in the manner in which the interpreter has given it to us, but that seems to clash with that has been stated before. The number did not reach the total now just stated so please repeat the number slowly and then we will see just what we get.
THE WITNESS:The Kommando contained about two-thirds of its original strength and the original strength was as follows: I Kommando leader, 7 officers, 45 men.
THE PRESIDENT:Because of that technical expression one seven four five we get the idea of 1,745 which, of course, is incorrect.
DR. HEIM:Your Honor, please permit me to make an explanation about this concept, one dash seven dash four five. In the German Wehrmacht it was customary to list the leaders, the officers and the men, and list them in this position, numerically, and merely have a line between those numbers.
THE PRESIDENT:Do we understand that the first digit indicates the commanding officer; the second, the number of subordinate officers; and the third number or position of digits indicates the number of men. Is that correct?
DR. HEIM:Yes, that's right. Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:Thank you. BY DR. HEIM?
Q.Witness, you were just telling us how strong your commando was. About 30 men remained, including officers and men, including the advance commando which had advanced toward Poltawa under Mueller. What chiefs were at your disposal?
A.The following chiefs were at my disposal: Untersturmfuehrer Mueller with an advance detachment at the front; Hauptsturmfuehrer Radetzky, with a driver who had been ordered to go to Army Command 6, and the administrative officer who had been recalled to his original unit but who was still with my commando.
Q.How strong was the remainder of Sonderkommando 4-a which remained in Kiev?
A.The rest of Special Commando 4-a, including the office helps, men and drivers, amounted to fifteen or eighteen men in Kiev. That is, non-commissioned officers and men. Added to that was myself and the administrative officer.
Q.As leader of SK 4-a did you have any special duty to make out reports?
A.Outside of the fact that the persons had to be reported to the Group, I had no duty to report to Army Command 6 or to the Higher SS Police leader, or the town commandant.
Q.Where was the headquarters of the Higher SS and Police leader?
A.The staff of the Higher SS and Police leader immediately after marching into Kiev had set up headquarters there.
Q.Can you tell us what jobs the units had which were immediately under the command of the Higher SS and Police leader?
A.The police regiments of the regular police, as well as the militia units of the Higher SS and Police leader, and of the town commandant, had marched in and were used in combatting the fire, and also had to remove Russian explosives and road mines.
There were thousands of mines on the roads, even in the city itself. The streets were just filled with mines.
Q.What units outside of combat units were stationed in Kiev at that time?
Of the Wehrmacht there were security units there which were under the command of the town commandant. Other units, such as supply units of the Transportation Corps of the various Army units, who started to set up their supply camps, etc.
Q.What mission did the SK 4-A have in Kiev?
A.The missions of the commando in Kiev consisted, first, in ascertaining the situation in the town itself. Reports about the population, and from the troop units, were summarized and passed on to the Group.
Q.What can you tell us, briefly, about the conduct of the Russian enemy during your stay in Kiev?
A.The terror acts of the enemy groups were large-scale. There were attacks, shootings within and around the city, which became more frequent. Security units of the Army, of the regular police, and of the Ukrainian units, made possible many arrests of people.
Q.What measures did the military commander undertake against these acts?
A.The Army or the town commandant posted announcements and threatened severe punishments if the decrees which had been ordered were violated. All troop units were used in arresting sabotage troops and terrorists.
Q.Did the conference take place in Kiev about the execution of measures in order to re-establish security aid to fight these disturbances.
A.As I heard later on, a conference did take place.
Q.Do you know between whom this conference took place?
A.The conference took place between the town commandant of Kiev, Brigadier General Eberhardt, the Higher SS and Police leader Jeckeln, and the leader of the Einsatzgruppe C, Dr. Rasch, or his Chief of Staff, Hoffman.
Q.Were you present during that conference?
A.No, I did not take any part in such a conference with the town commandant or the SS Police leader. I was not ordered to attend such a conference. I was not able to do duty because of my head wound.
Q.Did you know the results of this conference?
A.I know that the Higher SS and Police leader after that conference ordered action against these terrorist attacks.
Q.In this connection I refer to Document Book I, on page 149 of the German text. This is Document NO-3140, Exhibit 30. This is the situation report 106 of the 7th of October 1941. On page 155 in the German book it says, literally.... it is in the beginning of page 15 of the original-
DR. HOCHWALD:It is page 124, Your Honor.
DR. HEIM:Witness, do you have this page?
WITNESS:Yes.
Q. (By Dr. Heim--continuing) I quote: "As an added factor it was proven that the Jews participated in the arson. The population expected adequate retaliatory measures by the German authorities. Consequently, all Jews of Kiev were requested, in agreement with the city com mander, to appear on Monday, 29 September until 8 o'clock, at a designated place.
These announcements were posted by members of the Ukrainian militia in the entire city. Simultaneously, it was announced orally that all Jews were to be moved."
Herr Blobel, did you have anything to do with the above-mentioned retaliatory measures in Kiev, or with ordering them?
A.As far as giving orders for those measures I had nothing to do with it. The decision was in the hands of the Higher SS and Police leader Jeckeln and the town commandant, or the commander of the Army area.
Q.Did you know at the time that the retaliatory measures had been ordered, and do you know the reason why they had been ordered?
A.An order for the retaliatory measure was reported to me via the Group staff. The reason for this order was to be found in these terrorist attacks which were currently known, and the fact that the fire in Kiev could be traced back to Jewish origin. And the daily reports about the front actions show this especially.