THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. A.
Military Tribunal No. II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Just before you begin, Dr. Heim, I would like to make a short announcement. On Friday afternoon the Tribunal will recess at three instead of four-thirty. In order to make up that hour's time, We may run a little later this afternoon. We may go as far as five o'clock this afternoon and five o'clock tomorrow afternoon, and then on Friday at three o'clock we will terminate for the week, so that the attorneys can make whatever plans they desire. to trial briefs. At the end of the trial, of course, each counsel will address the Tribunal in behalf of his client. In addition to that, if he wishes, he may beforehand prepare and submit to the court what we call a trial brief, a brief on the law and on the facts. the defendants in order to analyze the various documents. It may be impossible in the course of an examination or cross-examination or in a final summation speech to refer to all of the documents in a way that would be entirely satisfactory to the attorney and his client, so that you are advised that, if you wish, the Tribunal does not request, but, if you wish, you may prepare a brief on the documents and on the law involved in a particular case which you are handling. That, of course, applies to the prosecution also.
DR. HEIM (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BLOBEL): Your Honor, I permit meself to ask a question of the Tribunal. I think as far as I am concerned and, as far as my colleagues are concerned, it would be an advantage-
THE INTERPRETER: The switch here is out of order. I cannot hear the original.
(The sound system was repaired.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, after what the Tribunal has stated, I would like to ask a question. This is important for my colleagues as well. and it would be to their advantage to know today what period of time is allotted for this closing speech, because this time and the knowledge of this time would be important to us, because we could then tell to what extent and how long we should submit a closing brief to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me say very clearly that there are two items. one the closing speech, which is delivered orally and which, or course, is also written, but which is delivered physically by spoken words to the Tribunal, when all the testimony is in. That is a normal procedure and happens in every trial. within the time alloted to him, in the final speech, cover all angles of the case legally and factually, he may, in addition, prepare a brief in which he can point out various arguments legally and factually. These briefs should be prepared currently and one should not await preparation until the end of the trial. I would suggest that each attorney who believes he will prepare a brief, should start on it immediately upon the conclusion of his case, because he knows what he has presented and, of course, he knows what the prosecution has presented. The same things is true of the prosecution. not have time to go into all the documents in cross-examination. It may not even be necessary, but in preparing a brief and then every reference which the prosecution feels is necessary in order to establish the case may be made in that brief. Is that clear?
DR. HEIM: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: We only add that the Tribunal does not insist upon it that you prepare these briefs, but, if you do prepare them we shall be glad to have them.
DR. HEIM: Thank your, Your Honor. With the permission of the Tribunal I continue my direct examination of the Defendant Blobel, as a witness in his own defense.
PAUL BLOBEL __Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION __ Continued BY DR. HEIM (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BLOBEL): Kommando 4a in Kiew. Witness, you said that various Kommandos of Special Kommando 4a arrived in Kiew on the 20th of November, 1941. with the mission of establishing themselves in Kiew, and then on the 24th of September you arrived yourself in Kiew and on the next day the two sub-kommandos arrived there too. In this connection, I would like to refer to Document Book I, page 149 of the German, page 415 of the English text. This is Document NO-3140, Exhibit 30.
In the English text on page 118, in the German text on page 150, it says, literally, at the beginning of page 9 of the original, about the middle of the page in both books-
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: On page 118 in Document Book I, in the middle, the heading is Kiew, "I, Kief."
Q I quote: "A Vorkommando of the Sonderkommando 4a led by Obersturmfuehrers Haefner and Janssen, 50 men strong, arrived on 19 September 1941 with the fighting troops in Kiew. The Main Kommando of the Sonderkommando 4a reached Kiew on 25 September 1941 after Standartenfuehrer Blobel had already been in Kiew on 21 and 22 September. The Vorkommando of the Gruppen staff, Hauptmann of the Schutzpolizei Krumme, Obersturmfuehrer Braun arrived in Kiew on 21 September 1941. The Gruppen staff followed on 25 September 1941."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Heim, you supplied the name which is absent in the English copy after "Standartenfuehrer". Which name did you read?
DR. HEIM: Your Honor. I beg your pardon.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: On page 115 of the document book it shows that the name is Blobel. Is that what Your Honors wanted to know?
THE PRESIDENT: That is right. Thank you very much.
Q (By Dr. Heim) Witness, is this description of the RSHA correct just as I have read it?
A The dates are not correct. Haefner and Janssen, as I have already mentioned, with 17 men and drivers, as well as with 28 men of the regular police arrived in Kiew after the day it was captured that is on the 20th of September. I personally arrived in Kiew on the 24th of September, one day before the Northern Kommando arrived. The Group Staff was already in Kiew when I arrived there. report is not correct, as far as the date of your arrival in Kiew is concerned?
A No, it was not the 21st and the 22nd of September. It was the 24th of September, 1941. answer until the translation has come through. Please describe briefly your first impressions about the conditions in Kiew. on their way to the front. Explosions to k place at various places. The inner city was in flames. Troops and units were quartered there. The roads were cleared of barricades by the troops. The part of the city which had been burned was evacuated by the population, who went to sleep in parks, and many buildings had been evacuated by the fleeing population.
Q When did the main Kommando of Special Kommando 4a reach Kiew?
A The Kommando designated "Main Kommando" was the northern subcommando with the Waffen-SS. This Kommando arrived on the 25th of September, 1947, in Kiew.
Q Where did Einsatzgruppe C take up headquarters? ing for its headquarters.
Q Where was the orderly room of Special Kommando 4a? space in a building nearby. The Ukrainian population greeted the German troops with obvious pleasure. :
Q What was the situation which Special Kommando 4a found in Kiew? Wehrmacht units went through the city and blew up the streets, but the fire spread to the other parts and did not stop. The entire city was a sea of flames and thick clouds of smoke covered the city.
Q What order came about as a result of this fire? 1941, all billets, those which were situated in the center of the city had to be evacuated. The Special Kommando 4a moved to a stadium on the Dnjepr River. All units which were not needed in Kiew had to evacuate the city.
Q Did this order also apply to the Group Staff? ing had been heavily damaged by explosions. to Special Kommando 4a? original units. The Regular Police joined the Group Staff in its guard duties.
Q Did sub-kommandos of the Special Kommando 4a remain in Kiew? ship of Untersturmfuehrer Mueller, up to then an interpreter, was ordered to report to Poltava at the front.
It consisted of a leader and 12 to 15 non-comissioned officers and men. that time?
A Yes, the leaders of the executive units. Hanf, Tausen, Haefner, Janssen, upon order of the Group, had to return to Berlin, to continue their studies. Dr. Funk had already left the Kommando in Shitomir.
Q Where did the rest of Special Kommando 4a stay? northern sub-kommando were billeted near the group which now occupied the main building of the NKVD, which it had confiscated.
Q What was the health condition of the members of this Kommando? had been taken to the hospital. I personally had been wounded on the
Q How strong was SK 4a at that time? addition to about 1,745 men.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. The witness apparently uses some technical expression which can very logically be interpreted in the manner in which the interpreter has given it to us, but that seems to clash with that has been stated before. The number did not reach the total now just stated so please repeat the number slowly and then we will see just what we get.
THE WITNESS: The Kommando contained about two-thirds of its original strength and the original strength was as follows: I Kommando leader, 7 officers, 45 men.
THE PRESIDENT: Because of that technical expression one seven four five we get the idea of 1,745 which, of course, is incorrect.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, please permit me to make an explanation about this concept, one dash seven dash four five. In the German Wehrmacht it was customary to list the leaders, the officers and the men, and list them in this position, numerically, and merely have a line between those numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we understand that the first digit indicates the commanding officer; the second, the number of subordinate officers; and the third number or position of digits indicates the number of men. Is that correct?
DR. HEIM: Yes, that's right. Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. BY DR. HEIM?
Q. Witness, you were just telling us how strong your commando was. About 30 men remained, including officers and men, including the advance commando which had advanced toward Poltawa under Mueller. What chiefs were at your disposal?
A. The following chiefs were at my disposal: Untersturmfuehrer Mueller with an advance detachment at the front; Hauptsturmfuehrer Radetzky, with a driver who had been ordered to go to Army Command 6, and the administrative officer who had been recalled to his original unit but who was still with my commando.
Q. How strong was the remainder of Sonderkommando 4-a which remained in Kiev?
A. The rest of Special Commando 4-a, including the office helps, men and drivers, amounted to fifteen or eighteen men in Kiev. That is, non-commissioned officers and men. Added to that was myself and the administrative officer.
Q. As leader of SK 4-a did you have any special duty to make out reports?
A. Outside of the fact that the persons had to be reported to the Group, I had no duty to report to Army Command 6 or to the Higher SS Police leader, or the town commandant.
Q. Where was the headquarters of the Higher SS and Police leader?
A. The staff of the Higher SS and Police leader immediately after marching into Kiev had set up headquarters there.
Q. Can you tell us what jobs the units had which were immediately under the command of the Higher SS and Police leader?
A. The police regiments of the regular police, as well as the mandant, had marched in and were used in combatting the fire, and also had to remove Russian explosives and road mines. There were thousands of mines on the roads, even in the city itself. The streets were just filled with mines.
Q. What units outside of combat units were stationed in Kiev at that time? the command of the town commandant. Other units, such as supply units of the Transportation Corps of the various Army units, who started to set up their supply camps, etc.
Q. What mission did the SK 4-A have in Kiev?
A. The missions of the commando in Kiev consisted, first, in ascertaining the situation in the town itself. Reports about the population, and from the troop units, were summarized and passed on to the Group.
Q. What can you tell us, briefly, about the conduct of the Russian enemy during your stay in Kiev?
A. The terror acts of the enemy groups were large-scale. There were attacks, shootings within and around the city, which became more frequent. Security units of the Army, of the regular police, and of the Ukrainian units, made possible many arrests of people.
Q. What measures did the military commander undertake against these acts?
A. The Army or the town commandant posted announcements and threatened severe punishments if the decrees which had been ordered were violated. All troop units were used in arresting sabotage troops and terrorists.
Q. Did the conference take place in Kiev about the execution of measures in order to re-establish security aid to fight these disturbances.
A. As I heard later on, a conference did take place.
Q. Do you know between whom this conference took place?
A. The conference took place between the town commandant of Kiev, Brigadier General Eberhardt, the Higher SS and Police leader Jeckeln, and the leader of the Einsatzgruppe C, Dr. Rasch, or his Chief of Staff, Hoffman.
Q. Were you present during that conference?
A. No, I did not take any part in such a conference with the town commandant or the SS Police leader. I was not ordered to attend such a conference. I was not able to do duty because of my head wound.
Q. Did you know the results of this conference?
A. I know that the Higher SS and Police leader after that conference ordered action against these terrorist attacks.
Q. In this connection I refer to Document Book I, on page 149 of the German text. This is Document NO-3140, Exhibit 30. This is the situation report 106 of the 7th of October 1941. On page 155 in the German book it says, literally.... it is in the beginning of page 15 of the original-
DR. HOCHWALD: It is page 124, Your Honor.
DR. HEIM: Witness, do you have this page?
WITNESS: Yes.
Q. (By Dr. Heim--continuing) I quote: "As an added factor it was proven that the Jews participated in the arson. The population expected adequate retaliatory measures by the German authorities. Consequently, all Jews of Kiev were requested, in agreement with the city com mander, to appear on Monday, 29 September until 8 o'clock, at a designated place.
These announcements were posted by members of the Ukrainian militia in the entire city. Simultaneously, it was announced orally that all Jews were to be moved." retaliatory measures in Kiev, or with ordering them?
A. As far as giving orders for those measures I had nothing to do with it. The decision was in the hands of the Higher SS and Police leader Jeckeln and the town commandant, or the commander of the Army area.
Q. Did you know at the time that the retaliatory measures had been ordered, and do you know the reason why they had been ordered?
A. An order for the retaliatory measure was reported to me via the Group staff. The reason for this order was to be found in these terrorist attacks which were currently known, and the fact that the fire in Kiev could be traced back to Jewish origin. And the daily reports about the front actions show this especially.
Q. Did you consider these retaliatory measures which had been military law?
A. The continuous arson, explosions, attacks and murders, and
Q. In the document just cited it says, in the continuation of the above mentioned citation, I quote:
"In collaboration with the Gruppen staff and to commandos of the September, 33,771 Jews."
Is this figure 33,771 Jews, correct in your opinion?
A. In my opinion this figure is exaggeratedly high.
Q. In the case of the people who were executed, were they ex clusively Jews?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Did the exact numbers of executees -- did they ever become known?
A. He, they never did become known exactly. A lot of guess work best.
As a basis for his figure, the evacuated apartments might have
Q. How many members of SK 4-a took part in this execution, who had been ordered to do so by the Higher SS and Police leader?
A. As far as I remember, according to the number of people then
Q. Were these 15 men joined in a firing squad?
A. The men of SK 4-a were assigned to the general duties, whether any such people had been ordered to join a firing squad, I don't know.
I just don't know.
Q. During the action in Kiev did an officer of SK 4-a participate?
A. No, an officer did not participate, and I myself was not present at the execution. I personally was not fit for duty at the time.
Q. Were any reports made out by SK 4-a, about this execution perhaps giving the numbers?
A. The possibility exists. In my sick room Hoffman reported on the 1st or 2nd of October, and told me that he reported to Berlin, that the Group staff and the SK 4-a, and police units, had shot 33,000 Jews. As a further document he requested a report by SK 4-a. He then repeated this request. Whether this report was written or whether he dictated it, I don't know.
Q. Did you contradict such a procedure, or object to such a procedure of reporting about executions?
A. I told Mr. Hoffman at the time that such a procedure of reporting would give a completely false picture in Berlin, and if Berlin would ask for reports under oath, steps would be taken against him and myself; but Hoffman had already reported to Berlin and was not prepared to correct his reports afterwards. He continued to send detailed reports about Kiev to Berlin, which have also been included in these operation reports.
Q. Did you -- that is to say, did the SK 4-a -- have anything to do with the collection of clothing, since it says in the document that money valuables and clothing were safeguarded?
A. The SK 4-a had nothing to do with that. As far as I knew, Ukrainian militiamen did this.
Q. Do you know who received these things?
A. The Ukrainians had the administration of these things. How they were distributed, and who was the recipient, I don't know. The militia was under the Higher SS and Police leader.
Q. I again refer to Document Book 1, page 156 of the German text.
This Exhibit 30, Document NO-3140. In the English document book it is page 115, under III, in the middle of page 16 of the original. We have a report -
DR. HOCHWALD: It is page 125 of the English, Your Honor. BY DR. HEIM:
(continuing) In the middle of page 16 of the original, under III, there is a report about the operation against the Jews in Shitomir. There it says, I quote: "After the confinement of the Jews to a resstricted area, which had been carried out by the Feldkommandantur following a suggestion of the Sonderkommando 4-a, a considerable calm was noticed, for example, at the markets and so forth." tion to the Field Command?
A. As far as I remember the SK 4-a in a report to Group C suggested this in its report, about the situation in Shitomir. This was done because the Ukrainians had often confiscated apartments from Jews who had moved there in 1937, and at that occasion murders and excesses had taken place.
Q. On the next page of the document, about the middle of the German text, a little below the middle on page 17 of the original, a conference which took place on the 10th of September 1941 in the Field Command is spoken of. According to this situation report, it had been decided as a result of this conference to eliminate and liquidate the Jews of Shitomir Completely and finally, - did you participate in this conference, witness?
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, the Prosecutor just drew my attention to the fact that in the English document book the 13th of September 1941 is given as the date of the conference. In my document book, in the German text, it says the 10th of September 1941. I cannot determine at the moment which one is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: May we not have a look at the photostat to determine which is the correct date?
DR. HOCHWALD: Your Honors, please, this document is Exhibit No. 30.
THE PRESIDENT: The Secretary General, will please locate that exhibit and submit it to the Tribunal.
Q. ( By Dr. Heim) Witness, did you participate in this conference at the Field Command?
A. I didn't take part in such a conference, but I can say definitely that the report about Shitomir was submitted to the SS and Polices leader Jeckeln. The order of Jeckeln about the shootings and what was to happen about the Jews was brought by Obersturmbannfuehrer Meier. Furthermore, the document, just mentioned says that on the 19th of September the Jewish quarter was evacuated and three thousand and some odd Jews were registered and executed.
Q. Did the SK 4-a have anything to do with the execution of these Jews -- because the Prosecution insists on the responsibility of SK 4-a in this case.
A. The SK 4-a had nothing to do with this. The SK 4-a was not in Shitomir at the time but was about 150 kilometers east of it, just at the time they were marching into Kiev. On the occasion of this execution, and at any other time, or for any other reason, the SK 4-a did not confiscate any money, or valuables, or clothing. The statement in this document is absolutely incorrect and -
Q. In connection with this-
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. I didn't catch that last word.
INTERPRETER: The defendant said the statement was a big lie.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. All right.
Q. (By Dr. Heim -- continuing) In connection with this operation report just discussed I want to refer to Document Book 1, page 159 of the German, page 129 of the English text. There we find Document NO3824, Exhibit 31. This is your affidavit, witness. It is an affidavit of the 6th of June 1947. In this affidavit it says, under number 7, I quote:
"In September or October 1941 the Einsatzgruppe C under Dr. Rasch placed a gas van at my disposal, and one execution was carried out by means of that gas van." that is to say, the Special Commando 4-a, used the gas van. Is that correct?
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
A. No, I never said anything in my interrogation about the use of the gas van for Special Commando 4A. This cannot be concluded from my statement in the affidavit that the Sonderkommando 4a used the gas van. This gas van was always with Group C, that is to say, it was delivered around this Kiev time and it was with the group staff. The group staff at the time was at the same location as Sonderkommanda 4a. I saw this gas van employed by another unit and later the gas van was used as a truck for general purposes.
Q. I now come to a set of questions which refer to a number of situation reports. Witness, was another Kommanda in Kiev together with the Special Kommanda 4a?
A. Einsatz Kommando 5 had also arrived in Kiev on the 25th or 26th of September 1941 with about 150 men. This was not the entire Einsatz Commando 5. Einsatz Commando 5 was larger than that.
Q. Who was the Commanding officer of Einsatz Commando 5?
A. The Commanding Officer of Einsatz Commando 5 was then Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer who had until that time been permanent liaison officer to the higher SS and police leader for Group C and who had relieved Schultz.
Q. Did the performance of the two kommandos of Einsatz Group "C" in Kiev result in a change of the organization?
A. A change in the organization had been planned. The Special Kommando 4a which was weak and continued to be weakened by losses was to be dissolved and incorporated into Einsatz Commando 5. Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer was to assume leadership since I was to be relieved because of sickness and injury. This reorganized Kommando 5 was then to put men at the disposal of the regular garrison duties and men were actually detailed to Shitomir, Rovonow and other places.
Furthermore, it was planned for the area of Charkow to use a certain advance commando there.
Q. Was this plan realized?
A. Not essentially, except for the details which I have already just described, but the files of special kommando 4a were handed over to Einsatz Commando 5,
Q. What was responsible for this plan not being realized?
A. About this time, October 1941, the Reichsfuehrer SS visited the higher SS and police leader Jockelm at Kiev. Dr. Rasch for reasons known only to him incurred the displeasure of the Reichsfuehrer. He then subsequently left for Berlin. In his absence Dr. Hoffman took over the command of Group "C".
THE PRESIDENT: Will you suspend just for a moment, please. We have before us now photostat of the Exhibit which was under discussion a few minutes ago. We have document No. 3140 before us for scrutiny and on page 17 we are looking at the date which was a subject for discussion a few minutes ago. We would like to have both the Prosecution and defense look at the data and see if they can agree upon it because it is not entirely clear.
MR. HOCHWALD: It seems to me to be a zero, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Heim, does it seem more like a zero than an eight to you?
DR. HEIM; Your Honor, I consider the number to be. a zero.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we agree on that.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I would then request a corresponding correction in the English document book,
THE PRESIDENT: That correction will be made. What page is that, Mr. Hochwald, do you recall the page in the English text?
MR. HOCHWALD: I shall find out, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 126, Judge Dixon says.
MR. HOCHWALD: Yes, it is 126, on the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will accept for the moment September 10th as the date but we will not close the door to any further discussion on this date. It may be that the photostat can be subjected to microscopic inquiry in order that all ambiguity may be removed. It may be that in connection with the rest of the document and with other documents that the 18th of September might be more logical and then that would fortify the possibility that that digit is an eight instead of a zero but for the moment it will remain the 10 of September. BY DR. HEIM:
Q. Witness, I would like to repeat the question just asked of you. You have only answered it partly. Why was this reorganization which you mentioned not realized?
A. I described that Dr. Rasch had left for Berlin and Dr. Hoffman-had assumed command of the group. After the return of Dr. Rasch from Berlin in the last third of October, 1941, the command was finally handed over to Dr. Thomas in Kiev. The new Chief, Dr. Thomas, left the two kommandos, EK 5 and SK 4a, according to the plans and used SK 4a in the combat zone and EK 5 in the rear areas, just as Dr. Rasch also recommended my release since the setting up of garrison units had already started and was proceeding.
Q. What directives did the new group Chief, Dr. Thomas, make about the area or about the garrison disposition?
A. The remaining kommandos, SK 4a until it had completed the necessary motor repairs, remained in Kiev, but it had orders to meet with the other two sub-kommandos in the area of CHARKOW.
EK 5 was to remain In Kiev and to continue its activities East of the Dniepr River and the area Kiev -- POLTAWA was rear area territory.
Q. In your opinion, does the possibility exist that the simultaneous presence of SK 4a and EK 5 in the Kiev area lead to mix-ups in the reports of the chief of the security police and the SD?
A. The IK 5 with a strength of about 180 men and the rest of SK 4a with a strength of one kommando, which is one administrative officer and 30 men had the same garrison, namely, Kiev, as can be seen from the document book II-C, Exhibit 72, No. 2830.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please witness, would you like to make a request for the excuse of the defendant
DR. DURCHOLZ: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He will be excused under guard. BY DR. HEIM:
Q. Witness you just said that the Einsatz Commando 5 had a strength of about 180 men, whereas SK 4a had one commanding officer, one administrative officer and 30 men. Here you had reference to a document which shows this relationship. Will you please refer to this document once
A. The document in which these reports are listed is in document book 2-C, Exhibit 72, document NO-2830, operational report of the 12 November 1941, on page 20. I now refer to document book II-A on page 43 of the German text. This is Exhibit No. 38, document No. 3155 in the English document book. This is on page 43. This is the operational report 111 of the 12 October 1941. On page 4 of the original, pardon me, on page 5 of the original, the second paragraph reads as follows:
In the English document book it is on page 45 and I quote:
"on the 26 September, the Security Police took up its activities in Kiev. On that day 7 interrogation Kommandos of Einsatzkommando 4a started their work in the Civilian Prisoner Camp, in the Prisoner-of-War Camp, in the Jewish Camp, and in the city itself." it to you?
A. This is an obvious mix up with the EK 5 stationed in Kiev. As has been frequently mentioned before the SK 4a strength was negligible so that the activities of the SK 4a mentioned here is impossible. I repeat, the SK 4a in Kiev consisted of an administrative office and supply units, the drivers, four men, and 7 or 8 Ukrainians, two men in the division and three men in the orderly room. Usually three men were detailed for interrogation duties. The interrogations themselves were carried out by officers who were first of all brought in from the Reich to the group and who had been provided for garrison duties and they frequently changed. SK 4a never was active in carrying out interrogations in camps as the report mentions.
Q. In connection with the designations in Kiev, I refer to document book II-C, page 28 of the German text. This is Exhibit No. 72, Document No. 2830, This is on page 20 of the English text. On page 17 of the original in the next to the last paragraph on page 24 of the English document book, page 28 of the German, there it says, and I quote:
"In Kiev, Sonderkommando 4a regularly carried out interrogations and arrests, which in most cases led to executions. Here, almost without exception, we were concerned with active Communists who had worked for the KP."