given the qualification of such an enemy - proper enemy in the sense of international law. The character of the Soviet Union as a state, and, consequently, as a potential belligerent can, it is true, not be denied. But the question is Whether the Soviet Union, according to her own ideology and to the ideas which are its basis, has not to be considered as such a belligerent who, considering the war aims and methods of the Soviet Union, puts the presumptive adversary ipso facto into the position of war self-defense admissible in international law.
II. In addition, the defendants refer to the orders given and the state of emergency caused by these orders. As to this question Dr. Gawlik is going to give detailed explanations. Concerning this problem of superior orders contested by the statute here, and by Law No. 10 of the Control Council, I only want to give some quotations of passages from English - not German, works:
Professor Oppenheim has stated in his book, "The Law of Nations":
"Violations of the rules of warfare are war crimes only if they are committed without order of the belligerent government in question, If members of the armed forces commit such violations by order of their governments, such violations are no war crimes and cannot be punished by the opponent; the latter can, however, take reprisals. If members of armed forces are ordered by their military commanders to commit violations - the members cannot be punished - for the commanders alone are responsible and the latter can, therefore, be punished as war criminals after being captured by the enemy." writes in the article, "The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary to the Laws of War";
"The principle that members of the armed forces of a country are not personally responsible and can, therefore, not be punished for acts contrary to the rules of warfare and committed by them by order, or with approval, of their governmental or military superiors, is not part of the codified law on warfare.
Nevertheless, this seems to be a recognized principle of this law, at least, this principle has been drawn up in the war manuals of the powers as a rule of the common law on warfare since 1914." the supervision of the Judge Advocate General published by the U. S. War Department in 1940, and today still in force, states - after enumerating the possible war crimes:
"Individuals of the armed forces are not to be punished for these war crimes if the latter were committed by order, or with the approval, of their government or commanders. The superiors who ordered such acts or under whose authority such acts were committed by their troops, can be punished by the belligerents in whose hands they fall." British authorities in the British Manual of Military Law. Its Article 443 went on, after enumerating possible war crimes:
"It is, however, important to note that members of the armed forces who commit such violations of the recognized rules of warfare that have been ordered by their governments or commanders are not war crimes and can, therefore, not be punished by the enemy. He can punish the officials or commanders responsible for such orders if they fall into his hands, otherwise he can only take the other measures dealt with in this chapter." published in the English Year Book for International Law 1944:
"Although Chapter XIV of the Military Manual was not given statutory powers it contains, in general, a statement of the rules of written and common international law as they are understood by Great Britain."
man was to disobey the order of the Fuehrer, if is necessary to illustrate the situation in its historical development by a written expert opinion.
III. When Fieldmarshal Keitel defended himself and the OKW at the trial before the IMT, he tried to convey a picture of the distribution of power in the National Socialist regime, according to which the SS represented the will which governed the state - whereas the Wehrmacht and its leaders were in a state of unqualified subjection to this "fact". Wehrmacht and any leading institutions and supreme representatives of the State and Party, we must always remain conscious of the fact that the Wehrmacht enjoyed at all times a privileged position which was unique. claimed a central position in a comprehensive sphere of activities, was at the beginning of the war excluded from the Wehrmacht and from the occupied territories under the command of the Wehrmacht. (Example: The first groups of the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD (Security Service) marched into France camouflaged and under a false designation,) It was only before the Russian campaign that an agreement was concluded, after difficult negotiations, which regulated the tasks of the State Police and of the SD outside the troops. High Command of the Army and the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD which led to a written agreement which was signed by Quartermaster General, General Wagner, and by the then Chief of the Security Police and of the SD, Heydrich. Schellenberg kept the minutes. The agreement contained the basic order of the Fuehrer, that the Security of the fighting troops must be guaranteed by all means and that units of the Security Police and of the SD must be employed in support of the Army units.
The Chief of the Security Police and of the SD was given immediate authority to issue pertinent instructions to these units and an independent channel for receiving and transmitting reports which was outside the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht. These units by no means formed a special "political theater of operations" hut they were attached to the Army units - this was laid down in the second part of the agreement - and generally had to carry out tasks for the Army units within their areas, which had hitherto been handled by the Army units themselves. The second part contained an exact regulation of commands and subordinations. "In the Front or combat areas the Einsatzkommandos of the SIPO and of the SD were in all tactical and service questions that is completely - put under the command of the Army." In the operational areas they were under the command of the Army as far as service matters were concerned; orders resulting from tactical considerations had precedence over all other orders. If it was required by the military situation, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos could be used for military tasks regardless of other orders. The third part of the agreement explained the concepts "tactical" and "service".
In accordance with this agreement and the "Barbarossa-Order" to the Army units, which was based on it, mobile units designated "Einsatzgruppen" and "Einsatzkommandos" were attached to the Army Groups and Armies in the East, Army Group North got Einsatzgruppe A. Army Group Center got Einsatzgruppe B, and Army Group South got Einsatzgruppen C and D. (Einsatzgruppe D was originally intended to serve with an Army Group which was to operate in the Caucasus.) In spite of the intended official designation of the leaders of these units as "Representative of the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD with the commander of the Rear Area of Army Group......, Einsatzgruppe....", what happened in practice was that at once, at the beginning of the Eastern campaign whole Einsatzgruppen or the larger part of such groups were attached to Armies by order of the Army Group in question. Einsatzgruppe D was, from the first day and for the entire period which is of importance for this trial, attached only to the 11th Army and had no connection with the Commander of the Rear Area of the Army.
(Kommandos) each to the Commanders of the Rear Area of the Army and to three individual Armies, the detachments (Kommandos) of Einsatzgruppe C were at the disposal of the Armies only. That the Commanding Generals of Armies themselves attached great value to having the detachments in their operational area is proved by the subsequent alteration of the order for Sonderkommando 4a. This Kommando was assigned to the Commander of the Rear Area of the Army, but was attached to the 6th Army on the personal order of Field Marshal von Reichenau.
For "Marches" and "Rations" the Einsatzgruppe was subordinate to the Command Headquarters, which means that the Army units were competent for 1. Determining the location of the staff of the Einsatzgruppen and of the Kommandos, which included fixing the strength of the staffs and kommandos as well as the length of time to be spent in one location.
2. Billeting.
3. Rations including PX goods.
4. Gasoline.
5. Repair of motor vehicles and spare parts.
6. Ammunition.
7. Maps.
8. Field post.
9. Telecommunications. carried out in practice in the East we may form the following picture of the actual and. legal situation, which is typical for the manner in which orders were given:
1. The Einsatzgruppen and their subordinate units were fully motorized mobile units which were militarily equipped and organized.
Members of the State Police, of the Criminal Police, of the SD and units of the Ordnungspolizei and of the Waffen-SS were assigned to the Einsatzgruppen. They were thus units composed of a minority of specialists of the Security Police and of the SD and of units of the Ordnungspolizei and of the Waffen-SS. This unit was at the disposal of the Representative of the Chief of the Sipo and of the SD for his tasks in the operational area of the Command headquarters, to which he was attached. The special position of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos manifested itself also in the fact that they were not called Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and of the SD, but simply Einsatzgruppe A to D, or Kommandos 1 to 12. Their primary task being of the kind normally handled by the Security Police and by the SD, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were led by leaders of the Sipo or of the SD who were specially assigned this task.
2. The Representatives of the Chief of the Sipo and of the SD with the Army groups and with the Armies were attached to the Commanding Generals and subordinate to them in the functions which were most important for their work.
3. As regards technical instructions the powers of command of the Commanding Generals and of the Chiefs of the Security Police and of the SD were not clearly separated. The question had been deliberately left open and left to practice. But it was certain - and expressly mentioned in the Barbarossa order - that every order of the Army Group or of the Army, "for reasons of operational necessity" had precedence over the orders of the Chief of the Sipo and of the SD. Whenever it was necessary in the military situation, the Army units could on their own responsibility and at their own discretion make the Einsatzgruppen and the subunits subordinate to themselves for military tasks.
Defense Law of 4 September 1938. In Article 2 we read: "Once an operational area has been determined, the declaration of the state of defense confers on the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commanding Generals of Armies without special order the right to exercise executive power in this operational area. This right to give orders has precedence over instructions given by other superior agencies..."
Concerning, "competencies to issue orders in the operational area of the Army" the OKW moreover issued an order on 11 April 1940 which states under No. 3 with reference to the Reich Defense Law: "... in their exercise of executive powers the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Commanding Generals of the Armies are entitled to issue directives, to set up special courts and to issue instructions to the authorities and agencies in charge of the operational area, with the exception of the highest authorities of the Reich, the highest authorities of the Prussian State and the Reichsleigung of the NSDAP. This right to issue instructions has precedence over instructions of other superior agencies." and by an order of the LKW shows, that the right of issuing instructions to the higher SS-and Police Chief and the SS-and Police units under his command is gradually more firmly established. Thus on 7 September 1943 the OKW issued a "service instruction for the higher SS-and Police Chief in Greece", in which it is laid down among other things: "The Higher SS-and Police Chief is an agency of the Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police, which for the duration of its service in Greece is under the command of the Military Commander Greece"..... The Higher SS-and Police Chief receives directives and instructions for the field of activity assigned to him from the Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police and carries them out independently while making current and punctual reports to the Military Commander Greece, as far as he gets no restricting orders from the latter. The Military Commander must be informed in time of the reports submitted by the Higher SS-and Police Chief to the Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police". gypsies prima facie as elements of insecurity in accordance with the order of the Fuehrer at the beginning of the Russian campaign.
be noted that it was carried on under the jurisdiction of the Commanding Generals to whom these groups were attached. Therefore, in all tasks, including these which belonged in a stricter sense to the Security Police and the SD, this jurisdiction had to be respected, which means that these tasks could be carried out only with the express will or with the tacit consent of the commanding generals. This applies especially to the commanding general's capacity as supreme judicial authority for the population in his area of jurisdiction. It is true that the use made by the commanding generals of this capacity varied considerably in their dealings with the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos; in certain areas the organs of the Army invariably gave their consent to all executive acts affecting the population. In other operational areas the fact that the command authorities occasionally interferred in pending proceedings or gave orders for special measures concerning the population, showed that the commanding generals were not only conscious of their superior jurisdiction and position, but also made use of it.
It is with deep regret that we clarify these points. For the Defense, however, they are of great importance with respect to the possibility of disobeying given orders. The leaders of the Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos were executive officers with instructions. Their authority as to decisions started only with the very execution of their orders. For them there was no real possibility at all to prohibit the execution of orders themselves. Actually, there was merely the theoretical possibility for the Army Commanders to examine at their discretion - an account of their authority and their task concerning the security of their operational area, on account of their responsibility for safeguarding the front-line operations - the question of whether the actual killing of the people selected endangered their tasks.
If they had come to this conclusion they would have "been authorized to give instructions to prohibit liquidations. Likewise it is clear that, again theoretically, only intervention of the Commanders-in-Chief with the Fuehrer was possible. Defense is going to prove: 1.) the continuous close cooperation of the Army groups with the Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos. Orders of the Army Commanders to secure objectives, to carry out inspections, etc., and also other military tasks, e.g. investigations concerning anti-partisan measures, recruitment of Tartars for front-line service, will show the close connection between the Commanding General and Einsatzgruppe or Kommandos.
Finally, evidence will be submitted for the following: quently, also Supreme Military Judiciary authorities. (Oberste Gerichtsherren) for their areas, i.e., they made decisions affecting liberty, life and death. That they were conscious of this fact in relation to the civilian population is clearly shown by individual facts already mentioned or still to be mentioned. mentioned by the Prosecution were known to the responsible Commanding Generals. Written or oral reports were given in many cases about such executions by Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos to the Commanding Generals. executions, or took part in them, or gave special orders in individual cases.
IV. The prosecution has charged the defendants not only with crimes against humanity and with war crimes but also with membership in an organization that has been declared criminal.
Under Count 3, Mr. Ferencz stated:
"The judgment of the International Military Tribunal established the fact that the SS, the Gestapo, and the SD are criminal organizations." In reaching its decision, the Tribunal made frequent reference to the acts of the Einsatzgruppen. In the face of this, the Defense, will demonstrate the following: "SD", even by official authorities of the NSDAF and of the State, by all military authorities up to Adolf Hitler himself, a completely false conception as to the Actual meaning of "SD" arose among wide circles of the German people, especially during this war, above all, however, abroad, and especially among the occur, occupation authorities.
The error is based on the fact that the term "SD" had the two following meanings:
A. It is the term for a special news service organization, which collected, evaluated, and Submitted. reports to the appropriate authorities of the State and of the Party. This news organization which did not have any executive police powers either before or during the war, exercised its functions within the SS, that is within the Party its members were employees of the The party and were paid by the latter, just as in general, the entire budget was met not by the State but by the Party, that is, the Reich Treasurer.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt, please, If you say that Hitler himself mis-used the term SD --
DR. ASCHENAUER: I would like Your Honor to repeat what he said. The system was out of order.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I understood you to say that Hitler himself misused the term "SD"?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Yes, that is so.
THE PRESIDENT: If that is so, won't we then run into many complications as to the meaning of this term, because the Tribunal has been led to believe, and, with the Tribunal the rest of the world, that Hitler's word was law in Germany. Therefore, if he used the term "SD" in any particular way, wouldn't that of itself then make his meaning official?
DR ASCHENAUER: No, Your Honor. This is not a matter of the general mis-use, it just occurs in one particular decree in a sentence which was used here.
THE PRESIDENT: It would appear to me that from what we understand of Hitler's power, that if he called the SD a "PQ" that then it become "PQ" from that moment on.
DR ASCHENAUER: I don't think I have understood what Your Honor meant.
THE PRESIDENT: Whatever Hitler said was law, and if he used the term "SD" in any way opposed to your definition of "SD", Hitler's definition would be the law, would it not?
MR ASCHENAUER: No, Your Honor. That I quoted it here is one certain decree, which is erroneous, a mistake which has been made once, and all the other decrees which are being offered to the Tribunal, and submitted to them, who that what is said in this one sentence is a mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, it was for purpose of clarification that I had asked it. (interruption) Will you please repeat Dr. Aschenauer, it seems that it got into the wrong channel.
DR ASCHENAUER: The error is based on the fact that the term "SD" had the following meanings:
A. It is the term for a special news service organization which collected, evaluated, and submitted reports to the appropriate authorities of the State and of the Party. This news organization which did not have any executive police powers either before or during the war, exercised its functions within the SS, that is, within the Party;
its members were employees of the Party, and were paid by the latter, just as in general, the entire budget was met not by the State but by the Party, that is, the Reich Treasurer. If, therefore, the SD is referred to as an organization with a special assignment, that is an organization with certain tasks, only the above-mentioned news organization, with its clearly delineated duties, its installations and its personnel carrying out this task can and should be meant. Any other duty, or the assumption of a function is a false implication.
B. All wearers of the SS uniform with the SD marking on their left jacket sleeve were also characterized as "SD". From the beginning of the war, the SS uniform with the SD marking was worn by almost all of the members of the Secret State Police (Gestapo) including the Border Police, Criminal Investigation police, and especially all members of the Stapo and Kripe on combat assignment, were SS uniforms with the SD insignia. It is, therefore, easily understandable that everybody considered all men wearing this uniform to be "SD". Another result was that this term was not only applied to all those wearing those uniforms with the SD insignia but also to the organizations to which these men belonged. These were the SD offices in the actual sense of the word and the offices of the State Police and Criminal Police. For the sake of convenience and the desire for simplification and abbreviation, all of them were now called "SD". Thus the Wehrmacht, when dealing in enemy country with "commanders of the Security Police and of the SD" and with "Commanding Officers of the Security Police and of the SD"--that is what these agencies were officially called --, referred to them briefly merely as the "SD" only, for all members of these organizations were the SD insignia. Thus the French or the Norwegians referred briefly to these organizations and their personnel, all of whom were the SD insignia, as SD only, and usually they meant the State or Criminal Police. Actually, how could he know that the "Commander of the Security Police and of the SD" was an organizational term that could be traced back to the "Chief of the Security Police and SD," that even in these organizations there existed not always an SD news service set-up, or that in such organizations there were actually three completely independent and separate organizations included:
1. A news organization of the Party or of the SS, that is the SD in the real meaning of the word, as the organization with a special news service function.
2. Two authorities of the State Executive, that is of the Police (Stapo and Kripe), which in their special duties and activities, stood on an equal feeting completely independent one of the other, and were merely held together by purely organizational ties and by the fact that the same individual held, a lending position in both. (In this connection, see enclosed sketch.) mutually shared uniform (SD) finally went so far that even the Fuehrer in his "Commando Order" of 18 October 1942, ordered that the arrested commando troops be given over to the "SD" even though, in this instance, beyond all doubt, he meant the police executive, the State Police. It would not have occurred to any office in the Wehrmacht or the German Police to deliver members of an enemy commando, if they were arrested in the Reich, to an SD sector, for everyone know that this was exclusively the concern of the State Police. Kripe were this uniform and this SD insignia, even though they had nothing to do with the actual SD news service itself, as far as their duties were concerned? The answer to this requires a brief description of the development.
The "SD" as a news service originated in 1932, when HIMMLER commissioned HEYDRICH, a former naval officer, with the establishment of a news service, in order to combine uniformly the local "political information service" (P.I.) which had here and there arisen due to political necessity. This P. I. had the task of gathering information about the other political parties, their plans, and aims, in order to be able to utilize it in the struggle against the other parties.
include the gathering of information about all opponents of National Socialism, their organizations and their activities. The actual hour of birth of the SD, however, was in 1934 when a few old National Socialists who came from all circles of the movement and were thus clearly not recruited from the ranks of the SS alone, recognized the following to be true: The old parties of all shades of opinion, together or banned by the State. Any additional activity by these organizations is illegal and is therefore to be dealt with by the police, and the police is therefore authorized to fight, together with the Information Service, against such illegal opponents. This in itself proves that from the very beginning the SD (Security Service) was not at any time given such executive powers which rested exclusively with the police organs of the State. (Even at that time the SD was mainly engaged in the research and study of ideological contrasts and their effects on National Socialism.) Furthermore, they relized that A. Gradually, ever since 1933, all public criticism in parliaments, press and radio had been abolished. B. There was a growing tendency to misuse the Fuehrer principle and to push through orders, permitting no criticism. C. There existed the common tendency always to stress to higher authorities only the positive aspect of one's own field of activities, but to conceal in a shamefaced manner all unfavorable developments, mistaken measures, danger points, etc. only a completely distorted picture of the development and situation in the individual vital spheres (Lebensgebieten) (Law, administration, education, economy, etc.) They could no longer have a clear perception of the resulting reaction among the public and professional circles concerned. From this they concluded that an authoritarian state, by its every nature, needed an organization which would be willing and capable of presenting to responsible central agencies an objective and undisguised picture of the general position and developments without having any administrative responsibility itself.
In 1934/1935, this task was assumed by the SD with out explicit orders to that effect from any party or government authority, therefore, illegally, (For the authorization and legitimation of the SD as sole permissible news service of the NSDAP covered only the collection and transmission of news relating to counterreforms, their efforts and aims.) This explains why in 1934/1935 this part of the SD at the SD Main Office in Berlin consisted of a mere handful of men. Easter, 1935, for example, it consisted of a man who also worked as legal and administrative expert, 4 or 5 younger jurists, who had not finished their professional training and only worked part-time at the SD in addition to their other work, and 3 or 4 assistants. plete lack of agencies in the country and the necessity to build up this news service for vital spheres in a more or less illegal manner, because every reference to it caused sharp protests by the Party and above all by government authorities against this type of work. It was regarded by all these people as an inadmissible encroachment upon their own jurisdiction. Thus, for example, until 1936, the time when Ohlendorf entered the SD, the entire field of economy had hardly been dealt with. Only after that were systematic efforts made to win suitable specialists who were able to handle the individual vital spheres (Lebensgebietsarbeit) in an expert manner. At this juncture, it may already be said that from this work in purely vital spheres done by the Zentralabteilung II/2 the Amt III was subsequently developed under OHLENDORF, this is today considered the SD in the proper sense. "Chief of the German Police" with the official designation "Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police at the Reich Ministry of the Interior" in the process of another governmental reform and the centralization of the police which had hitherto been under the direction of the Laender.
Under him were Daluege as "Chief of Police and Heydrich as "Chief of the Security Police" Thereby, Heydrich simultaneously held a post in the administration of the SD as news service of the Party and of the entire German Security Police. This two-fold function explains the subsequent title of "Chief of the Security Police and SD" from which derives the designation "Commander" (or in command) (Befehlshaber) bzw. Kommandeure) of the Security Police and the SD in the occupied territories. Whereas until 1936 probably only a few members of the police, mainly the State Police, belonged to the SS, partly to the SD and partly to the General SS Himmler, from 1936 on, endeavored to have the SS take over the whole police organization. Thus from 1936 to 1939 many members of the police force who were eligible for the SS, were taken over into the SS, starting with the State Police and Criminal Police. Heydrich brought it about that the transferred members of the Stapo and Kripe began to wear SS uniforms. They were the SD insignia on the left sleeve, although they were never in any way connected with the SD as news service and as organization for a special task but remained, as hitherto, members of the state executive. Neither common service nor esprit de corps tied them to the SD. The uniform clothing of the Stapo and the SD, the distribution of which was started at that time, gave the uninitiated the first cause to designate on bloc as SS, members of two organizations of totally different fields of activitywork of a news service for vital spheres and executive work of the Security Police - merely becuase of their uniform outer appearance that is to say the SD uniform with the SD insignia. This misleading collective name led to the habit, of calling SD men not only the members of both organizations but of designating the offices and field of activity of both institutions simply as "SD". In fact, 90 percent of the people wearing SD uniforms had nothing to do with the actual work of the SD news organization. On the other hand, the SD of the RFSS, purely as news service, was not connected with the state executive (State Police and Criminal Police), either by subject matter or by its duties.
In spite of this fact, it was also called SD in common usage and especially also during the war in official announcements, decrees and orders (see Hitler's commande order). (Besides, in the NS-State there were numerous such 'personal unions' (one person being the holder of two or more jobs) as for instance in the person of Goering, the Minister President of Prussia, Reich Minister for Air, Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, Reich Chief for Hunting, etc. Nobody would dream of it to call all this one organization on account of the 'Personalunion'.) produced. There we see two completely different organizational and actual spheres of office - one of them the Party, the other the State. But the men working in these two completely independent and different set-ups are wearing the same uniform: The SS-uniform with SD. These were the first decisive causes for the above-mentioned complete confusion. the Party news service and the State Police were, on account of wearing the same uniform, mistakenly looked upon as one uniform entity, whereas from the very beginning they also showed very relevant actual differences among each other. These differences were the cause that already in 1937/38 some spheres of work Were completely taken away from the SD (II/i) and were handed over to the Secret State Police Office, namely Communism and Marxism. The 1938 decree concerning the division of functions (Funktiens-Trennungs-Erlass) already made it quite clear that the SD had nothing whatsoever to do with the comprehensive intelligence Service in enemy territory. These differences were ultimately settled when, urged by the State Police in 1938, another reorganization was effected, the result of which was the establishment of the "Reichssicherheitshauptant" (Reich Main Security Office.) Thus it was ultimately made clear that the dealing with the enemy in its entirety as far as intelligence service and actions resulting from it were concerned, belonged to the competence of the Secret State Police, that is to say, Amt IV of the RSHA.
This reorganization terminated the former Zentralabteilung II/1 (Central department) (Enemy research) ("Gegnerforschung") in the framework of the SD as a news service organization, and from that time onwards the SD's exclusive sphere of work was that of a mere news service organization, exclusively occupying itself with "Lebensgebietsarbeit" (matters concerning vital spheres). The former Zentralabteilung II/2 (Lebensgebiete) became the AMT III of the RSHA, and its employees were branded as members of a criminal organization in the IMT verdict. The SD, however, which organization was declared to be a criminal one, is according to its development the leading Zentralabteilung II/2 (Lebensgebiete), which at no time has had any contacts whatsoever with the tasks and the activities of the State Police (Stapo).
As from September 1939 the following set-up was given:
The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office) (RSHA) consists of 7 - seven - Aemter:
Amt I: Organization and Personnel Amt II:
Administration and Economy Amt III:
SD - Home Front (Lebensgebiete) Amt IV:
Secret State Police Amt V: Criminal Amt VI:
SD-Ausland (Foreign News Service) Amt VII:
Scientific Research problems of the Sipe (Stapo and Kripe) (State Police and Criminal Police) and of the SD in one organization. As far as their objectives are concerned they remain separated in the Amt, as for instance all the personnel problems of the SD (Amt II, VI and VII) Were handled in Referat I A 4 by men of the SD, of the former SD-Main Office, that means employees of the Party. They are exclusively concerned with SD, that is Party personal data, which have nothing to do with the problems concerning civil servants (Stapo and Kripe).It is the same in AMT II.
The administration of the budget funds is handled completely separately in Amt II. And this by necessity, for the administration has to concern itself with;
A. The budget funds of the State (Stapo and Kripe)
B. The budget funds of the Party (SD). Here completely different directives are followed, for not only the salaries and wages were entirely different, but so were also the whole of the accounting system of the Party and of the state. its tasks, AMT III was a hundred percent identical with the former Zentralabteilung II/2 (Lebensgebiete) of the SD-Main Office. Therefore, it is exclusively a Party office, its men are employees of the Party, they receive Party wages, have no civil service rights and duties, are exclusively subordinate to Party orders, and for this reason only they cannot have any State executive powers. If individual men, as will be commented on later, were detached for executive tasks, then they were used as individual persons. They worked by order of the State (Stapo and Kripe) and not as SD and in pursuance of its tasks: to be the Party news service without any executive functions.
AMT IV takes ever the tasks of the Secret State Police. Therefore, its special tasks are exclusively those of the State Police as an executive agency of the State. One might say that Amt IV is identical with the Secret State Police Office. Reich Criminal Office, which is also a purely State executive organism.
AMT VI (Foreign News Service) takes over the tasks of the former Zentralabteilung III/2 (Foreign News Service) therefore it is also a more SD (Party) office, its members are Party employees and do not possess any executive powers.
AMT VII (Scientific Research) is also a mere SD (Party) office without any executive powers and without any regional agencies. It did not have any real predecessor in the SD-Main Office. Its task is philosophical historical scientific research in the sphere of "Weltanschaung" which is laid down in a series of publications. This task too, did no longer exist during the war, so that it really only constituted a library and archives office. was a clear and unequivocal separation of mere news service tasks (Amt II, VI and VII) on the one hand, and of the State Executive (Amt IV and V), so that at the beginning of the war there is no longer any overlapping of competencies. Verdict that the SD after 1939 were an auxiliary organization of the Government's Executive Branch. The only factors which these different offices had in common with each other were three:
A. The same uniform.
B. The same chief (HIMMLER AND HEYDRICH).
C. The merely technical junction effected by the organizational structure of the RSHAL, which, however, only exists in the main office, because regionally, the Stapo offices, themselves entirely self-contained and independent from each other on the one and, on the other hand the SD sections continued to exist. The Security Police Inspectorates and the SD Inspectorates are offices with no executive duties but only with supervising and organizational tasks without any departmental competence and power of command. The Stapo office received its directives for its work exclusively from Amt. IV of RSHA, the SD sector exclusively from Amt III and VI of RSHA.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, I think this might be a convenient time to take the morning recess. Before we actually recess, let me indicate to the defense counsel that Mr. Wartenberg, the interrogator, who took most of the statements of the defendants, will be available this afternoon for cross-examination on the part of defense counsel with regard to the manner of taking of the statements.