Q. Did this happen in your agency in Frankfurt on the Oder in the years 1936 to 1939, and to what extent and on what basis?
A. During the activity in the direction of these state police agencies in Frankfurt on the Oder and Graz no Jews were arrested, only because they were Jews, but as anyone else who violated any Reich Law or any decree, that is, a cumulative arrest was not carried out by me.
Q. For what period are you saying this, witness?
A. I say this for the period from September, 1937 -- no, from September, 1936 to September, 1937, and from July, 1938 to July, 1939.
Q. Did you ever get orders from Berlin to arrest Jews?
A. I remember very clearly one decisive case, but that was the only case which, for the periods I have named, was concerned at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, why don't you answer your attorney's question very directly? He said did you ever receive any orders from Berlin to are rest Jews. Now, the answer to that is yes or no.
THE WITNESS: Yes, in this one case.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Then you want to say there was only once that you received such an order?
THE WITNESS: For this period, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Al right, let's be very specific. All right, proceed, Dr. Hoffmann.
Q. (By Dr. Hoffmann) When was this?
A. That was in connection with the incidents of the 9th and 10th of November, 1938.
DR. HOFFMANN: Your Honor, may I take the liberty to come back to this later?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
Q. (By Dr. Hoffmann) Witness, I now want to determine definitely from when to when were you in Frankfurt on the Oder?
A. I was in Frankfurt on the Oder from the fall of 1936 until September, 1937 as director of the State Police; after that, as a coworker for the border inspector.
He was senor Government Councilor Damzog, who at that time had moved his office from Breslau to Frankfurt on the Oder.
Q. And what happened to you when your activity in Frankfurt on the Oder ceased? Where did you go then?
A. My activity in Frankfurt on the Oder ended in July, 1938, but in the period in between, that is to say, from the 10th of March on, for the duration of three months, I was used as a liaison officer between the security police and the regular police and was sent to Graz in Austria in this capacity. From this time on I returned to Frankfurt and from July, 1938 on I was again given the direction of the State police office, and this activity ended after one year, end of July, 1939, At that time the border inspector Southeast was transferred and was not replaced by another person. Therefore, I was put in charge of the border inspector's job for this part of Southeastern frontier of the Reich, as a deputy. I was in this position when war broke out.
Q. And what happened after the war broke out?
A. I remained in this position after war broke out until Easter, 1941. At that time the Southeastern campaign in the Balkans was finished and that ended my activity and my security job and my customs job ceased because the border was occupied by the military.
Q. Witness, in Graz up to the period which you stated in the year 1941, did you have any activity other than in Frankfurt or was it the same?
A. If you mean Frankfurt, the time when I was with the inspector, yes, but if you mean the time during which I was with the state police, then no.
Q. I understand you correctly then that you performed the same activity in Frankfurt on the Oder as you did in Graz?
A. Yes. First of al, direction of a state police agency and then a purely inspectional job with the border police.
Q. What happened to you when your job in Graz became superfluous?
A. I was called to Berlin and I was given a temporary job. This job was to suspend the state police agency at Aachen.
I was to be changed and reorganized into another agency in another city. Furthermore, the organization of the border police as it had existed thus far in the West was to be adapted to the new conditions in the West owing to the newly acquired territory there.
Q. Witness, how long did this position last?
A. This activity was almost completed when, on the 17th of June, 1941, as I recall, I was called up by the personnel office in Berlin to report to Berlin the next day. When I asked what was the matter they could not answer me. They just told me that I had to count on a lengthy absence.
Q. What happened on the next day?
A. I want ot Berlin, reported to the personnel office, and there they told me that in place of the director of the police agency at Hamburg who had become ill, Government Councilor Creutzer, I was to be sent to an assignment abroad. Creutzer had become ill and the day before they had received an official certificate of his illness and I was taken in his stead.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this, Dr. Hoffmann?
DR. HOFFMANN: I believe the 18th of June.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Q. (By Dr. Hoffmann) 18th of June?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they tell you on the 18th of June where this assignment would take you and what it was concerned with? A. No, the personnel office told me nothing. They only told me hat on the same day I was to report to the Prinz Albrecht Palace of RSHA and there I would receive my orders and all further information.
Q. Did you then go to the RSHA?
A. Yes, I went there at appointed time and I found 25 to 30 higher ranking SS officers there, of whom two to three were known to me from my previous activities. I knew the chief of Office I, Strecken bach, who was there.
Of other officials I saw other SS officers, such as Nebe, Stahlecker, Rasch, also Standartenfuehrer Ohlendorf. I did not know him at the time. For the first time I found myself in such surroundings and in such a circle of people and I could not find out what was the matter. The officers who were gathered there had already been in Pretzsch or Dueben several days and they only told us that men and vehicles had been collected there.
Q. What was the result of this conference in which you participated? with what result did you leave this place?
A. When we sat down at eh conference table Heydrich appeared and told us the following: The Fuehrer had to decide to take up the fight against the Soviet Union. It was a matter of getting ahead of Bolshevism, but his time it was not only a matter of a military opponent but an ideological one, and this opponent is a fanatic fighter and the fight would be ruthless. The breaking of the Bolshevist system was, however, not only the job of the security police but was also the job of the Army, and the Fuehrer had made this clear to the Army unequivocable and had given it the same orders. Ont the basis of the Fuehrer order it had become possible or arrange an agreement between the Wehrmacht and the security police.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Hoffmann, he is now going to go into the details of his instructions, and I think this might be a good point at which to break off for the recess, don't you?
DR. HOFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will reconvene at 1:45 (A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 4 December 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. HOFFMANN: that you described to the Tribunal what happened in the Prinz Albrecht street. When you gave this description I noticed that you talked about the fuehrerorder on that occasion without having mentioned it before. would you just describe how you got to know about the feuhrerorder first, and the contents of it? Albrecht Palais I had not yet spoken about the fuehrerorder, but Heydrich had told us that war with Russia was unavoidable and that on the basis, of the Hitler order an agreement between the army and the security police could be made on the basis of which Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were being set up, and were assigned as part of the army.
Q Witness, that was all you were told there? afterwards? were still being set up. The same day, together with quite a number of the leaders who had been also present there, I travelled to Pretsch or to the Duebener Heide, the Duebener Heath, to the stations provided for the units. I myself travelled to Dueben, and one or two days later, I don't exactly remember, we were asked to go to Pretsch because further orders would be given to us there. Together with Herr Ohlendorf, II went there. Streckenbach appeared as deputy of Heydrich, Office Chief 4 was also present. In general, it was almost the same circle of officers whom I had already met in Berlin.
Q What were you told there? we knew the situation, he assumed. The Einsatzgruppen would march with the fighting units. This was the most difficult assignment which the security police would ever deal with. He described to us the difficulties of the task in detail in view of the enemy we would have to deal with. In this connection, I can remember one sentecne verbally which impressed me particularly. He said, "Keep the last bullet for yourself so that you won't fall alive, into the hands of the enemy." Apart from that, he announced to us the order of the fuehrer, that in order to break the bolchevist system it was necessary to eliminate the Bolchevist leading circles, and since the Eastern Jews were its most important bearers, they were to be liquidated, including women and children. This was the order from Hitler. We were under military law, and absolutely had to obey this order.
Q What was the first personal impression you had of this? the others who were present. I could see that the higher officers reacted in such a manner that they immediately went to Streckenbach and disputed the matter very vividly and objected to it. I was one of the lowest ranks present there and, therefore, saw no reason to take part in this objection, because I realized that the high officers were already doing this; and in view of the personal connections which they seemed to have, it would be much better for them to deal with this matter, but I also realized, or I heard that Streckenbach recognized the misgivings, but finally he pointed out that this was the fuehrerorder which could not be charged and which had to be carried out.
Q You witnessed then, Witness, that the order continued to exist?
A Yes. It continued to exist and was not changed. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Witness, what was Streckenbach's rank? in Army terms?
Q Major General. What was the rank of the highest officer in the group that spoke with him?
Q Was there anyone who had a rank higher than Streckenbach?
A I don't quite know. I don't know whether the Office Chief 4, Mueller, was already a Gruppenfuehrer or still a Brigadefuehrer?
Q Were there several at least of the same rank as Streckenbach's rank?
A I think so. Nebe, I believe; Rasch; whether Stahlecker already had that rank, I don't know, but I think so; then there were people, who were one or two ranks lower; some oberfuehrers, and some standartenfuehrers, and then obersturmbannfuehrers, and people of my rank which was the lowest one; the rank of a major, there was perhaps a dozen people. bach?
A Yes. Gruppenfuehrer Mueller was there, but I don't think that he took an important part in the discussion, because, as Streckenbach had said, he had been instructed by Heydrich to tell us about this order. rank according to Streckenbach's did not go further, that is to say, appeal to Heydrich directly? even on the basis of their personal relations which they had, I think that certainly a few of them might have been on familiar terms with Streckenbach-- that they knew Streckenbach so well that he had the authority to say that and that they never doubted that Streckenbach would announce anything or take an authority to which he was not entitled. On the other hand, Office Chief 4 was with him.
The fact that he was present alone and his attitude, even if I don't remember his words, showed that there simply was no doubt about the commission of Streckenbach. Mueller and Ohlendorf and the others?
Q Well, then why couldn't all the officers who objected strenuously to this, including Streckenbach, go to heydrich and point out that it was impossible for them to perform this task?
A It is very difficult for me to answer this question. It originates, rather, it can be answered with the same reasons I gave before. We also expected and it had been said that, before the Einsatzgruppen and commandos were to move Heydrich himself would carry out an inspection. On that occasion the opportunity would arise for those officers to talk to Heydrich himself; whether this happened, I don't know. task I am speaking of, this day when you first learned of the fueherorder, and you say that you heard it with not only misgivings but with some shock, and this revulsion was shared by other officers, and officers equivalent in rank to Streckenbach attempted to reason with him about it, and Streckenbach received their protests sympathetically and agreed it was a very difficult order but said that his hands were tied and couldn't do anything about it. Arriving at that stage, why couldn't all the officers, including Streckenbach, then go to the next higher level, the next higher exhelon, and again in a very friendly and rationalizing manner, point out that this order was impossible of fulfillment? Why couldn't that have been done? the fuehrerorder had been given and it could not be evaded and absolutely had to be obeyed, I assume that these higher officers who knew the situation much better and who firmly believed that in fact it was a fuehrerorder, they therefore refrained from making representations to the chief of the security police.
at all, they merely objected to Streckenbach, that is right, isn't it?
PRESIDENT: Very well, proceed, Dr. Hoffmann.
BY DR. HOFFMANN: did you have the impression that these officers who protested were afraid of going to Heydrich?
A I don't think so at all, because I am convinced that Streckenbach or the other officers who objected could have found a way of going to Heydrich, but obviously in view of the situation they were convinced that Heydrich would only confirm this order again and nothing else. BY THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't their consciences be relieved somewhat if at least they would have made the attempt and not left it to conjecture as to what Heydrich would say? to Dueben and there he inspected the units which were about to advance. I am convinced that in this connection, too, the officers, the higher officers, who had reported to the chief of the security police talked to him and debated this question again, but could not come to another result; but in my own sphere I did not hear anything about it, and it was only confirmed to me again that this fuehrerorder was to be carried out.
PRESIDENT: Dr. Hoffmann, that answer is not very clear to me, is it clear to you?
DR. HOFFMANN: No, but I will ask him something about this. BY DR. HOFFMANN: general opinion perhaps that Hitler as well as Himmler and also Heydrich basically would never revoke a once given order, only because of requests and objections made by normal human beings?
A I think so. I think one was quite convinced of this. BY THE PRESIDENT:
this, he merely made his inspection, left, and then the detail moved on to Eastern Russia--Western Russia? was when the inspection in Dueben took place, the units which had since been set up were standing in an open place and the unit officers, those who had the same rank as I had, were standing immediately in front of their units. We, therefore, stood there before the chief came, then marched past him and we personally had no opportunity to talk to him, but the higher officer, who then accompanied the personal staff of the inspecting officer, had an opportunity to talk to him, and I saw them talking.
Q Well, you saw them talking, but you didn't hear what they were talking about?
A No. I say I cannot pass a judgment from my level. these protesting officers never brought it to the attention of Heydrich?
Q Well, just a minute. You are convinced of what? I ask you now, do you know of your own personal knowledge whether these other officers spoke to Heydrich about the fuehrerorder before you actually moved into Russia--of your own personal knowledge?
Q Now, please answer that question. Do you, or do you not know of your own personal knowledge, whether they spoke to Heydrich about the fuehrerorder and the possibility of its fulfillment?
PRESIDENT: Very well. Proceed, Doctor.
THE WITNESS: Well, in this connection, may I add that before the units he made a speech in which he again pointed out the task which was to be carried out. This convinced us that this order could not be altered and, therefore, was an order about which Heydrich could not decide either, but that it was a fuehrerorder which had come from the supreme head of the state.
BY MR. HOFFMANN:
Q. Witness, let us go back to yourself. I would like to first ask you what was your own attitude toward the order when you received it?
A. This order and the general situation upset me very much. For me personally there were two facts, which shocked me particularly. The first fact was that a war with Russia should break out at all. This fact to which our attention had been drawn upset the ideas which I had of a war and of a possible conclusion of the war. In my profession I had no opportunity to take an interest in higher politics and conducting war. I had only imagined a war with certain limits and I now faced the fact that the war was being expanded, the consequences of which were unimaginable.
had heard officially. Particularly with regard to Russia the press and other official statements did not mention anything, so that the fact of the war surprised me all the more. Also a war with the Bolshevist opponent would be a difficult one and was also bound to entail cruelty and atrocities. The order itself I considered impossible and I could not imagine if and how it could be carried out.
Q. Witness, what did you object to in this order? Did your upbringing not agree with it or your inner attitude? What effect did this order have on your feelings?
A. When attitude is the result of upbringing, it concerned both, but in the end it was my conscience.
Q. How did you think you could get out of this difficulty?
A. In those days I could not imagine that at all. I could only wait and see how things would develop. Apart from that we had been told that I with my Einsatzkommando 12, as part of the Einsatzgruppe D, was assigned to the Caucasus Mountains. The Army Group to which the Einsatzgruppe was attached had not yet been set up. It was still in the southeast territory. There were still thousands of kilometers which had to be fought for first, before we could over reach the Caucasus Mountains, and when this would be and should I ever reach the Caucasus Mountains, these were questions for me which remained unanswered and to which I could not find a reply. Perhaps I myself would never have occasion to carry out this order and such a situation might never arise for me. Perhaps by then things might occur which might make it unnecessary to carry it out.
Q. What happened actually? If I remember rightly, you were appointed to be in charge to Einsatzkommando 12?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was your Einsatzkommando?
A. As I have already stated, when we came to Dueben, - incidentally the enlisted men were gathered there and they vehicles, they were all in a large parking lot--after the order had been announced in Pretsch, the units were divided and I was told that one unit was Einsatzkommando 12, of which I was to be in charge.
Q. How strong was this Einsatzkommando?
A. The Einsatzkommando had about 130 to 140 men.
Q. What was their equipment?
A. I would first like to add here that this was the strength when it was set up. Later on, of course, some changes took place because of losses and other circumstances. The kommandos were fully motorized units. With vehicles as the offices in the Reich had sent them. They were not special Army vehicles, but common vehicles as you use in the city.
Q. And, witness, what were the weapons you had?
A. The weapons were nothing special either. The men of the Regular Police and the Reserve had carbines and the men of the Waffen SS they had one or two machine guns. Apart from that they only had pistols. In all in my unit there were perhaps at the most six to eight submachine guns, and no heavy weapons.
Q. Were the members of your Einsatzkommando 12 volunteers, or were they forced to join?
A. No one was a volunteer. They had all been drafted and ordered to go there. The members of the Security Police had been drafted by Regional Offices of the State Police and the Criminal Police, sometimes also by SD offices.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you don't mean, witness, that every member of your detachment was drafted into the SS, do you?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your statement they were under compulsion is not entirely correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Were you drafted? Did you join the SS voluntarily?
THE WITNESS: I only belonged to the SS, Special Formation SD and because of my position I had the same rank as an officer but for the actual assignment not one was a volunteer and the members of the Regular P Police, perhaps, were only drafted a few months earlier, and until that time they had carried out their jobs as tailors or business men or whatever they were.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what you mean is that the order to move into Russia was a military order and therefore you were acting under the compulsion of the military order, but you don't mean that each and everyone in your Einsatzkommando or in the Einsatzkommando was drafted into the SS, because you know that there were many who were volunteers.
THE WITNESS: It is definitely right, yes, absolutely, but I talked about matters generally, in as far as the actual assignment was concerned. For the actual assignment nobody could volunteer. The men from the Regular Police were age groups which the Army did not require, who had been released for police jobs. They had been drafted, at least, and the Main Office of the Regular Police had assigned then to the Security Police. The Waffen SS men had been drafted by a Police company in Berlin and the members of the Security Police originated. as I already said, mostly from the Regional Police Offices. who had been released because member of small offices had been dissolved and therefore the men were available.
Q. Witness, did you notice that when the members of Einsatzkommando 12 were selected only special directives were observed or was everything mixed up that is, were there all kinds of people at all ages?
A. Yes, they were all kinds of people, and I am convinced that often there were mere coincidences that these men came to the Einsatz assignment.
Q. How was the attitude of these men with regard to this assignment?
A. First of all, my recollection is not quite clear, whether even before leaving Pretzsch every individual officer and man know about this Fuehrer Order and had been told about it. In this connection, it was not yet necessary. First of all we had to advance, in order to reach the area to which we were assigned.
Q. When did Einsatzkommando 12 leave Dueben?
A. While the other Einsatzkommando moved on already the day after Heydrich had made the inspection, Einsatzkommando D, as far as I remember it remained for about another week in Dueben and as I thought, because they had been assigned to the Caucasus Mountains and the assignment for the Caucasus any way was not yet necessary. The day of departure, as far as I remember, was fixed for the 28th or 29th of June, 1941.
Q. Please describe to the Tribunal the route after the 28th or 29th of June until you came to your permanent station.
A. In a closed column, the Einsatzkommando moved from Dueben via Bohemia. In two days they reached the Austrian Hungarian border. On the third day, the Hungarian territory was crossed and the city of Chesburg in Siebenbuergen was reached. As far as I remember, already one or two kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe were branched off. These two kommandos, or this one, marched over the mountains into Roumanian territory The Einsatzgruppe staff and the other kommandos made their first station in Piatraneamt, which was a barracks camp. The Group Staff remained there for some time, perhaps ten, perhaps 14 days. I can't say exactly, and then the Einsatzgruppe Staff and the other kommandos, except for Kommando 12 marched into Roumanian territory.
Q. Where did your kommandos stay?
A. I said already that Einsatzkommando 12 remained at Piatraneamt.
Q. How long did you stay there.
A. Kommando 12 remained stationed until the end of July 1941, partly in Piatraneamt, partly near Jassy, in the original Rumanian territory.
Q. When did your Einsatzkommando move to Russia and where to?
A. While the Einsatzgruppe staff and the other commandos had already advanced Pruth and Jassy, following the fighting units, the connection between them and Einsatzkommando 12 had become very loose. Therefore, Einsatzkommando 12 followed into the Russian territory and the first location they reached was Olschanka on the other side of the Knjestr River. Olschanka at that time was the headquarters of the Group Staff.
AA few days later, perhaps a week later, I don't know quite exactly, the group staff and together with them the Einsatzkommando 12 moved their garrison to Charnomin. Charnomin was not a village it was an old castle in the side buildings of which the Einsatzkommando and Kommando 12 were quartered. that time? August, was kept there as reserve, but about two weeks previously, the Einsatzkommando chief gave orders and instructions to detachments of Kommando 12 and to me personally, too. the kommando? August, that two platoons of Einsatzkommando 12, two platoons consisting of 10 to 15 men, were to help to bring in the harvest and to help the Army do this.
This was a mission of the Army of the socalled economic kommando, for short, in German, W.i.k.o. The job consisted of working together with units of the Army who were available for this purpose and to in collecting the crop which had became overripe in this territory and to organize the harvesting. These platsoon were therefore assigned certain territory or some localities where they had to carry out these measures. If I understood you correctly, at the order of Ohlendorf this subcommando left? you visit the commandos as well which had been detailed. of course I wanted to have a look at the work out there, and I don't know exactly, whether I made one or two trips to those distant areas in order to have a look at the work.
Q You say "work of the commando." Do you mean to say mass executions, or what are you referring to by work of the commando? in the harvest and to help the Army to do this, and not to carry out the Fuehrer order.
Q Why not? under the reasons of the Wehrmacht, a very specialized mission. This that time, because of an agreement or because of some request made by the Army, there existed a directive that the Jews in the flat country should be exempted from the registration, which had been ordered by the Hitler orders. Because of these special considerations the Army did not want these measures to be carried out yet.
Q How could you prove that this existed? I was not subordinated to a special unit of the Army yet, but this was an instruction which I expressly received from the Einsatzgruppen chief in this connection.
Q The Einsatzgruppen chief was? the harvest, did you hear of any special occurences there? events reported to me. I could convince myself, that the harvest measures were being carried out as it could be expected.
Q How about shootings? Did any shootings take place during these actions? BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Let's have the date, Dr. Hoffmann, please, of this particular activity. haps, I am not quite certain, until about the 23rd or 25th of August, 1941. bringing in the harvest? men of my commando under my responsibility.
Q Did you yourself participate in the harvesting? of the commando, of the rest of the commando in Chanomin, but I cannot quite say whether once or twice I travelled to the district where my two platoons, were working. I believe only once, on another occasion, I had an economic mission to travel somewhere else.
Q Were your men all farmers?
Q What did they know about harvesting? measures had to be taken, and, as happens so often, something had to be done in a matter which, although one does not really understand the matter, but that was not what was needed, whether one understood. agriculture or not here. dorf told you, "Now, you go ahead and harvest this wheat." What would you do? Would you know what to do?
DR. HOFFMANN: May I say something just briefly?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you a farmer, Dr. Hoffmann?
DR. HOFFMANN: No, I am not. Witness. may I add another question to the question of the President? By "bringing in the harvest", did you mean that you people themselves filled the hay wagon or that they cut the horn, or what do you understand by bringing in the harvest in this connection?
THE WITNESS: I have already expressed myself to the effect, the organization of bringing in the harvest. They did not operate the machines themselves and cut the wheat, but to see to it that the harvesting was done by the people in the rural districts. And may I say two sentences here to describe the situation which we found in this fertile part of the Ukraine?
DR. HOFFMANN: Witness, one question. Your people did not work. themselves, they merely supervised?
THE WITNESS: Yes, they gave instructions. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Did they know enough about agriculture to give instructions? It takes a smarter man to give the instructions than to do the work.
A Your Honor, I quite understand you. I was not able to say my two sentences yet. They were not to give expert instructions here, but merely to give some intiative orders, to make the population in the country carry out the work to their expert knowledge and according to their expert knowledge and according to their old experience, but the following was necessary for this. The population in Bolshevist Russia was only used to do something when ordered, not on their own initiative and not as necessity arose. But since the administration of the districts did notexist any more, no district administration gave any instructions that the collective farms so-and-so collect their harvest tomorrow, and since no order came, they just did not do anything. ratively--the organization for bringing in the harvest was there but someone had merely to see that the machine was put into motion and supervise its operation. That is what you did?