DR. HOFFMANN: May I make it more concrete then.
Q. Witness, did you dissipate the inner resistance of these people against this order and did you tell them that this order was necessary?
A. To do this, such an inner resistance would have to have been evident to me and I didn't see any trace of this. Ho such resistance came to my attention on the part of the client of Mr. Hoffmann and to which I would have had to answer. I was concerned with making it easier for my men and then one had to make them realize the seriousness of their tasks.
Q. You want to claim, witness, that all the men, especially my client , did not object to carrying out these orders?
A. No, I didn't say any word about this. The question was -did such an open resistance -- was such an open resistance evident to me, and how did I act on such resistance. In two and one-half years I had sufficient occasion to see how many men of my Gruppe did not agree to this order in their inner opinion. Thus, I forbade the participation in these executions on the part of some of those men and I sent some back to Germany.
Q. But it is your opinion that this is merely a matter of nerves?
A. I have had no possibility to investigate the various psychiatric conditions of every single man.
Q. Witness, the question is too serious to just shrug it off. I hope you agree with me that everyone must have had a moral resistance against these orders.
A. I believe my answers to questions on direct examination did show that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Hoffman, please ---- Kindly pause for a moment after Dr. Hoffmann finishes with his question before you begin to answer in order that we may get the full interpretation of his question before your answer begins. BY DR. HOFFMANN:
Q. Witness, in my opinion, you must have counted on such a moral resistance on the part of everyone of your men, isn't that right?
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. I May I repeat it. Can it be assumed -- or, I ask you .... Do you believe that everyone of your men simply agreed with this order and merely would carry out -- such as bringing water or carrying coal?
A. I will comment on your question. You want to hear from me that it was my duty to talk to everyone of my men and overcome the moral resistance widen he had against carrying out these orders.
I say again that - this would have been neither my job, nor did the men give me such an opportunity, by their conduct - for, in the final analysis it belonged also to the moral attitude of these men that they being soldiers should know how to obey, and that they applied their moral inner convictions to the carrying out of the orders.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, am I correct in assuming from your answer that the men at no time offered such distress or complaint with regard to executing theorders given them, that necessitated your speaking to them -- to calm their fears or inner resistance?
THE WITNESS: I think I have already said that I had repeated conversations with my men which had this problem as their content, but there was no genuine resistance which, in order to express myself more clearly, I would have had to break by force. But many men have suffered terribly under this task, and, therefore, had to be sent home for many, various , reasons; either that their nerves went to pieces, or they could not stand this morally, and they were sent back home for their own protection.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Any other questions by any of the defense counsel? BY DR. MAYER (For defendant Dr. Braune):
Q. Witness, since when have you known Dr. Braune?
A. Since May 1936.
Q. Where did you get to know Dr. Braune?
A. Dr. Braune was Department Head for Law and Administration of the SD, Central Department II-2, -- in this same Central Department in which I took over the Department for Economics.
Q. Do you know since when Dr. Braune was a member of the SD and how he got to join the SD?
A. As far as I recall he joined the SD in 1935 with Professor Hoehn.
Q. Were you, yourself, Braune's superior?
A. From 1937 on , yes; as Chief of Staff of the Central Department.
Q. Did Braune, during the time of your work with him, have anything to do with the Enemy Information Service? That is II 1?
A. No, he always worked in the Domestic intelligence service.
Q. Do you know whether he had anything to do with that field before you worked with him?
A. No, he got into the Domestic intelligence Service immediately.
Q. With what did Braune chiefly occupy himself in the SD Main Office?
A. With the questions of law, of administration, relation of Party and State, and the students.
Q. Did you talk with Dr. Braune of the aims and purposes of the Domestic Intelligence Serbice of the SD?
A. Very frequently. In this sector he was my closest collaborator.
Q. What opinions did Dr. Braune represent? Did he agree with yours?
A. He agreed with me so much that after Hoehn left he could not remain there very much longer, but was forced, in 1938 at the latest, to leave the Central Department II-2.
Q. Was it also Braune's job to deal with Party matters?
a. Yes, I just said Party and State was one of his departments.
Q. Did his activity include also reports about Party matters?
A. Yes, of course; that was the task of the department.
Q. What were the opinions of Heydrich and Himmler about this task?
A. They were officially forbidden by a decree of Heydrich.
Q. Was the activity then discontinued?
A. No, it was continued under a camouflaged designation.
Q. What do you know about Dr. Braune's leaving the SD?
A. In the dispute between the state police and the SD -especially about questions of administration and the state which belonged to the field of activities of Dr. Best in the State Police - Braune came to be so strenousuly in favor of the SD that he had to leave at the demand of Dr. Best. After his dismissal the work of his department practically stopped. That was the demand of Best.
Q. But despite these tensions with Dr. Best -- how did Dr. Braune get to join the Stapo, the State Police.
A. Braune together with a number of other assessors, at the demand of the SS Main Office, Department I, had been directed into the State service. The Budget of the SS Main Office was so small at that time that the SD was in no position to employ new people. This emergency was eliminated partly by the fact that planning agencies of the state were employed for this new personnel, which were then detailed to the SD Main Office; and thus Braune also was transferred to such a planning agency.
Q. Is it correct that Dr. Braune thus only belonged formally to the State Police -- but actually worked for the SD?
A. Yes, that is absolutely correct.
Q. How did it happen Dr. Braune was subsequently transferred to the Stapo state Police?
A. In 1938, two attempts were made, First, Best requested that the assessors who held planned positions of the State Police now should also be put at the disposal of the State Police; and secondly, Heydrich tried, in order to have his way with the StateProtection Corps, to effect an exchange of State Police and SD officials. Thus a successor of Braune, an official of the State Police, was detailed to the SD.
Q Do you know anything about the fact whether Dr. Best especially objected to some special work of Dr. Braune in the legal field? the dismissal of Braune from the SD. In the dispute between the State Police and the SD about the treatment of administrative questions - Braune on my order had written a report which was submitted to Heydrich, the SD Main-Office, by way of the Central Department I, and Heydrich gave it to Best, and Best thereupon demanded the definite dismissal of Braune. Police and his transfer to Muenster?
A No, no; he objected strenuously. He felt betrayed and he tried by all means to stay with the SD. in Muenster?
A Yes, he finally achieved that. He need not resign from the SD completely, but he got the SD sector in Muenster the State Police in Muenster. because of the almost exclusive activity of Braune for the SD in Muenster a row developed? Schoengast, demanded the recall of Braune from Muenster because Braune, as he said, did not do any work for the State Police. He only worried about the SD. That was psychologically understandable because he was chief in the SD Main Office, whereas the work of the Deputy State Police director corresponded to the position of an Assessor, that is of an expert referent.
support him in those attempts with the aim of getting him back to Berlin? 1939. When I got the order from Heydrich to make a reform suggestion for the future SD, I got Braune to come back from his furlough and he helped me in Drawing up the suggestion. And I had planned to give him the Gruppe A in the new office. Heydrich had agreed to this, however Best managed to prevent this again.
Q Is it correct that you even asked Dr. Braune to look for an apartment in Berlin so that he would get the idea that he could count on his recall to the SD? look for an apartment in the same area where I was living. That was about the beginning of October 1939.
Q Did I understand you correctly, that it was Dr. Best who strenuously objected against Dr. Braune's retransfer to the SD, and who finally prevented this retransfer?
Q When did Dr. Braune hear about these various actions? concerned in the dispute. But the fact that he finally did not come back to the SD in October 1939 he heard from me since Heydrich now told me this.
Q Did Dr. Braune have the possibility of leaving the State Police and returning to the SD? Heydrich, not on the will of Braune. Heydrich had decided against him.
Q But isn't the fact to be considered that war had broken out by this time?
happened, what I have already said: that any possibility of leaving the State Police was prevented be a decree of Heydrich. That is to say, Braune was not only prevented from joining the SD by the will of Heydrich, but he did not have the possibility of leaving the State Police either against Heidrich's will. Braune belonged and I want to ask you a few questions, Herr Ohlendorf, about Dr. Braune's activity in the Einsatzgruppen. Did you cause Braune to be detailed to your Einsatzgruppe D?
Q How is it to be explained that Dr. Braune came to join the Einsatzgruppe at all? were to be put in the Einsatzgruppen. Thus, in ways the loaders were released and now fuehrers were always committed.
Q When did you hoar about Braune's being detailed to your Einsatzgruppe D?
A In October I was in Berlin on an official trip. Braune looked me up and told me that he had been ordered to report to my Einsatzgruppe. We then left together in my car.
Q Then your garrison was in Nikolajev, is that right?
Q What job did you assign to Dr. Braune after you arrived in Nikolajev? Norway, who was to inform himself about my job. During his presence which lasted for about two weeks I had told Braune to take care of this Minister. At the same time Braune acquainted himself with the task of the Einsatzgruppe by reading the documents of my Einsatzgruppe.
After that, about the beginning of November, he then left for Odessa as the leader of Commando 11b. about his job as leader of a Commando? acquainting himself with the job, and I am sure I spoke to him about these jobs. Odessa? Braune acquainted himself with the job during about one week. For that period the preceding Commando leader still held the command. Odessa? all business in Odessa and to prepare the Commando for an advance into the Crimea.
Q Did Dr. Braune carry out liquidations of Jews in Odessa? Roumanians demanded liquidations from Braune. According to my directives Braune objected to this, but the Roumanians pressed him and threatened him with complaints, so that Braune asked me once more and received the same directives from me. He did not carry out any liquidations in Odessa.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please. I am wondering if that answer came through in accordance with the statement of the witness. What nationality was involved there?
DR. MAYER: I didn't get the question, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I have that the Ukrainians demanded liquidations from Braune, and then later on the word Roumanian was used.
DR. MAYER: In Odessa it was a question of occupational areas overlapping, and the Roumanians advanced beyond the Border-Lines of the occupied area. Thus they were given the power in their areas. It was the Roumanians who demanded from Braune the executions of Jews in that area. Dr. Braune refused these executions decisively.
THE PRESIDENT: I see; very well.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
Q Do you recall when Braune's Kommando arrived in the Crimes? of November, that is, with his commander., with only a few vehicles. The rest had got stack in the mud, and he was able only to follow slowly.
Q Where did the Dr.. Braune establish his command post?
A This was in Simferopol?
Q Was there already another Kommando active in Simferopol? and a sub-command of 11-A were in the Crimea?
Q Were these part Kommandoes already active? Simferopol? Jews in Simferopol be carried out before Christmas, This directive of the Army was handed to me by a liaison officer, and Braune thereupon negotiated with the Army since we were not in a position to carry, out these liquidations. Thereupon, the Army agreed to create the conditions necessary which happened, and, thus, the liquidations took place before Christmas 1941. actually lent its support to carrying out of these executions? the Jews, the drivers, the gasoline, the military police to guard in that area.
Q What do you know about Dr. Braune's attitude concerning the Fuehrer's Order in general?
A Braune is a very soft sensitive man. Since I was with him for months I know that he carried out these things only with difficulty, and by overcoming his great reluctance.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
Q What was Braune's main activity in Simferopol? the middle of the great partisan movements, and thus, his commandos hunted down partisans. Furthermore, he occupied himself with intelligence service, because he was predestined for this by his background.
Q When did you again see Dr. Braune after your return to Berlin? back, and to take up a position in the Academic Exchange Service, and in the student field. On my suggestion he was transferred to this activity.
Q What do you know about Braune's recourse to the RSHA, and his transfer to Norway. more complicated, the younger officers from the RSHA were all drafted, and, thus, Kaltenbrunner wanted officers who were under his jurisdiction, and who were active in other agencies to return to the RSHA. Thus, he wrote the letter to the then superior of Braune, Scheel, and demanded that Braune be released. Braune was then ordered back to the RSHA. Even though Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, was against it, Braune was detailed to Norway in the capacity of Commander by Kaltenbrunner.
Q Did you speak with Dr. Braune before he reported for Norway?
A Yes, I did. He reported away to me before he left. duct in his new position at that time?
A Yes, I did. I was especially concerned with Norway. For a long time we from the "SD" had carried on a fight with Terboven. Through the unfortunate system of the agencies of the Commander, they were very much dependent on the Reich Commissioner as I already explained. The Commander in his opinions had adopted himself completely to the Reich Commissioner Terboven. So that I, in order to be able to Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.inform myself, sent my own man to Norway.
The tensions were so great that Terboven had one of these men dismissed. I told Braune about these conditions, and I demanded that he should resist Terboven, and that he should take care that so far as possible the politics of violence carried on by Terboven be stopped, and that a reasonable agreement with Norwegians should be reached. Braune agreed to this. the sense of your instructions? and the commander of Norway. Because of the resistance of Braune against the large scale action which had been ordered by Terboven to be carried out by the Security Police, which had been refused by the RSHA also, the commander had now come into a position when he also had to resist the Reich Commissioner. Thus, a dispute developed which as a result of the activity of Braune was brought about. He thus conducted himself in accordance with my instructions. measures on the part of Scheele against Terboven? so. ly changed? that he could no longer get out of it. to ask you a few questions about the landing of the Russians in Jewpatoria in January 1942? Witness, do you recall the landing? results did these landings have? also on the penninsula of the eastern side of the Crimea, and from Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.these bases it was attempted to make the partisan movements successful.
was when the Russians conquered Jewpatoria? had tried to fell Jewpatoria. These trucks with wounded people were met by the Russians, and they cut all the throats of these wounded people. The civilian population showed great joy about these things, and they resorted to celebration around these dead people.
MR. FERENCZ: Your Honor, I must object at this point, and ask what relevency this testimony has to the charges in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection is well put. Will you please answer that question as to the relevency of this line of questioning.
MR. MAYER: I consider this question necessary in order to show in what difficult situation the Einsatzgruppen found themselves in the Crimea, and, it also is to show how strong the partisan resistance was against the Einsatzgruppen, and how big the partisan movement was in that area, especially, after the landing of the Russians, and, especially how it effected the civilian population, and thus created a dangerous strategical situation. I also want to show by means of these questions how close the collaboration of the Einsatzgruppen was with the Army, and. finally, also to what extent my client received orders from the Army. In that respect I consider these questions as of probative value, but I leave the decision to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly you may put any questions which refer directly to your client. You may show what conditions he had confronted with when he arrived in any certain area or locality. You may show what directly was brought to him in the way of information, but we can not lose time in a general history of a "situation of anywhere not immediately connected with your client.
DR. MAYER: Yes, Your Honor. I shall leave this field, and in conclusion I would like to ask the witness Ohlendorf to give a judgment of Braune with whom he worked so long.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you nay a judgment?
DR. MAYER: A purely personal judgment, A judgment of his personality.
THE PRESIDENT: If you us? the word judgment
DR. MAYER: Or recommendation which he would make out of his superior.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You use the word judgment, and you are then encroaching upon the duties of the Tribunal.
DR. MAYER: I did not mean that, but I meant purely a personal relation to his subordinates.
A I have known Braune for nine years. I got to know him as a very decent, true and straight character, who was so stubborn in his character that quite apart from the welfare of his own person, he tried to act according to this genuineness and straightforwardedness; he was a good patriot, and believed that he found his calling in the SD, thus, with all passion he through himself into the work of the SD. He was one-hundred percent reliable, and one knew that wherever he worked, there would be decency and a clean attitude.
DR. MAYER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say that you knew that he could be counted upon for one-hundred percent as to reliability, I take it that you mean that he would carry out whatever directions he received with regard to liquidations, or of anything else he was directed to do.
THE WITNESS: I did not quite understand this, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: In your summation of Braune's character, I understood you to say that he was one-hundred percent reliable. By that I understood that you mean that he was one-hundred percent reliable to the Reich?
A No, no, but reliability of his character. If a job was given to him one did not have to bother about whether it was carried out or not. If he said, yes, he meant, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LINK: Dr. Link for the defendant Ruehl. I have a few questions with the permission of the Tribunal, to put to the witness Ohlendorf. BY DR. LINK: Einsatzgruppen-D?
A Yes, together with other men - one moment, please. I am mistaken. Yes, I know him from his activity in the Einsatzkommando 10-B.
Q What position did he hold in this Einsatzkommando? Kommando 10-B. Since he had these qualities which the kommando leader of 10-3 did not have, the leader of Kommando 10-B did not keep order, any official business matter was against his nature, and, thus, I ordered Ruehl to see that order was kept within this kommando. Without his holding the title, he was practically the administrative chief of the Kommando. of an administrative chief, may I ask you whether he had any power of command over this Kommando, or any part of this Kommando in this function?
A No, he had no such command over the Kommando. Mot even over parts of it. Persterer? have the seniority after Persterer, Ruehl was Obersturmfuehrer, that is, a 1st Lieutenant, and there was another man who was a captain, and who in the Kommando itself was the leader of the Department IV. Thus, were any one to be designated as deputy of the Kommando, it would have been automatically this leader of Department IV, because he was a captain. his deputy; would you know anything about this?
fore; I know that he was not deputy of Persterer. Also that he was not the designated person to be such by Persterer. a case of Ruehl once actually appearing as a deputy of the Kommando Leader. This assumption by the Prosecution is mentioned in connection with the transporting of a number of Jews back to Rumania territory. I therefore, ask you, can you remember that Persterer had reported to you at any time about the situation which had prevailed or developed in his area as a result of the fact that the Rumanians had transported a large number of Jews into the area occupied by the German Army? Do you remember that?
Q How was that situation developed? from me what was to be done with the Jews who had been transported across the Dnestr River, into the German area by the Romanians. He had brought Ruehl along because Persterer himself did not go back to Mogilew, but had still another mission to complete. I told Persterer that the Jews driven across the River by the Rumanians were to be brought back into the Rumanian territory, and that it was to be prevented that the Russians would drive any more Jews into our area. The situation in the area of Mogilew was so difficult, because the city of Mogilew was completely destroyed. Therefore, the famine prevailed, and it was not possible to prevent plunderings and revolts, for these Jews had been completely plundered by the Rumanians. They had no baggage with them at all. Therefore, hurry was great, and thus Ruehl wont back to Mogilew-Podolsk and -- he was to see to it that the Jews were to be sent back into the Rumanian territory, which was their homeland. The fact that Ruehl came to see me is nothing special for in contrast to what the Prosecution assumed it has not a question of a lieutenant coming to sec his general but of a leader coming to see his superior; everybody had this possibility who had any type of mission, and such mission could be given to any one, even if he had not been a leader, and even if he had not been a leader, he certainly would have the opportunity of speaking to me, for that is what I was there for.
explanation of my client that he then handed your order on to a SubKommando at the suggestion of Persterer. Did I understand you correctly that this fact would lead one to assume that Ruehl had any power of command, or any activity as Deputy? first order could not be executed at once? back the Jews into their territory, but we were dependent on the Rumanians because there was only one bridge at that time, and the Rumanians threatened to shoot if we tried to bring back the Jews into their land. Ruehl informed me of this and now I ordered Kommando 12 to negotiate at another bridge near Jampol and which had just been completed at that time, but it had not yet been handed over to the Rumanians, and thus Kommando 12 received the order to see to it that these Jews would now be brought back into their homeland via that bridge, and that happened. report appeared before you and that this was not Pesterer, would you explain this in the same way as you explained the first conference? because of the situation I have described, and thus Ruehl had to take his place in order to tell me about the results of the negotiations with the Rumanians.
Q Was this order then carried out? in any connection with the basic order under discussion? the conduct of the Rumanians I had ordered namely we would under no circumstances undertake to execute people by order of the Rumanians.
