no such authority neither was it conferred upon him. Schubert was in no position to remedy any arising deficiencies. orders to any officer carrying out the execution. Schubert "could not interfere" (page 586 German record,) "he had no authority to give orders" (same record). He would have had to report to Ohlendorf in case he had noticed deficiencies (page 586 German record).
This express limitation of Schubert's mission is a decisive indication for the legal judgment of whether his inspection was performed as Ohlendorf's deputy or not. For Ohlendorf decided about the kind and extent of Schubert's task when the latter was assigned. he was entrusted with: From the point of penal law it would be of importance if Schubert would have subjectively comprehended and carried out his mission to a greater extent than it was given to him by Ohlendorf. However, this is not the case either. In his testimony, Schubert has clearly described the particulars of his own interpretation in regard to his mission. (Page 4672 of the German record, page 4587 of the English record). he was "some kind of a deputy." The passage quoted by the Prosecution on page 5 of its closing brief from the English record page 4671 says exactly the opposite of what the Prosecution asserts.
In noticing deviations from Ohlendorf's directives Schubert would not have been able to interfere and give instructions; the utmost possible for him to do, according to his own view, was that, in an emergency case, he could have called the attention of the competent officer to a violation of Ohlendorf's directives (page 586 of the German record) (page 4823 of the German, page 4732 of the English, page 4673 of the German, page 4587 of the English records). However, there cannot be any doubt that this authority, provided for an emergency case, was not specifically based on the mission he received, on the contrary, Court No. II, Case No. IX.
everyone in general has a right to this authority who realizes that existing regulations are violated, and considers it necessary to call attention to this fact because of the existence of an emergency case. The authority was no longer within the scope of the mission given to Schubert, it rather belongs to the general rights of every soldier and officer. closing brief asserts incorrectly on pages 7 and 10, but only contains the possibility to draw the attention of the competent officer to violations of Ohlendorf's directives. did not refer at all to such an emergency case, since his interference would not have been necessary in this case at all. (page 4707 of the German record, page 4622 of the English record). Fundamentally his mission, according to his own view, was confined to an inspection the result of which he had to report to his chief. tion for which Ohlendorf himself was competent, constitutes from the legal point of view the decisive limitation of the mission given to Schubert.
Here I must once more thoroughly discuss SCHUBERT's phraseology concerning his assignment in his affidavit of 24.2.47, Prosecution Exh. 28, Doc. Book 1 Eng. p. 108, German p. 141), which has already been mentioned several times during his interrogation in direct and in cross examination.
There SCHUBERT says literally under fig. a) that he had to see to it that the shooting area was located well outside of town, so that there would be no witnesses of the shooting living in the vicinity. According to the actual conditions this phraseology must appear sheer nonsense. Let our memories take us back to the time: the place of execution has been fixed for days, the necessary preparations have been made, executions are taking place regularly, and Herr OHLENDORF Court No. II, Case No. IX.
has already visited the location that same morning. Probably neither Herr OHLENDORF nor SCHUBERT can have seriously thought that SCHUBERT was in any way supposed to exercise any supervision so that in the meantime while OHLENDORF was absent the place of execution would not somehow be changed and the shootings perhaps be carried out in an entirely different place, possibly in a place which was not far from town and therefore could be seen by unwelcome witnesses.
This assumption, by which alone fig. a) with the expression "see to it" ("Beaufsichtigen) might have some meaning, is nevertheless probably so impossible that it must be completely rejected in the case of a proceeding so complicated with respect to organization as the above-mentioned executions. However, the wording of fig. a) must thereby also be denied any meaning. To be sure, this fig. a) acquires a meaning if we take into consideration what SCHUBERT himself reports about how this phraseology came to be used. I refer to the transcript, German p. 4681, Eng. p. 4594. SCHUBERT says there that he discussed the matter for a fairly long time with Mr. WARTENBERG, with whom this phraseology originated, and pointed out to him that he possibly used this word "supervise" ("beaufsichtigen") incorrectly by deriving it from an English word, and that it rightly ought to be "observe" ("besichtigen").
If we only consider fig. a) in this version with the word "observe" it takes on a thoroughly sensible meaning. Without entering into a lengthy analysis now of the phraseology, corrections and uncorrected mistakes in various places in the affidavit I should at least like to point out here that SCHUBERT's statement not only appears credible in itself but also logical and natural. I am convinced that SCHUBERT, who after all is an educated and intelligent man, would never of his own accord have used such phraseology as in fig. a). And in the last analysis our search for evidence has brought us one more proof for precisely this point, which is better and clearer than any other proof one could think of. We recall that this German word "beaufsichtigen", Court No. II, Case No. IX.
which Mr. WARTENBERG wanted to use and actually did use, was already translated by the English translator of the affidavit as "to see", although literally it ought to have been translated as "supervise". An impartial philologist of the original text would have been obvious nonsense and has translated it with the correct meaning. Concerning this I refer to the transcript, German p. 4692, Eng. p. 4606-07.
Figs. b) and c) contain the same word "beaufsichtigen" as fig. a). In connection with the tasks described there this mode of expression makes some sense in itself; however, we must consider its meaning once more later on. tion with the legal structure and effect of the order given by OHLENDORF: 1.) SCHUBERT received and carried out the order with the limitation which OHLENDORF attached to the order. 2.) Accordingly, the crux of the order was merely to inform OHLENDORF whether or not the execution was also carried out according to his instructions during his absence. 3.) Basically SCHUBERT had no occasion at all to interfere. He had no executive power whatsoever.
Therefore, OHLENDORF's order to SCHUBERT to observe the executions in Sinferopol in December 194 cannot be legally regarded as tantamount to acting as OHLENDORF's deputy.
Now what did SCHUBERT actually do? And what is the criminal nature of his act from the legal point of view that is said to connect with the execution of human beings? where it maintains that there were no other officers present when the transportation took place. As a matter of fact, two officers were present, who had Schubert's rank. sees them being loaded aboard and shipped off. Then he drives to the place of execution, sees the rerouting of traffic, the roads blocked Court No. II, Case No. IX.
off, persons being unloaded, valuables handed over, and the shooting. Finally, he drives back once more along the way to the gypsy quarter and there again sees them being loaded aboard and carried off, and then returns to his office. That is what he did. SCHUBERT did not in any way affect persons who participated in the progress of the execution, whether ordinary soldiers or officers. There is no connection whatsoever of cause and effect between SCHUBERT'S inspection and the execution. The statements of OHLENDORF, BRAUNE and SCHUBERT himself are in complete agreement on this point.
SCHUBERT's statements in his affidavit of 24.2.47, Prosecution Exh. 28, Doc. Book 1, Eng. p. 108, German p. 141, and his statements on this point as a witness in his own defense. The statements concerning this take up the largest amount of space in the evidence submitted during the entire trial, and besides myself, both the prosecuting attorneys and the presiding judge themselves have repeatedly helped through appropriate questions to clear up conditions which at first glance appear highly confused. If we sift out the results of this thorough examination of all the inconsistencies between the affidavit and the actual situation, (transcript, German p. 4705 et seq., Eng. 4620 et seq.) we find that SCHUBERT's actions kept within the bounds of what was proper for his limited assignment. He briefly observed the various phases of the execution at the various places, directed his attention to the points concerning which OHLENDORF had given him special instructions, and drove back to headquarters without having anywhere or at any time ordered anything to be done during the course of the action, or having observed anything unusual. Even his report to OHLENDORF on the inspection was so unimportant that OHLENDORF and SCHUBERT do not even remember it any longer. glance creates the impression that SCHUBERT had interfered during the course of the execution -- I am thinking of fig. 4, which in several places contains the phrase "I saw to it that" -- is to a considerable Court No. II, Case No. IX.
extent to be attributed to the fact that the phrase did not originate with SCHUBERT himself. Likewise, the expression "supervise" ("ueberwachen") is used in such a way that it can be clearly seen that the interrogator was trying to represent SCHUBERT'S assignment in an individual case in such a light as would appear to justify the conclusion that SCHUBERT'S position was connected with executive powers and supervisory duties, so that finally an indictment could be brought against the man who was already bound hard and fast by an affidavit. Even the laws of logic are forgotten in this fanatical zeal. When, for example, it says in fig. 5): "This phase was carefully supervised (uebarwacht) by me so that all the valuables would be turned over to Einsatzgruppe D ....... "then one only has to ask one's self the question: How could SCHUBERT supervise the collection carefully and how could he observe the collection of all the valuables if he himself was only a few minutes at the place where the collection went on throughout the entire day? represent the preparation of the outgoing mail as a supervisory activity.
Neither during his interrogation by Mr. WARTENBERG nor in the courtroom did SCHUBERT report any occurrence which permits the conclusion that he displayed any activity during the execution at Sinferopol which could be described with the words: "Superintendence" (beaufsichtigen), "supervision" (ueberwachen) or "seeing to it" (dafuer sorgen). Mr. WARTENBERG has attempted to make up for this lack of activity by the frequent, even strikingly frequent, use of the verbs "superintend", "supervise", and "see to it" in the affidavit. exert a certain amount of pressure in order to obtain truthful statements. For this purpose the technique of interrogating even permits the use of stratagems and tricks.
of the time cost Schubert much trouble and a hard fight. It is clear that Mr. Wartenberg remained adamant when it came to the point of changing that formulation which was his sole reason for preparing the affidavit, especially as the words "supervise" etc. do not so much express a concrete activity as suggest that one's presence has a definite implication. It was, however, impossible to imply this meaning from Schubert's presence because in no mobile unit of Germany was it permitted that a 1st Lieutenant "supervise" a major and several other senior officers. Furthermore, on the same day, Ohlendorf as Troop Chief, and Braune as Kommando Leader were, themselves, witnesses to this execution, consequently, all attempts to brand Schubert as Ohlendorf's substitute, or to charge that he had commanding authority or supervisory duties are frustrated by this fact alone.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that will be a good point in which to have the morning recess, Dr. Koessl.
DR. KOESSL: Yes, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess fifteen minutes.
(Recess)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. HOFFMAN: Dr. Hoffman for the defendant Nosske. ing session today?
THE PRESIDENT: That will all depend on whether we can get in the remaining closing statements before 4:30 this afternoon. We have three more statements here after Dr. Kossel finishes.
DR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, then I would ask that the following defendants be excused for this afternoon, and if there is an evening session, also for this evening: The defendants Seibert, Jost, Fendler, Sandberger, Steimle, Nosske, Schulz, Blume and Ott, in order to prepare their final statements.
DR. DURCHALZ: Dr. Durchalz for the defendant Schulz.
May I make a suggestion, your Honor. In case there should be an evening session today, it would perhaps be useful that between 5:30 and 8:30 there would be no session, because there is only a possibility for the defense between 6:00 and 8:00 o'clock to speak to the defendants. Since the final statements have to be in writing, it would perhaps be useful if we could take care of it during that period, and have the remainder of the session this evening to be held from 8:30 on. I am speaking for the entire defense.
THE PRESIDENT: That will be agreeable to the Tribunal. If we have an evening session it would be from eight-thirty on until we finish the closing summations. And with regard to the motion made by Dr. Hoffmann, the following defendants will be excused from attendance in Court this afternoon, and if there is an evening session, from this evening's session, the defendants Seibert, Jost, Fendler, Sandberger, Steimle, Nosske, Schultz, Blume, Ott.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, after the defendants that you have just mentioned have now been excused this afternoon, and since there is no possibility now to speak to these defendants may I ask that the Secretary General be instructed that he should tell Mr. Joseph in Room 55 that these defendants may be brought over there in order to speak to their counsel?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Joseph? Mr. who?
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Yes, Mr. Joseph.
THE PRESIDENT: In which room?
DR. DURCHHOLZ: 57.
THE PRESIDENT: Will the Secretary General so inform Mr. Joseph in Room 57. Very well.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Thank you, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, such defendants as have their statements ready by four-thirty or five o'clock should turn them in to somebody so that translations can be made tonight. Let's see first to whom to turn them in. Whichever statements are ready this afternoon should be taken to Room 106 and given to Mr. Hodges, not to be delivered anywhere else, because those statements will be given special attention because of the time element, so that as a statement is ready counsel for that particular defendant will take the statement to Room 106. Very well, proceed.
DR. KOESSL: I do not believe that there exists an army in the whole world in which principles of troop leadership different in that respect prevail.
The pressure that Mr. Wartenberg exerted during the interrogations may not even have exceeded the usual limits. But when we hear of threats with a broom or of the stipulation that every correction must be approved by Mr. Wartenberg, or of solitary confinement in an unheated cell, then I, at least, am of the opinion that even in a subsequent purely theoretical consideration of all the circumstances one must at least take into account that the defendant was not free in his decisions, nor at his best to defend his interests in a haggling about words, as Mr. Wartenberg termed the discussion about the expressions "supervise" etc., and to hold his ground.
Schubert's statements in connection with this not only comprise a clarification of prima facie seemingly contradictory actions and statements, but they grant also an insight into Schubert's personality and illuminate the credibility of his own statements. When Schubert here testifies that he was once threatened with a broom by Mr. Wartenberg and thereby puts himself into contradiction with Mr. Wartenberg's statement, then I can only express my conviction that Schubert told the truth. influence whatever that the execution was held, his duty was only to see for himself if it was done in the manner Ohlendorf had ordered, and to report to the latter what he had seen. charge by the Prosecution that Ohlendorf had sent Schubert to substitute for him in inspecting executions, is not in accordance with the powers granted to Schubert, nor with the factual happenings, and furthermore, that the confusing formulations in his affidavit were not corrected by him for the sole reason that he was simply unable to obtain Mr. Wartenberg's approval for it at that time.
English Transcript p. 4589, also in Ohlendorf transcript, where Ohlendorf explains the meaning of the formulations contained in his affidavit, Prosecution Exhibit 148, with regard to the inspections mentioned there. These show clearly that Schubert, with the exception of the Simferopol case, was only sued for general inspections and not for executions as the prosecution asserts on page 10 of the Closing Brief. tional incriminating activity outside the bounds of a general adjutant's functions that Schubert, at intervals, had composed certain reports of the Einsatzgruppe. This is again on Page 15. They supported this claim by a statement of the co-defendant Seibert in his affidavit Document Book III-D, Exhibit 158. On the stand as witnesses, the co-defendants Seibert and Ohlendorf offered an explanation in regard to this assertion of the Prosecution which relieves this point of its incriminating quality. not an essential, but only a formal part of the report namely the reports about changes of personnel and locations, as they appeared regularly on the first page of every Operational Situation Report. In these points the two statements are in full accord, and I believe, since Schubert, too, when examined in his own behalf, said the same thing, neither the Court nor the Prosecution had any doubts as to the correctness of his exposition. increased by the finding that they not only do not contradict the Seibert affidavit, but rather are its explanation. Material contributions to these reports were never part of Schubert's work. One may add that Schubert's function, as elucidated in this point, was in full accord with the scope of tasks he could perform considering his training. ordinate activity consisting only of superficial acts of a technical or organizational nature, which had no material connection whatsoever with the subject matter of the tasks or the acts in themselves.
cleared and I see no possibility to consider Schubert as in any way whatsoever incriminated in regard to it. namely the charge of knowledge of the Fuehrer Order. The way in which he reacted to this knowledge is of import in considerations of judicial nature.
In this respect, Schubert's own testimony alone can elucidate this point, for in a military unit with its discipline demanding unconditional obedience, no superior will be able to testify as to a contrary reaction to an order, as it would surely mean certain destruction for any soldier if he showed even the least counter-reaction. the question of the consent with or the rejection of the Fuehrer Order, we are left to depend entirely on Schubert's testimony and encounter in proving the hereby expressed sentiments to be genuine, one of the main difficulties of this trial, namely, the question of the credibility of the statements of Schubert about himself. For this reason, I am forced to treat the credibility of my client in detail. the foundation for an answer to this question and I believe to be of one mind with the Tribunal if I make here and now the anticipatory assertion that the over-all impression gained from Schubert and his testimony is that he honestly endeavored to present all points, which he was confronted with and had to answer, truthfully.
Sometimes we did notice a slight hesitation on Schubert's part.
A mental inhibition of Schubert's, which characterizes his whole personality and which we encounter in a conspicuous manner again in his correction of his affidavit of 24 February 1947. There too, he placed, in the argument arising from the wording and the permission for correction, at first the greatest weight on having a wording altered that was apt to incriminate another man. Only in the second place he took care of the matters that concerned himself, even making with concessions, so that no other man might be incriminated by an incorrect statement. concerned, Schubert gave the answers without hesitation and without any omission, only there striving for details, where he was certain that truth had not been reached to the full extent. And let us not deceive ourselves by asking why Schubert has struggled so tenaciously for the wording in the Wartenberg case, of all things. This he certainly did not do for reasons of his own safety, but rather out of a fanatical zeal for the truth. explain the seeming contradiction between his affidavit of 24 February 1947, where in sub-section 7 the wording is to be found that the reports contained the number of the villages destroyed and the persons killed, and his deposition that he was in ignorance of the number of the persons executed. In this point too we have seen how carefully Schubert stuck to the truth, explaining that in sub-section 7 of his affidavit it was not a question of execution within the meaning of the Fuehrer Order, but of statements as to the casualties incurred on the occasion of military operations. seeming contradiction between his statement that Seibert had not been Ohlendorf's deputy for the entire sphere of duties of the Einsatzgruppe, on the one hand, and some wordings in his affidavit which curtly called Seibert Ohlendorf's deputy, on the other hand.
For this elucidation too Schubert fought with genuine zeal for the truth even with a sort of petty effort for veracity. The more it had been tried to discover a vagueness or a false judgment in the wording of his affidavits, the more punctiliously did he keep fighting for an elucidation. Yet, this doubt about the question of the capacity of Seibert as a deputy, between the verbal and written statements of Schubert has finally been decided by the Prosecution in favor of the facts stated by Schubert verbally by submitting the doc. No. NO-5111, Doc. Book V D p. 5. I am thinking of the document that shows an organization scheme of Einsatzgruppe D, worked out by Schubert himself, and where Seibert appears as permanent deputy under the section "Staff of the Einsatzgruppe". I think in the English translation the date, December 1945, is missing. This was it what Schubert meant then and in all his later statements, always protesting whenever different statements of facts were to be read into wordings which were not even made by himself. Here the trustworthiness of Schubert could, at the end of long arguments in the course of direct and cross-examinations, finally be proved even through a Prosecution document. Schubert was able to rely on his good memory, apart from his zeal for the truth, in all the statements he made.
There is no need, I believe, to prove Schubert's trsutworthiness, From this starting point, I should suggest that his own statements referring to his knowledge of the Fuehrer Order and the executions be judged, so that later a total evaluation of his conduct may be gathered from his later working methods.
He learned about the Fuehrer Order from Ohlendorf. From his statement also a mental reaction emerges. We saw him arriving, as a final result of his mental struggle, at the conclusion that he was facing the situation completely helplessly. Was that helplessness, that incapability to find a way out, really the utmost left to do for a person who had done something to prevent these crimes, as the Prosecution demands?
Should he to have withdrawn from these things? Russia, to take any action against the goings-on which are under discussion today? Nobody will consider this seriously, in view of the picture we have received of his subordinate activities, of the way he was tied by orders and his complete lack of independence. It must be added that Ohlendorf himself had told him, that he had nothing to do with these things. By that Schubert had been shown his proper place by his chief, and this in a manner so as not to leave him any possibility of supporting an application for transfer or a refusal to carry out orders by pointing to the executions, for with those he had nothing to do and he would only incur the risk of having "his nose rubbed in" even more, as Heydrich had once threatened the defendant Blobel. Moreover, it is remarkable that Schubert, in whose soul the internal struggle about those things had not come to an end by that, learned on the occasion of the Simferopol executions in December 1941 that not the Einsatzgruppe alone was in possession of this Fuehrer Order, but that even the supreme command authority, the 11th Army itself, was giving orders for execution contrary to Ohlendorf's protests, supplying the personal and material assistance required for carrying out the executions. This state of affairs could not but convey to this little lieutenant the conviction that no way out was left to him even through the Wehrmacht.
Coming back to the words used by the Prosecution that "it" was a legal and moral obligation to prevent the slaughter of innocents, to limit, to repudiate it, an obligation which all the defendants have obviously neglected, we arrive first of all at the conclusion that Schubert has not neglected his obligation to repudiate those acts. In the German transcript p. 4656 /57 Schubert has shown us his feelings and he broached this subject again in the course of the cross examination.
Everybody will have to recognize, in just evaluation of these statements that Schubert has not neglected this obligation which the Prosecution stressed as a generally legal and moral one, but rather has fulfilled it. of ordering executions, so he was not in a position to prevent executions. Nor could Schubert be expected to refuse to obey the order to go on an inspection trip, since his refusal would have neither prevented nor limited the execution, the more so since his inspection was in no way causally converted with the chain of events. Thus, Schubert was unable to realize any noticeable personal implication in the crime. Ohlendorf himself has explained to the Tribunal what consequences would have been drawn by him from a refusal to obey orders. office because in the reports which he had to register and to file in the books, statements were contained with regard to executions? this question, because that knowledge of the events was one gained in the routine work in an office, and the events had in each case already been concluded, and, besides, Schubert, was, as an officer in the orderly room placed outside of any power of authority and command with regard to those events and the reports made thereof. The notion of being in connection with crimes within the meaning of the Control Council Law may surely not be extended as far as that. And listening to the words of the Prosecution that "the rank and the position of the defendants comprised the authority and obligation on the part of the defendants to exercise control over their subordinates and that that authority in conjunction with their knowledge renders them unequivocally responsible from the penal point of view", we conclusively exclude those from criminal responsibility who did not possess such an authority and obligation.
Nobody will attribute such an authority over subordinates to Schubert in view of the results of the investigations of this trial. No penal responsibility can, thus, be invoked against Schubert in this respect.
The Prosecution sees a signifiance in Schubert's position within the staff of Einsatzgruppe D. It would be a completely wrong opinion to consider the staff of the Einsatzgruppe as a leadership agency in which every officer would be partly originator, or even only participant in, or accessory to, the acts which were being done in the Einsatzgruppe. If we admitted this as right, we should have left the ground of individual guilt, the basic principle of any criminal responsibility.
Schubert's position regarded in itself is illuminated enough, it was not tied in with any authority. With any other activity of the Einsatzgruppe it had closer relationship than just with the executions, which in no way were promoted by the adjutants. It was a position that always goes with any military unit, but in itself it was neither typical for the tasks of Einsatzgruppe D, nor was the holder of the position charged with any special tasks of the Einsatzgruppe. Schubert as the first lieutenant at the side of a Chief, who is Colonel, 5 officers of the rank of Colonel and Lt. Colonel, who were CommandoLeaders and about 5 other officers of the Staff, superior to him in rank, could not possibly have attained any significant leadershipor Commando position.
DR. KOESSL: Schubert did not even pass on orders. The Prosecution's questions to this effect rare merely hypothetical ones. Not a single case was proved why page 8 of the closing brief is unjustified in referring to page 4657 of the English transcript. On the same page of the closing brief the Prosecution goes too far in explaining the passage in the English record page 4710 by deducing from Schubert's quoted statement that he knew all the missions of the kommando chiefs, although only the general tasks of the members of the staff were mentioned at that point. Schubert was not informed about all missions with which Ohlendorf entrusted the kommando chiefs.
Apart from that the question comesup: Does SCHUBERT's knowledge of the executions have the effect of knowing criminal aims of the SS, here specifically of the SD, and was it SCHUBERT's obligation to withdraw from the SD? To answer this last important question it must be examined of what kind his professional development and activity was before and after the Russian assignment.
He has given us his professional curriculum. The submitted documents SCHUBERT- Exh. 1 and SCHUBERT - Exh. 3show that until his Einsatz in 1941 he had been employed all the time and exclusively as an administrative employee. Of what minor category this position was is disclosed by SCHUBERT -- Exh. 6. A look at the graphic description of the organizational build-up of Office I of the RSHA attached to this document, shows that at first until 1940 SCHUBERT as an assistant clerk belonged with the clerks to the lowest rank among the employees and beginning 1940 as a specialist to the lowest rank within the leadership organizational chart. At first an aide to the Registrar and the Postoffice. SCHUBERT in the course of his career finally becomes a specialist in personnel matters. How his position was during the Russian-Assignment, I have already explained and I only wish to add here that it was a direct continuation of the pure administrative activity, as exercised in Berlin.
Also after his return from the Russian assignment, SCHUBERT at first becomes Adjutant to the Chief of Office III, not an SDspecialist in Office III, but he remains an employee of Office I. This also corresponds to his tasks as Adjutant, which OHLENDORF declared were the same as in Russia. Chief of the waiting-room he calls it. Here too purely clerical work without any participation in the material decisions of Office III. by abolition of the adjutant position, SCHUBERT becomes Assistant Specialist in the Personnel Dep. of Office III and is reinstated as an administrative employee. Schubert-Exh. 3.
The witness EHLICH in the SCHUBERT-Exh. 5 explained in detail that also in Gruppe B of Office III SCHUBERT attended at first only to administrative technical and organizational tasks and throughout the time up to 1 Dec. 1944 he was involved in material tasks only as far as information is concerned, but by no means as an SD-Specialist. official whose road was prescribed by his education. I also refer to the fact that during his 2 years of military service he was also used as a clerk for one year. (SCHUBERT-Exh.7). We get the picture of an official whose assignments up to 1 Dec. 1944 never went beyond the limits of pure administration and in addition kept themselves within a rank, which beginning at the lowest went up only 3 grades to the position of Assistant Specialist and never permitted any independent work or much less material decisions of his own. An average official as it is called in the German language. Augsburg and there he takes charge of the SD-Dep. health) (SCHUBERTExh. 5). For the first time in his life. SCHUBERT enters the service of the SD in its specialized field as an independent worker beginning at the lowest rank. It will be important now, for the judgment of the case as a whole, how SCHUBERT is going to conduct himself in an independent position.
The 2 documents SCHUBBRT-Exh. 2 and 4 cast a significant light upon this. The affidavit KONONOFF, a now stateless Russian, who since the First World War lived in Germany and was during the Second World War degraded by the Nazis to an East-worker, is more than a testimony to his decent character. KONONOFF, who lived in daily terror of the Nazi authorities, put confidencesin SCHUBERT and to the SD-men of Schubert and what he has to report on SCHUBERT's, intervention in the cases referred to, are moving testimonials of SCHUBERT's, the SDmember's, aid to the suppressed and mistreated workers of foreign nationality, above all how he helped Russian male and female workers and prisoners of war to obtain humane treatment, the punishment of their oppressors and deceivers, in short to be given their rights and how he thereby disregarded the danger to his official position. The testimonials speak for themselves and what SCHUBERT's secretary, the then student of medicine LACKER, a military service draftee, reports about this time in the SCHUBERT-Document 4 is one more proof for the absolute truthfulness and love for justice that was glowing so much within SCHUBERT, that I cannot but refer to it as the most eminent quality of his whole personality. much as a possibility for a decision of his own, was commandeered into the Einsatzgruppe D, after he had on his own initiative expressed a desire to be released for service with the Army, following the death of his first wife and child during the terror of the bombings.He had just as little chance to determine the end of this assignment and the way he was employed. He wasunder military law and had no choice as to his activity or much less any possibility of leaving the SD. In addition SCHUBERT could not see the acts committed by Einsatzgruppe D in connection with criminal activities of the whole SD or the SS, revealed to us today by the IMT.