At the time I did not consider myself a high-ranking member of the SS and actually I was no such think. For that reason I could not say it.
Q Well, what was your rank at that time?
Q That is equivalent to a full colonel, is it not?
A I don't know the American army, but about the rank conditions I have already mode a statement in detail in my direct examination. Do not forget that I was a political SS leader and not a military SS leader and that the unit which I had to lead actually had the strength of a battalion and not that of a regiment with a colonel over it. campaign with the SS and SD units if you had not been a member of these organizations before the war? would have had or got the possibility to give me orders, I certainly would have evaded this fate. of the SS and SD before the war you would have been conscripted for service in some branch of the Armed Forces as distinct and seperate from the SS and SD? because as I said, I was considered indispensable for the Reich groups Trade (Handel). On the other hand, many people were drafted for this effort who were not members of the SS and had no connection with the SS or SD, and just for that reason they could be drafted because until then they were in a position which the Wehrmacht could not approach until then, for example, in plants which were considered essential for the war effort.
time, just now, that no SS and SD men were drafted by the Wehrmacht at the time of the campaign against Russia?
A No, that is incorrect. Many SS leaders were also in the Army. Himmler tried, of course, to stop SS leaders from joining the Wehrmacht because he himself did not have sufficient personnel. He continously got new orders to set up new divisions, and in '43 at least, he did not have sufficient officers and men who could be a basis for this new division. were not put in the Wehrmacht but retained in the SS and SD units? general way what the armament of an Einsatzgruppe was and more specifically Einsatzgruppe D? gruppe D had 180 vehicles. These trucks had two drivers each, and this figure is contained in the entire total of 500. This fact shows the limited number of actual experts because from the very beginning 200 drivers were deducted from the 500 men. This large number of vehicles shows that the Einsatzgruppe was fully motorized. The Waffen-SS, another 80 to 100 men, was particularly given for armed protection. They were equipped with automatic rifles. The others either had rifles or automatic rifles. I believe that is about the total equipment.
Q There was no light or heavy artillery, of course?
and the gypsies who were not partisans?
A Their equipment? gypsies who were not members of partisan bands. What was that? civilian population, had just as many and just as little weapons as it was usually the case. roundups or these assemblies came to them with their arms in their hands? similar occurrences, which you have submitted yourself.
Q Answer my question, General. Was it reported to you that Jews and gypsies who were required to register by your orders, passed through their own council of Elders, came to register with their arms in their hands?
Q only now do I understand you. I believe this is only a rhetorical question. If the Jews at the order of the SS police, had to be registered surely they would not appear with weapons, and I think I can guarantee that they did not appear with, weapons. say that the Jewish population, exclusive of partisan bands, had now arms, whatsoever, isn't it? already in a organized unit while, of course, there were a lot of passive partisans, that is to say groups who had weapons or poison and which only later would be organized and used by larger units.
Q I will state it differently. Then those Jews who did not belong to any active resistance movement, is it a general fact to say that they were unarmed members of the civil population?
A Certainly. Some of them did not have any weapons, of course. way you so desire the methods generally used by these Jews?
THE WITNESS: I am sorry, I cannot hear the translation.
THE WITNESS: I am sorry, the translation is interrupted.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed. generally used by the Jews and gypsies to carry out their resistance to the armed forces if they were not members of partisan bands?
DR. ASCHENAUER: A similar question has alreday been asked by Mr. Heath, and I object to it it is really a repetition of what Mr. Heath said and it is one of the overlapping cases to which your Honor has indicated.
THE PRESIDENT: The question was very similar to it.
MR. WALTON: Very good, sir, I will withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q (By Mr. Walton) General, can you give us a few examples of acts of sabotage which these people commited against your Einsatzgruppen or the German Armed Forces?
THE INTERPRETER: I am sorry, the channel is out. I can't hear.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It seems as if it will take a little while to repair the channel so the Court will recess until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty o'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 15 October 1947 at 0930 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II-S.
Military Tribunal No. II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
DR. WISMARCK (for the defendant Jost): Your Honor, I ask that the defendant Jost, to prepare his examination on the witness stand, be excused this afternoon and tomorrow from presence in Court.
THE PRESIDENT: The request is granted, and the defendant Jost will be excused from attendance today and tomorrow.
DR. DURCHHOLZ (for the defendant Schulz): Your Honor, I would like to make the same request and ask that the defendant Schulz be excused for this afternoon to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: The same approval is granted, and the defendant Schulz will be excused from attendance at the time indicated.
DR. LUMMERT (for defendant Blume): Your Honor, I have the same request for defendant Blume, for today.
THE PRESIDENT: And the request is also granted, for defendant Blume.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, I only want to correct one translation mistake. Defendant Ohlendorf was asked yesterday about the speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS in Poland. He replied to this, he had "heard about this speech hero." This "here" means here, in Nurnberg. That was not translated. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, I wish to point this out.
THE PRESIDENT: In other words, the defendant Ohlendorf indicated that he did not hear the speech at the point where it was delivered, but only heared of it here, in Nurnberg?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Yes, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the record show, as so indicated.
MR. WALTON: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall proceed.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed, Mr. Walton. BY MR. WALTON: about which so much has been said here, was an illegal order? and customs of war?
Q Have you ever heard of the Geneva Convention?
Q And have you ever heard of the Hague Convention? subject to military law, did you not know that the killing of civilians in occupied areas, without any trial, is considered by both international law and the laws and customs of war to be plain murder, and nothing else? the authority to decide whether a person was a Jew, or Gypsy, or a Communist, and to order his execution? commanding officer of that unit?
man was a Jew or a Gypsy and order his execution?
A I cannot answer to this question in a concrete manner; but before I do so I wish to point out that the question of discretion what could be done to carry out the order, - the entire situation should be considered. For example, concerning the Jews. It was usual that the Commandos called the Jewish Elders to determine who was Jewish and who was not. The possiblility to go beyond this decision was not given to the Commandos. Therefore, they had to accept the determination of the Jews themselves as a basis of their orders. The actual carrying out could not be done by the Commando leader himself, of course, but he had to rely on his officers who were commanders of part of the command as well. As the Tribunal knows, this question had already been decided before the war by order of the Fuehrer, through Keitel, insofar as individual officers had the opportunity to arrive at a decision whether or not the person was suspicious, and whether they might endanger the security. In my direct examination I already explained that this statement went too far in my opinion, and, therefore, I gave the order that the suspicion be confirmed. But to ask for more, - for example, concerning the Jews, than, to believe the determination of the Jewish Elders could not have been expected of the Commandos because there was no possibility of doing more. Doing more would have questioned the task. Commando leader by the Jewish Council of Elders was sufficient to denominate those named as Jews? Jewish Elders themselves took the Jews to the registration place or the collection place. identification that could cause his execution by Einsatzgruppe D?
A No; I remember cases in Sinferopol where, to identify Gypsies, the certification of two witnesses, at least, was used and required by the command there.
of the area in which this man was arrested?
Q And these witnesses claimed to have known it?
A Yes. That was the difficulty, because some of the Gypsies - if not all of them - were Moslems, and for that reason we attached a great mount of importance to the fact that there were no disprepancies in the procedure, and on this question in particular local Tartars took part. there was in the case of a Jew, is that right? Jews - and as I said yesterday already, I only remember the great action in Sinferopol. that you personally never issued execution orders. Am I correct? order for execution as such had been given from the start in Pretsch, or rather, later by the Reichsfuehrer. But the Commandos took it for granted that when they came to a larger city the solution of the Jewish question would be the first problem to be solved, and, therefore, the execution developed - not from one order, but followed a number of occurrences - such as asking for a Council of Elders, or rather, nominating a Counsel of Elders registering etc., until the final action was the result. The same during the executions themselves, where a number of organizational occurrences took place one after the other, a definite order was only given, really, at the moment when an officer stood before a military unit and gave the order to shoot. Everything else develops - one occurrence following another. examination, reference was made quite frequently to, and I quote, "the Army". To what Army, or Army Group were you referring?
A In my case, to Group 11. Eleventh Army.
Einsatzgruppe D?
A First, General Ritter von Schobert; he was killed. After that, there was a temporary assignment; end then later, Field Marshal von Manstein. Army Group Wouth during your career as commander of Einsatzgruppe D?
A With the Army Group South itself, no; only with the Army. The reason was that the Eleventh Army was independent, relatively. That had been intended as a nucleus for a new army group which was to operate in the Caucasus Mountains. These army units at that time were still in the Baltics and were ready there.
Q How often were you in contact with General von Schobert? And later General von Manstein? the 12th of June; then I saw him again in the Army casino once or twice. And von Manstein, I mostly saw in the Crimea on duty, as well as privately; for example, privately - he put me in charge of recruiting Tartars. I also had personal discussions with him about the question of military commitments of my unit. Contact with the Army became closer in time because the difficulties of the first month put some officers at such a disadvantage that they had to beg my pardon. And now the other officers tried to eliminate these former differences. It took longest with Manstein. Not before the Spring, 1942 was I invited by him personally, for the first time, to his castle on the South coast, which he had set up for recuperation. There I was, together with my successor von Albensleben, and another officer, and three or four officers of the Army. I was invited to his place one evening. I stayed there the night. The next morning I had breadfast with him, and then I travelled on. The second time I was privately invited during the celebration when Sevastopol fell. Apart from that, there was a constant contact with the Army, of course, owing to the fact a liaison officer was with the Army to share the billets with the one I C.A.O.; and beyond that, Herr Seibert, at least one week visited the Chief of Staff of IA or IIA, or the Chief for Partisan Combatting, and arrangements were made.
Naturally, I had more to do with the Chief of staff than with the Commander in Chief. And for that reason I visited him officially, repeatedly. Finally, after the winter of 1941, a very lively personal relation with the Staff Office of the Army took place in my casino. For example, during the Christmas celebration the staff of the Army was almost completely represented, and also during my goodbye party.
Q General, I think a translation came through incorrectly. The way I heard it when you were mentioning the commanders of the Eleventh Army, the name von Albensleven come through as your successor.
A I want to complete this. Einsatzgruppe D was given to Overfuehere Bierkamp, but he was with Einsatzgruppe D only for a snort time in the Crimea. The Crimea was given over to the civil administration and Albensleben became SS and Police Leader for the Crimea, and, therefore, he became successor for that area. Not in my position as chief of the Einsatzgruppe. question, your personal contacts and official contacts with the Army under General von Manstein were more frequent and more friendly than with his predecessor, General von Schobert? before he died, in battle.
Q. Can you remember now when General von Mannstein succeeded General von Schobert, that is, the approximate date?
A. I cannot remember the exact date, but I think that von Mannstein beemae successor of von Schobert in September 1941 at the latest.
Q. Now did General von Schobert, or General Mannstein ever issue orders to your Gruppe concerning executions?
A. That question is to concrete, Mr. Prosecutor. Such orders existed in various forms. For example, if he told the defendant Siebert, who is present here, that retalliation measures which he had ordered were not sufficient, and for that reason he would have to take a hand himself, or concretely, as I described concerning Sinferopol, where the Army requested that the liquidation of Jews be carried out immediately. Apart from that the idea of killing certain persons like, for example, the insane people, but I can not always say, of course, that this was of the Army itself. But the Einsatzoommandos, were assigned to corps or divisions, so that they had contact with the commandos, and, therefore, the task of issueing individual orders was later given to the smaller units rather than to the Central Offices.
Q. Then General von Mannstein did personally issue instructions or orders concerning the executions in Sinferopol, about which we have spoken?
A. No, I cannot say that, but an instruction came, sofar as I remember after discussing it with Braune, it came from the Quartermaster General Oberst Hauch, Colonel Hauch, but in the organization of the Army, it is natural that the Quartermaster General on his own authority cannot do such things without the approval of his commanderin-chief. I, therefore, cannot say that von Mannstein knew about it, or that he ordered it. I am merely considering it to be so owing to the military situations.
Q. It is highly probable that General von Mannstein did know and did instruct his staff officer to issue orders which came to you, is that correct?
A. In that case I cannot imagine that a staff officer as to his own authority can make such demands.
Q. General, who were the Army officers with whom you usually had conferences as to the activity of the Eisatzgruppen-D?
A. That was I-C.
Q. Can you give me his name?
A. First, Major Rank, R-A-N-K. Later his successor, Major Eisler, or Colonel Eisler; the I C-A-I, Major Riesen, E-I-E-S-E-N, and the chief of the Partisan combatting unit was Major Steffanus. The other staff officers I think are not of such great interest in this connection, that is, the I-A, there was Oberst Bussel, and von Werner. They are the most important names I know of.
Q. You say all of these were on the staff of General von Schobert, or General Mannstein.
A. Yes.
Q. Did these same officers whom you have named hand down to you orders for the execution of Jews?
A. No, I cannot say that.
Q. For the execution of Gypsies?
A. No, I cannot say that, either.
Q. For the execution of the insane?
A. As I said before, I do not definitely know whether this order was given by the Central office or from the Medical offices, or from the Regional offices.
Q. Who issued the orders for killing of active Communists and Soviet officials?
A. For these groups the order was contained in the general Fuehrer's Order.
Q. I believe you testified a few moments ago that the liaison officer of Einsatzgruppe-D with the 11th Army was the present defendant Seibert?
A. No, the liaison officer was another man. Siebert belonged to my staff, and was in my billets, while the liaison officer was another officer, who was in the staff of the Army, and also shared his billets with the Army.
Q. Now, General, you have admitted here that during the time you commanded Einsatzgruppe-D, an unidentified number of persons were executed, by the units under your command, and, I believe you testified further that the responsibility for the actual executions generally were in the kommando leader, am I correct?
A. Responsibility is a word which can be explained in different ways, those who gave the order; were responsible. They were responsible for the carrying out in this case.
Q. Just a matter of information, will you state in detail what normal channel the order went through from the authority issuing it to the man who actually pulled the trigger?
A. I believe my entire examinations show that this order was given once, namely, in Pretsch, and, therefore, the initiative was given, and, therefore, no new initial order was given in my time. Such an original order I did not get anyhow, unless one could consider the order to pick out PW's from PW camps as an extra order. The original order, as I have said, was sent to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, and to the Kommando leaders who were assembled.
Q. This in effect is true, is it not? Because of the difficulty of communications in the area in which you found yourself, you Kommando leaders were largely, because of poor communications, independent units, were they not?
A. The Kommando leaders were independent, there is no doubt about that. They had to be able to act independently for reasons as you gave just now.
Q. And they made a great many decisions without having to consult either you or higher authorities, did they not?
A. These decisions, Mr. Prosecutor, have to be stated more definitely. In this general form I cannot answer, yes or no.
Q. I apologize. They made tactical situations without consulting higher----tactical decisions-----I am sorry, without consulting higher headquarters, did they not?
A. Of course,
Q. How to select these commanders, great care had to be exercised as to their ability. Their initiative and their general ability to do the job?
A. Of course.
Q. And they were trusted sub-unit commanders of yours?
A. It is rather difficult to answer this.
Q. I will repeat General. I shall rephrase the question. Because of their careful selection, you relied on their judgment in given situations, did you not?
A. The Kammando leaders had certain tasks. These tasks they had to carry out. I did not choose the Kommando Leaders, or else they would have been quite different ones, but they were appointed by the RSHA, and they had to carry out the task which they had been assigned, and I had to rely on it, that according to their best ability they would fulfill these tasks. But since I did not rely on it completely, I tried by inspections to find out whether the commandos were in order, and whether the tasks were carried out. Unfortunately, as to some commanders, it was possible to go there, even once within six months, because it was rather difficult to get there. I had no influence in choosing Kommando leaders, either.
Q. In your direct examination you have explained your position and relationship with the Chief of the 11th Army. My question in connection with this topic may be, therefore, in a sense a little repetitious, but nevertheless, I would like you to answer this for the information of the Tribunal. Which were the special tasks which were assigned to you by the Army on the basis of the so-called Barbaressa Decree?
A. The basic task surely was to supply information and to look after the policing and the security of the Army. Beyond that the Army gave definite detailed tasks, and those changed according to the situation. For example, in July and August the harvest had to be brought in, the rear, had to be guarded; in November and December and January, to make inquiries about the partisans and to fight them; immediate military commitments, and then again the information service. These changed according to the situation.
MR. WALTON: At this time, may it please the Tribunal, I should like to submit to the witness for his examination, and later to be introduced into evidence, the document under NOKW-256. There are copies in the German language ready for distribution just as there are in the English now. I think it would be fair to Dr. Aschenauer at this time if he choosesto inspect it, and if he desires to make an objection I shall await on him at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: You are subitting it now for identification and scrutiny prior to actual introducing it as an exhibit?
MR. WALTON: Yes, and unless it is ruled out, sir, I should like for it to be given an identification number, so that it can be more easily introducedinto evidence by its number at a later time.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it might be well to give it an exhibit number at once.
MR. WALTON: According to my count, sir, the exhibit number it is entitled to is No. 174. I am ready to stand corrected if that is an error.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness received it?
MR. WALTON: I submitted it to his counsel, first.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If you have an extra copy, let Dr. Aschenauer have one. If so, he can read it simultaaneously.
MR. WALTON: Yes, sir, but I would like Dr.Aschenauer to see the original, first.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, alright. Secretary General, have you enlightened Mr. Walton on the correctness of the exhibit number?
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Exhibit No. 174 is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: That is correct.
MR. WALTON: Before I can ask him, the witness will have to read it, first. It is not too long, but it consists of several pages.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. WALTON: General, will you indicate when you have finished reading it, please?
THE WITNESS: Yes (after reading same) I am ready.
MR. WALTON: Thank you. BY MR. WALTON: containing this Decree? the so-called Barbarossa Decree. I do not think that this draft actually constitutes the Barbarossa Decree, but considerable parts are contained in the Barbarossa Decree. I believe that there are not a great number of differences in the contents.
outlining the collaboration of the Sonderkommandos, and the Army in the rear areas?
A I just forgot one thing. This text shows in this draft the fact that the Einsatzgruppen in the operational areas are mentioned, and also Einsatzgruppen in the rear areas. There were no such double assignment. Only one Einsatzgruppe was assigned to the Army, to each group, and the Army group decided how they were to be used. in the forwarded areas, the Army decided that?
Q now, isn't it true, that this Barbarossa Decree, that Himmler's orders based on it made it plain that the Sonderkommando should carry out their missions under their own responsibility? expression "own responsibility" were, I presume, that this means that the chief of the Security Police, and the SD could give instructions to these commandos, which then were carried out on their responsibility; but it never meant beyond the authority of the Army, or rather of the Army group, and this limitation, as is shown in this draft also, because every time it is said that the instructions are to be given to the Army, the Army can make restrictions. The Army can exclude areas; it can make restrictions if the operational situation required it. Later in the Barbarossa Decree, it says that the operational necessity could cause instruction of the Army, and change them. This sense is revealed clearly in this draft, "own responsibility" never means beyond the actual authority of the commander-in-chief.
of the Army, as contained in his task. This is shown in the assignment of the Einsatzgruppen and in the instructions of the OKW for the competence of the commander-in-chief. of the order, the Fuehrer Order, subject to the tactical situation at any time, which was the responsibility of the Army as to how to carry out these missions was entirely up to the decision of the Einsatzgruppe, was it not? draft of the Barbarossa Decree include executions? the executions, the Einsatz commanders had the order, and the tasks were given to them to carry out certain executions, of course.
Q By the Barbarossa Decree?
A No, no, I did not say that. At least, I did not intend to say that. I do not know that in the Barbarossa Decree this order for extermination is contained. To repeat it. I do not know that in the Barbarossa agreement the Fuehrer Order anything about the killing of certain groups of population was contained.
Q General, I won't quarrel with you, but the testimony is very clear on your oders for execution. I leave that point at this time. Now, General, did it ever happen that the order of the Commander of the 11th Army, or his staff, was given directly to the Kommandos -- these units which were subordinate to you?
A Which orders?
Q Any orders?
they did not pass through your headquarters? distribution lists, a written order to a command was given to me to see. This was only so if they were orders by the Army. Orders by a Corps, or by the Division I did not see, of course. after the order was actually given? Army corps gave an order to s sub-unit of yours?
A Whether I was informed? from your headquarters, and attached to the Army corps, do you follow me? commando 11-B should be committed for a certain specific task, the Army group commander issued an order directly to the commander of the Einsatzkommando 11-B?