Q: Was Seibert's service in Einsatzgruppe D satisfactory to you at all times?
A: That would be saying too much. In general, I managed to get along with him.
Q: Would you consider that Seibert was one of the few close friends you had in Einsatzgruppe D when you commanded it?
A: I do net consider military connections as friendly connections.
Q: General, let us turn for a moment to Co-Defendant Heinz Schubert. When he reported to you in Nikolaev in October 1941 -- this was some three months after the Einsatzgruppe D had taken the field, was it not?
A: Yes.
Q: who informed Schubert of his field of tasks?
A: That was very simple, relatively speaking. He went to the office and looked at how the files were kept and took care of these files, and, apart from that, I told him what I wanted concerning visitors, terms, order, and so forth. That was all and it was not very difficult to make this clean to him, because he had previous experiences about such things.
Q: Now, was he also informed officially of the main tasks of Einsatzgruppe D in its own operational areas? I specifically refer to the Himmler order and the order to Keep the supply lines moving to the Wehrmacht. Was he informed of that officially?
A: Whether he knew about that, I don't know; I presume so. In any case, I had no reason to inform him about it officially, because officially it was no concern of his
Q: Do you happen to know where he first acquired the knowledge that Einsatzgruppe D was engaged in liquidation of the Jews and Communists, etc?
A: I don't know that. I presume that he only heard that in the Crimea.
Q: When Schubert returned from his inspection trip to Simferopol in September 1941, did he report to you in person?
A: That was not an inspection trip in Simferopol. That was in the same place. He was sent out by me to the same place, because I went there in the morning and in the afternoon and he went there in between. When he returned of course he reported to me.
Q: Did he tell you that he had seen to it that this execution by Braune's Commando II B was carried out according to your orders?
A: He could not have reported that to me, because that was not his task. He merely had to watch and listen but had no authority of command.
Q: Then you would make this same answer to the next question: Did he tell you that he saw to it that those condemned persons were not beaten and that there were no disturbances among the civilian population?
A: It was not his task.
Q: General, isn't it a strange coincidence that all your efforts from 1938 to 1941 to have Braune assigned to you for duty were of no avail, and then suddenly he turns up in your Einsatzgruppe in the fall of 1941, by the merest chance?
A: I don't know whether he had good connections with Amt I and if he wanted to come to me, but I don't think so. I think actually he was surprised by his transfer and it was a mere coincidence that he came to me, but I don't want to maintain that definetely.
Q: You were glad to have him when it so happened he did report to you?
A: I was very glad that he was with me, of course.
Q: And the reason you were glad was because you valued his services, isn't that true?
A: Yes.
Q: Now did Browne ever ask you to be relieved of his command?
A: He never talked about that.
Q: Yesterday -
A : One moment, please. There would have been no chance to do so either, because he knew, like everybody else, that a soldier cannot ask to be relieved from the Army, but unfortunately, he is under the war legislation, where no special application can be made. Such an application would be of no avail.
Q: Yesterday, you testified that many of your officers and men could not stand the mental strain of executions, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: you described Browne yesterday as a soft and sensitive man. How did it happen that he was able to stand this strain and there was no necessity to relieve him of his command?
A: As far as I know, Browne only saw one single execution in his life. That does not seem to be a very great strain.
Q: Let us turn our attention once more to Sonderkommando 10 B. Who was the highest ranking officer next to Pesterer in this Kommando?
A: It was Hautsturmfuehere Finger.
Q: Do you consider it impossible for Ruehl ever to have been the deputy Pesterer?
A: Yes, definitely.
Q: When asked by counsel for the Defendant Biberstein about the time when the activities of the Einsatzsgruppen ceased completely, you answered, that that was a result of the retreat of the German forces from Russia and you said, further that the activities of the Einsatzgruppen stopped, when they had to retreat into areas under the German civilian administration, did you not?
A: Yes, but concerning the actual tasks of the Einsatzgruppen, because previously in interrogations I said that on this occasion the Einsatzgruppen were usually reorganized. Their tasks were changed and they were converted into fighting units to help fight the partisans. That was the fate of Einsatzgruppe D, for example.
Q: Approximately when did this change in the activities of the Einsatzgruppe in general take place? What year?
A: In general, one could say after Stalingrad. That is in January, 1943, that is, with the year of 1943.
Q: Are you in a position to state specifically when the activities of Einsatzgruppe C ceased entirely?
A: Unfortunately not.
Q: Were you at that time active in the conquered territories of the East or had you already returned to Berlin?
A: In July 1942 I returned and never went back to the East.
Q: So you were in Berlin at this particular time?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, General, you have told us that the Einsatzgruppe D was broken down into Kommandos. What was the average strength of a Kommando in personnel?
A: That varied. There was only one complete kommando. That was Kommando 12, while the other Einsatzkommandos were broken down and on an average they consisted of 70 to 80 people.
Q: Was there any further breadkown? Were there platoons, or squads in each Kommando?
A: Yes, as required, part kommandos were found.
Q: Now a Teilkommando, is this a permanent organization; or was it organized to perform a cert in mission and then return to its parent group, which is correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Which is correct?
A: As required by necessity the Army could require that a corps or a division could be given such a sub-unit.
Q: Now, it was necessary to have on your staff and certainly distributed through the kommandos, interpreters, was it not?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the usual rank off interpreters in Einsatzgruppe D?
A: That varied. I, for example, had a hauptsturmfuehrer who acted as interpreter. Mostly these interpreters were not from our own ranks, but had been sent to us to help out and mostly they did not join the SS, but were only given a uniform usually according to their former position, that is, an assessor, for example, as a rule would have the uniform of a hauptsturmfuehrer, a regierangsrat, a counsellor, would get a uniform of a sturmbannfuehrer. That is, the interpreters did not no Id a rank as such, but his rank changed according to his former position. He could have been an unterfuehrer, or a hauptsturmfuehrer, or some higher rank.
Q: In the event that it was a sturmbanfuehrer or a hauptsturmfuehrer, did he have interpreting duties?
A: If he was employed as an interpreter, he was an interpreter.
Q: Nothing else?
A: It is possible, of course, that he may have been used for other jobs if necessary of course. Of course, I did not leave anyone in my office without doing anything.
Q: In Einsatzgruppe D, did you have a kommando for the purpose of collecting archives or intelligence material?
A: No.
Q: Do you know if any other Einsatzgruope had a kommando for the purpose of collecting archives?
A: No.
Q: Was there attached to the Einsatzgruppen headquarters any units whose purpose was not the protection of the rear are as by insuring the security of the area?
A: I think this document which you showed me previously reveals that. Here it says first, "Securing, before the commencement of operations, of certain objectives (material, archives, files, pertaining to organizations, associations, groups, etc. hostile to the Reich or State)" It was, of course important to secure such archives. It was necessary and of great importance to know about conditions in the Soviet Union.
preserve such material, were they not? Vorkommandos or Sonderkommandos, because they marched into a city with the fighting troops and had to secure such objects. ever have any contact with the officials of the Reichskommissar for the strengthening of German Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the Race and Resettlement Office? deutsche Mittelstelle. Kommando 12, during the month of August, September, until the middle of October, moved up to the Ethnic German Regions in Transistrien, which were dlosed regions and these areas were then handed over to a representative Volksduetsche Mittelstelle and during that time the Chief of that organization, Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, was in this area and I also talked to him. recollection? Litzmannstadt?
Q Did you know of the Lidice incident? an Einsatzgruppe? Mittelstelle Einsatzkommandos?
expression. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans, had Kommandos that had to look after those areas which I described and these kommandos took over the work from me and in that respect I was in contact with them.
Q Did you continue to work together with this group? Germans, and if we heard about the fate of those as for example of the 50,000 Ethnic Germans in the Crimea, we informed these groups about it. the Race and Resettlement questions? This was the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans. I don't know whether these people belonged immediately to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle or to the Higher SS and Police Leader who had special officers for these tasks. In any case, I wish to add immediately that the actual task of the Einsatzgruppe had nothing to do with these kommandos and that they did not help us either. SS and Police Leader Hildebrandt in the Crimea?
Q A few more questions and then I am done. May I assume that it was your opinion that you had to obey an order of the Fuehrer whether you personally would agree or disagree with such an order? human or inhuman?
even unto death?
A Unto my own death? Of course. Of course, in winter, for example, we thought that our lives had come to an end. gruppe Chief that Germany had signed a defense treaty with the Soviet Russia in the summer of 1939? Russia went to war?
A I don't know that. Probably.
MR. WALTON: General, I want to thank you for your cooperation and your prompt answers in this examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any questions, Mr. Heath?
MR. HEATH: If Your Honors please, yesterday I had begun to ask a question. I think I did not make the relevancy of it clear to the court. Mr. Walton has just touched on it and it is this the plea of the Defendant here obviously is the coercion of a superior order that under the law -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Heath, I don't think it is necessary to make any argument.
MR. HEATH: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Put the question and then if it seems irrelevant, we will rule on it.
MR. HEATH: Yes, sir. BY MR. HEATH:
Q. Mr. Ohlendorf, you have just said that you felt that you must respect this order unto your own death.
Will you now tell the Court what your present judgment is of the order. Do you think it was a moral order or do you think it was a wrong order which you received from the head of the German state?
DR. ASCHENAUER (Attorney for the Defendant Ohlendorf): I object to this question, Your Honor. Only facts can be asked about and not opinions.
MR. HEATH: May I answer, if Your Honor please. who claims mitigation because of superior orders is putting himself in the position of saying, morally I had no choice. If, in fact, he morally approved of a superior order and therefore would have acted without the coercion of it, if in fact he did not object to the coercion but merely lent himself to the course of action which he would have to follow without coercion, then a plea of mitigation fails entirely, and so here, if the Defendant did these killings because of the coersive effect of an order, with which he disagreed, that is one thing, but if Ohlendorf was himself in full agreement or in partial agreement with the purpose which Hitler had, then the mitigating effect of the coercion oder is fully or almost fully lost.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, do you follow that argument?
MR. HEATH: The plea is bad, if it is done willingly.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I wish to point out that these are merely argumentations which have nothing to do with testimony by the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has indicated that this is not the time for argument, but it would appear that the purpose behind the question is not in the nature of argumentation, but for the purpose of determining whether there can be any mitiation in the offense as charged by the prosecution in the indictment and for that purpose the question will be permitted.
The objection is overruled.
A Mr. Prosecutor, I have already replied to that question during my direct examination by stating that I considered the order wrong, but I was under military coercion and carried it out under military coercion knowing that it was given in a state of emergency and the measures were ordered as emergency measures in self-defense. The order, as such, even now, I consider to have been wrong, but there is no question for me whether it was moral or amoral, because a leader who has to deal with such serious questions decides from his own responsibility and this is his responsibility and I cannot examine and not judge. I am not entitled to do so.
MR. HEATH: If Your Honors please, that is exactly the state of the record and I respectfully submit that we yet have no answer. For this reason: the witness has said he thought it was a wrong order, because it was difficult or impossible of execution, when he was told -
THE WITNESS: I didn't say that.
MR. HEATH: When he was told about it at Pretzsch, he thought it was impossible of execution. I think the very issue which he seeks to avoid is the crux of this question, namely, not whether it was a difficult order, or a wise order, from the standpoint of his, but whether it was right or wrong. The issue is a morale one. The coercion of superior orders goes to the moral coercion and not to the wisdom of the order.
THE PRESIDENT: But, Mr. Heath, hasn't he answered your question?
MR. HEATH: He has said -- he said it was a wrong order.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, what more do you want. Put another specific question and we will see if he hasn't answered. It appeared to the Tribunal that he has answered, but put the question to him.
Q You have said it was a wrong order. I want you only to tell me whether it was morally wrong or morally right.
THE WITNESS: May I correct beforehand that in my reply I never said whether it was a difficult or not a difficult order. That is an ssumption which I don't want to have in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Then it must have been an error in transmission, because the Tribunal is under the impression that yesterday you stated in your original protest against the order that it was impossible of fullfilment or very difficult of fullfilment. Are we in error in that impression?
THE WITNESS: I said, "inhuman", Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, very well. The record indicates just what was said. Now do you want to put another question?
Q I put the same question. Was the order a moral one: was it morally right, or was it morally wrong? to decide on the moral issue, but I considered it to be wrong because such factors are able to bring such results which may mave immoral affects and, in my opinion are bound to have immoral effects. But I fo not think I am in a position to jusge the responsibility of a statesman who, as shown in history, rightly, saw his people before the question of being or not being, to jusge whether a measure in such a fight against fate, for which this leader is responsible, is moral or immoral.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we extract from all that you have said, this thought@ That you are not prepared to pass upon whether the order was morally right or morally wrong, but you do say that the order could only lead to very bad circumstances which would be injurious to Germany
WITNESS: Not only to Germany itself, your Honor. I consider this to be much more serious, even. I see the order which Hitler gave, not as a first cause for this order, but I already consider it as a result of logical developments which may have started - or at least became very obvious - when in 1935 in our opinion Germany was encircled. Such measures must further such developments -- for example, to the effect that instead of an understanding, - hatred, revenge and an exaggereated effort to gain security will become very strong and, therefore, the general insecurity of the word will be increased. For example, causing effects - as can be described with the name "Morgenthau Plan" or requests, as such that Germany is be weakened in its greatness and strength so that this people will no longer endanger the security of any one. That is what I meant by "effect" which might result from such factors, because they are intended for this: while I mean that throughout historical development at some time a chain of hatred or mistrust has to be broken in order to start anew somewhere, and that, for example, I hoped would be achieve through national individual people, but here the chain is continued, a sequence is continued, which instead of reconcialiation breeds more hatred, and increase the feeling for security.
That is my opinion on this.
MR. HEATH: May I put the question once more, if Your Honor please?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may put the question and then the witness may answer it directly, or, if he feels he has already answered it, he may so indicate, or he may refuse to answer it.
We will see what happens. BY MR. HEATH:
Q I do not ask you for a judgment of Hitler's morale; I ask you for an expression of your own moral conception.
The question is not whether Hitler was moral; but what, in your moral judgment, was the character of this order: Was it a moral order, or an immoral order? abstractly for a moral estimation or nothing - but a moral estimation and judgment about a deed of Hitler. And for that reason the judgment which I may make is judgment on the deed of Hitler. Your Honor. You surrendered your moral conscience to Adolf Hitler, did you not?
A No. But I surrendered my moral conscience to the fact that I was a soldier, and, therefore, w wheel in a low position, relatively, in a great machinery; and what I did there is the same as is done in any other army, and I am convinced that in spite of facts and comparisons which I do not want to mention again, the persons receiving the orders and all armies are in the same position- until today, until this very day.
your moral scruple. It was the fact that you had surrendered to Hitler the power to decide moral questions for you -- is that right?
A That is an argumentation from you which I never said. No, it is not correct. But as a soldier I got an order, and I obeyed this order as a soldier. required - I suppose you did -- if you had a moral conscience you had to judge the orders that came to you. You got an order from Adolf Hitler, and you tell us you accepted his moral judgment absolutely, whether right or wrong, - is that right? I think my answer will not be changed by the fact that you want me to make a certain reply.
Q Let us put it in the negative, then. You refuted to make any moral judgment, and you refuse now to make any moral judgment then, and you refuse now to make any moral judgment on this matter?
Q I am not asking you the reason. I am asking whether you refuse to express a moral judgment as to that time, or as of today. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Yesterday Mr. Heath put a question to you which perhaps we did not allow to be answered - but in view of what has now been stated perhaps we might go back just a moment. He asked you whether, when you received this order, any question arose in your mind as to its authencity namely, was the order of such a nature that it caused you to hesitate as to whether there could have been an error in it and would cause you to go higher than the officer who had given you this mission, in order to determine, positively, whether it was uathentic or not. You remember that discussion?
Hitler, that is, it was Hitler's, it did not give it to you, but it came from Streckenbach.
Q Yes, very well. And his rank was not so high that an incredible statement by him could be questioned? to such extent that you wanted to inquire whether it truly was an order given by Hitler or not; or not, or were you so satified that Hitler knew what to do, and the circumstances were such that even that order could be a logical one, that you accepted it without misgivings, without questioning, without doubts, and without investigation? dispersed, as I explained yesterday, through reaction-to wards Streckenbach, and Streckenbach argumented on all those questions which your Honor just mentioned. So that during this discussion all the questions have been worked on already, and finally. No other solution was loft to us, than according to Streckenbach's experience through his discussion with Hitler it is quite obvious that there is a Fuehrer Order here which under no circumstances can be taken back, or can be cancelled.
Q You indicated a lack of desire to answer Mr. Heath's question on the moral issue. You indicated that it wans't for you to decide the moral question at all. But with every order, with every demand, or request, there instinctively goes a moral appraisement -- you may agree whith it or not --; so when this order was given to you to go out to kill, you had to appraise it, instinctively. The soldier who goes into battle knows that he must kill. But he understands that it is a question of a battle with an equally armed enemy. But you were going out to shoot down defenseless.
Now, didn't the question of the morality of that enter you mind? Let us suppose that the order had been -- and I don't mean any offense in this question -- suppose the order had been that you should kill your sister. Would you not have instinctively morally appraised that, order as to whether it was right or wrong -- morally, not politically, or military but as a matter of humanity, conscience, and justice between man and man?
from the others. I believe during my direct examination plenty of questions of this kind have been dealt with. Probably with the occurences of 1943, 1944, and 1945 which I had - where with my own hands I took children and women out of the burning asphalt myself, with my own hands, and with my own hands I took big blocks of stone from their stomachs, of pregnant women; and with my own eyes I saw 60,000 people die within 24 hours -- that I am not prepared, or in a position to give today a moral judgment about that order, because in the cause if this connection these factors seem to me to be above a moral standard. These years are for me a unit separate from the rest. Full of ruthlessnot in position to take one occurence or rather a small event, of what I experienced and to isolate it, and to value it morally in this connection. I ask, you to understand that from a human point of view.
Q Your answer gave a certain date. You mention the years 1943, 1944, 1945. Naturally, these were years following 1941, when you were confronted with that issue.
MR. WALTON: One thing further, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, let's wait until the recess is over and determine whether you gave anything else.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I ask you to permit defendant Blobel to be absent from the Tribunal tomorrow forenoon and afternoon so that I can prepare with him his own examination.
THE PRESIDENT: The request wilt be granted.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution have any further questions?
MR. HEATH: Your Honor, please, is this Court going to pursue the question which it asked before the recess, or is the Court through questioning the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I thought we had exhausted that inquiry, unless-
MR HEATH: The Court made inquiry on which it got no response from the witness, which was, I think, the ultimate question which Your Honor was putting to him, namely, if you get an order from Hitler to kill your sisten, would you have acted on the order, or would you have had any conflicting moral judgment about the nature of the order? There was no response, and I don't know whether the Court thinks we have gone far enough with the questioning, or, whether we may ask for a response to that question?
THE PRESIDENT: The Court would not insist on the question being answered because of its very nature, but it seems to me that it is a relevant question, but the witness may or may not answer, as he sees fit.
MR. HEATH: May we then put the question to him, if Your Honor, please? BY MR HEATH: and blood, would you have executed that order, or not?
A I consider this question frivolous. The question which is being put to me here by the Prosecution, it deals with people - - with life and death of people, and of millions of people who are near starvation even today, therefore, I can only designate and state that the question is frivolous. killing order, a moral question arises, but if thousands of human beings are involved in it, you can see no moral questions; it is a matter of numbers?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I think you are the only one to understand my answer in this way, that it is not a matter of one single person, but from the point of departure events have happened in history which among other things have led to deeds committed in Russia, and such an historical process you want me to analyze in a moral way. In fact, I do, however, refuse moral valuation with good reasons as outlined sofar as my own conscience is concerned. I don't refuse answering this last question because of just one person; it is, in order to bring morality on the basis of numbers, but because the Prosecutor now addresses me personally....
Q I shall not address you personally. Suppose you found your sister in Soviet Russia, and your sister were included in that category of gypsies, not a Jewish - - but in, gypsy band, and she was brought before you for slaughter because of her presence in the gypsy baud; what would have been your action? She is there in the process of history, which you have described?
DR. ASCHENAUER: I object to this question and I ask that question not to be admitted. I think the subject has been dealt with sufficiently so that no other questions are necessary. This is no question for cross examination.
MR. HEATH: Your Honor I believe we have met tests which we applied by putting one of his own flesh and blood in exactly the alleged historical stream in which he can form no judgment. I asked him now whether if he found his own flesh and blood within the Hitler order in Russia, what would have been his judgment, would it have been moral to kill his own flesh and blood, or immoral.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I ask for a ruling of the Tribunal upon my objection.
THE PRESIDENT: The question indubitably is extraordinary one, and ordinarily would not be, tolerated, in any trial, outside of a trial like this, which is certainly an extraordinary and a phenominal one. We are dealing her with a charge, which to the knowledge of this Tribunal has never been presented in the history of the human race of a man who is here charged with the responsibility for the snuffing out of lives by the hundreds of thousands - - not hundreds of thousands, but ninetythousand.