THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. DURCHHOLD (Attorney for the defendant Schulz):
Q. Witness, you tols us at the end of the last session that you succeeded in being called to Berlin in order to see Strenckenbach. Just tell me exactly what happened in Berlin.
A On the 24th of August I left for Berlin. As far as I can recall I arrived there on the 27th of August. I can recall this date rather clearly because the date of my arrical in Berlin was just before the birthday of my wife and so I was able to spend her birthday with her. I was unable to see Streckenbach on that same day.
It may have been on the 28th or 29th of August, I don't remember this quite clearly, but then I reported to Streckenbach in detail, and I told him what order Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln had issued through Dr. Rasch, in particular, that women and children were not to be saved. I described to him very much in detail just what effects this would be bound to have and I told him how monstruous the conscience of these people concerned had been. issued it, he told me that such an order would just mean plain murder. In this connection I would like to emphasize that this statement on his part referred to the form of the order, which was passed on by Rasch and which stated as a reason for this measure that women and children should be shot so that no vendetta would arise. I also expressed that at the time of my interrogations at Oberursel. I would like to comment on that again later on. Heydrich about that subject as soon as possible. On that occasion I asked him to submit my request for transfer also in case this order should be maintained.
Several days passed, because Heydrich was not theere. If I am not mistaken he was at Prague at that time. Several days later, Streckenbach asked me to come and see him and he told me on that occasion that Heydrich also had misgivings about the manner in which this order had been issued.
be changed because a Fuehrer ordere demanded that these measures should me maintained as long as the opponent was also using these measures, and as long as they were necessary. I again repeated my request for transfer because I told him that I was not able to carry out such an order, or to announce such an order to my man. He then told me that this had already been done because my transfer had already been requested by another agency, Which described me as not being enough, at the same time. Streckenbach announced me that Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer had been appointed as my successor and that he would be notified immeduately.
Q You told me that you requested a transfer. On that occasion didn't you have the feeling that you were very selfish and that you were letting your men down?
A Yes, I did have that feeling. When I was traveling from Russia to Berlin, I realized quite clearly that if those orders should be maintained, that I would never be able to agree to it in my inner feeling.
However, I would like to emphasize that my own mental consitution was not the only thing which took me to Berlin.
When I left Russia I simply could not imagine that this order should be valid, I considered it to be a result of the doings of an over fanatical worker. At this time I would like to point out again at that period of time I did not have the least idea of the Fuehrer Order, which had already been announced.
Dr. Rasch had not discussed it with me, either on any occasion. I therefore hoped that I would be able to get a decision in Berlin which would mean liberation to all persons concerned, from the mental burden it had imposed upon all of us. After all, I did not were concerned. I assumed at the time that these happenings in Einsatsgruppe C had occured, who was a great fanatix, and that for this reason Einsatzgruppe C was occupying a social position. When I considered the idea of my transfer, the question arose within me whether my attitude was dishonorable or cowardly before my men a the men of whom I was in charge.
I can assure that my request for my transfer was very hard for me. However, I could not act differently, especially since I had realized quite clearly that it would mean a difference whether I had to carry out an order as s soldier or whether I as an officer in a leading position would issue such an order, I was unable men which I myself refuted throrough;y within myself, orders which I was simply unable to understand, I participated in one single execution of 18 people at Lemberg, and I therefore know that at that time I had to use up all my energy in order to avoid losing my outer appearance, and from this experience I knew what this order meant. However, I would like to emphasize here that my own opinion is not to be any criticism on the actions of anybody else who, from his own inner deep conviction, may have harbored a different opinion and who represents it at this time. I was frequently reproached for my alledged softness. I had to bear this repraoch and I did bear it. ing to his disposition. He just cannot alter his basic constitution. At that time, although O know that I was a man who was fully ready to do his duty, I was unable to raise a strong enough will in order to issue an order which I was unable to give. However, I would also like to point out in this respect that my request of transfer probably would not have been approved if Streckenbach had not heldped me out in a friendly manner and if my transfer had not been requested by another party. Also, the possibility that I could approach Streckenbach, as I was able to do, certainly was only possible to very few people since I, as a commander of the officer candidate school, was subordinated to the Office Chief One, I had a very close official relationship with him.
by way of Streckenbach because you had a particularly close personal relationship with him?
A Yes, only because of that reason. However, that I did not only think of myself is shwon by the fact that I was also successful in being able to have the officers candidate training course sent back of which I was in charge. Although for the Einsatzgruppem this lack of officers candidates meant a severe burden for some time, which they did not let go without objections, in spite of their objections the recall was carried out.
Q How were you able to rescind this reaching training course? circumstances he should see to it that the officer candidates should be taken off. I described to him that these valuables men, if they should remain, under such orders, they would completely deteriorate as officers. However, this was the contrary of what this traning course was trying to achieve, Under such a way of giving orders, these officers wither would have to degenerate mentally or they would become so brutal that they be completely unsuitable as leaders of human beings, Streckenbach agreed with my opinion and he assured me that he would report to Heydrich once more.
Again I had to wait for several days. Then I was notified by him that Heydrich had shown full understanding for the case and that he had also ordered that this training course be interrupted and withdranw at once.
In this way I at least had some partial success.
Q Once you had been in Berlin did you again return to Russia?
A Yes. After all, I had to turn over my detachment to my successor, who was Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer. In the meantime, he had already been notified to that effect. Approximately on the 12th of September 1941 I left Berlin. I left for Skwira where my detachment had moved in the meantime.
In my affidavit of the 26th of May 1947 in Document Book 1, on pages 134 and 135 of the German text, Exhibit No. 26, Document No. 3644, I have stated that approximately on the 26th of September 1941 my successor arrived at that locality. This date, however, is not correct. The mistake was an by the fact that I did not know any more, Kiev. I told Mr. Wartenberg at that time that the change of my position to Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer followed immediately in connection with the fall of Kiev. Since, however, I now know the difference from the documents, I can tell them to you with rather certainty. Accordingly, Kiev fell on the 19th of September, so that at the very latest, on the 21st of September, or probably already on the day before, Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer arrived at my locality and took over the command. My return journey to Berlin followed on the 25th of September. I am also able to determine this date from the documents. From this it becomes evident that Dr. Rasch arrived at Kiev on the 25th of September.
At that time, however, he came from Nowoukrainke, to Skwira, where he was stationed in the school were I was also s taying. He stayed there overnight together with the Chief of Staff. Since it had become very late at that time, and he was unable to move on during the night on account of the strongly mined streets. On that occasion I immediately reported leaving his sphere. On the following morning, on the 25th of September, Dr. Rasch went to trip to Berlin.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
from Russia?
A Yes. Approximately at the same time when I relinquished my command, the members of the training course were also recalled by radio message. Until 1 October 1941 they were to report to Group 1-B at Berlin, at the school there. Right on the spot I was able to convince myself that with the exception of one who was killed in battle and several cases of delay owing to special difficulties, all of them were back in time. In agreement with the Chief of Personnel, they were granted a furlough until the 1 November 1941. use this occasion in order to tell the training course something about your judgment of the war measures taken in the East?
A Yes. Since I had found out that those people partly had to fight the same strong inner conflict, I felt it to be my duty to tell them my opinion quite clearly, with the intention to give them some inner support. I thought that in their faces I saw the mirror of their feelings, that their thoughts did not differ from my own. However, probably all of them could not find the right way in their inner struggle between right, duty and their feelings; they were confronted with a horrible picture of an atrocious war; a constant propaganda began running on them with the eternal motto: "The Jews are trying to exterminate Germany." Finally they began to believe it. They just clenched their teeth and did their duty. Perhaps they did so to test that they were doing their very best in order to pacify their own souls. I assembled the members of the training course in the assembly hall of the officers candidate school, and first talked to them about general matters. With regard to measures caused by the war in the East, I finally concluded with the following words: "I know that part of you with clenched teeth had to fulfill a hard duty which was contrary to their inner feelings. This assignment brought something different to them than they had hoped for and what they had wished, namely that Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.they would be able to prove their worth in combat at the front.
However, I told them I was expecting one thing from them, even if it has been said that these measures were necessary, because the opponent provoked these things, and, even if they acted in a deepest conviction of what they ware doing was right and necessary, each one of them should clearly realize that this was a terrible experience. I told them that I prohibited them to talk about these things. That these things were too serious to serve assa subject of a conversation. However, those who were bragging about the shooting of Jaws, those people I would remove from the training course, because they had character deficiency. People who maintained such an attitude certainly were not fit to be officers. assignment in Russia, I am now coming to several individual questions. In your opinion was there a possibility of launching protest against the orders which were issued by Hitler? which I spent there during my assignment, two phases of development must be observed. First of all we have the Fuehrer Order, which was contained in the so-called Commissar Order, and which was supplemented by the Barbaressa Order, and, secondly, we have the other order which was issued by Jackelm in August. The first possibility of objecting to this order wasat the time of our assignment, and it was too late at that time in my opinion, or of what I don't know -- it would have been unsuccessful because of the fact that the first order, the so-called Commissar Order, after all, existed already actually as a Fuehrer Order as the result of mutual discussion between the OKH and other agencies. Here there would have been the first possibility of raising an objection. If inspite of this, this order had still been issued, thus we had to assume with certainty that the details in particular with regard to the legal aspects should have been conscientiously discussed; for how can the legality be doubted if higher responsible commanding agencies Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.do issue them; and this order did not result from any local situation, but from the very beginning it was considered to be applicable to all territories in the East.
The measures which ware taken, therefore, had to be considered as being necessary for the combat troops, and as being inevitable. This could not have been a political measure alone, because the order was issued by the OKH, the High Command of the Army. Therefore, in this case the objection would have had to be raised already by the Highest Command Agency of the Wehrmacht. The first observations during the campaign in Russia led to recognize very clearly that a very fierce opponent was confronting us who just like we had to fight for existence or his extermination, and accordingly he chose his methods. Also William Henry Chamberlain writes in the "New Leaders" in an article "The Permanent Crisis", that in this connection we have to quote Lenin: "It is necessary to apply every method no matter how mean, howdeceitful, how illegal it may be, in order to serve the Communist Idea." Could we reproach legally our opponent with these measures, with that repudiation of the existing International Law which was so well known to the world, his methods for the extermination and weakening of his arch-enemy? His attitude required other harsh measures considering our self-preservation. That was an opinion which I also had succeeded in obtaining, even against my own inner feelings. Within the framework of the order which was given to me, I did in our behalf, and absolutely saw to it, that the measures which resulted from self-defense, and from the urgent circumstances, which were necessary for the security of troops, and the security of areas they were entitled to, in my opinion, should not exceed the permissible limits. I want to add in this respect that my judgment may have been wrong. If from the Russian side, measures were taken with terrible severity against the civilian population, as well as against German soldiers. I can understand that when these facts became known by the local Wehrmacht agencies in this first phase, when the order was given. There were no objections that these measures were even emphasized to be urgently necessary.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
However, I can not understand it that no objections were raised against the second phase of development by the Wehrmacht commanders. But the responsibility remained with the Wehrmacht Agencies; they were in charge of the executing power; only with their consent could happen what actually had happened. Even silent toleration in such serious cases must be compared with consent. Whether the Wehrmacht commanders with their objections expected to be successful or not, in my opinion, this didn't matter at all for the time being. However, as long as the Wehrmacht did not do anything at all in the way of making objections, any steps from any other side were completely impossible and useless. After all, the question could have been put to them just how can you raise objections to measures against which even the Wehrmacht does not have any objection. However, the failure to object at that time meant consent, and consent was played on equal basis with necessity. Only under these circumstances things could develop as they actually did, especially as without any doubt, for example, Jeckelm had sufficient fanatics at his disposal who instead of impeding the carrying out of these measures would always press to have them carried out; and who were able to do so because no effective obstruction was placed in their path.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
However, this avalanche would just roll over the little man who tried to raise an objection. In this way my own description of things in Berlin, in which I did not only tell them of this development but where I also told them about the mental destruction of the individual person, was found not to have any reaction. I am also firmly convinced of the fact that the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen also would have been unsuccessful in raising an objection if an objection had not been issued by the command agencies of the Wehrmacht. agencies were bearing the responsibility for the tasks which were forced upon the Security Police. But from above there came no obstruction but only instigation.
Q What was your own attitude towards that? there was an order which was not so firmly limited I determined that criminal activity of the person concerned had to be the basis for the most harsh measure it required. In this connection I would like to point out once more that the sequence of time with regard to this order within the Einsatzgruppen C took another course as far as I was concerned. I ordered that no shootings were to take place without that reasons for the execution were examined conscientiously, and that the persons concerned, the victim as well as the person who had to carry out the execution, was told that in every case the necessity of the situation had to be taken into consideration and had to be decisive. I myself regretted it most that no court martials were established. They were refused by the Keitel Order and by pointing out the fact that the Russians did not use any court martials either. Here the Wehrmacht did not raise any objection either. It could and should have reserved for itself the right to institute court martials. of a formal proceed. I accepted officers to head these small detachments who had been professional policemen and officials in the police Court No. IIA-Case No. 9.for many years, and who, furthermore, in their training course had shown themselves to be very conscientious and that they had received some legal training.
Without their personal decision no execution could be carried out. I was unable to reserve my own decision in this matter because all prerequisites for that were lacking, and they had been given the right to make the decisions. However, I am still grateful to fate, even today, that the officers who worked under me were humane and decent, and if I may express myself so, in this connection: they were quite reasonable. Order, could not have prevented anyone not carrying out any more executions, and it would have given everyone the possibility of correcting me if they were not in agreement with my opinion. However, none of them did that. This also becomes evident from the documents. It should have been proven by them.
Q At Zhitomir weren't you informed of the other order by Jeckeln? announced. about that supplementary order? civilized nations and international law is concerned, I am unable to decide. I am not a legal expert. However, the fact is that Russia did not recognize International Law, and the ruthlessness of the methods which they employed could be clearly seen by all. Is it that under these circumstances the partner is also bound to International Law? After all I no longer was able to see any International Law. The fact is that the German measures toward the Western powers were never used. In this, however, one should see a premeditated action. That is the way the little man in the street looked at it, and he was certainly convinced of the fact, in his bitter fulfilling of his duty, that if he had refused to obey these orders, it would have cost his own life Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.and he did not believe that he was doing any wrong.
Whether, in consideration of these things, we are dealing with something wrong here, that probably would have to be decided by an International Court of Law. However, regardless of the fact whether this was wrong or not, I was unable to give my inner agreement to these measures, and I did not do it. you any extensive comment on the subject because my requested and approved transfer liberated me from this issuing of orders. ments, I want to ask you one more brief question. Yesterday when we discussed your official assignment you mentioned the fact that even before your assignment in Russia you were in charge of Einsatzkommandos. Was this decisive it any way for your assignment in Russia later on? be approximately the same, especially since I did not know the Streckenbach order, since I was absent from Pretsch. With the exception of the statements of Heydrich, which I have told you about already, I did not hear any details about the assignment in Russia which could even have lead me to conclude that such special tasks would be demanded of me. Only subsequently I heard of the statement of Heydrich that more severe measures would have to be taken against the Jews, and here I had to give it another meaning than I did at the moment when I reported to him. At the time, in any case, I really did not assume that shootings on a major scale were intended or planned, Even though up to that period of time I had been a member of the Security Police for eight years, I myself never had received any order or ever heard of an order which would have dealt with the shooting of Jews.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: I am now coming to the discussion of the Prosecution documents which the Prosecution has introduced so far. I would like to ask this Tribunal and the Prosecution to have the following volumes at hand, Volume I, Volume II-A, II-C and III-C, because I Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.shall only discuss documents from these volumes.
THE PRESIDENT: Those documentsbooks will undoubtedly be available on Monday when we will reconvene at nine-thirty O'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 October 1947, at 0930 hours.)
THE MATSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II-A.
Military Tribunal II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
DR. MANDRY: (For Defendant Sandberger): Your Honors, my client has been ill for several days and for that reason I could not work on the questionnaire. I ask that my client be excused from attending today and tomorrow, and I would be very grateful if he would be released immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is your client?
DR. MANDRY: Sandberger.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Sandberger will be excused from attendance in Court today and tomorrow, in accordance with Dr. Mandry's request.
DR. MANDRY: Your Honor, may he be taken down immediately to room 55?
THE PRESIDENT: He is in Room 55 now?
DR. MANDRY. No, he is still here. He wants to be taken to Room 55.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Marshal will have the defendant Sandberger escorted to Room 55 so that he may confer with his attorney.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, may I continue with the direct examination?
THE PRESIDENT: You may. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. Witness, on Saturday when we concluded the session we intended to look at the document books. I now ask you to make general statements, briefly, on the documents.
A. Yes. From the very beginning I want to express very clearly that my leaders and myself do not want to be identified with the manner in which the reports were made, because it was disgusting. The wording in the reports is not the same wording as it was in the original reports. The contents surely only contain part of the original reports. The contents and the way it is written are the result of not in every respect very pure imagination of the staff leader of Einsatzgruppe D. Sturmbennfuehrer Hoffmann. Hoffmann was a defficiency character. He was as uncontrolled by ambitious; as he was dishonest. Everybody was afraid of him because his intrigues. This is not only my opinion of today; this opinion I told him to his face, and described it to Dr. Rasch in a report of several pages. This was even my only personal report during the Russian campaign. How Hoffmann got his statement and figures. I can't imagine at all. Surely, in order to shine he took everything down in favor of the Einsatzgruppen and what the Commandos in other offices did according to their duty. For example, the measures of the Commandos Jeckeln, and also the measures of the commandos of the army, the Wehrmacht. His devilish report about the resettlement measures in Kiev alone is a proof of his character. Hoffmann was released and relieved of the Security Police and at that time I told him myself that he was dismissed. If, in spite of his untrue statement the documents prove that my previous statements are at least basically correct, I can only be grateful.
Q. About the occurrences in Lemberg which have already been mentioned, do you want to say anything in addition to that?
A. Yes. I believe that it is not necessary to state anything more about it because it will not express anything further than what I have already said. May I add that the events in Lemberg at the time were shown to the foreign press, and to foreign representatives also. allowed to make three corrections.
Q. Witness, which document are concerned here?
A. It is my affidavit in Volume 1, Exhibit 26, Document No. 3644, on page 132 of the German text. Here it reads, in the first sentence, in the German text in the third line from the top, "according to which guilty persons and those suspected were to be shot as reprisals"; hut I stated in the record; "According to which the guilty persons and the participants were to be shot as reprisals." This mistake I did not notice because "suspected persons" were mentioned previously in connection with arrests. I can submit also the original from which I dictated - and which I put at Herr Wartenberg is temporarily disposal. In this connection may I mention that the statements which I gave here I have previously given to Herr Wartenger in the same manner. Please, make corrections. In the last sentence of this paragraph it reads; "It saw Dr. Rasch on the place of execution." That is right. But in this connection it gives the impression that this happened during the executions carried out by Einsatzkommando 6. That is not so. I saw him when Einsatzkommando 5 carried out the first execution. I told Mr. Wartenberg about this at the time but as the text had already been written he told me that I could clarify this during my examination, which I would like to have done by this now.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Durchholz, the witness has stated that he has the original. What does he mean by that?
DR. MANDRY: At the time he had made the statements at Herr Wartenberg's request himself, and gave them to him, and the affidavit was then made up out of those statements. The witness still has the original which he gave to Herr Wartenberg at the time, and this was shortened and excerpts taken out.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the original in his own writing?
DR. MANDRY: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: How did this get back to him once he gave it to Wartenberg?
WITNESS: Herr Wartenberg gave it back to me personally; or one of the gentlemen of the prosecution gave it back to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do I understand that this so-called original which you possess differs in some essential point from the affidavit which you signed, and which is now an exhibit?
WITNESS: No, your Honor. That is not what I tried to tell you. It was merely that the wording is incorrect. The actual statement is absolutely correct; only the connection might give the wrong impression here. That is all I wanted to clarify.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. If even the connection is such that an improper inference may be drawn from the affidavit and you regard this as of some importance, why wasn't Mr. Wartenberg questioned on this when he was here in Court?
WITNESS: Your Honor, these mistakes I informed my defense counsel about when I saw the document immeidately; and Herr Durchholz at the time when it was submitted also objected to it. And you, your Honor, granted to Herr Durchholz that this correction be carried out when I was examined here.
THE PRESIDENT: That is entirely correct. But I am now wondering why Dr. Durchholz didn't question Mr. Wartenberg on this feature.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, I did not consider this clarification. so important as to question Herr Wartenberg here. I believe it sufficient to merely ask the witness to clarify it. The facts, actually, are correct. Only they appear to have been taken out of the connection and are not very clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Proceed. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. On page 6 of the same document it says, under number 7, "About the 6th or 7th day after the executions..." - but actually it should read: "About the 6th or 7th day after my arrival in Lemberg." This is shown, and is obvious, from the way I described things previously because on the 6th or 7th day after the executions I was already in Dubus. This is merely a correction as to the date.
Q. Does that finish Lemberg?
A. Yes.
Q. While advancing, you stayed, in Dubno for about six days. What happened there?
A. I think here I can make a brief statement, too. I have already described the events in Dubno, and surviving witnesses were examined on the events. The entire events were handed over to a dective Commissar in the General Go vernment who was competent on this, because as previously Polish territory it was to belong again to the area of the General Go vernment. I think I do not state anything incorrect if I repeat that in Dubno no executions were carried out by Einsatzkommando 5. In Dubno I had to give part of my detachment to Kreminig. According to my opinion the AOK-6 had requested them to go there. At first I thought that this would happen only at Shepitowka, but now I recollect it having been already at Dubno. The two other detachments alternated took over patrol and guard duties and the one off duty had to look after the supplies for the providing as well as for the preparing of food, because the detachments were independent and looked after this themselves. Also vehicles and equipment had to be maintained.
Q. From Dubno you moved to Shepitovka, did you not? Anything special to be said about this?
A. Shepitovka was surrounded by very dense and thick woods for many kilometers, and in these woods troops were hidden who were well armed, and constantly attacked small units, so that even during the day the streets could only be passed in convoy. During the night they were closed to traffic. My two part detachments - the third was still being absent - were performing patrol and guard duties day and night. Inquiries were made also; an Intelligence Section was set up, If I remember correctly, while staying in Shepitovka two people who were caught because they proved to be partisans were shot. The detachment in Kreminev also, as far as I remember, at the order of the Army Command had reported two or three shootings.
As far as I remember these were persons who had made armed attacks on individual vehicles of the Wehrmacht, where a driver was killed.
Q. On 25 July, approximately, you arrived in Berditschew, and there you stayed until you left for Berlin on the 24th of August - approximately?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you want to state anything about that?
A. Here, systematical security work was started. May I refer to the report I have given already? My detachments -- the third one had returned in the meantime -- I set up in such a manner that the one dealt with the city area itself, the second detachment looked after the surroundings of Berditschew, and the third one I kept for special tasks because at that time the harvest had to be brought in the various small cities had to be given Mayors and the collective farms their managers and this had become very important because these areas -that is, the small cities and the collective farms -- did not have any leaders.
Q. Did you hear anything about executions during that time?
A. Yes, All the time while I stayed in Berditschew, as far as I remember only two major cases of executions occurred. One was in Berditschew where, at the order of the Wehrmacht, on the citadel such persons were shot who during the fighting for Berditschew had been caught as armed partisans, and had been put to prison at the citadel by the Army. The other case was at Schmelnik, where a real terror group had appeared, who, apart from other criminal deeds, had murdered 25 Ukrainians who had cooperated with the local German commander.
Q. Let us now skip over to the individual documents. In Volume 3-C, Exhibit No. 130 of the Prosecution, Document NO-3841, that is on page 98 of the German text, - it is your affidavit in O berursel of 20 December 1945, and there it says under figure 1, at the top, second sentence, I quote: "After the end of 1931 until 1934 I was Referent to the Political Department of the Police in Bremen."